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Abstract 
In its early stages of development, the petrochemical industry was characterised as being 
an innovative and R&D intensive industry, enjoying expanding markets and rapid growth, 
with high profits. By the 1970's the industry was already showing signs of maturity, with 
an increase in the number of players and slowing growth. Technology was becoming 
standardised, and the need to exploit economies of scale for new plants was the order 
of the day. This process continued in the 1980's and 1990's; rapid growth gave way 
to cyclical demand and the emergence of significant overcapacity. Industry profitability 
had become an issue. Concern about overcapacity and uncertainty about future demand 
precipitated a process of restructuring of the industry with changing roles for major 
players, merger activity, and consolidation. 
This thesis explores the relationship between overcapacity and the investment be-
haviour of firms, and the role of demand uncertainty. A dynamic capacity expansion 
model of the linear quadratic type is developed and formulated in a game theoretic 
framework for rival firms serving a single market, and producing a homogenous prod-
uct. Price is endogenised as an inverse demand function, making the actions of the firms 
interdependent and capturing the interaction between them. The model allows for ad-
justment costs; in the empirical simulations economies of scale and learning effects are 
also accounted for. 
Initially formulated for a duopoly, the model is then extended to deal with an 
oligopoly. It is applied to the US styrene industry which serves as a proxy for the 
petrochemical industry. The industry is examined over a period of 23 years. Optimal 
control theory and dynamic programming techniques, are used to obtain optimal solu-
tions, under different investment strategies, for investment and output rates of rival firms. 
The model performs well in explaining the evolution of industry capacity, production and 
prices, and most of the overcapacity over the study period. 
The investment behaviour of the major styrene producers is best described by a feed-
back Nash-Cournot strategy, indicating that overcapacity can be attributed to strate-
gic considerations. An examination of market developments also reveals that major US 
styrene producers invested strategically. Building larger plants to benefit from economies 
of scale, and increased integration of production operations contributed to raising entry 
barriers and the low levels of entry into the styrene industry. 
While uncertainty causes firms to increase their investment rate in this model, the 
simulation results show that industry overcapacity could not have been caused solely by 
concern about demand uncertainty. 
To the constellation of stars that shines every night over the dark skies, in its 
eternal journey south by southeast, over mount Hermon. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overcapacity and the Investment Decision 
Capacity expansion modelling, which is the main concern of this thesis, has grown in 
significance to occupy a small but expanding segment of the industrial organisation liter-
ature since the early pioneering contributions of Chenery (1952), Manne (1961), Lucas, 
Jr. (1967), Arrow (1968), and Nickell (1978). Driven by advances in oligopoly theory, op-
timal control, and the explosive rise in computing power and memory of new computers, 
more recent contributions cover dynamic and sophisticated models applied to empirical 
work in areas such as electric power generation, water and natural gas networks, petro-
chemicals, and newsprint. It was these same large scale industries which in the first 
place raised the interest of the pioneering works; due to the importance of economies of 
scale and the inherent association with overcapacity, or the economic penalties involved 
in accumulating backlogs of unsatisfied demand in these industries. The high cost of 
investments involved made it imperative for early modelers and planners to strive to find 
optimal capacity investment rates especially when firms were facing uncertain demand 
growth and economies of scale. These issues continue to be the concern and subject of 
research to the present day. Building on advances in oligopoly theory the models have 
become more developed and the techniques sophisticated, and a wider coverage of topics 
and industries has become possible for empirical work as data sourced from industry be-
came available. But some of the old arguments about interpretation of the data continue 
10 
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to the present day. 
Overcapacity in industry has been dealt with extensively in the economic and par-
ticularly the industrial organisation literature. While it is accepted in the main stream 
of the literature that overcapacity is a result of oligopolistic markets, where large scale 
industries operate, there are different explanations for its causes, which include mainly: 
concentration of producers, protection of market share against rival firms and entry de-
terrence by incumbents against potential entrants. 
Another explanation which is explored to a lesser extent in the literature is the lumpi-
ness of plants resulting from economies of scale, combined with uncertainty about demand 
growth patterns. Also the decision regarding the timing and size of capacity by differ-
ent firms contribute to overcapacity when ill timing, or poor planning is involved. Also 
uncertainty about future demand and the allowance that firms build in their planned 
capacity is often cited. 
In petrochemicals, the topic of this research, investments are huge and sunk. As in 
all large scale industries exercising an investment decision is a complex process. Decision 
makers have to contend with different types of uncertainty when evaluating their new 
investments; which introduces an element of risk into the decision making process. These 
include, uncertainty about the growth of demand for the output products, or about their 
prices, or the prices of their raw materials. There is also uncertainty about the cost of 
investment required for the project, or uncertainty about the volatility of exchange, or 
interest rates. In this research project, however, we will be concerned with uncertainty 
about future demand, since it is demand variation which has the largest element of risk 
for producers of commodity petrochemicals. 
Other aspects of the decision process, which petrochemical producers have to contend 
with, include the timing of new investments or projects to coincide with favourable market 
conditions. And choosing its capacity so as to capture the benefits of economies of scale, 
whilst achieving sufficiently high utilisation rates to hold market share, and meet demand 
expectations which are uncertain. 
Finding an optimal path for the investment decision or capacity expansion problem, 
therefore, requires careful planning, and an understanding of industry dynamics, if the 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 	 12 
objectives of maximizing profits, and strategic consideration such as maintaining market 
share are to be achieved, especially under conditions of uncertainty. 
The situation is complicated further if possible actions, or strategies of rival firms 
are also to be taken into account, To capture these characteristics and find an optimal 
solution to the investment problem, which explains the presence of overcapacity in the 
industry, we propose developing a dynamic model of oligopoly for capacity expansion of 
the game theoretic type. The model, its structure, and how we propose to address the 
question of optimal investment and overcapacity are outlined in Sections 1.3 and 1.4 
In what follows a brief review of the petrochemical industry is given; then a succinct 
literature coverage of entry deterrence, dynamic game theoretic models, and investment 
models of the option pricing type relevant to our proposed project is presented. Some of 
their attributes and short comings are also indicated. 
1.1.1 Petrochemicals: A Mature and Oligopolistic Industry 
The petrochemical industry is characterised by its oligopolistic structure and practices 
of its major players; partly due to the history of its development, its integrated nature, 
and the high degree of know how required in its operations. Also the huge investments 
involved reduce the number of potential participants in this industry. 
Over the last 40 years the petrochemical industry has undergone dramatic changes 
transforming it from an R&D intensive, highly profitable and rapidly growing, to a tech-
nologically mature and sluggish industry, frequently hit by cyclical trends and low profit 
margins, especially in Western Europe, where overcapacity appears to be an endemic 
problem. 
With the maturity of the petrochemical industry, both in terms of its technology and 
its markets, overcapacity has become one of its endemic features, which during periods 
of weak demand, burdens the industry, and causes substantial losses. 
Two independent driving forces were shaping the industry: Technological maturity 
exemplified by the standardisation of process technology available from a large number 
of engineering companies; and a change in the production cost structure resulting from 
higher raw materials prices following the oil price rises of the 1970's, and from increased 
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benefits of economies of scale of much larger plants that were coming on stream. 
Freeman (1982a) and Pavitt (1982) provide the evidence for the technological ma-
turity of the industry through a number of studies they conducted. Using patents they 
evaluate the role of R & D and innovations in changing the structure of the industry, and 
its interactions with its markets. Studies of US and European industries reveal that high 
concentration industries such as synthetic fibres, synthetic rubbers, and organic chemi-
cals derivatives was caused by vigorous innovation combined with patent and know-how 
barriers to imitation. Geroski (1990) found that there was a strong tendency for concen-
tration to fall during the 1970's. He also found that higher concentration had a negative 
influence on innovation; and greater monopoly power leads to larger time-lagged profit 
margins. Spitz (1988), Chapman (1991), and Arora, Landau & Rosenberg (1998) survey 
the historical development and growth of the global petrochemical industry, as the major 
companies introduced new products and processes. 
What followed as a result of these forces, was a process of restructuring within the 
industry involving the main producers: the chemical majors and the rising chemical arms 
of major oil companies. This process affected product lines and market share. There was 
also the emergence of the new corners to the industry, notably in oil producing and 
the newly industrialised countries. The process of restructuring does not seem to have 
resolved the problem of overcapacity, which bedevilled the industry during the early 
eighties. The industry continues to complain about overcapacity and the adverse impact 
on profitability . 
But what are the main causes of this overcapacity? Is it a natural result of the 
oligopolistic structure of the industry, or more a consequence of the maturity of the 
markets, increased uncertainty about the economy, and poor planning on the part of 
the main petrochemical producers? It is important to understand this phenomenon of 
overcapacity, for the industry has been blaming the high cost of this overcapacity for 
years for its bad performance and low profitability margins, which could put at risk the 
future growth of this important industry. 
The technological maturity of the industry meant that the process technology was 
more easily accessible to potential entrants to the market. The industry has arrived 
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at what Freeman (1982a) describes as swarming stage where the industry attracts large 
numbers of newcomers. Stobaugh (1976) by studying investments in nine products shows 
that this process has been taking place on a global scale. He also emphasizes the role of 
chemical majors in globalising the industry through joint ventures. 
Fayad & Motamen (1986) point out that in petrochemicals the swarmers were mainly 
the global entrants in the oil producing countries of the Middle East, Canada, Mexico, 
and the newly industrialised countries such as Brazil and South Korea. 
They also observe that the integrated nature of production operations of large volume 
petrochemical products, and the higher investment requirements for the new vintage of 
large size plants to capture economies of scale, reduced the number of entrants, and 
viable competitors which can operate in the industrial markets of Western Europe, the 
US and Japan to a small number of large and powerful producers. They conclude that 
despite its technological maturity the structure of the petrochemicals industry remained 
oligopolistic in nature. 
Since the early 1980's, the petrochemical industry appears to have been trapped in 
a cyclical pattern of rapid investments, overcapacity, followed by low profit margins and 
a process of capacity rationalisation through mergers and product line shedding. Sutton 
(1991, 1998) analyses this process by studying the development of market structure for 
several industries. He provides a general theoretical framework to explain the evolution 
of industrial markets. 
This thesis will investigate the investment behaviour of firms in oligopolistic markets, 
in the light of recent developments in oligopoly theory; and will address the question 
of overcapacity in the US petrochemical industry by studying styrene, a commodity 
petrochemical product over a period which extends from 1974-1996. 
1.1.2 Oligopoly Theory and the Problem of Overcapacity 
The question of overcapacity in oligopolistic markets goes back a long way. Wallace 
(1937) considers that oligopolistic rivalry can lead to a rapid rate of investment when 
one or more firms see an opportunity to gain advantage over rival firms, which leads to 
overcapacity. 
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There are two major strands for the causes of overcapacity in the literature: 1) The 
oligopolistic structure of the industry under demand uncertainty together with the lumpi-
ness of projects; and 2) strategic considerations by the incumbents to deter entry or 
mobility. Empirical work in this area, however, appears to provide inconclusive evidence 
as to the causes of overcapacity. 
Esposito & Esposito (1974) by studying a large sample of three digit industries found 
that there was a significant relationship between excess capacity and the concentration 
ratio of producers. They conclude that loose oligopolies exhibited greater excess capacity 
than tight oligopolies. 
Scherer & Ross (1990) makes two important observations on oligopolistic markets: 1) 
that they are prone to chronic excess capacity; and 2) that the structure of these markets 
contribute to cyclical instability in capital investments. He provides examples from the 
US petrochemical industry (plastics and synthetic fibres) as well as the aluminium and 
fertilizers industries. 
The reasoning for this behaviour, explains Scherer, is as follows: in periods of rapidly 
growing demand oligopolistic firms will invest heavily in additional capacity collectively 
for fear of losing market share to their rivals; and this takes place at a rate exceeding 
demand growth. As a result when excess capacity starts to disrupt pricing disciplines, 
new investments must be cut back abruptly. 
This view, however, that oligopolistic markets naturally result in overcapacity is by no 
means universal. Richardson (1960) attributes overcapacity even in competitive markets 
to a failure on the part of firms to respond correctly to market conditions. 
The works of Lieberman (1987a, 1987b, 1987c), and Gilbert & Lieberman (1987) 
on the US chemical industry, and those of Paraskevopoulos (1988) and Paraskevopoulos, 
Karakitsos & Rustem (1991) on its Western European counterpart support the first view, 
and find little evidence of entry deterrence behaviour by incumbent firms. While Reynolds 
(1983, 1986) by studying the US aluminium industry finds contradictory evidence, where 
excess capacity results from strategic considerations of incumbent firms. Steele (1995) 
in an empirical study of North American newsprint industry also finds that most firms 
invested strategically to influence the behaviour of their opponents. 
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Two observations on the Lieberman (1987a, 1987c, 1989) and Gilbert & Lieberman 
(1987) works are worth noting. Firstly, the data series analysed covers a period of thirty 
years, it ends in 1982, which just covers the beginning of the period when the industry 
was facing excessive overcapacity as a result of the recession, increasing maturity of the 
markets, and mounting uncertainty about demand growth patterns. 
Secondly, a large number of products are studied as one lump. It is more likely that 
firms would behave differently in product lines where they realise that they have a large 
share of the market, or possess a technological advantage, than they would in others 
where the market is more competitive. As such these firms would be more selective 
about where, and in which products strategic investment would be used effectively. 
1.1.2.1 Uncertainty 
Evaluating investment decisions under conditions of uncertainty is a complex process. 
Since the end of the era of macroeconomic stability and continued growth of the 1950's 
and 1960's, planners in the petrochemical industry had to contend with different forms 
of uncertainty when making decisions about new investments. 
In the mid 1970's uncertainty arose about the security of feedstock supplies and its 
cost following the oil price rises. In the 1980's and 1990's, it was mainly uncertainty 
about demand growth patterns and the volatility of interest and exchange rates. 
With modern and large scale petrochemical plants where investments are sunk, and 
costs could run into several hundred million dollars, petrochemical producers have to 
decide on the timing and capacity of their new investments under conditions of uncertain 
future demand, while at the same time taking into consideration the strategic objectives 
of their rivals. To maximise its profits, a petrochemical firm has to find an optimal 
solution to this investment problem. 
But how relevant is uncertainty to the problem of overcapacity and the investment 
decision? While Reynolds does not deal with the question of uncertainty directly, he 
attributes to it the presence of excess capacity unexplained by his model. 
Paraskevopoulos, Karakitsos & Rustem (1991), on the other hand, introduce the 
element of uncertainty into their model, but deal with the industry aggregate, ignoring 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 	 17 
the interaction between rival firms in the market. 
Bell & Campa (1997) study the influence of volatilities on irreversible investments in 
the chemical processing industry. They find that the effect of input prices, and product 
demand volatility on investment in capacity to be less significant than exchange rate 
volatility, especially in Western Europe where a significant share of the output is exported. 
Exchange rate volatility is found to have a strong negative influence on investment by 
chemical producers. 
It is worth noting that their model instead of considering the scale of investment in ca-
pacity, assumes new capacity as any incremental change above 5% of the smallest national 
capacity for a product; although they differentiate between incremental and greenfield 
expansions, effectively it is the number of capacity changes that is being modelled, rather 
than the size of production capacity in place. 
1.1.2.2 Entry Deterrence 
In another strand of the literature, excess capacity is held for strategic reasons by existing 
firms to deter entry. A large body of empirical contributions in this area supports the 
findings of theoretical models. But there are also ample opposing views. The differences 
on theoretical grounds appeared also early on, as in the contributions of Spence (1977) 
and Dixit (1980). 
Eaton & Lipsey (1981) find that an incumbent firm may have an incentive to hold 
excess capacity in the pre-entry period to deter entry even if entry is not effectively 
blocked. In a bargaining model of capacity choice, Osborne & Pitchik (1987) show that 
collusive firms carry excess capacity to make their threats more damaging, and so that 
they can obtain more favourable agreement. Maskin (1986b) argues that uncertainty 
forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity to deter entry than he would under 
certainty. 
Also Spence (1977) models the behaviour of several firms facing the possible entry by 
a single firm. He argues that existing firms would hold excess capacity for the strategic 
purpose of deterring entry. In this model Spence assumes that firms would resort to full 
capacity production if entry actually occurred. But as Dixit (1980) points out this is not 
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an optimum response. Dixit shows that once entry occurs the incumbent will not carry 
out its threat of utilising excess capacity. Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & Whistler (1991) 
counter by arguing that in industries characterised by modest rates of return, and a high 
degree of uncertainty, the cost of entry deterrence would be prohibitive. 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1983) analyse strategic investments by an early entrant in a new 
market. In this model, by over-investing, the leading firm forces its rival to make its 
subsequent decisions taking the leader's capital stock as given. And the follower firm is 
forever deterred from investing to its steady-state reaction curve. 
The evidence in the literature on the causes of overcapacity in oligopolistic markets 
is by no means conclusive. In fact there are conflicting views on this matter. 
Lieberman (1987c) in an empirical study of the US chemical industry finds rare evi-
dence of incumbents building excess capacity to deter entry. In this study which covers 
thirty eight chemical products, he finds that entrants and incumbents exhibited similar 
investment behaviour. 
In an another empirical study of twenty four chemical products Gilbert & Lieberman 
(1987) show that preemptive investment by large chemical firms has the role of main-
taining market share and leads to lower probability of redundant investment by rivals. 
Rather than leading to an increase in the market share, preemption has the effect of allow-
ing rival firms to coordinate their investments. Paraskevopoulos, Karakitsos & Rustem 
(1991) find that the signalling mechanism, where companies announce planned invest-
ments, contributed to minimising' excessive investment with respect to demand forecasts 
during the early 1980's in the Western European PVC industry. 
Where as Reynolds (1983, 1986), in an empirical study of the US aluminium industry, 
shows evidence of strategic use of overcapacity in this oligopolistic industry. A similar 
behaviour is uncovered by Steele (1995), in an empirical study of another oligopolistic 
industry. His findings show that strategic considerations are prevalent in capacity expan-
sions in the North American newsprint industry over a 38 year period. Major firms are 
unable to deter entry; but instead they utilise mobility deterrence in order to pre-empt 
rivals' expansions. 
Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & Whistler (1991) on the other hand, find that newsprint 
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producing firms in the North American market were tacitly coordinating their capacity 
expansions to share the market.- Their model estimation supports the price mark-up 
mechanism, which they find is a function of operating rate in industry. They also discover 
evidence of price rigidities indicating the existence of a price signalling mechanism to 
induce firms to adjust their prices to changing market conditions. They uncover regional 
variations in investment behaviour as well. Higher prices lead to aggressive expansion 
of capacity in the US where capital stock is homogeneous and new. While in Canada a 
two-tier age structure of capital cost exists, with old vintage capital stock which is retired 
when demand is weak, is mobilised into production during periods of peak demand. 
However, Bernstein (1992) who studies price margins and capital adjustment in the 
Canadian pulp and paper industries, finds that firms adjust their capital stock toward 
long-run equilibrium through successive short-run equilibria. And unlike other studies in 
this industrial sector, he finds that firms behave competitively in the short run as they 
adjust towards a long-run equilibrium. 
Investment rivalry in the pulp and paper industry is dependent on market structure; 
investment rules are studied by Christensen & Caves (1997), instead of just looking 
at investments in projects, they study the factors affecting abandonment of announced 
projects and devise a set of rules for finding out which are destined for completion. They 
find that unexpected announcements of new projects by rivals, promote abandonment 
by announcing firms in less concentrated markets ; while implementation is encouraged 
in more concentrated ones. 
The investment behaviour of manufacturing firms in 15 industrial sectors in the UK is 
analysed by Hay & Liu (1998). Using panel data, they show that in fragmented sectors 
behaviour is non-cooperative; while it is coperativer in dominant group sectors, and 
competitive in dominant group sectors. In fragmented sectors market shares of firms are 
found to have declined over time; for dominant firms, on the other hand, market shares 
are stable, as was the case also for leading firms in a dominant group sector. 
The desired outcome from entry deterrence, merger activity and the heightening of 
investment activity, is an increase in industry concentration, reduced competition and 
eventually higher profit margins. By studying the UK industry, Cowling & Waterson 
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(1976) and Clarke, Davies & Waterson (1984) find that profit margins tend to rise in 
concentrated sectors of industry. While Demsetz (1973) attributes higher concentration 
and improved profit margins in a sample of US industries to firms achieving a strong 
degree of efficiency over their competitors, and gaining advantage as result. Smith (1981) 
also attributes gains of strategic investment, in part, to higher efficiency gains made by 
incumbent firms. 
Besides excess capacity other instruments are available to firms to influence market 
structure. Davies & Geroski (1997) find that advertising and to a lesser extent R&D 
and innovation play a major role in affecting the dynamics of market shares and the 
concentration at the industry level in the UK. The authors employ a model of stochastic 
firm growth in studying the dynamics of industry structure. They also find that while 
considerable turbulence in market shares takes place, the concentration on the industry 
level is fairly stable. 
Another observation made b3'7 Geroski (1991a) in this respect ought to be pointed 
out here though; that studies that involve surveys of industry sectors in general find 
little evidence to support the entry deterrence hypothesis; while case studies of specific 
industries, are more likely to find evidence of strategic use of overcapacity to influence 
markets and opponents' investments. There are exceptions here to the general rule 
as in Sutton (1991). He conducts cross-sectional industry studies on different sectors 
of industries in different countries, and finds strategic investment behaviour in various 
forms, including advertising, innovation, and R&D expenditure. 
In this regard, the works of Singh, Utton & Waterson (1992, 1998), Smiley (1988), 
Bunch & Smiley (1992), and Driver (2000) are relevant. These works cover a wide range 
of mainly small and medium industries where the use of excess capacity may not be 
the main instrument in influencing the behaviour of opponents, and the market. They 
find that a significant proportion of firms (nearly two thirds) report the use of different 
forms of entry deterring strategies including excess capacity, advertising, R&D, patenting 
and pricing policy to deter new entrant and an even higher proportion to influence their 
opponents. 
Specific industry studies on the other hand such as those of Ghemawat (1984), 
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Reynolds (1986), Hall (1990), Rosenbaum & Ye (1992), Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & 
Whistler (1991), Steele (1995), and Mathis & Koscianski (1996) report the use of excess 
capacity and strategic investment to be prevalent in the industries they study. Others 
such as Gilbert & Lieberman (1987), Lieberman (1987a, 1987c), and Paraskevopoulos 
(1988) report more ambiguous findings about the strategic use of investment and excess 
capacity. Where as a study by Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson (1989) on the US chemical 
industry found little incidence of entry despite the consistent healthy growth of the in-
dustry; and where entry occurred it was by large chemical producers from other sectors 
expanding into a new product market. 
We have more to say about entry deterrence, and these developments in the context 
of the petrochemical industry in Sections 5.7.1 and 5.7.2, in Chapter 5. 
1.1.2.3 Game Theory, Firm Interaction, and Uncertainty 
A game theoretic framework allows firms to interact, and to find optimal policies which 
is a suitable framework for our problem of optimal capacity planning. A dynamic formu-
lation also captures the requirement for subjecting the capital stock to new investment 
and depreciation over the specified planning horizon of the game. Where the firms or 
players act as independent economic agents, each trying to maximise its payoff or profits. 
There is a rich literature in game theory that deals with investment and capacity 
planning. The advances made in game theory opened a new horizon for researchers 
in the field of industrial organisation and in particular those dealing with problems in 
oligopoly theory. Although the topic has also received its fair share of criticism as well 
(Sutton 1990). Fudenberg & Tirole (1992) provide a comprehensive review of the game 
theoretic and dynamic models of oligopoly literature. But most of this literature remains 
theoretic in nature, with very few empirical contributions particularly in the area of 
capacity planning. 
In their seminal work, Starr & Ho (1969a, 1969b) construct a capacity expansion 
model for n firms as a state space or differential game. The payoff for each firm is its 
value function which is a function of its investment rate, its capacity and that of its 
rivals, which varies over time. Starr and Ho proved that a unique equilibrium investment 
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strategy that maximizes the payoff for the firms involved can be found for linear quadratic 
games. In their formulation each player takes into consideration the investment strategies 
.of his rivals. 
In one of very few papers that utilize the game theoretic approach in a real case study 
of an industrial sector, Reynolds (1983, 1986) develops a dynamic model of output and 
capital investment choice to explore the influence of strategic interaction among existing 
firms on the incentives for investment. The firms play a Nash-Cournot game, and he tests 
feedback, open-loop and Stackelberg strategies. Reynolds (1987, 1991), using a model 
formulation similar to that developed by Starr & Ho (1969a), also examines the impact 
of variation in adjustment costs on model performance and equilibrium values for rival 
firms. 
Reynolds (1986) utilizes algorithms devised by Kydland (1975, 1977) for computing 
the Nash equilibrium and to simulate the performance of the US aluminium industry. 
He uses the model to test firms' investment behaviour, production and output prices. 
Although demand is taken to be deterministic in this model, Reynolds points out that 
introducing demand uncertainty, may improve its ability to explain the emergence of 
excess capacity in the American aluminium industry. 
In a related work, Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) develop a two stage model where 
companies compete on capacity in the long term, and on price in the short term. In their 
model the firms produce a homogeneous product, and the effects of one firm's output on 
its rivals profit are analyzed. They show that this type of competition is akin to a Nash-
Cournot competition, and equilibrium can be achieved. However, this model assumes 
that there is no depreciation. 
Ba§ar & Olsder (1999) provide a wide ranging treatment and formulate the theoretical 
framework for solving discrete and differential games of n persons of the noncooperative 
type. They also deal with situations that involve conditions of uncertainty. 
Toivanen & Waterson (2000) provide an illustration of applying a game theoretic 
model of entry to the fast food industry in the UK. They deal with the problems of 
identification and implementation in applying such models to an empirical case, which 
involves the hamburger market as a duopoly between McDonalds and Burger King over 
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a five year period. 
On the other hand, a new branch in the area of evaluating capital investments under 
conditions of uncertainty has grown out of the option pricing literature. Pindyck (1991) 
and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) provide an extensive survey of this literature. 
Applications to irreversible capital investments by firms are mostly theoretical and 
include several contributions by Majd & Pindyck (1987), Pindyck (1988), Dixit (1992), 
Abel, Dixit, Eberly & Pindyck (1996), Lund & Oksendal (1991), Kulatilaka & Perotti 
(1992, 1998). Problems that involve real life investments include Brenan & Schwartz 
(1985) and Slade (2001). There is also a wider coverage in the area of real options. 
In this literature capital is evaluated as irreversible investments under conditions of 
uncertainty. Which could result from demand, product prices, capital investment cost, 
or interest rate fluctuations. These variables are modelled as Weiner processes, there by 
introducing the element of uncertainty into the investment problem. 
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) show several examples of how this type of timing problem can 
be solved. While Brenan & Schwartz (1985) evaluate the value of a copper mine, when it 
is open or shut as the price of copper fluctuates. Lund & Oksendal (1991) also includes 
examples on evaluating investments in natural resources projects such as oil fields. 
A common feature of these contributions is that they all deal with a single firm 
interacting with an exogenous environment. Bertola & Caballero (1991), however, ex-
tend their treatment of solving the optimal investment problem for the firm, under the 
combined effect of uncertain business environment and capital costs, to characterise the 
aggregate investment behaviour of a large number of firms. But this does not cover the 
strategic interaction of these firms. 
Kulatilaka & Perotti (1992, 1998) undertake this task by examining the optimal 
timing problem under uncertainty for two firms in a model of Cournot competition, and 
find that increased volatility favours early investment, an outcome which is in contrast 
to the results of main stream option theory literature. 
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1.2 The Research Project Objectives 
The purpose of the research project and the model we propose to develop, is to examine 
persistent overcapacity in the petrochemical industry. In fact we want to find out whether 
capital investment and overcapacity are being used for strategic purposes by the main 
industry players. Whether investment or overcapacity is being used strategically is not 
only measured by the success, or otherwise, of deterring new entrants. Rather, the 
analysis needs to find out how firms are interacting in the investment and production 
game. Is investment being used to deter mobility of other firms, dissuade new entrants, 
or compel them to enter at lower capacity level? And how is the market environment, 
in terms of concentration and the level of competition, changing? These are the kind of 
questions that need to be answered. 
A model of capacity expansion will be developed in this thesis to study intertemporal 
developments that take place in an oligopolistic industry. In our model, we intend to 
test the investment behaviour of firms, and its interaction with industry dynamics, to 
determine whether capital accumulation, output, and capacity utilisation in the petro-
chemical industry can be explained or predicted by a dynamic, game theoretic model of 
the non-cooperative Nash-Cournot type. And to find an appropriate equilibrium concept 
for the analysis. 
Initially, the model will be constructed for two firms producing a homogeneous prod-
uct, but will be extended to test the performance of the largest petrochemical producers 
that dominate the US market. Demand uncertainty will also be introduced into the 
model to determine if it provides a plausible alternative explanation for the excess ca-
pacity problem in the petrochemical industry. 
It is hoped that this research will further our understanding of firm interaction and 
investment behaviour and its impact on market structure in oligopolistic industries pro-
ducing a homogeneous product. 
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1.3 	Methodological Aspects and Outline of Thesis 
In this thesis I explore the suitability of dynamic capacity expansion models for studying 
capacity expansion by firms in a growing industry, and the development of its market 
structure. I examine how well these developments can be captured by these models; and 
if well behaved and properly specified, may be they can be developed so that they could 
be usefully employed by industry in capacity planning implementation. 
Empirical testing for strategic investment is difficult to accomplish directly, unless 
one relies on issuing questionnaires to corporate planning management on the main cri-
teria that determine and drive their strategic planning, as in the studies of Smiley (1988), 
Bunch & Smiley (1992), and Singh, Utton & Waterson (1991,1998). Since it is usually 
difficult to ascertain whether an investment is carried out for strategic purposes to in-
fluence the actions of opponents, like in situations where firms invest in excess capacity 
to deter entry or expansion by rival firms, many econometric studies rely on indirect 
testing, by modelling the correlation of the incidence of entry, or lack of it, and capacity 
addition over time, together with other relevant economic measures. This is the approach 
used in Gilbert & Lieberman (1987), Lieberman (1987a, 1987c), and Ghemawat & Caves 
(1986). Or in the form of announcements for investment in new capacity and the degree 
of abandonment or success rate in adding new capacity from the initial announcement 
list, by rivals as employed by Christensen & Caves (1997) in their study of the pulp 
and newsprint industry, and by Henderson & Cool (2003) in their study of the world 
petrochemical industry. 
Strategic investment behaviour can also be modelled in the form of conjectures that 
the firms hold about the reaction of their rivals to their actions. The model can then 
be evaluated econometrically, as in Hall (1990), who investigates Du Pont's capacity 
expansions in the titanium dioxide industry in a two stage game; or as in Steele (1995) 
who evaluates a dynamic capacity expansion model for the newsprint industry in North 
America relying on an Euler equation. Using industry data he then estimates the model 
coefficients econometrically. 
Also Rosenbaum & Ye (1992) study the investment behaviour of Du Pont in the 
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titanium dioxide industry, by examining the timing and scale of its capacity additions. 
They test for strategic investment by Du Pont to preempt capacity expansions by rivals, 
by the deviation of its investments from the cost minimising optimal path. The industry 
is reduced into a duopoly, where Du Pont is the preemptor and the rivals act as the 
opponent. 
A similar approach is employed by Reynolds (1986) in studying the US aluminium 
industry, and the investment behaviour of Alcoa (the Aluminium Company of America). 
Using a quantity game theoretic model, the capacity expansion of each firm is modelled 
explicitly in a dynamic setting. Strategic investment is envisaged by the use of Stack-
elberg, open-loop or feedback Nash-Cournot investment strategies; and strategic excess 
capacity is measured as the divergence between optimal capacity generated by the model, 
and the actual amount of excess capacity held by industry. 
Game theoretic models allow:the interaction between firms to be captured directly; 
and the strategies employed by rival firms to be modelled explicitly. Outputs and invest-
ment rates are modelled as control variables that can be selected optimally by competing 
firms. In a dynamic context, the total output of industry, the price formation, and the 
evolution of market shares, result explicitly from the intertemporal decisions of the firms 
that makeup the industry. By examining the different scenarios of possible strategic 
interaction that can take place between the economic agents, the competitive nature of 
industrial markets can be studied, and it would be possible to infer from the resulting 
simulations the economic relationships taking place, and market characteristics of the 
industry and its products. 
Open-loop Nash-Cournot, feedback Nash-Cournot, Stackelberg, and price taking sce-
narios can be studied independently. Strategic behaviour can be modelled in terms of the 
type of model adopted; in these models the impact of a rise in the number of firms in the 
market on total industry output and price may also be examined. These developments 
cannot be modelled explicitly in this way by cross-section or time series models. Complex 
interactions between variables of market structure and capital commitment may not be 
detectable by a general model of a cross-section of industries; nor can such a model be 
able to filter out the noise of historical accident. Such details may be resolved by detailed 
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empirical studies of individual markets or industries (Ghemawat & Caves 1986, p. 108). 
This approach is followed in this thesis. A game theoretic model of capacity expansion 
is developed where the firms are modelled explicitly, to capture the interaction between 
them directly. Each firm (player) maximises a payoff or objective function which is the 
firm's discounted flow of profits over the duration of the game. Because we are interested 
in studying industry developments, a dynamic formulation is employed, where demand 
and capacity evolve over time. Firms' capacities, therefore, are subject to change as a 
result of additional investment and depreciation. 
However, initially static models are studied in Chapter 2, showing the different model 
formulations and the implication for interacting firms. In each case the corresponding 
solution concept is discussed, with an illustration of the resulting market shares for 
the firms concerned. These concepts are developed further in Chapter 3 for a dynamic 
continuous time setting. A noncooperative Nash-Cournot game is played between the 
firms; where two types of Nash-Cournot strategies are examined: the open-loop, and 
the feedback strategies. Adjustment costs are introduced and justification for their use 
is discussed; and the model formulation is extended from duopoly to an oligopoly of n 
firms. Using optimal control theory techniques, the main focus of this chapter is two 
fold: (a) to determine the optimal investment strategy for the two firms, and establish 
the uniqueness of the solution; and (b) to examine the behaviour of the model and its 
performance. This is done assuming that firms operate at full capacity. As a result each 
firm controls one instrument or control variable, which is its investment rate. In this case 
production is equivalent to capaCity in place. The model simulation results presented, 
are for a duopoly. 
In Chapter 4, the assumption that firms operate at full capacity is relaxed, and pro-
duction costs that were assumed to be negligible in Chapter 3 are added to the model. 
Each firm's profit maximisation problem is subject to two decision variables the invest-
ment and the production rate in every period. Four investment strategy/model concepts 
are introduced in this chapter: open-loop Nash-Cournot, feedback Nash-Cournot, Stack-
elberg, and competitive price taking strategies. Using algorithms developed by Kydland 
(1975, 1977), the model is formulated as a linear quadratic problem in each case. The 
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performance of the model is examined, as before, under different adjustment cost pa-
rameters; and the impact of different production costs, adjustment costs, and investment 
strategies used, on capacity utilisation and market shares is shown. Also, as the number 
of firms operating in the market increases, it can be illustrated how the model perfor-
mance shifts to show a more competitive outcome in terms of product prices, profits, and 
market shares. 
The model formulations and solution concepts considered in Chapter 4 are put to 
test in Chapter 5, in an application to a case study of the US petrochemical industry, 
namely the investment behaviour of styrene industry. The industry characteristics, and 
the development of market structure are studied first within a brief historical context, 
paying particular attention to the investments made by, and the changing roles of the 
main producers. For evaluating the model and determining the optimal investment and 
production rates of styrene producers, empirically based investment and production cost 
functions are estimated, taking into consideration learning effects, and economies of scale 
achieved in the styrene industry during the period under study. The model simulations, 
under different investment strategies, are used to explain the incidence of overcapacity; 
and the presence of certain forms of entry barriers in the styrene industry is also discussed. 
In Chapter 6 attention turns to the role of demand uncertainty in affecting capacity 
accumulation. Using a geometric Brownian motion process to drive the demand, the 
model is reformulated and solved to see how well demand uncertainty accounts for indus-
try overcapacity. Chapter 7 summarises the main findings and conclusions of the thesis, 
drawing attention to the limitations and possible extensions of this work. Also presented 
are some suggestions for future research and for empirical work, in this interesting and 
promising segment of the industrial organisation literature. 
1.4 Model Type, Scope, and Contribution 
The model employed in this research project is a dynamic model of capacity expansion 
of the non-cooperative Nash-Cournot type. It will be built as a linear quadratic game 
with a finite horizon, in the range of thirty years for the parametric simulations. It 
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will be formulated as a linear quadratic dynamic game in discrete, or continuous time. 
The model will be similar in spirit to that used by Reynolds (1986) for the aluminium 
industry; and where capacity expansion is subject to investment and depreciation. 
I propose to extend this approach to the treatment to the US petrochemical industry, 
by allowing for uncertainty about demand in the model formulation to examine how well 
uncertainty explains the presence of overcapacity in industry. As far as I am aware no 
empirical work has been published to date using the present formulation which takes into 
consideration firm rival interaction in the context of a game theoretic framework. 
I will also introduce the following modifications into the model by allowing for economies 
of scale, and learning effects to be taken into account when evaluating production costs, 
with different firms having different production costs. Adjustment costs in the produc-
tion cost function allow for penalties on redundant capacity to be measured directly. This 
is slightly different from the treatment of Reynolds (1986) where production adjustment 
cost is treated as a quadratic function evaluated by a Taylor expansion. 
The role overcapacity in an entry game of a duopoly is examined in Chapter 2. This 
is a single shot or a two stage game where the cost of redundant capacity is taken into 
account to examine using different examples how it impacts on the game outcome under 
Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg strategies. This is a point which is commonly overlooked 
in this segment of the literature. 
The model structure and how it works is explained in Chapters 2 and 3. A discrete 
version based on two algorithms by Kydland (1975, 1977) is presented in Chapter 4. 
Below some of its other features are briefly presented. 
In this model firms choose their outputs and investments (capacities) to maximise 
the value of their profits for that period. And for the dynamic case over the remaining 
period of the game. Both investment and output are the decision or control variables in 
this game. Output will be constrained by the capacity in place; and capacity utilisation 
rate takes the strain of fluctuating demand. 
Benefits of economies of scale, or of more efficient processes will be incorporated in the 
model. So companies operating larger plants have a cost advantage when production is 
close to design capacity. And depending on plant capacities and the process technologies 
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employed, costs of production will vary across firms. 
Price in the model is endogencsed as an inverse demand function, where total demand 
is considered to be linear in price and a stochastic variable. All firms face the same 
depreciation rate, and discount rate of profits, which are exogenous. Also the capital 
stock market is assumed competitive, so firms face the same unit capital acquisition cost 
for plants of the same capacity and employing same technology. 
When uncertainty is introduced into the model the overall demand facing the industry 
is considered to be known in the current stage but its future is uncertain and is driven 
by a stochastic process. So when companies plan for their capacity expansions, they are 
uncertain about future demand but they all hold the same expectations about how it 
evolves over time. 
Different strategies will be considered in the thesis. In the case of feedback strategies 
each firm chooses its output and investment as a function of the capital stock held by 
other firms, there by accounting for the subsequent decisions taken by its rivals as a 
result of its own actions. Other variations such as Stackelberg leadership, or open-loop 
equilibrium will also be addressed. 
Chapter 2 
Competition and Entry 
Dynamics: Duopoly in a Game 
Theoretic Framework 
2.1 	Introduction: Model Formulation and Roles of Play 
This chapter deals with a duopoly where the role of entry, and the impact of the nature 
of competition between the players on the market is studied. In particular strategic 
investment in capacity in an entry game between an incumbent firm and an entrant is 
examined under different assumptions for the firms' costs of production and roles of play. 
In this game the duopolists maximise their payoffs which are their profits. Consequently, 
the incumbent has the advantage and the incentive to invest strategically in his capacity 
to deter the entrant, or to manipulate the market in his favour. The different outcomes 
that arise in each situation for both firms, and the degree of success in achieving profit 
maximisation and deterrence are explored. 
The market I examine throughout this thesis is that of firms producing a homogeneous 
commodity product, and serving a single market. These firms engage in noncooperative 
competition; and in view of the undifferentiated nature of their product, they compete 
on output. The price clears the market, whatever the firms produce in a period is sold 
in the market; and there are no inventories accumulated, imports or exports. 
31 
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The petrochemical industry which is the subject of this research, is served by a large 
number of engineering and service firms where plant capacities are known, and new in-
vestments are widely publicised in advance; investment costs may therefore be considered 
to be common knowledge; and where as other production costs are firm specific, it may 
be assumed that industry participants are in a position to estimate to a fair degree of 
accuracy, the costs involved in the operations of their competitors. Raw materials are 
widely traded, while utilities, energy, and labour costs are published regularly. The firms 
can observe the capacity of their rivals, but not the output or production of the product 
in any single period which remains unknown. But the firms can detect from the price 
variations what is happening in the market place. Such industry characteristics, give cre-
dence to any assumptions made about gaming with complete information, an essential 
condition in a noncooperative game for arriving at an optimal solution (Shubik 1955). 
Because the two firms do not observe production in the current period, they can be 
thought of as acting simultaneously in arriving at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium output, 
although the actual physical production may be taking place in sequential moves. 
However, it should be made clear at this point that in this chapter, as well as in 
Chapters 3 and 4, in conducting the model simulations, I introduce user induced values 
for the parameters of the cost and investment functions. But these are chosen such 
that model costs mimic the cost structures for commodity products in the petrochemical 
industry. Raw materials and utilities are the dominant elements of the cost of production; 
and capital investment costs form only a small proportion of overall costs. In Chapters 5 
and 6, I employ industry based data to evaluate the parameters of the cost and ivestment 
functions, and test the model performance. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 a noncooperative Nash-Cournot 
model is introduced. Its structure, the equilibrium solution and its basic characteris-
tics are then discussed briefly. In Section 2.3 an optimisation based general approach for 
evaluating Nash-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets and its main attributes is pre-
sented. In Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 the role of strategic investment for the incumbent 
in a Nash-Cournot game is explored. Asymmetric and symmetric costs are considered 
for the entrant and incumbent firms. The impact of the role of play on the outcome 
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of the game, in terms of market share by production or capacity, and profitability are 
examined for each situation. Initially, under a Nash-Cournot game setting, the two firms 
are assumed to have identical production costs. Another alternative is tested, where the 
incumbent has lower investment and production costs than the entrant. For instance the 
incumbent firm, in view of its experience and well established position in the market, is 
allowed to assume an advantageous position in terms of its production costs and the size 
of its initial capacity in place. And the impact of the role of play on the game outcome, 
and the overcapacity levels that emerge when mobility or entry deterrence strategies are 
employed are examined. Then the entrant is allowed to enjoy more favourable produc-
tion costs than the incumbent, as a result of superior technology for instance. Finally 
the privileged position of the incumbent firm in terms of its ability to choose its capacity 
first is eliminated; and the two firms are allowed to enter the market simultaneously. 
In Section 2.6 another set of games is tested, where the two firms play a Nash-
Cournot game and the entrant challenges the position of the incumbent. In this section 
I also examine the situations where it becomes feasible for the entrant to force the in-
cumbent out of the market. 
Alternatively, the game may also be played under a different set of conditions where 
one of the firms acts as leader, as in Section 2.7. The incumbent firm takes advantage of 
its superior position of being in the market first to take on the role of leader, and the game 
is played under a Stackelberg setting. Two cases are examined. In the first, Section 2.7.1, 
the entrant takes into consideration only the leader's output when deciding how much to 
produce and chooses capacity independently; and in the second, Section 2.7.2, the entrant 
allows for both her capacity and output to be subject to the leader's output. Then the 
entrant takes on the role of leader in Section 2.7.3, and I examine the incumbent's reaction 
in modifying his output rate and capacity utilisation. In Section 2.7.4 both firms strive 
for the leadership position. The likely credibility of each of these strategies is discussed 
in Section 2.8. Finally Section 2.9 concludes the chapter. These simple two player games 
are discussed further below. 
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2.2 Noncooperative Nash-Cournot Competition and Mar-
ket Outcome 
Strategic investment to gain advantage over business opponents whether in the form of 
advertising, or R&D expenditure to develop new products and more efficient production 
processes, or by differentiating products to fill a market niche and attain higher price 
margins, or in larger capacity for forestall new entrants or existing competitors plans has 
been studied extensively in the organisation theory literature as the surveys in Geroski 
(1991a), Nickell (1978), Scherer & Ross (1990), Sutton (1991, 1998), Tirole (1988), and 
in the PhD theses that are cited in the Introduction and the rest of this thesis attest to. 
In particular the area that pertains to the use of strategic investment in excess capac-
ity for entry or mobility deterrence has received considerable attention. Yet the evidence 
is far from being conclusive in favour of this thesis, or against it, as discussed in Chap-
ter 1, and as we shall see again in Chapter 5. The examples that are considered in this 
chapter examine strategic interaction in Nash-Cournot , and Stackelberg games between 
two players using capacity as a instrument. The model parameters used for the two 
players are chosen such that their cost structures and their differentials, reflect costs in 
the petrochemical industry. The emphasis is on the roles of play and the extent to which 
strategic investment in capacity can influence the outcome of the game. And the likeli-
hood of extreme situations such as entry deterrence, or forcing an opponent to exit the 
market. 
Strategic interaction between two firms, and a game in the choice of capacity and 
output in the context of the chemical industry was first studied by Fathi-Afshar & Rippin 
(1984). In this chapter I develop this interaction further by allowing for adjustment costs 
and redundant capacity. I study a richer menu of possible roles between the incumbent 
and entrant firms; and I emphasize the role of strategic investment in capacity for mobility 
or entry deterrence, and allow for cost differentials between the two players. Furthermore 
I examine the credibility of the different strategies that may be followed by the two 
players. 
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2.2.1 Model Structure 
To begin with its useful to define-some preliminaries and market characteristics some of 
which have already been mentioned. The market is served by a set N of firms which pro-
duce a homogeneous product where N = {1, , n}; each firm i E N produces a quantity 
xi , where xi > 0. The industry production profile is a vectors x = (xi, 	, xn )' , 
and the total industry output is X = 	s xi , and since we are dealing with a duopoly 
n = 2. Each firm also decides on an investment rate2 ui , and a plant capacity ki. Obvi-
ously in this context, nonnegativity applies to both ui > 0, and ki > 0. In a single shot 
game, the firms' main decision involves the choice of production rate, and plant capacity 
for an entrant; investment rate and depreciation are more relevant to multiperiod or dy-
namic situations, that are dealt with in following chapters. The structure of the model in 
its quadratic form is preserved in this chapter to facilitate comparison with later results. 
Market price, P, is determined as an inverse demand function, where total industry 
output determines the product price, P = h(X). Each firm maximises a utility or payoff 
function, which is its single period profit, w,; this function is in turn defined as the firm's 
revenue less its investment, h, and operating costs, 
wi = max-U'xi — — 	Vi E N xi >o 
ui>o 
(2.1) 
Given its capacity ki , each firm i maximises its profit wi by selecting its optimal output, 
xi , and investment rate, ui. A new firm that enters the market must also decide upon 
an optimal plant capacity. 
Following Ruffin (1971), Friedman (1986), Dockner (1992), Murphy, Sherali & Soyster 
(1982), and Nagurney (1988) I also make the following assumptions: 
(a) The inverse demand function that determines the price is assumed to be linear and 
downward sloping throughout this thesis. In the case of a duopoly, it is given by: 
P = h(X) = a — b(x, x j ) a,b> 0 	 (2.2) 
1A prime on a vector denotes a transpose; x here is a column vector. 
2 The role of investment rate will become more prominent in subsequent chapters when the model 
becomes dynamic, and the evolution of capacity is subject to depreciation and new investment. 
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prices are limited to be positive, by assuming that h(0) > 0, and that there is a 
limiting output X such that h(X) = 0; and for all X < X, h(X) > 0, and (j-k < 0. 
(b) Both the operating costs, Ci , and the investment costs, Ii, are assumed to be 
nonnegative, increasing and convex functions that are continuous and twice dif-
ferentiable. And I assume further, that they are quadratic and take the following 
form. 
Ci = f i x i + mi ki + igi(xi - ki)2 
	
(2.3) 
where fi, mi , and gi are positive parameters. The first two terms in equation (2.3) 
refer to the variable and fixed production costs; while the last quadratic term is an 
adjustment cost. For the time being we accept this cost as given, but have more 
to say about the significance of the cost parameters, and about adjustment costs, 
their use and justification in the literature in Chapter 3; and about their relevance 
to the petrochemical industry in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.5 of Chapter 5. While in 
general we take xi < ki, small deviations are allowed, where output can exceed 
stated plant capacity at an additional cost given by the adjustment cost term as 
indicated in (2.3). 
The investment cost function, Ii, also involves an adjustment cost, and takes the 
following form. 
qui + 	- (Ski )2 	 (2.4) 
where ci is the unit cost of capital, d i is an adjustment cost parameter, and 6 is the 
depreciation rate of capital. All are positive. The first term in equation (2.4) is the 
cost of investment, and the second is an additional cost incurred for the adjustment 
of capital. 
(c) The strategy of each firm i is a choice of an output rate, xi , and an investment 
rate, ui , that maximise the firm's profit function. This pair of actions may be 
represented as a vector u., 	xi)' (also known as firm i's control vector). And 
the strategy set for firm i is the set of all admissible actions, defined as Ui, where 
ui E Ui. Although ui > 0 and xi > 0 were assumed, with the implication that 
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Ci and h are defined over the range [0, oo); it is reasonable however, to assume 
that rates of production and investment are bounded by upper limits such that 
ui < oo, and xi < co, since the market was assumed to be finite, and bounded 
by X; also plant capacity is a binding factor on the firm. Therefore the range of 
admissible actions for each firm, are defined over bounded ranges, with ui E [0, fid, 
and xi E [0, 	As such the strategy set Ui for each firm is also bounded, where 
Ui C R. Furthermore it is also compact and convex3. Consequently Ci and h are 
bounded. 
From the aforementioned we can also deduce that Xh(X) is bounded and concave 
for all x, and where xi E [0, 	Vi E N. In view of (a) above, where P is a linear 
and decreasing function, xih(X) is bounded and concave. This holds also for the 
more general case where the price function, h(X), is nonincreasing or convex. A 
formal proof is found in Theorem 3.1, in Friedman (1986, p. 72) and in Murphy, 
Sherali & Soyster (1982). The profit function wi, which is defined for all ui E Ui, 
is bounded, continuous and concave since as equation (2.1) shows, it is the sum of 
three concave and bounded functions. 
I turn next to the question of the existence of an equilibrium solution for problem 
(2.1), and its evaluation. 
2.2.2 The Noncooperative Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Solution 
In a noncooperative game, firms choose their decisions or strategies that maximise their 
profits, independently. Collusion and binding agreements between firms are ruled out. 
But two important features affecting firms behaviour are required to hold: first, that 
each firm acts optimally to maximise its payoff or objective function when reacting to its 
opponents actions; and second, that firms hold the correct beliefs about their opponents 
behaviour (Friedman 1986). 
A Nash-Cournot equilibrium for our problem is a vector of optimal admissible strate- 
gies, u* = (ui, 	uI, 	,u*„)', of output and investment choices of the n firms partici- 
3A compact set is a set that is closed, i.e. it contains its boundary, and is bounded in that it can be 
contained in a ball of finite radius. A convex set has the property that any straight line connecting two 
points in the set is also contained in the set (Friedman 1986). 
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pating in the market, that maximises the profit function wi for each firm, and such that 
no firm has an incentive to deviate from its choice, by selecting any other strategy from 
its admissible set of strategies, giVen that its opponents have made their optimal choices. 
This can be represented by the following familiar inequality. 
wi(uT, 	un* ) 	 dui E Ui, ei E N 	(2.5) 
The existence of a Nash-Cournot equilibrium rests on meeting conditions (a), (b), and (c) 
above. It has been established that the strategy set Ui for each firm i is compact and 
convex; and the payoff or profit function, wi , is defined, continuous, bounded and concave 
for all admissible actions u E U, where U = U1  x, 	, x Ui x, 	, x Lin , is the strategy 
space of the game. Therefore by Theorem 3.1 of Friedman (1986) the market admits a 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium for our problem as stated in (2.1). Since problem (2.1) admits 
a maximum, then this equilibrium is unique (Murphy, Sherali & Soyster 1982, Theorem 1, 
p. 96). 
Next I turn to evaluate the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for a case where the market 
is served by a duopoly. The problem at hand is made simple by having a linear inverse 
demand function. The Two firms act independently, each maximising its profit function 
with respect to its production and investment rates. However the two firms are interde-
pendent in their actions, as their combined output determines the market price of their 
product and consequently affects their profitability. Initially, I assume that firm 1 is the 
incumbent, with a plant of capacity k1 in place; while firm 2 is the entrant and has to 
select an appropriate optimal plant capacity, given the state of the market. Expressed in 
full the two objective functions are shown below: 
wi = max(a — b(xi + x2))xi — Cl — Il 
W2 = max (a — b(x l  + x2 ))x2 — C2 - 
x2 ,u2,k2 
These are quadratic functions. Optimal values r4, XI, for firm 1 and 7.6, 4 and k2 for 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
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firm 2 can be obtained from the first order conditions, namely: 
awl 
au/ 	= —c1 — di(ul — 8k1) = 0 
awl = 
axi 	
a — 2bx — bx2 — .f1 — (xi — ki) =- 0 
awe = —c2 — di (u2 — 8k2) = 0 
ak2 
(9722 
awe 	a — bxi — 2bx2 — f2 — .92( ax2 x2 — k
2) = 0 
OW2 
—M2 ± 92(X2 k2) 6d2(2t2 — 8k2) = 0 
(2.8) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
the first order conditions are linear equations that can be solved simultaneously by vari-
able substitution; or if arranged in matrix form, by simple matrix inversion. Using 
equations (2.10) and (2.12) in equation (2.11) we eliminate 722 and k2 , and obtain a 
relationship between x2 and x1: 
1 
x2= —2b (a— f2 — m2 — 8c2) — 
(2.13) 
we will need this result for the situations when the incumbent firm acts as a leader and 
can influence the output of the second firm; but for the time being equations (2.13) and 
(2.9) can be solved to determine x1 and x2. The remaining values of u1, 722, and k2 can 
be easily obtained from the respective equations (2.8), (2.10), and (2.12). The resulting 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium depends on the model parameters pertaining to the relative 
costs of the two firms, the demand function, and the size of the incumbent's capacity. 
The optimal output for firm 1 is given by equation (2.9). In the process of determining 
its optimal output, firm 1 assumes that firm 2 will be utilising its optimal output as well 
given by equation (2.13). Substituting x2 from (2.13) into (2.9), and rearranging with 
some algebraic manipulation we obtain the following relationship: 
1 	 2gi 
x1 	
, 
3b2 = 	 + J2 + m2 + 8c2 2f1) + 	 3b 	2 gi gi 
(2.14) 
The optimal output of firm 1 is dependent on its capacity, its raw materials cost, its 
rivals costs of production, and the demand function parameters. Where as the optimal 
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output of firm 2 is dependent on its production costs, demand function parameters, and 
the output of its rival, firm 1, as illustrated in (2.13). 
When firm 1 is operating as a monopolist, it selects a capacity and output that can be 
determined from first order conditions. These are analogous to equations (2.10)-(2.12) 
above. I assume initially that the incumbent selects a capacity of k1  = 21; which is 
equivalent to it's monopolistic capacity, when production is constrained by capacity, and 
the model parameters used are: a = 100, b = 2, (5 = 0.10, ci = 10, d1  = 50, f i = 10, 
91 = 2, and m l = 5. These cost parameters apply to a firm when it is an inefficient 
producer throughout this chapter. I then determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium that 
results when the incumbent faces an entrant that has the same costs. 
It should be noted that the model parameters used for simulations, are chosen such 
that raw materials costs dominate the cost of production, as in commodity petrochemi-
cals. And where adjustment costs are restricted to account for only a small proportion 
of total costs, by appropriate choice of di and gi values. 
In general the entrant selects a capacity that is lower than the output rate. This 
is apparent from the optimality conditions (2.10)-(2.12), which when combined yield a 
relationship of the following form: 
k2 = x2 — —
1 
(m2 + 8c2) 
92 
(2.15) 
The second term on the rhs of the above equation is always negative since all costs and 
model parameters such as adjustment cost are restricted to take positive values. For 
firm 2 then it is always the case that k2 < x2 , when it selects its optimal output and 
capacity simultaneously. Without enforcing capacity constraints on the problem, the 
entrant's capacity will be always overutilised with production exceeding plant capacity. 
2.2.3 Capacity Utilisation and the Role of Adjustment Cost 
Additional insight may be gained from evaluating the impact of variations in the value of 
the adjustment cost factor gi on the capacity utilisation of each firm i. The relationship 
between the incumbent's choice of capacity and production rate, and that of its opponent 
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is particularly relevant to dealing with the issue of entry level of the opponent and the 
instances where the possibility of entry or mobility deterrence can be achieved. 
Consider the incumbent with an existing capacity k1, since we are assuming that the 
incumbent chooses his capacity first. By examining equation (2.14), it can be shown that 
as 91 	oo, the first term on the rhs vanishes and the coefficient of k1 approaches unity. 
In this situation firm l's output, xi , is equivalent to its capacity in place, k1. This can 
be explained in terms of the role of the adjustment cost. An increase in the adjustment 
cost factor causes the firm to increase its output so as to minimise the adjustment cost 
term 29,1(x1  — k1)2; when output is equal to capacity this term vanishes completely, and 
production costs, 	are minimised. 
On the otherhand, when gi is very small, adjustment cost becomes insignificant. As 
91 ---> 0, the second term on the rhs of equation (2.14) which involves k1, goes to zero 
and the first term dominates. In this case firm l's output approaches a fixed value given 
by x1 = (a f2 + m2 + (5c2 — 2f1). For the case of a duopoly with asymmetric costs4 , 
where the entrant is the more efficient firm, firm l's output becomes, x1 = 15.03. From 
this outcome it can be deduced that in situations where adjustment costs are negligible, 
and firm 1 can choose its capacity first, the incumbent can maximise profits when faced 
with the prospect of entry by firm 2 whose costs it has foreknowledge of, by choosing a 
capacity k1 = xi = 15.03 (for the case of symmetric costs, k1 = xi = 16.0) instead of 
maintaining its monopolistic capacity (k1 = 21), and outputs, (x1 = 21). 
Another observation worthy of note here is that when adjustment costs are low, there 
is little chance on the part of the incumbent to deter entry by building a large capacity, 
especially when the entrant firm has lower production costs than the incumbent. Such 
a strategy would have some degree of success when the incumbent has a very wide cost 
margin over the entrant; otherwise the incumbent inflicts as much damage on his venture 
before succeeding in making entry for the would be entrant a loss making venture. 
I examine further the choices available to the incumbent firm when it has the advan-
tage of selecting its capacity first. The incumbent operates at full capacity when 71- = 1. 
"For parameter values of two firms' costs see Figure 2.1. 
5The interaction between the incumbent and entrant, and choice of optimal capacity and output is 
discussed in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5. The results of runs Ncga2 in Table 2.1, p. 52 and Ncgal3 in 
Table 2.2, p. 58 attest to the above observation. 
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Dividing equation (2.14) by k1 and rearranging we obtain a term for the incumbent's 
capacity when it is fully utilised, which I will denote as critical capacity, k1, given by: 
(a+ 	-F n12 -I- c5c2 	2 fi.)  k1 = 3b 
(2.16) 
this term is independent of the adjustment cost factor gi; it is a function of the raw 
materials cost of the incumbent firm, the cost of production of its opponent, and demand 
parameters. When the incumbent chooses a capacity k1 > k1 , he operates with overca- 
pacity since in this region a < 1; and similarly when k1 < 	firm 1 overutilises its ki 
capacity and production exceeds capacity, since in this region it > 1. 
Firm 2 produces at an output level of x2 which derives from the Nash-Cournot com-
petition with firm 1. This rate of production is determined by equation (2.13); it is 
therefore dependent on firm 2's costs of production and is inversely proportional to the 
output of firm 1. Firm 1 in turn uses (2.14) to determine its optimal rate of production 
as a Nash-Cournot player in a production game with firm 2. The optimal output, xi, 
of firm 1 is dependent on its own costs, its opponents raw materials costs and its own 
capacity, k1. When gi is very small (gi = 0.02), the first term in (2.14) dominates. 
Possessing a very large capacity does not ensure for the incumbent a large market share, 
since the coefficient of the second term, k1, is very small, and production costs determine 
x1. Also when firm 1 employs a capacity well below the critical capacity k1, production 
exceeds capacity by a wide margin of more than 2.5 orders of magnitude when the two 
firms face asymmetric costs. Firm 2 on the otherhand ends up having a negative ca-
pacity. This is clear from from equation (2.15). At very low values of adjustment cost 
factor, (e.g. g2 = 0.02), the second term which is always negative, becomes very large 
and dominates the output term, x2. With no capacity constraints in place the results are 
spurious, producing a negative k2. It becomes necessary, when gi values are very small, 
to impose capacity constraints on output for any meaningful results to be derived from 
this exercise. 
The choice of the incumbent firm's capacity has an important bearing on its pro-
duction capability, capacity utilisation, profitability, and also on its opponents capacity 
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of entry and production potential. Firm l's choice of capacity k1  > ki ensures that it 
operates with some overcapacity. In this region it gets a larger market share the larger 
k J, is, but this is at the expense of a larger overcapacity which rises as k1 gets bigger, 
especially with low values of 91. As gl  increases overcapacity declines, because higher 
adjustment costs cause the firm to increase its production. Figure 2.1 depicts this varia-
tion of overcapacity for the incumbent firm at different levels of capacity k1. For values 
of k1  < ki, the incumbent firm, in the absence of capacity constraints, overproduces by 
operating above its physical capacity. In this region larger gi results in firm 1 reducing 
its output to minimise the adjustment cost. It achieves this by operating the plant at 
levels closer to its design capacity. 
Firm] Capacity 
Figure 2.1: Capacity utilisation vs capacity of incumbent firm for a duopoly: parameter 
values used: a = 100, b = 2, 8 = 0.10, c1 = 10, c2 = 2, d1  = 50, d2 = 50, del = 10, 
f2 = 8, m1 = 5, m2 = 2. 
The situation for firm 2 is in the reverse order; for k1  > ki its share of the market 
declines as the incumbent's capacity level k1  increases. And because an increase in gi 
causes firm 1 to increase its output in this region, firm 2 reduces its production and choice 
of capacity level with rising 92. While both x2 and k2 increase in the region where k1  < 
The impact on capacity utilisation is uniform. As we have seen earlier the entrant always 
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Figure 2.2: Capacity utilisation for entrant vs capacity of incumbent firm for a duopoly: 
parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, 6 = 0.10, Cl = 2, c2 = 2, d1 = 50, d2 = 50, 
10, f2 = 8, mi = 5, m2 = 2. 
chooses production higher than capacity; a rise in 92, causes overproduction to decline. 
To minimise adjustment costs firm 2 which is selecting both capacity and output, operates 
such that capacity utilisation moves closer to the 100% level as shown in Figure 2.2 
Firm 2's entry level into the market is dependent on the incumbent's output and 
capacity. As the incumbent increases its capacity beyond ki , the entrant's entry level k2 
declines. When the incumbent faces high adjustment costs, its output, xi, rises and the 
entrant therefore enters at an even lower level, and produces at a lower rate. 
For intermediate values of gi , the impact on the direction of movement of the output 
can be inferred from the adjustment cost term 	(xi — k1)2, and the critical capacity 
Above this capacity level firm 1 carries overcapacity; and below it overproduces above 
the capacity in place. In this region its output exceeds capacity, such that xi > k1. As 91 
increases, firm 1 increases its output when its capacity is above kl , to reduce overcapacity 
and minimise the adjustment cost term. Alternatively output decreases when k1 is less 
than kl , also in order to minimise adjustment costs that are caused by overproduction. 
These variations in the capacity utilisation on either side of k1 are depicted in Fig- 
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ure 2.1. However, when capacity constraints are enforced, the incumbent firm produces 
at full capacity, at or below kl , since enforcing capacity constraints ensures that x i < k1; 
therefore when ki < kl , we select an output that matches and does not exceed capacity. 
In this region, the output of firm 1 becomes unaffected by variations in the value of gi. 
All the curve segments to the left of kl in Figure 2.1 collapse on the horizontal of full 
capacity utilisation when capacity constraints are enforced. While the entrant, firm 2, 
which has to select its optimal capacity and output, would operate at full capacity. When 
capacity constraints are binding, all the curves in Figure 2.2 would collapse on the base 
line where capacity utilisation = 100%. 
2.3 An Alternative Approach to Compute Nash-Cournot 
Equilibrium Solution with Binding Capacity Constraints 
Finding the equilibrium to our problem was made easy by the quadratic nature of the 
model, and the linearity imposed on the inverse demand function. Implementing the 
first order conditions for a Nash-Cournot equilibrium was straight forward as a result 
of the linearity of equations (2.8)-(2.12). In situations where the demand function is 
nonlinear, or with higher order cost functions than what was assumed in Section 2.2.1, a 
more advanced treatment is required to find a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the oligopoly 
problem posed in (2.1). A problem of this nature was examined by Murphy, Sherali & 
Soyster (1982)6. The same oligopoly problem was later dealt with by a number of papers 
including Harker (1984), Dafermos (1983) and Outrata, Koevara & Zowe (1998). Each 
employs a variant formulation that relies on variational inequality theory, to construct a 
computational scheme to obtain an equilibrium solution which is shown to be an equiva-
lent Nash equilibrium for the oligopoly market problem. Different algorithms are used to 
arrive at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution7; the main emphasis in these papers is 
on the efficiency of the algorithms in dealing with the oligopoly problem, and for formula- 
6The demand function in their paper was of the form P(X) = 5000 •rX --71", where the price elasticity 
ry > 1; the cost function also had a similar form, and the industry was served by 5 firms. 
7The Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution is not unique in this case, and is dependent on the initial 
vector of output values used for the players. This problem can be implemented in MATLAB using a 
nonlinear equation solver and utilising a formulation as in Harker (1984); it takes 5 to 7 iterations to 
converge to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in a matter of few CPU seconds. 
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tions of varying degrees of complexity. Nagurney (1988) discusses different algorithms for 
solving an oligopoly problem where a large number of firms are involved in the produc-
tion, and marketing of several commodity products that each sells in different markets. 
Each market has its own demand function that determines the price. Transportation 
costs are involved as well for shipments of products between markets. Clearly this is a 
more complex problem than those dealt with by previous researchers. She develops a lin-
earised Gauss-Seidal decomposition method to compute the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, 
and her results show that this method is computationally superior to other algorithms. 
The literature on the development of generalised Nash-Cournot games and evaluation 
of their associated equilibria as variational inequality problems is surveyed in Harker 
(1991). In this paper he also discusses computational methods and provides appropriate 
algorithms for each problem formulation. The relationship between variational inequality 
theory and Nash-Cournot game theoretic problems was demonstrated in an earlier paper 
(Harker 1984), where a diagonalisation/relaxation (also known as nonlinear Jacobi) al-
gorithm based on a contribution by Dafermos (1983) was presented for solving this type 
of problems. Only the main steps involved in this procedure are outlined below. 
2.3.1 Variational Inequality Formulation 
The problem of finding a solution for the maximisation problem (2.1), can be dealt with 
as a finite dimensional variational inequality problem, which involves finding a solution 
vector u*, where u* E U, and U is a closed and convex set, such that: 
F(u*)' (u — u*) ?_ 0 	Vu E U 	 (2.17) 
where F(u) is some smooth and monotonic function, F : U 	RT, and F(u)' is the 
transpose of F(u). In our formulation of the oligopoly problem, U C 11qn, since each 
player i of the n players controls 2 decision variables, ui -= (ui, xi)'. Also define: 
Fi(u*) =_ 81"Z* )  , and, 	F(u*) = (F (f) / • • Fi(u* )' 	F n(u*)'Y 
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where u*N\i refers to the vector of optimal decision variables under the control of all other 
n players excluding player i. 
This formulation involves the formation of a smooth function G(u, u) : U x U —> W4, 
where G(u, u) = F(u), Vu E U. The algorithm starts at some chosen initial vector 
uo E U, and solves sequentially in step s (s = 1, 2, ... ) the following version of (2.17) 
until conversion (see Dafermos (1983) for a discussion and proofs) which is when no 
player has any incentive to change his control variables: 
G(u*,s,u*,s—l)/ (u u*,$) > 0 Vu E U 	 (2.18) 
for player i, then we have 
Gilui u*'871 ) = Nv 	aui  
equation (2.17) can therefore be represented as follows: 
*,8 * ) 	,8 - ui )?(,) Vu E U 
Dafermos (1983) and Harker (1984) show that for firm i, the first order conditions for 
the maximisation of its payoff function wi as in (2.1), namely: 
max wi (ui, uN\i) ui E Ui,Vi E N, ui  
can be represented as: 
aWi 
,UNVY(ui — 	0 dui E Ui) 
where Ui is player i's set of feasible strategies, and — a (u1, uN\t ) is the gradient of wi 
wrt to player i's strategy vector ui, which is the optimal solution to (2.20). In view of the 
concavity of wi wrt ui, this gradient is the direction of ascent towards the solution u7. 
Once at the solution, no feasible ascent direction exists and conversion is accomplished. 
Equation (2.19) above is the summation of the individual player's first order conditions 
awi(u:'s,u'i4T1) 
(2.19) 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
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for maximisation of their respective payoff functions. The solution to the variational 
inequality, is equivalent to finding the equilibrium solution to the Nash-Cournot problem. 
2.3.2 Algorithm Procedure and Implementation 
There is more than one approach to finding a solution to the problem in (2.20). A direct 
approach involves implementing the first order optimality conditions directly, and solving 
a math programme as in Murphy, Sherali & Soyster (1982). Considering that there is an 
incumbent firm with an existing plant in place, one solves a set of 3n - 1 equations as in 
(2.8)-(2.12). For situations where we have complex demand and cost functions, that are 
of higher order than quadratic functions, this set of equations can be solved using any 
nonlinear equation solver. 
The variational inequality approach adopted in the previous section (Harker 1984), 
for implementing (2.19) involves solving n optimisation subproblems (2.20) in a serial 
manner. This approach has advantages in terms of efficiency of implementation, espe-
cially when dealing with large scale and highly nonlinear problems, by dividing a large 
scale problem into n smaller problems. In addition to solving complex oligopoly market 
problems, this approach can be adopted to solve very large scale traffic and network flow 
problems; examples of these applications can be found in Nagurney (1988), and Harker 
(1991) and references therein. 
Furthermore an optimisation approach allows the imposition of constraints on the 
variables of the problem, and to specify feasible regions for the solution. For instance in-
vestment and production rates can be limited to be positive and bounded by an an upper 
limit. In particular the outputs of the two firms may be constrained indirectly by specify-
ing that product price remains within a positive region. For our Nash-Cournot problem 
we solve 71 optimisation subproblems in the following manner. 
max wi ui>o 
xi >o 
= 
= 
Pxi - Ci - Ii 	ui EUi, Vi E N 
(a - b(xl 	Xlv-\D) xi - Ci - Ii 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
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subject to: 
xi < ki  
xs 
a < X3—i 
b NV 
(capacity constraint) 
(price constraint) 	(2.24) 
where we are at step or iteration s of the algorithm; and define the production of oppo-
nents to firm i as X N\i = E7_1  x2 , and total industry output becomes X = xi + XN\i . 
.102: 
1. We initiate the algorithm by setting s = 1, and choose a starting vector u0, where 
u° = (u?, 	 ?, 
2. Next solve (2.23) for a new value ui = 	IcIr; and repeat procedure for all 
firms, i = 1, 	, n. 
3. Once a new set of ui values is obtained, update vector us. 
4. Evaluate if 'us — us—i, < 6, where c is a preset small tolerance value, then stop. 
The current value of us is the Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution. 
5. Else, the latest computed value of us, becomes the new starting vector for (2.23); 
increment s, s = s 1, and go back to 2. This completes one iteration of the 
algorithm. Continue with this procedure until convergence. 
From the above procedure it is clear that the algorithm describes the process of arriving 
at a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Each firm i, in turn, takes the output of all other firms 
X Nv as given, and tries, by solving (2.23), to improve on its payoff function by adjusting 
its output, investment rate and plant capacity until it finds a new maximising vector 
ui. The process is repeated until no firm finds it profitable to change its output profile. 
The firms perform these actions independently. In step 4 above, vector u describes all 
the firms in the industry. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution, is arrived at when all 
the firms attain optimal maximising values that they cannot improve upon in successive 
steps. The optimal vector we arrive at upon convergence, u* = (ui, 	u*„)', is the 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution. 
Variational inequality methods can be used for dynamic situations. Haurie, Zaccour 
& Smeers (1990), Pineau (2000), and Pineau & Murto (2000) implement dynamic game 
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formulations that involve capital accumulation. These works make use of GAMS (2003) 
software, which seems to be in use in other publications with models dealing with nonlin-
ear functions that appear in the applied game theory literatures. Slade (1989, 1994) uses 
a different formulation for dynamic games, in which firms maximise an objective function 
that she terms as a fictitious payoff-function. The problem is formulated such that the 
whole oligopolistic industry appears to be maximising a single objective function; and 
where the firm's objective function embodies the payoffs for all the periods involved (two 
periods are considered as an illustration in the paper). Slade's approach is similar to that 
of Murphy, Sherali & Soyster (1982) in that all first order conditions for optimality are 
solved simultaneously. A specialised proprietary nonlinear optimisation software is used 
to obtain the Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution. Nagurney (1988) also uses a specialised 
university software. The last two references however do not involve capital accumulation 
or depreciation in their models. 
In this chapter as well as in the rest of this thesis, I make use of a PC version of 
MATLAB ® (2000) software to obtain model solutions9 for different Nash equilibria . 
MATLAB utilises two approaches for dealing with constrained nonlinear optimisation 
problems. The one I employ selects a sequential quadratic programming algorithm to 
solve the maximisation problem. The algorithm moves in the direction of the gradient 
at each step to arrive at the maximum; and one provides the analytic gradient of the 
objective function to speed up the convergence process. A brief but clear description of 
the algorithm used is provided in the MATLAB documentation. But for a more detailed 
description the reader is referred to Schittkowski (1985/6). 
The constraints of (2.24) are formed in matrix form Aui < b, and the non-negativity 
constraints are introduced in the argument of the maximisation function as lower and 
upper bounds on the elements of ui. In evaluating the cases of Table 2.1 I assume that 
the incumbent, firm 1, has a capacity of k1 = 21, which is its monopolistic capacity, 
8GAMS apparently has features of a mathematical programme with equilibrium constraints, that it 
combines with nonlinear programme models to solve single or multiple-objective function models. Its 
documentation specifies that the main applications are in economics and game theory. 
9The optimisation in equation (2.23) is computed using the frnincon function; all MATLAB functions 
are essentially minimisation functions as this software is used mainly as a tool in solving and simulating 
engineering optimal control problems where the aim is to minimise cost functions. By using the negative 
of the objective function one converts a minimisation problem into one of maximisation. 
CHAPTER 2. COMPETITION AND ENTRY DYNAMICS IN A DUOPOLY 	51 
and throughout the exercises I use a tolerance value of c = 0.001. In addition the 
parameter values for the exercises are chosen such that the cost structure corresponds 
to the prevailing average costs for the basic petrochemical industry. Raw materials and 
utilities costs are the dominant costs of basic petrochemical products, and depending on 
the scale of the plant and technology used, can range from 60% to as high as 80% or 
more, of the production cost. Fixed costs that relate to salaries, and other capital related 
costs not affected directly by the level of production are usually in the range of 15-40%. 
And capital investment costs are on average in the range of 5-10% of the total production 
costs10 (see Section 5.5.2 of Chapter 5 for an illustration). For dynamic situations one 
just adds the equation of state describing the evolution of the capacity into a matrix 
equation describing equality constraints similar to the one above, and the dimensions of 
the matrices and vectors would be extended to take account of all periods involved. The 
objective function to be maximised in (2.22) would be reformulated to account for the 
discounted sum of wi for all periods. 
2.4 Incumbent under threat of entry in a Nash-Cournot 
game 
When the market is served by the incumbent only, firm 1 acts as a monopolist and achieves 
monopolistic profits. Its optimal choice of plant capacity, k1, and output, xl, and the 
corresponding market price and profits, wi, are shown in Table 2.1 (for the particular 
set of model parameters specified in the table footnotes). With its monopolistic capacity 
fixed at k1  = 21, firm 1 faces an entrant, firm 2, and has to decide whether to maintain, 
or to change its monopolistic output under the threat of entry. Once entry occurs, and 
since both the incumbent and the entrant are concerned only about profit maximisation, 
the two firms engage in a Nash-Cournot game and employ a solution concept based on 
Section 2.3 (or Section 2.2.2). 
I consider two situations; one where the entrant has the same production costs as the 
10These ranges of cost estimates pertain to the commodity sector of the petrochemicals industry; and 
cover a range of plants of different sizes over a period going back to the 1970's. The wide variation in the 
range of costs reflects the level of complexity of technology in use, the size of the plant, and the benefits 
of learning effects and economies of scale over time. 
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incumbent, and the second where the two firms have asymmetric costs with the entrant 
being the more efficient firm with lower production costs. This could arise as a result of 
the entrant employing a more efficient technology and production process for instance. I 
also allow for two possible scenarios of adjustment costs: low adjustment costs (gi = 2) 
which indicate that firms can operate plants with significant overcapacity at low penalty 
cost; and with higher adjustment costs (e.g. gi = 20), firms are penalised more heavily 
for operating their plants at high rates of overcapacity. 
Table 2.1: Duopolistic competition between incumbent and entrant firms in a Nash-
Cournot game 
xi 
Incumbent 
ki 	wi cui% 
Entrant 
X2 	k2 	w2 X 
Industry 
Price 	Profit 
Low adjustment cost (gi = 2, 92 = 2) 
Mono 21.00 21.00 883.0 100 21.00 58.0 883.0 
Ncgsl (1)  18.00 21.00 406.0 86 12.00 12.00 	289.0 30.00 40.0 695.0 
Ncga2(2) 17.42 21.00 344.4 83 13.74 13.74 	377.6 31.16 37.7 722.0 
High adjustment cost (91 = 20, 92 = 20) 
Ncgs3(') 20.35 21.00 433.4 97 10.83 10.83 	235.4 31.18 37.6 668.8 
Ncga4 (2)  20.22 21.00 372.0 96 12.34 12.34 	304.5 32.56 34.9 676.6 
Ncga5(3) 19.64 21.00 92.4. 94 11.86 12.34 	136.7 31.50 22.0 229.1 
Ncga6(4) 19.41 21.00 -15.7 92 11.62 12.34 	71.7 31.03 16.9 55.9 
Simultaneous entry(5) (gi = 20, g2 = 20) 
Ncgs7(1) 14.00 14.00 393.0 100 14.00 14.00 	393.0 28.00 44.0 786.0 
Ncga8(2 ) 13.03 13.03 340.7 100 15.93 15.93 	507.8 28.96 42.1 848.5 
Parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, r = 0.05, ö = 0.10, k1 = 21. cui refers to capacity utilisation 
of firm 1. The convention used for the numbering of the different runs, is that in Ncgsl, for instance, 
it refers to a Nash-Cournot run with changing value for gi, and symmetric costs for both firms. The 
last digit refers to the run number. 
(1)Firms with 	symmetric costs: c1 	fi = 10, ml = 5, d1  = 50; C2 = 10,12 = 10, 77Z2 = 5, d2 = 50. 
(2)Firms with asymmetric costs: c1 = 10, fl = 10, ml = 5, d1 = 50; c2 = 2, 12 = 8, m2 = 2, d2 = 50. 
(3)Firms with asymmetric costs as in case Ncga4 but with lower demand, where a = 85. 
(4)Firms with asymmetric costs as in case Ncga4 but with lower demand, where a = 79. 
(5)When both firms enter the market simultaneously, the assumption is that both start from zero 
capacity. 
Under symmetric production costs and low adjustment cost factors, the incumbent 
reduces his output to xi = 18, and operates at a capacity utilisation rate of 86%, as 
shown in case Ncgsl. Firm 2, the entrant, selects an optimal capacity k2 = 12, and 
operates at full capacity. The industry price and profits fall as a result of entry. The well 
established firm, firm 1, makes more profits than firm 2. But because firm 2 operates at 
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full capacity, it appears to be more productive since its capacity is 57% relative to firm 1, 
while its profits are 71% those of.its rival. 
When the entrant is more efficient in terms of its lower costs, it enters at a higher 
capacity than with symmetric costs. In this case the incumbent reduces its output further 
and operates with a capacity utilisation rate of 83%, but still retains a larger share of 
the market than the entrant. The entrant operates a smaller plant, and has a smaller 
market share than the incumbent, but makes higher profits as case Ncga2 illustrates. 
Total output is higher than with symmetric costs, and industry profits are higher. 
Higher adjustment cost factors, as in cases Ncgs3 and Ncga4, force the incumbent to 
operate at high utilisation rates. This forces the entrant to enter at even lower capacity 
levels than before. Because output of the incumbent rises to avoid incurring higher costs 
of adjustment, industry price drops and so do profits. Prices and profits are lower than 
the corresponding cases with low adjustment costs. Under this scenario, in case Ncga4, 
the entrant firm does worse than the incumbent even when the former has lower costs. 
The incumbent firm also makes more profits than it did under case Ncga2 when it had 
lower adjustment costs. 
This anomalous situation of the high cost producer, firm 1, attaining larger market 
share and higher profits than its entrant rival, firm 2, arises as a result of the static 
nature of the game. Firm 1 has a short term advantage that derives from its position 
as an incumbent with an established production capacity in the market. By selecting a 
large plant it forces its more efficient rival firm 2 to enter at a smaller scale. Although 
firm 1 reaps higher profits, firm 2 runs a more efficient operation; it has lower cost per 
unit output, and generates higher revenue per unit of production capacity. 
The advantage that accrues to the entrant from its lower production and investment 
costs, becomes clear when market conditions deteriorate; the entrant is capable of com-
peting in this environment, and of withstanding adverse market conditions better than 
the incumbent. Consider the situation of case Ncga4, where the two firms have estab-
lished their production capacities, as indicated in Table 2.1, and the level of demand is 
at a = 100; but now when market demand drops to a = 85, both firms suffer due to 
lower demand as shown in the results of case Ncga5. Production for firm 1 declines. It 
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now operates at a capacity utilisation rate of cut = 94%. Firm 2 also reduces its output. 
Instead of operating at full capacity it operates at cue = 96% utilisation rate. Market 
price declines from P = 34.9, to P = 22.0; but more importantly the fortunes of the 
two firms are interchanged. The entrant, firm 2, although it now produces and retains a 
much smaller market share than its opponent, generates substantially higher profits than 
the incumbent. 
This is a particular feature of oligopolistic markets, where market price in a quantity 
game, is dictated by the least efficient producer. The more efficient producer benefits 
from the high market price and despite its smaller market share, can in some instances (as 
in cases Ncga2, Ncga5, and Ncga6), generate higher profits than the high cost opponent. 
When demand declines and price drops the least efficient producers that form the tail-end 
of the supply curve are unable to sustain their inefficient production operation and are 
the first to exit the market. A further decline in the demand to a = 79, (case Ncga6) leads 
to both firms reducing their output, with firm 1 now operating at a capacity utilisation 
rate of cut = 92%. Price drops to P = 16.9, and firm 1 makes losses of wi = —15.74; 
while the more efficient firm 2 continues to generate profits, as shown in case Ncga6. 
The advantage for the incumbent firm from holding a large capacity that allows it to 
obtain a large market share and higher profits, at the expense of a more efficient entrant 
is sustainable only when demand is high to support high utilisation rates and prices. In 
the presence of adjustment costs that penalise producers for operating their plants with 
overcapacity, an inefficient producer that relies on having large scale plant to gain market 
share can easily find its venture run into difficulty if demand falls and prices decline as 
the above examples demonstrate. 
2.5 Entry or Mobility Deterrence by Incumbent 
Instead of the inflexible position of having the incumbent firm stick to its monopolistic 
capacity in the face of entry, let us consider a situation where the incumbent can pick a 
plant of capacity k1  of his choice first, and then the entrant having taken notice of the 
incumbent's capacity, decides whether to enter the market; and if she does, has to choose 
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an optimal plant capacity and output. 
This is a two-stage game, where in the first stage the incumbent acts as a Stackelberg 
leader in the choice of capacity; and in the second stage both the incumbent and entrant 
engage in a Nash-Cournot game in outputs. In this game capacity is fixed; once chosen, 
it cannot be changed. The incumbent by acting as a Stackelberg leader, can conduct 
an analysis of the choice of capacity, given the anticipated reaction of the entrant, that 
maximises his profits; or can even contemplate the situations where it would be possible 
to deter the entrant by blocking her completely from entering the market. 
Below, I examine a set of examples, under different scenarios of cost structures for the 
incumbent and entrant firms. The first assumes that both firms have identical costs; and 
the second corresponds to a situation where the incumbent has the advantage of lower 
investment and production costs. While in the third, the entrant takes on the role of 
the more efficient producer which possesses lower costs. Also four values of adjustment 
costs ranging from low (gi = 2), to medium (gi = 10, gi = 20), to high (g, = 100) 
are considered for each scenario. These adjustment costs correspond to the respective 
situations where when it takes low values (gi = 2) it would be least costly to operate 
plants at low capacity utilisation rates; and when it is high it indicates the high cost of 
overcapacity. In each situation, the examples help to illustrate the nature of strategic 
interaction between the two firms and the likely market equilibrium that could emerge. 
Since the incumbent has the opportunity to select his capacity first, he can there-
fore carry out an analysis to find the best starting capacity to confront the entrant 
with, that maximises his profits, given his knowledge of the costs of production of both 
players. In these exercises the differentials in costs between the two firms for raw mate-
rials, fixed costs and investment costs when they run asymmetric operations, are chosen 
within reasonable limits. Although for commodity petrochemical products it is unlikely 
that producers would have differentials in raw materials costs that are as high as those 
considered here. Nonetheless the exercises serve to illustrate the extent and possible 
influence of incumbent's capacity on the outcome of the Nash-Cournot production game 
that ensues. 
In carrying out an analysis of the optimal choice of capacity, the incumbent starts from 
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an initial capacity, say k1 = 6, and finds the Nash-Cournot solution to his production 
game with the entrant. Both find the optimal output and investment rates that sustain 
the profitability of their operations using the variational inequality formulation discussed 
in the previous section. The incumbent then selects a new capacity; so he increments ki 
to k1 = 7, and conducts the same exercise for finding the new Nash-Cournot solution. 
And so on until the incumbent finds the best choice of k1 that maximises his profits. Here 
the incumbent is acting like a Stackelberg leader in its choice of capacity. The results are 
discussed below and shown in Figures 2.3-2.5. 
Firml Capacity 	 Firm] Capacity 
Figure 2.3: Incumbent's capacity as a mobility deterrence in a Nash-Cournot game 
against an entrant under symmetric costs: a = 100, b = 2, 6 = 0.10, ci = 10, 
c2  = 10, di = 50, d2 = 50, 11 = 10, 12 = 10, m1 = 5, 17/2 = 5- 
2.5.1 Symmetric Costs: incumbent searching for ki* 
The two firms have symmetric costs when the incumbent and entrant have access to the 
same technology, raw materials, and utilities. They also have the same investment cost 
per unit of capacity, ci , which is assumed here to be constant and independent of the 
scale of plant. This assumption will be relaxed in later chapters to allow for economies 
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of scale and learning to be taken into consideration. 
With low adjustment costs, gi = 2, the incumbent is unable to block the entrant from 
the market as the results of the Nash-Cournot analysis show in pane (a) of Figure 2.3. It 
is worth noting that each pair of values represent the profits of the two firms when they 
are in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. In the figure they are plotted against the capacity 
chosen by the incumbent. In this exercise, the Nash equilibrium for the incumbent that 
maximises his profits corresponds to a choice of capacity of k1 = 16. Firm 1 operates 
at full capacity and generates profits of wi = 417.0. Firm 2 enters the market with a 
capacity of k2 = 13, and generates profits of w2 = 339.0. At this point market price is 
P = 42. These results indicate that it is worthwhile for the incumbent to use a lower 
capacity than his monopolistic capacity; both firms now achieve higher profits than cases 
Ncgsl and Ncgs3 of Table 2.1, p. 52. Also there are two instances at which the two 
firms generate equal profits. When they have equal capacities of ki = 14, each; and when 
k1 = 39.5, and k2 = 8.3. In the latter case firm 1 operates at a capacity utilisation of 
cui = 65% and the two firms generate profits of wi = 139.0, each. 
Firm 1 is unable to deter firm 2 from entering the market by installing a very large 
capacity. Beyond k1 = 40, the profits of firm 1 start to decline at a faster rate than 
firm 2; eventually firm 1 would be making losses before it can make the entry of firm 2 
a loss making venture. Firm 1 can, however, follow a mobility deterrence policy. When 
it chooses a capacity in the range of k1 = 25 — 31, its profits remain above 300; while 
firm 2 enters with a lower capacity, and its profits are pushed down into the range 
of 200. However, the two firms can do better if they stick to their profit maximising 
policy where they achieve the highest profits by sticking to their Nash equilibrium at 
k1 = 16, and k2 = 13. With higher adjustment costs (gi = 10, gi = 20, and gi = 100) 
the incumbent firm operates at higher rate, and installs larger capacity. The Nash-
Cournot equilibrium capacity for firm 1 rises to k1 = 20, and k1 = 21, respectively. 
Higher adjustment costs force a rise in utilisation rate for the incumbent. The entrant as 
a result enters at a lower capacity and takes a slightly smaller share of the market than 
before. However, total industry output rises, and as a result market price drops, and 
industry profitability declines, as shown in panes (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 2.3. These 
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Table 2.2: Capacity preemption by incumbent in a Nash-Cournot game under different 
cost structures 
gi 
Incumbent 
x1 	k1 	w1 	cui% 
Entrant 
x2 	k2 	w2 
Industry 
X 	Price 	Profit 
Symmetric costs(i) : incumbent and entrant have same costs of production 
Ncgs9 2 16.00 	16.00 	417.0 	100 13.00 	13.00 	339.0 29.00 	42.0 	756.0 
Ncgs10 10 19.08 	20.00 	428.5 	95 11.46 	11.46 	263.7 30.54 	38.9 	692.2 
Ncgs11 20 19.48 	20.00 	433.8 	97 11.26 	11.26 	254.6 30.74 	38.5 	688.4 
Ncgs12 100 20.85 	21.00 	440.0 	99 10.57 	10.57 	224.6 31.57 	37.1 	664.6 
Asymmetric costs(2) : entrant is more efficient producer 
Ncga1.9 2 15.00 	15.00 	362.5 	100 14.95 	14.95 	447.0 29.95 	40.1 	809.5 
Ncgal4 10 17.32 	18.00 	371.8 	96 13.57 	13.57 	380.5 30.89 	37.8 	752.3 
Ncgal5 20 18.48 	19.00 	376.3 	97 13.21 	13.21 	349.0 31.69 	36.6 	725.3 
Ncgal6 100 18.88 	19.00 	381.4 	99 13.01 	13.01 	338.4 31.89 	36.2 	719.8 
Asymmetric costs(3) : incumbent is more efficient producer 
Ncgal7 2 18.40 	21.00 	528.5 	87 11.80 	11.80 	279.5 30.20 	39.6 	808.0 
Ncgal8 10 21.54 	23.00 	551.8 	93 10.23 	10.23 	229.0 31.77 	36.5 	762.1 
Ncgal9 20 22.17 	23.00 	559.6 	96 9.91 	9.91 	197.5 32.08 	35.8 	757.2 
Nega20 100 23.79 	24.00 	568.5 	99 9.11 	9.11 	166.9 32.90 	34.2 	735.4 
Parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, r = 0.05, 6' = 0.10, k1 is free. 
(1)Firms with symmetric costs: c1 = 10, fl = 10, mi = 5, di = 50; c2 = 10, f2 = 10, m2 = 5, d2 = 50. 
(2)Firms with asymmetric costs: ci = 10, fl = 10, m1 = 5, d1 = 50; c2 = 2,12 = 8, m2 = 2, d2 = 50. 
(3)Firms with asymmetric costs: c1 = 2, fi = 8, mi = 2, d1 = 50; c2 = 10, h = 10, m2 = 5, d2 = 50. 
results are also summarised in Table 2.2. 
Overcapacity may be used strategically by the incumbent. A combination of large 
capacity and low utilisation rate by the incumbent can act to reduce the profitability and 
entry level of its rival when adjustment costs are low, or moderate (gi = 2, gi = 10) as 
in panes (a) and (b) of Figure 2.3. When firm 1 employs a capacity of k1 = 40, firm 2 
is faced with the following option-s. When firm 1 operates with an overcapacity of 36%, 
firm 2 enters at a capacity of about k2 = 8 (gi = 2, in pane (a) and the rest of Figure 2.3, 
the capacity for firm 2 is not shown), and generates profits of w2 = 135.5; and with 
overcapacity of 14%, firm 2 enters at a capacity of k2 = 3.8 (91 = 10, pane(b)), and 
receives profits of w2 = 29.4. 
Lower levels of overcapacity achieve the same effect under regimes of higher adjust-
ment costs. An overcapacity of only 8% is needed by firm 1 when gi = 20, which leaves 
firm 2 with a capacity of about k2 = 2.6, and profits of w2 = 14.2; and with k1 = 40 and 
gi = 100, firm 2 is virtually deterred from entry into the market. But this is achieved 
at the cost of lower profitability; since with large capacity and high adjustment costs, 
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the incumbent operates at higher utilisation rates, which forces down market price and 
profits. 
Figure 2.4: Incumbent's capacity as a mobility deterrence in a Nash-Cournot game 
against an efficient entrant under asymmetric costs: a = 100, b = 2, S = 0.10, 
Cl = 10, c2 = 2, d1  =- 50, d2 = 50, fi = 10, f2 = 8, ml = 5, m2 = 2. 
2.5.2 Asymmetric Costs: entrant as the more efficient producer 
An interesting feature of the power of incumbency is illustrated in this example, where 
the entrant is a producer that enjoys lower costs of production than the incumbent firm. 
The entrant may be an innovator with a new more efficient technology, or the owner of 
a process that utilises cheaper raw materials, and may also have lower investment costs. 
Yet when the entrant is faced with a market dominated by an established incumbent, 
her entry into, and share of the market is largely influenced by the prevailing market 
conditions. These conditions are dictated by the less efficient incumbent, when firm 2 
accepts the leadership position of capacity choice by firm 1; which in turn influences the 
distribution of market shares. 
The incumbent carries out an analysis of his choices of capacity to select an optimal 
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that will maximise his profits in the face of the more efficient potential entrant. 
The results that are shown in Figure 2.4, and summarised in Table 2.2 indicate that 
the profit maximising Nash-Cournot equilibria in this case are lower, under the different 
adjustment costs, than what they were when both firm's had symmetric costs; which is 
expected given the entrant's lower costs. In each case, firm 2 now can enter at a larger 
capacity than before, and as a result has larger production and market share. There is 
a rise in total industry output, and market price is lower, but industry profitability as a 
whole is improved. 
In this situation, the incumbent cannot deter the entry of firm 2 by employing a large 
capacity. In fact as the incumbent's capacity increases to k1 > 38, it starts making losses; 
while firm 2 can still enter the market, albeit at a low scale, and make some profits as 
panes (c-d) in Figure 2.4 illustrate. Despite the entrant's lower production costs, the 
incumbent, in view of his advantage of being in the market first, is capable of capturing 
a market share of about 60%, when adjustment costs are on the high side. 
It should be noted, however, that the incumbent can pursue a policy of mobility 
deterrence against firm 2 as illustrated especially in panes (c) and (d). Instead of opting 
for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium that maximises its profits at k1 = 19, firm 1 can 
choose a larger capacity in the range of k1 = 25 — 33 and force a substantial reduction 
in the expected profits of its opponent thereby reducing its growth potential. Consider 
the situation when gi = 20 (pane (c)) and the incumbent opts for k1 = 28, instead of 
k1 = 19. In this case firm 1 operates with an overcapacity of 6% and its profits drop to 
wi = 299, a decline of about 20%. While for the entrant the expected profits drop to 
w2 = 173, a decline of more than 50%. A similar proportional decline in the fortunes of 
the entrant arises also when adjustment costs are high (gi --= 100) as can be envisaged 
from pane (d). 
2.5.3 Asymmetric Costs: incumbent as the more efficient producer 
An incumbent is more likely to benefit from his established position in the market than 
a potential entrant. There are several ways in which he do so, to reduce his costs, ex-
pand his market share and improve profits at the expense of opponents. Being in the 
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market first, an incumbent can take advantage by forming a large network of suppli-
ers to market his product and create a strong relationship with customers. Building 
strategically located storage centres and distribution channels reduce the average cost of 
delivered product to users. Also experience gained over the years by the incumbent in 
operating production facilities more efficiently contribute to reducing waste, and to im-
proving operating conditions for optimal output. There are cost savings that can be made 
from reducing investment and capital related costs through learning and technological 
advances in constructing and developing more efficient plants. 
These issues are discussed further in Chapter 5, where empirically determined cost 
savings from the petrochemical industry are also introduced in finding Nash-Cournot 
equilibria for an oligopoly. For the time being I consider an investment game between 
two firms. I assume that the incumbent firm has lower production and investment costs 
than its entrant opponent. 
The cost differential between the two firms is the same as that for the cases considered 
above in Section 2.5.2, and as shown in Table 2.2, where in this case the incumbent is 
the more efficient producer. 
The incumbent derives additional advantage from being the low cost producer with an 
established presence in the market. This is apparent from the results of the incumbent's 
search for optimal capacity to forestall the potential entrant. Under different adjustment 
cost scenarios the incumbent obtains larger capacity and market share than the entrant. 
And his profit and market share are consistently higher than what was possible under 
the cost structures of Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.5.2 as illustrated by the results shown 
in Table 2.2. Because he is the more efficient producer, the incumbent dominates the 
production capacity in the market; and retains on average a market share of 64% to 
72%. The total industry output is also higher, and consequently prices are lower. But 
the industry as a whole benefits and profits increase; this indicates that the industry is 
operating in a region of the market where demand is elastic. 
The results of the incumbent's-searches for optimal capacity are also shown in the plots 
of Figure 2.5. Firm 1 obtains consistently higher profits than firm 2; and these profits 
are higher than what firm 1 obtained when the entrant was the more efficient producer, 
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Figure 2.5: Incumbent's capacity as a mobility deterrence in a Nash-Cournot game 
against a less efficient entrant under asymmetric costs: a = 100, b = 2, 5 = 0.10, 
= 2, c2 = 10, d1 = 50, d2 = 50, fl = 8, 12 = 10, m1  -= 2, m2 = 5. 
by about 45% to nearly 50%. More significant is that the incumbent now dominates the 
market; where his profits range from being 1.9 times those of the entrant (gi = 2) as 
in pane (a), to 3.4 times (gi = 100) as in pane (d). This outcome is also indicative of 
the advantages that the incumbent enjoys, from having an established operation in the 
market, and from lower production costs. 
The pattern of competition which is prevalent in large scale commodity industries 
such as petrochemicals, is similar in many respects to what is presented in this section. 
Incumbent firms in such industries benefit from lower production and investment costs 
that derive from economies of scale, advances in process technology, learning and ex-
perience gained over the years in operation and production. Economies of scale and 
overcapacity allow the incumbent firm to gain market share at the expense of its oppo-
nents of smaller producers, and potential entrants. Larger profits and experience gained 
in industrial production enable the incumbent firm to finance future expansions more 
readily, and to stay ahead in the investment game. 
CHAPTER 2. COMPETITION AND ENTRY DYNAMICS IN A DUOPOLY 63 
The incumbent is unable to deter firm 2 from entering the market when adjustment 
costs are low (gi = 2) as illustrated in pane (a) of Figure 2.5; the incumbent nevertheless, 
is capable of mounting a mobility deterrence strategy. Using a combination of large plant 
and some overcapacity the incumbent forces firm 2 to enter at a low capacity and accept 
modest profits. For instance when firm 1 chooses a capacity of ki = 36, and operates 
with an overcapacity of 32% it receives profits of wi = 410.9, on the other hand firm 2 
enters with a capacity of k2 = 8.8, and receives profits of w2 = 155.9. 
Mobility deterrence becomes more feasible when adjustment costs rise. Firm 1 can 
even deter its opponent, firm 2, from the market with moderately higher adjustment 
costs (gi = 20). As demonstrated by pane (c), when firm 1 increases its capacity to 
ki = 45, firm 2 is unable to enter the market and sustain a profitable operation. And 
when the adjustment cost rises to gi = 100, the incumbent can deter the entrant when 
he installs a capacity of ki = 40, as demonstrated by pane (d). However in all cases the 
incumbent receives much lower profits when a mobility or entry deterrence strategy is 
followed instead of following a profit maximising Nash-Cournot strategy. 
2.6 Strategic Investment in Capacity by Entrant: mobility 
deterrence and exit 
In a similar exercise to that conducted by the incumbent in Section 2.5, the entrant can 
search over the choice of capacity that maximises her profits given that the incumbent's 
capacity has already been chosen. The entrant attempts to improve on the outcome 
of her profits obtained in Section 2.5.1-2.5.3. I also examine situations where mobility 
deterrence or exit of one of the players may arise under the three different production 
cost structures already discussed; but I consider only two of the four possible costs of 
adjustment, that I designate for this purpose as low (gi = 2), and high (gi = 20). In each 
case, the incumbent's capacity is considered fixed at the value obtained for the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium that maximised his profits. These are taken in turn for each cost 
structure reflecting the relative efficiency of the two firms at the corresponding adjustment 
cost as shown in Table 2.2, and the entrant tries to find a new Nash-Cournot equilibrium 
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that maximises her profits. 
2.6.1 Symmetric Costs: firm 2 searching for k; 
Under symmetric costs and low adjustment costs it was found in Section 2.5.1 that the 
best that the incumbent can do is to select a plant capacity of k1 = 16, and expect 
to generate profits of wi = 417 as in case Ncgs9 of Table 2.2. The entrant, instead of 
selecting a capacity of k2 = 13, can carry out an analysis of the best possible outcome by 
searching over her optimal capacity k2 that maximises her profits given that the incum-
bent's capacity is now fixed as just indicated. The results of this Nash-Cournot game are 
shown in pane (a) of Figure 2.6. The entrant can improve her profitability by selecting 
a plant capacity of k2 = 15, and producing an output of x2 = 14.9, giving her a larger 
market share than in case Ncgs9. Her profitability rises by 3.2% to w2 = 349.8. The 
incumbent's output declines to x1  = 15.4, and his profitability by 14% to w1  = 358.2, 
mainly as a result of smaller market share and a lower market price which now stands at 
P = 39.5. These results are also summarised in run Ncgsj9 in Table 2.3. 
The figure also shows that the two firms share the market and attain equal profits 
when the entrant firm selects a capacity of k2 = 16. Both firms, however, obtain slightly 
lower profits of wi = 346, each. Also the entrant can obtain higher profits than the 
incumbent when she selects a capacity in the range of k2 = 17, to k2 = 28. But in all of 
these cases the two firms would be better-off if they retain their Nash-Cournot equilibrium 
profit maximising capacities. 
It was shown in Section 2.5.1 and in pane (a) of Figure 2.3 that the incumbent can 
resort to a mobility deterrence strategy successfully. By selecting a capacity of k1  = 25, 
and operating with an overcapacity of 14%, the incumbent reduces the entry level of firm 2 
to k2 = 11.2 (capacity of firm 2 is not shown in Figure 2.3), and its profits to w2 = 251.9. 
As a result firm l's profits deteriorate also, falling from wi = 417, to wi = 378.5; and 
price falls to P = 38.4. However, the entrant can still counter and obtain slightly better 
results by independently selecting a capacity of k2 = 13. She gets profits of w2 = 261, 
which are about 3.6% higher as illustrated in pane (b) of Figure 2.6. Neither firm is able 
to dislodge the other from the market by installing a large enough capacity. The two 
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Figure 2.6: Nash-Cournot game in a duopoly under symmetric costs: k1 is fixed and 
firm 2 is searching for optimal capacity. 
firms are better-off following a profit maximising Nash-Cournot strategy; since a larger 
capacity installed by the incumbent to deter its opponent, results in both firms having 
their profits deteriorate by similar orders of magnitude if the entrant chooses to fight for 
larger market share. This would also indicate that once entry occurs, and if the entrant 
wants to expand market share, the incumbent would be more accommodating. 
When adjustment costs are high (g, = 20) the incumbent performs even better. We 
saw in run Ncgs11 of Table 2.2 .that firm 1 selected an optimal capacity of k1 -= 20, 
and made profits of wi = 433.8. The search over firm 2's optimal capacity and a new 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium is illustrated in pane (c) of Figure 2.6, and the results are 
summarised in run Ncgsj11, Table 2.3. The entrant makes negligible improvement in her 
profitability (compared to case Ncgs11) by selecting a capacity of k2 = 12, and obtaining 
002 = 255. The incumbent's profits drop about 6.6% to w1 = 405.1 as a result of the 
challenge by the entrant, which is much smaller than the decline with low adjustment 
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costs. It can be seen also that Firm 2 can also enter with a capacity of k2 = 20, and share 
the market with the incumbent. The two firms obtain equal profits of wi = 145.6. Both 
firms, however, are better-off retaining the Nash-Cournot equilibrium capacities where 
they both generate much higher profits. 
Table 2.3: Entrant searching for kl in a Nash-Cournot game against incumbent under 
different cost structures(1) 
gi 
Incumbent 
x1 	k1 	wi 	cui% 
Entrant 
x2 	k2 	w2 
Industry 
X 	Price 	Profit 
Symmetric costs(2) : incumbent and entrant have same costs of production 
Ncgsj9 
Ncgsj11 
2 
20 
	
15.37 	16.00 	358.2 	96 
19.42 	20.00 	405.1 	97 
14.87 	15.00 	349.8 
12.00 	12.00 	255.0 
30.24 	39.5 	708.0 
31.42 	37.2 	660.1 
Asymmetric costs(3) : entrant is more efficient producer 
Ncgaj13 
Ncgajl5 
2 
20 
14.62 	15.00 	327.7 	97 
18.42 	19.00 	348.3 	97 
16.12 	17.00 	453.7 
13.96 	14.00 	349.5 
30.74 	38.5 	781.4 
32.38 	35.2 	697.8 
Asymmetric costs(4) : incumbent is more efficient producer 
Ncgajl7 
Ncgajl9 
2 
20 
17.75 	21.00 	458.0 	85 
22.17 	23.00 	555.8 	96 
13.75 	14.00 	288.2 
10.00 	10.00 	197.7 
31.50 	37.0 	746.2 
32.17 	35.7 	753.4 
Parameter values used: a = 100, b= 2, r = 0.05, 8 = 0.10, ki is fixed. 
(1)Compare results in this table with corresponding runs in Table 2.2, p. 58. 
(2)Firms with symmetric costs: ci = 10, f l  = 10, mi = 5, di = 50; c2 = 10, f2 = 10, m2 = 5, d2 = 50. 
(3)Firms with asymmetric costs: ci = 10, fl = 10, mi = 5, di = 50; c2 = 2,12 = 8, m2 = 2, d2 = 50. 
( )Firms with asymmetric costs: ci = 2, h = 8, mi = 2, d1 = 50; c2 = 10, f2 = 10, m2 = 5, d2 = 50. 
A search by the entrant for an optimal capacity does not affect the outcome of the 
game when the incumbent follows a mobility deterrence strategy. Because of high adjust-
ment costs the incumbent operates at high utilisation rate making the mobility deterrence 
more effective. As illustrated in pane (d) of Figure 2.6, the incumbent selects a capacity 
of k1  = 25, and forces the entrant to accept a capacity of k2 = 10, and reduced profits of 
W2 = 167.1 as a result. This amounts to a loss of 34% for the entrant compared to what 
she could get when the incumbent follows a profit maximising strategy as in case (c) of 
Figure 2.6. The incumbent's profits, however, drop by only 8.5%, from wi = 405.1, to 
wi = 370.6. 
Under conditions of high adjustment costs, the incumbent can curtail the market 
share, profits, and growth potential of the entrant. In addition, by installing a sufficiently 
large enough capacity, the incumbent firm can practically exclude the entrant from the 
market, as illustrated by panes (c) and (d) of Figure 2.3, p. 56. When firm 1 selects a 
plant capacity k1  = 40, the entrant is unable to make any significant entry. This however 
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is achieved at a price. The incumbent will have to accept much lower profits of about 
w1  = 73.4. If the incumbent reduces output to allow prices to rise, he risks making the 
market attractive to a potential entrant. 
2.6.2 Efficient Entrant: firm 2 searching for k; 
An efficient entrant, with lower investment and production costs than the incumbent, 
obtains a larger market share when she follows a strategy of selecting her capacity 
independently, and searches over for an optimal capacity that maximises her profits. 
When adjustment costs are low and overcapacity is inexpensive, the incumbent reduces 
his operating rate and allows for a larger share for firm 2 (compared with the Nash-
Cournot equilibrium results of pane (a) of Figure 2.4). 
As shown in pane (a) of Figure 2.7 firm 2 is able to increase her capacity to k2 = 17, 
and obtains profits of w2 = 453.7. The entrant is also capable of increasing her market 
share at the expense of her opponent, and of diminishing his profits. But this is also at 
the expense of reducing her own profits. 
Despite her superior production and investment costs, the entrant is unable to force 
the incumbent out of the market, since as firm 2's capacity rises (k2 > 42), the entrant's 
profits decline at a faster rate than that of the incumbent. 
This situation changes when the incumbent follows a mobility deterrence strategy by 
employing a larger capacity (k1  = 25) to reduce the entry level of firm 2. Both firms obtain 
lower profits. More importantly firm 2 can now enter with a large capacity (k2 = 36), 
and force the incumbent out of the market as illustrated in pane (b) of Figure 2.7. In 
order to achieve this outcome the entrant has to operate with a large overcapacity (39%), 
and ends up retaining much lower profits of w2 = 76.9. 
The incumbent firm benefits from high adjustment costs. Because of the high cost 
of overcapacity the incumbent firm operates at high utilisation rate and retains a larger 
share of the market (ki" = 19), than the more efficient entrant (k; = 14). The two firms, 
however, realise almost equal profits at the new Nash equilibrium as shown in pane (c) 
of Figure 2.7. 
Furthermore, the incumbent can now mount a strategy of mobility deterrence suc- 
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capacity level of k2 = 20 and employ a capacity utilisation rate of 93%, thereby forcing 
the incumbent into a loss making position and eventual exit. The entrant in this case 
expects to receive lower profits of about w2 = 100. 
Incumbency endows firm 1 with an advantage even when it operates a more costly 
plant than its opponent. Despite its inefficiency the incumbent firm obtains a larger 
market share and higher profits than the more efficient entrant. The incumbent is unable 
to deter the entry of firm 2, but his mobility deterrence strategy takes him a long way. 
When he selects a capacity of k1  = 30, the best that the entrant can do in a single shot 
game is to enter with a capacity k2 = 9, and receive profits of w2 = 144.2, which are 
lower by some 60% of what was possible under the Nash equilibrium strategy of pane (c) 
of Figure 2.7. But there are other alternatives available to the entrant as depicted in 
pane (e) of Figure 2.7. The entrant can select a capacity k2 = 14, and force firm 1 out of 
the market completely. In this case she receives profits of w2 = 98.8; but the entrant can 
now act as a monopolist in the market. It is immediately clear that a dynamic setting 
provides a richer menu of options for the entrant than is available in a static game. The 
entrant can choose a large capacity to force a less efficient incumbent out of the market, or 
to increase market share at his expense gradually, and eventually arrive at a new market 
equilibrium that is more advantageous to the entrant. This type of games is examined 
further in the following chapters. 
2.6.3 Efficient Incumbent: firm 2 searching for k; 
By searching over a profit maximising capacity the entrant can improve on her position 
when the incumbent is the more efficient producer. When adjustment costs are low and 
overcapacity is inexpensive (gi = 2), the incumbent selects a capacity of k1  = 21, to 
maximise his profits (see pane (a) of Figure 2.5). The entrant takes the capacity of 
firm 1 as given and tries to find optimal values for her capacity and output. 
The results of firm 2's search over its profit maximising capacity against the more 
efficient incumbent are shown in pane (a) of Figure 2.8. By following this strategy 
the entrant gains a larger share of the market. Her capacity rises by about 18%, from 
k2 = 11.8, to k2 = 14; and now produces an output of x2 = 13.75. The incumbent 
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accepts a reduction in output from xi = 18.40, to xi = 17.75, and his profits decline to 
wi = 458.0; while firm 2 gets a profit of w2 = 288.2, which is higher by about 5% than 
what she gets under case Ncgal 7. The reason for the small rise in the profit margin of 
firm 2 is due to the fact that the two firms output turns out to be higher under this 
scenario and as a result industry price drops to P = 37.0 (compared with P = 39.6). 
It is apparent from pane (a) of Figure 2.5 also, that the incumbent can follow a mobil-
ity deterrence strategy. By installing a capacity of k J. = 30, he forces the entrant to select 
a capacity of k2 = 12, when she searches over a profit maximising capacity. The results 
are shown in pane (b) of Figure 2.8; the entrant now obtains lower profits of w2 = 208. 
However the incumbent should be careful about installing a larger capacity in the hope 
of curtailing the share of the entrant further. As pane (c) of Figure 2.8 illustrates when 
the incumbent increases his capacity to ki = 45, his profits decline to wi = 172.4, in-
stead of wi = 458, that he obtains if he persists with his Nash-Cournot profit maximising 
strategy; and the entrant's optimal capacity declines to k2 = 8, and receives profits of 
w2 = 102.3. More importantly, the entrant can also encounter by installing a capacity of 
k2 = 15, where upon the incumbent becomes liable to run a loss making operation, and 
would eventually be forced out of the market. 
The position of the entrant becomes worse when adjustment costs are high. Because 
overcapacity is costly in this case, the incumbent's plant operates at high loading rates, 
leaving the entrant with little room for manoeuvre. When gi = 20, the incumbent selects 
an optimal capacity of kJ. = 23, and operates at a utilisation rate of over 96% (see case 
Ncgal9 of Table 2.2). The entrant by searching for an optimal capacity can scarcely 
improve on her position. Firm 2's optimal capacity of k2 = 10, and optimal profits of 
= 197.7, illustrated in pane (d) of Figure 2.8 are almost identical to those of case 
Ncga19 which refer to a standard Nash-Cournot game played with firm 1. The latter's 
profits and market share are also practically unchanged. 
The incumbent can mount a successful mobility deterrence strategy as demonstrated 
by the results of pane (e) of Figure 2.8. When the incumbent chooses a plant capacity 
ki = 30, and operates with an overcapacity of 6%, the best that the entrant can do 
now is to select a capacity of k2 = 7, which is 30% lower than before. The incumbent's 
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Figure 2.8: Nash-Cournot game in a duopoly under asymmetric costs where incumbent 
is more efficient: k1  is fixed and firm 2 is searching for optimal capacity. 
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profits drop by 8% to wi = 510.8, while the entrant's profits are reduced by about 52% 
to w2 = 95.5. Total industry output rises and the market price drops as a result from 
P = 35.7, to P = 29.5. 
2.7 Follow the Leader: Stackelberg game between Incum-
bent & Entrant 
A Stackelberg solution is considered when one of the firms acts as a leader. In this section 
two cases are evaluated. The first when the incumbent firm acts as the leader; here the 
entrant react in one of two ways. By choosing her capacity independently and acting as 
a follower in output; or by making her choice of capacity and output to be subject to 
the leader's influence. And the second when the entrant, in turn, acts as leader. The 
equilibrium solutions are evaluated under conditions of binding capacity, that is when 
xi < ki is enforced, where output is not allowed to exceed capacity. 
A Stackelberg equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where the leader acts first by choosing 
the strategy u': that maximises his profits. The follower reacts rationally to the leader's 
action by selecting optimal strategy u;=Ri (un that maximises her profits, taking as 
given the leader's choice of optimal strategy 	Where the notation Ri (un refers to 
the rational reaction of the follower firm j when firm i selects strategy 74'. The pair 
of strategies (u7, Ri (un) is said to constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium if it satisfies 
the following inequality (Simaan & Cruz 1973b, Sherali, Soyster & Murphy 1983). A 
definition for a Stackelberg equilibrium solution for a more general problem can be found 
in Ba§ar & Olsder (1999, p. 133): 
u';) > wi(ui , 	Vui E Ui, 	i j, di = 1,2. 	(2.25) 
I will concentrate on the optimal outputs of the two firms. In this context R2(xi) is the 
reaction function of firm 2, which determines the optimal response, or reaction of this 
firm to every output x1 produced by the leader, firm 1. A pair of output strategies by 
the two firms (xt, 4), or equivalently (xi, R2(xi)), constitutes a Stackelberg equilibrium 
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if the two outputs satisfy the solution of the two maximisation equations stated below. 
max P(xi, R2(xi))xi — 	— 1-1(u1,14) Vui E Ui 	(2.26) U l 
w2  = 	max P(xi, R2 (x1))R2 (X1) - C2 (X2, k2) - /2 (U2, k2) V2 E U2 (2.27) 
U2 
Considering the case for the outputs, the two equations become: 
awl  
axl 
awe  
OP  OP  
P + (— + axi  aR2(xi.) 
OP 
P+ 	R2(xi) 
aR2(xl) 
aR2(xi) ) oci  ail 0  
ox, xi oxi oxi 
ace 	ail  
aR2(xi) aR2(xi) 
(2.28) 
(2.29) 
aR2(xi) 
These two equations are equivalent to equations (2.6) and (2.7) of the Nash-Cournot 
problem of Section 2.2.2. The inverse demand function was defined to be strictly de-
creasing in Section 2.2.1; moreover equations (2.28) and (2.29) involve the maximisation 
of strictly concave functions over two bounded, compact and convex sets, since we have 
already defined xi E [0,xi ], (see item (c) in Section 2.2.1). A unique optimum exists, and 
the solution (xi, R2(xi)) of the above system is a Stackelberg equilibrium (for a formal 
proof refer to Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 in Sherali, Soyster & Murphy (1983), or to Ba§ar 
& Olsder (1999, p. 131)). 
2.7.1 Entrant Acting as Stackelberg Follower in Output 
Initially the leader is assumed to influence only the output of the follower, firm 2. The 
latter selects her investment rate and plant capacity independently. When the leader 
selects an output rate xi, the follower firm 2 takes this output as given and reacts in a 
Cournot fashion to leader's output. The leader realising this, knows that firm 2 will take 
his output as given and tries to find an optimal output xi, that maximises his profits 
given firm 2's optimal response R2(xi). Which he obtains from equation (2.26). Firm 2 
on the other hand, finds her optimal output x2 = R2 (xi) in the usual way by solving 
(2.27). 
The term aR2(xl) refers to the optimal variational response in the output of firm 2 axi 
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to marginal changes in the output of the leader. Since firm 2 is acting as a Cournot 
follower, its optimal reaction to the output of firm 1 is obtained from the reaction curve 
of firm 2 as given in equation (2.11) p. 39. When plant capacity is chosen independently 
by firm 2, k2 is not influenced by x1 and in this case from (2.11) we can derive: 
aR2(xi) _ ax2 _ b 
Oxi 	axi 	(21) + 92) 
(2.30) 
inserting this value in equation (2.28) and rearranging we obtain: 
b2  (a 	+ giki) + (-2b +  (2b 	92) 91)x1 — bR2 (X1) = 0 (2.31) 
for the follower firm the output of its opponent is taken as given, and firm 2 in finding 
its optimal output x2 = R2(xT), utilises equation (2.29) which is the same as (2.11). 
Optimal investment rate, 4 and capacity, q, are also obtained from same equations as 
(2.10) and (2.12). Using these results in equation (2.29) and rearranging we obtain an 
equation which is the same as (2.13), p. 39. 
R2 (Xi) =-
2b — f2 — m2 — Sc2) — -12 x1 
	 (2.32) 
The vector of optimal output strategies x* = 	R2(xI)), which constitutes the Stack- 
elberg equilibrium for the two firms, can be obtained by solving (2.31) and (2.32). The 
results are shown in case Skgsil in Table 2.4. The leader, firm 1, performs better than the 
follower. Its profits are better than when the two firms played Nash-Cournot strategies 
under the same conditions in Table 2.1, case Ncgsl. These results are restated in Ta-
ble 2.4. Firm 2 performs worse because its role as a follower allows it a smaller market 
share. 
2.7.2 Entrant's Capacity and Output Subject to Leader's Influence 
A situation may arise where a new firm which is considering entry into a market served 
by a well established incumbent, becomes cautious. It could be because the entrant is 
venturing into a new market with which she is not familiar; or because what is being 
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considered is a new product or process, that the entrant may wish to give due consid-
eration to the scale of entry into the new market. The entrant in these circumstances 
would wish to enter at a small scale, so as not to 'upset' the market and precipitate an 
adverse reaction from the incumbent. The entrant in this case behaves as a follower, and 
would take into consideration the output of the leader when choosing her output and 
plant capacity. 
The problem at hand is still one of finding solutions for the maximisation problems 
of equations (2.26) and (2.27). In addition to having the output of firm 2 dependent on 
the leader's output, x2 = R2 (Xi), we also have firm 2's capacity dependent on its output, 
k2(x2), and as such is indirectly dependent of the leader's output. 
Evaluating the optimal output for firm 2 proceeds as in Section 2.2.2; if we allow for 
the optimal investment rate and capacity to be taken into consideration first, we obtain 
the following expression: 
g2(x2 k2) = n'12 C5C2 	 (2.33) 
using this result in equation (2.29) we obtain equation (2.13). The relationship between 
R2(xi ) and x1 in this equation takes into consideration the influence on the optimal 
ax1)  choice of capacity k2 as well. The term  R2 ( 	can then be obtained by differentiation axi 
of (2.13): 
	
OR2 (x ) 0x2 	1 = 	2 	 (2.34) ax i 	°x i  
using this result in (2.28) we obtain an equation for the optimal output of the leader 
firm: 
a — 	 bx1 — bR2(xi) — — 91(x]. —  k1) 2 (2.35) 
the Stackelberg equilibrium of output strategies, x* = 	R2 (x1)), for the two firms can 
be obtained by solving equations (2.35) and (2.32). In this case the entrant will do worse 
than before, since it gets an even smaller market share and plant capacity as illustrated 
by case Skgsi2, in Table 2.4. 
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2.7.3 The Entrant Acting as Leader 
An entrant in many circumstances may not wish to act as follower upon entering a 
new market. Instead, an entrant may assume the role of leader and expects that the 
incumbent would act as a follower. This may arise when the entrant is in possession 
of a more efficient production process, or has access to cheaper raw materials that give 
her an advantage over the incumbent. Taking on the role of Stackleberg leader enables 
the entrant to benefit from her advantageous costs of production. This is more likely in 
situations when the entrant is a large and well established firm in the industry entering 
the market for a new product segment; or is the subsidiary of a large producer in a 
similar industry, and is therefore adept in dealing with manufacturing and marketing of 
new products. 
The roles taken by the two firms in the previous section are now reversed. Firm 2 now 
acts as leader while firm 1 accepts the role of the Cournot follower. The entrant selects 
her optimal output rate, x2, first, and the incumbent reacts by selecting an optimal 
response, Ri(eD. The two firms try to find a solution that satisfies the maximisation to 
the following two equations: 
wi 	= MaXP(Ri (X2), X2)R1 (X2) — (xi, ki) — /1(ui, ki) Vui E Ui (2.36) ul  
w2 	= max P(Ri (X2), X2)X2 C2(X21 k2) I2 (U2, k2) Vu2 G U2 U2 (2.37) 
which in turn when profits are being maximised with respect to outputs, become: 
ORI. 
(x2) =-- a — 2bRi (x2) — bx2 — 	— (Ri (x2) — k1) =--- 0, 	(2.38) 
aw2 ( OP 	OP 	OR1(x 2 ) 0C2 012 0.  (2.39) ax2 	‘ax2 aRi(x2) 0x2 ax2 ax2 
Note that the term '91-4-2 is obtained from the Cournot reaction of the follower incum-
bent, namely equation (2.38), which yields: 
OR1(x2) _ 
ax2 	(2b + 
awl  
b (2.40) 
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and remembering that when the entrant is optimising her choice of capacity, k2 , we also 
have: 
g2(x2 — k2 ) = m2 + 8C2 	 (2.41) 
Using those two terms in (2.39) we obtain: 
awe  b2 = (a —12  — m2 — bc2) — bRi (x2) + (-2b + 2b + gi )x2 =0. 	(2.42) Ox2 
The Stackelberg equilibrium x* = (Ri (4), 4), where Ri (4) = 4, is obtained by solving 
equations (2.38) and (2.42), and finding the optimal values. These values are depicted 
in Table 2.4, case Skgsj3. The entrant now installs a capacity of k2 = 15, and produces 
at full capacity. The incumbent, firm 1, reduces its output to xi=17, to allow for the 
leader's increased output. It so happens that the two firms obtain equal profits. The 
entrant generates higher profits than when she acted as a follower in cases Skgsil and 
Skgsi2. 
2.7.4 Entrant and Incumbent Acting as Leaders: Stackelberg Disequi-
librium 
It was shown in Section 2.7.2 and Section 2.7.3 above, that each firm generates more 
profits when it takes on the role of leader with its opponent accepting the role of follower, 
than the case of both firms engaging in a Nash-Cournot game. This is clear from the 
outcome of profits generated by the leader in Table 2.4, in runs Skgsil and Skgsi2 where 
the incumbent takes on the leadership role; and in run Skgsj3 where the entrant plays 
leader. In each of those cases the leader obtains higher profits than the cases when he 
takes on the role of follower, or when both firms engage in a Nash-Cournot game as 
illustrated in case Ncgs1. 
These results are corroborated by the findings of Vives (1999), Dastidar (2003), and 
Anderson & Engers (1992). The latter find that in an oligopoly of m firms, the Stack-
elberg equilibrium is more competitive than the equivalent Nash-Cournot equilibrium. 
The reason is that in a hierarchical Stackelberg game each firm selects a higher output 
in an attempt to induce remaining firms to cut back on output. As a result prices are 
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higher under Nash-Cournot competition and firms make more profits. 
In general this is an expected outcome for quantity games with linear and downward 
sloping demand curves. Dockner, Feichtinger & Mehlmann (1989) illustrate a similar 
outcome for a fisheries game. Gal-Or (1985) and Dowrick (1986) generalise this result 
for situations where firms are engaged in quantity games, and have downward sloping 
reaction functions. Coverage of the more recent literature concerning these issues can be 
found in Vives (1999) and Dastidar (2003). 
But the question of which of the firms takes on the role of leader, when the leader-
follower roles are determined endogenously in the game remains largely unresolved. The 
leader-follower relationship is instable, as originally pointed out by von Stackelberg, since 
each firm struggles to become leader (Matsumura 2002). The dichotomy of roles and its 
implications for the payoffs of players is illustrated in Dowrick (1986), who argues that a 
Cournot solution is a Nash equilibrium in outputs, but not in the choice of roles. However, 
Dowrick is inclined to the view that a Stackelberg equilibrium is a more likely outcome in 
situations of asymmetric costs as a compromise solution to avoid a "leadership warfare" 
or a price war; and further that firms might be expected to collude in seeking a more 
profitable solution. While a Stackelberg solution is more likely in situations where one 
firm enjoys sufficiently large cost advantages over its rival, that the follower accepts the 
weaker role as it expects its rival to take a strong position and win a price a war. 
Matsumura (1999) shows under restrictive conditionsll in a quantity game where 
the roles are determined endogenously, that a Stackelberg equilibrium is plausible for a 
duopoly. While for a price game Anderson & Engers (1994) demonstrate that a Stackel-
berg equilibrium with sequential moves exists. 
The roles of play for the firms, in all the games that are considered in this thesis are 
imposed exogenously as we have seen, and there is no ambiguity about what role each 
player takes. 
However, consider a situation which we have not dealt with so far, where both firms 
want to act as leaders, and each expects its opponent to act as a Nash-Cournot follower. 
1.1In his model firms produce in m periods but sell their output simultaneously in the mth period. 
There is no discounting and the firms are unable to observe deviations from the optimal path. The 
author shows that a Cournot or Stackelberg equilibrium is feasible for a duopoly, but a hierarchical 
Stackelberg equilibrium for an oligopoly is not. 
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Let us see how the two would perform. 
When both firms act as Stackelberg leaders, with each assuming that its opponent will 
take on the role of Nash-Cournot follower, the two firms overproduce and find themselves 
in a worse situation than any of the other strategies that have been considered. The equi-
librium solution to this strategy is known as Stackelberg disequilibrium, or what Dowrick 
(1986) refers to as "leadership warfare". We have already seen that when firm 1 acts as 
leader, while holding the expectation that firm 2 will behave as a Nash-Cournot follower 
in output, the following relationship describing the influence of the incumbent's output 
on that of the entrant was obtained from (2.30): 
OR2(xi) Ox2 
axi 	aX1 	(2b + 92 ) 
furthermore, the optimal output for firm 1 has to satisfy equation (2.31), which is restated 
below: 
b2 
(a — f1 + giki) + (-2b + 
(2b + 92) gl)xl — bR
2(xi) = 0 
and similarly for firm 2, when it acts as a Stackelberg leader assuming that the incumbent 
will act as a Nash-Cournot follower. The relationship describing the influence of firm 2 
on that of the incumbent was shown above in (2.40) to be: 
aRi(x2) = 	 
Ox2 	(2b + .91)' 
the optimal output for the entrant firm when it acts as a Stackelberg leader has to satisfy 
equation (2.42): 
aw2 = (a — f2 — m2 — bc2) — bRi (x2) + (-2b + 2b 	b+2 gi )x2 = 0. ux2 
remembering that at equilibrium xi = Ri (4), and also 4 = R2 (et ). The optimal output 
values for this Stackelberg disequilibrium are obtained by solving equations (2.31) and 
(2.42). Also for firm 2 the optimal capacity can be obtained from equation (2.41), and 
optimal investment rate from (2.8), p. 39. 
The optimal results when the incumbent's capacity is fixed at k1  = 21, are shown in 
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case skgsd.4 in Table 2.4. It has to be noted that the capacity constraints on output are 
imposed for all the runs that appear in the table. 
Table 2.4: Entrant searching for q against incumbent under symmetric costs and differ-
ent investment strategies 
Incumbent 
x l 	k1 	w1 	clti% 
Entrant 
x2 	k2 	w2 X 
Industry 
Price 	Profit 
Stackelberg games with incumbent acting as leader“ ) 
Skgsil 
Skgsi2 
	
20.80 	21.00 	440.5 	99 
21.00 	21.00 	442.0 	100 
10.62 	10.62 	226.4 
10.50 	10.50 	221.5 
31.42 
31.50 
37.2 
37.0 
666.9 
663.5 
Stackelberg game with entrant acting as leader(2  
Skgsj3 	17.00 	21.00 	301.0 	81 15.00 	15.00 	301.0 32.00 36.0 602.0 
Stackelberg game both incumbent and entrant acting as leaders(3)  
Skgsd4 
Skgsd5 
19.59 	21.00 	329.2 	93 
18.98 	21.00 	274.7 	90 
13.77 	13.77 	239.0 
15.00 	15.00 	230.1 
33.36 
33.98 
33.3 
31.3 
568.2 
504.8 
Incumbent and entrant engaged in Nash-Cournot games 
Ncgsl (4)  
Ncgks2(5)  
Ncgks3 (6)  
18.00 	21.00 	406.0 	86 
17.38 	21.00 	339.7 	83 
17.25 	21.00 	326.7 	82 
12.00 	12.00 	289.0 
13.88 	14.00 	298.5 
14.25 	15.00 	295.2 
30.00 
31.26 
31.50 
40.0 
37.5 
37.0 
695.0 
638.2 
621.9 
Parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, r = 0 05, d = 0.10, 	= 2, ki = 21. Capacity constraints 
are enforced in all cases, and both firms have symmetric costs: ci = 10, fl = 10, ml = 5, di = 50; 
C2 = 10, f 2 = 10, TTL2 = d2 = 50. 
(1)In case Skgsil the leader, firm 1, influences only the choice of follower's output; and in case 
Skgsi2 the leader influences the follower's choice of capacity and output. 
(2)The entrant, firm 2, acts as leader and assumes that firm 1 will act as a Nash-Cournot follower 
in output. 
(3)Each of the two firms act as leader assuming its opponent will act as a Nash-Cournot follower. 
Firm 2 chooses its capacity and output accordingly in case Skgsd4. While in case Skgsd5 firm 2 
selects its capacity independently at k2 = 15. 
(4)The two firms play a Nash-Cournot game with firm 2 selecting its optimal output and capacity. 
This is the same run as in Table 2.1. 
(51  Unlike in Ncgsl, the entrant in this case searches for optimal capacity independently. 
()In this run the entrant acts as a leader in the choice of capacity as in case Skgsj3; and then the 
two firms play a Nash-Cournot game in the choice of optimal outputs. 
2.8 Which Optimal Strategy? 
The problem at hand that we are dealing with is one where an incumbent firm has already 
installed a plant, with a capacity fixed at k1  = 21, and is facing the entry of a new firm 
into the market. The question that needs to be addressed is what output strategy should 
the incumbent follow? And for the entrant, the strategy she follows will have a bearing 
on both her capacity and output. 
In evaluating Nash equilibria we assume that the players hold the correct beliefs about 
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their opponents (Friedman 1986). The players stick to the roles they are assigned to, for 
the equilibrium solution we evaluate to be meaningful. So in case Skgsil, of Table 2.4 
when the incumbent takes on the role of leader, and makes his choice of optimal output 
on the basis that the entrant will behave as a Nash-Cournot follower, the entrant, firm 2, 
is aware of this and makes her choice of optimal output and capacity on the basis of her 
role as a follower with the expectation that firm 1 will play the role of leader who will 
stick to the declared optimal output 
When making their choices of which strategy to follow, both firms would evaluate the 
alternatives that are available. Whether to play a Stackelberg or a Nash-Cournot game, 
and what role each would take. I also examine two cases where there is a breakdown 
in the agreement over the roles of leadership between the two firms. The results of the 
different alternatives are shown in Table 2.4. 
By accepting the role of follower, firm 2 obtains the smallest market share and profits 
when it allows the choice of both its capacity and output to be subject to the leader's 
influence as cases Skgsil and Skgsil illustrate. Firm 1 operates at full capacity and 
generates its highest profits possible. Firm 2, as case Skgsj3 shows, performs much 
better when it acts as a Stackelberg leader, and selects a capacity of k2 = 15, assuming 
that the incumbent will behave as as Nash-Cournot follower. The entrant's market share 
rises by more than 40% and generates as much profits as the incumbent. The incumbent 
is worse off, his operating rate declines to cui = 81, and profits drop by more than 31%. 
The price is more competitive than before, and profits for the industry decline. 
However, there is no reason under these conditions for the incumbent to accept the 
role of follower. By sticking to a Stackelberg strategy, firm 1 performs much better even if 
the entrant chooses to act as leader as well. In case Skgsd4 firm 1 retains a larger market 
share and obtains more profits than case Skgsj3 where it was acting as follower. Firm 2 
is worse off now; but is still better off than when it acted as a follower. It generates 
more profits than in cases Skgsil and Skgsil. It is unlikely therefore that the entrant 
should elect to act as a follower, because she is better off choosing a Stackelberg or a 
Nash-Cournot strategy. Both firths perform better when the entrant chooses a capacity 
of k2 = 12, and the two firms engage in a Nash-Cournot game, as in case Ncgsl. Firm 2 
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in this case is still better off than being a follower. The two firms obtain higher profits 
than when they engage in Stackelberg warfare. In the latter case, market price is more 
competitive, and industry profits are lower. Under a Nash-Cournot game, the industry 
is more disciplined. Prices and industry profitability are high. 
Case Skgsd5 is the worst case scenario. The entrant chooses her capacity according 
to a Stackelberg strategy assuming the incumbent will behave as a follower as in Skgsj3. 
The incumbent instead produces following a Stackelberg strategy. Both firms obtain less 
profits than the previous case Skgsd4. They can do still worse if they both produce at 
full capacity. The entrant however, is still making more profits than when she choose the 
role of follower. The entrant would do better in a Nash-Cournot game if she chose her 
capacity independently by searching over a profit maximising capacity as in case Ncgks2. 
Firm 2 now has a larger market share and its profits rise to w2 = 298.5; while the profits 
for firm 1 drop to wi = 339.7. These profits are still better than what the incumbent 
would get under the Stackelberg warfare cases. 
The entrant would perform better by following a Stackelberg like strategy in the 
choice of her capacity. And if she is unsure about whether the incumbent would resort 
to a Stackelberg production strategy, by sticking to her choice of capacity of k2 = 15, 
the entrant would ensure a better outcome. A Stackelberg warfare under this choice is 
damaging to both firms as the results of case Skgsd5 illustrate. The incumbent is unlikely 
to carry out the threat of resorting to Stackelberg output if firm 2 selects a capacity of 
k2 = 15. This strategy is not credible. Because both firms would do better by resorting 
to Nash-Cournot production strategy. The two firms will learn that once their capacities 
are fixed, they can earn more by reducing their outputs in accordance with the outcome 
of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium values of case Ncgks3. 
In a quantity game, firms engage in struggle for the choice of capacity (or capital 
(Anderson & Engers 1992, p.129); (Friedman 1986)). Capacity is the strategic asset that 
enables the firms to compete for market share. And overcapacity is like the strategic 
reserve that allows the firms to make their threats of reverting to higher output credible. 
For if firm 2 were to choose a smaller capacity there is no guarantee that firm 1 will 
reduce its output to accommodate the increased share of its rival . 
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2.9 	Analysis of Results and Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I examined the role of investment in capacity for strategic gain in a 
noncooperative game of a duopoly producing a homogenous product. Using a model 
of simple structure, that involves quadratic adjustment costs that penalise the firm for 
operating with idle capacity, I also briefly explored under what conditions it becomes 
feasible to deter mobility or entry into a market, and the levels of sustainable overcapacity 
required. 
The examples examined for different competitive positions between the incumbent 
and entrant reveal that because of adjustment costs firms care about the size of plant ca-
pacity they build. Two factors are taken into consideration when deciding on production 
schedule and the overcapacity they carry. First, production is limited by the capacity, 
and how much product is produced affects market price and the firm's profitability. Sec-
ond, the cost of overcapacity is influenced by adjustment costs and its level is dictated by 
the desire to accommodate a new entrant, or the willingness to have enough production 
capability to force an opponent out of the market. A profit maximising firm tries to 
balance these two opposing factors. 
Depending on the cost structures of the two firms, their relative efficiency, and the 
cost of investment, the firms determine whether mobility or entry deterrence is a desirable 
or feasible option. Either of the two firms can pursue such a policy to its advantage. 
Adjustment costs are often not taken into consideration in studies concerned with 
the strategic role of overcapacity. The models in Dixit (1979, 1980), and Spence (1977, 
1979) overlook the role of the cost of idle capacity. Dockner (1992) includes quadratic 
adjustment costs that are a function output but do not account for variations in capacity 
utilisation and overcapacity. The cost of idle capacity has an important bearing on how 
far the firms can go in investing in additional capacity for entry or mobility deterrence; 
and determines whether employing overcapacity for strategic effect is feasible. 
It was shown in Section 2.5 that under a regime of low adjustment costs, it is not 
possible for an incumbent to deter entry into the market even when the incumbent is the 
more efficient producer. Nevertheless, the exposé of different examples throughout the 
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chapter illustrate that the incumbent can take advantage of his ability to move first, by 
investing strategically. By choosing a large plant capacity in the first stage of the game, 
an incumbent invests strategically to influence the second stage of the game, and forces 
the entrant to accept a smaller market share. Slade (1989), Fudenberg & Tirole (1992), 
Reynolds (1991), and Dockner (1988, 2000) provide different representations of a similar 
investment strategy, in the form of feedback investment strategies that will be dealt with 
in the following chapter. 
The results of Table 2.1, p. 52, and Table 2.2, p. 58, show this effect. Despite the 
entrant's more favourable production and investment costs, the incumbent still dominates 
the market and generates more profits, because of his higher capacity. The results of the 
simultaneous entry cases of Ncgs7 and Ncgsa8 in Table 2.1, depict the outcome that 
would emerge in the market if the incumbent were to forgo his larger capacity. The two 
firms would retain identical profits and market shares when their costs are symmetric. 
When the entrant is more efficient, firm 2 would dominate the market and obtain higher 
profits. 
An implementation of an algorithm developed by Harker (1984), to compute Nash-
Cournot equilibria using a variational inequality formulation was illustrated. This formu-
lation can deal with more complicated market situations and highly nonlinear problems, 
such as those discussed in Harker (1984, 1991) and Nagurney (1988). The use of optimi-
sation techniques in this formulation, facilitates the explicit imposition of capacity and 
other linear or nonlinear constraints on the problem. Outrata, Koevara & Zowe (1998) 
show how constraints like upper limits on the output of the leader or on total indus-
try can be imposed, whilst finding equilibrium solutions for oligopoly problems under 
Nash-Cournot or Stackelberg strategies. 
When adjustment costs are high the use of capacity investment by the incumbent for 
mobility or entry deterrence is rendered more effective. It becomes harder for the entrant 
to enter the market. High adjustment costs make idle capacity very expensive, and the 
incumbent operates at high utilisation rate; as a result the entrant firm has to accept a 
smaller market share, and is forced to enter at lower capacity. 
In situations where costs are symmetric or the incumbent is the more efficient pro- 
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ducer, entry deterrence becomes possible with the incumbent holding very high capacity. 
Such a strategy is unlikely to be attractive with prevailing differentials in costs of pro-
duction. A drop in demand, or arrival of a determined entrant puts the incumbent at 
risk (see cases Ncga5 and Ncga6, Table 2.1). Mobility deterrence is more likely. Strategic 
use of capacity by the incumbent has to be used with caution especially if the entrant 
has more advantageous costs of production. If the incumbent selects too high a capacity, 
the entrant could become indifferent between choosing a profit maximising strategy at 
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium capacity, and opting for a large enough capacity to force 
her opponent out of the market (see Figure 2.7). 
It is evident from pane (f), in Figure 2.8, that when the incumbent installs a capacity 
of k1  = 40, the entrant enters with a capacity of k2 = 5 and is barely making any profits. 
If the incumbent firm raises its capacity level slightly, the entrant will effectively be 
deterred from entry into the market. But the question is what would happen if the 
entrant installs a capacity of k2 = 10? It is clear that in this situation, both firms will be 
making losses. And although the incumbent is the more efficient producer, he will incur 
substantially higher losses than the entrant. This then raises the question of whether 
the incumbent would still be willing to maintain such a high capacity and risk incurring 
as a result heavy losses in the face of a determined entrant; or would he rather revise 
his capacity level plans and accommodate his less efficient rival? This analogy becomes 
more compelling when the entrant has more efficient or similar costs of production. 
In the examples examined in this chapter, engaging in entry or mobility deterrence 
was found to be costly to both firms even when the incumbent enjoyed fairly large cost 
advantages in terms of investment and production costs. In all the cases considered, both 
firms obtain higher payoffs if they stick to their Nash-Cournot equilibrium capacities. A 
strategy of entry deterrence is justified only when the cost differentials between the two 
firms are substantial to allow one firm to dominate the market while running a profitable 
operation. Firms may follow such a strategy when markets are still growing. Or if there 
are economies of scale and learning effects that can be exploited, in the expectation of 
reducing costs and capturing larger market share of an expanding market. The rationale 
behind this behaviour is that firms forgo short term profits for longer term rewards. A 
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dynamic setting is more suited to the study of such market situations. The petrochemical 
and commodity products industry has several documented cases that attest to similar 
behaviour; Du Pont with titanium dioxide (Ghemawat 1984, Hall 1990, Rosenbaum & 
Ye 1992), Dow Chemicals with magnesium (Lieberman 1987c), Alcoa and aluminium 
ingot (Reynolds 1986), Kellogg and breakfast cereals (Schmalensee 1978, Sutton 1991), 
and many other examples given in Scherer & Ross (1990) and Sutton (1991, 1998). 
Under a low adjustment costs regime, where the cost of idle capacity is low, the 
incumbent can afford to invest strategically to influence his opponent. By installing a 
large capacity the incumbent aims to gain a large market share and earn higher profits. 
Overcapacity becomes prevalent when one of the firms follows a mobility deterrence 
strategy to force its opponent to reduce its capacity or output level. Consequently, social 
welfare improves when the firms engage in mobility deterrence, or one of them assumes the 
role of Stackelberg leader. The market becomes more competitive and prices fall. Where 
as when they follow profit maximising Nash-Cournot strategies, the market becomes 
more disciplined. Under Nash-Cournot strategies, industry output is lower, prices rise 
and both firms' profitability improves. 
It was also found that the strategy adopted by a firm in choosing its role as a leader 
or follower, has an important bearing on its market share and profitability. Since a Stack-
elberg leader performs better than its follower, the entrant by playing the role of leader 
gains in market share and profits. It is natural therefore that each firm struggles for the 
leadership position (Dowrick 1986), but when there is a breakdown in the agreement over 
the roles, both firms will suffer as shown by the results of the Stackelberg disequilibrium 
(see Table 2.4, runs Skgsd4 and Skgsd5). At least by opting for a Stackelberg-like strat-
egy in the choice of capacity, the entrant improves her standing in the market even when 
the duopolistic firms resort to Nash-Cournot competition in outputs. This conclusion 
appears to point in the direction of the suggestion by Anderson & Engers (1992) and 
Matsumura (1999) that more attention be paid to Stackelberg models. 
Chapter 3 
Capacity Expansion and 
Competition in a Dynamic 
Context: a linear quadratic model 
Having discussed an entry and competition game in a static setting in the previous chap-
ter, I turn to analyse the capacity expansion problem in a dynamic setting as a differential 
game, with the firms engaging in a Nash-Cournot competition. Before discussing the nec-
essary conditions for convergence and uniqueness of the solution of the game, I address 
the model formulation as a linear quadratic problem for n firms (for the simulations, the 
model is implemented for a duopoly; this can be easily extended to an oligopoly of three 
or more firms). 
Linear quadratic (LQ) games became widely used in economic modelling for their 
tractability and the possibility of obtaining analytical solutions for the optimal stabilising 
strategies. More importantly LQ games may be used to represent a more general type of 
models by means of linear quadratic approximations along the optimal solution of these 
general type models. 
LQ games are characterised by having linear quadratic objective functions, and linear 
state equations; that is equation systems that are linear in the state of the game and the 
control variables. With quadratic investment and production costs, it is imperative that 
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the objective function is quadratic. 
Another feature of these models is the presence of adjustment costs. The adjustment 
costs can be interpreted as deviations of some economic indicators, that may be repre-
sented by the state variable or control variable, from optimal target values or some long 
run equilibrium level. These deviations are accounted for as quadratic cost functions 
that penalise the objective function which the player is trying to maximise. The player 
attempts to minimise the sum of these deviations from the desired target values. 
LQ games were first studied by Starr & Ho (1969a, 1969b) and showed that these 
games are normal; that is they admit unique equilibrium solutions in open-loop and feed-
back Nash strategies if the differential equations of the game admit feasible trajectories. 
Capacity expansion models, which face a linear downward sloping demand curve 
for their output, fall necessarily into this category (Reynolds 1986, 1987, 1991, Hanig 
1986). Other areas where LQ games find application include macroeconomic policy 
coordination (e.g. Kydland 1974, and Dockner, Jorgensen, Long & Sorger 2000, who 
model games between the Federal Reserve Board, or central banks, and government 
fiscal policy), optimal policy stabilisation (e.g. Fershtman & Muller 1984, Fershtman 
& Kamien 1987, 1990, Pindyck 1973), R&D competition for patents of new products 
(Kamien & Schwartz 1991), gasoline price wars (Slade 1992b), advertising campaigns 
(Slade 1990, 1992a, 1996), and international trade (Karp & Perloff 1989). Within the class 
of cooperative games, LQ models have been used to model power generation planning and 
electricity exchange between different states or across countries (Pineau & Murto 2000, 
Haurie & Zaccour 1986, Haurie, Zaccour & Smeers 1990), pollution control (Jorgensen 
& Zaccour 2001, Feenstra, Kort & de Zeeuw 2001). And in the energy field but in a 
noncooperative framework they have been used to model natural gas and oil projects 
development and supply contracts (Haurie, Zaccour & Smeers 1990, Salant 1982); and 
finally LQ games have been used to model optimal policies for fishing problems, or in the 
extraction of renewable or nonrenewable natural resources (Levhari & Mirman 1980). 
The capacity expansion games we analyse are of the LQ type, with an equation of 
motion that is linear in the state and the control variable. Another significant feature of 
these games is that they admit unique solutions when certain conditions on the strategies 
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of the players are met which are dealt with in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. 
The role of adjustment costs, which are introduced into the model formulation, and 
justification for their use in the literature, is discussed first in Section 3.1 below. Then 
the model formulation, its main components, and the optimality conditions for a single 
company and their economic interpretation are presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Two 
types of models and their solutions are considered for the Nash-Cournot game, the open-
loop, and the feedback model. The significance of the different information structures 
imposed on the formulations of the three models is discussed, and the implications for 
the equilibrium solutions of the models is highlighted in Section 3.4. In the last section 
the feedback Nash-Cournot model is solved in discrete time to show the stability of the 
solution attained, which is not always clear in continuous time due to limitations in the 
convergence of the algorithms used, in some cases when certain parameter values of the 
model are applied; this reveals itself in the resulting oscillations around the equilibrium 
values. And finally the chapter concludes with a discussion and conclusion sections. 
3.1 Adjustment Costs 
The role of adjustment costs in influencing the investment policy of firms has long been 
recognised, and was first studied by Gould (1968), Treadway (1970), and Nickell (1978). 
Since then many more studies that incorporate adjustment costs have been carried out; 
other than capacity accumulation models, adjustment costs are now widely used in mod-
els of price adjustment (Pindyck 1982, 1988, Slade 1992a, 1996, Fershtman & Kamien 
1987, 1990), pollution and environmental control (Feenstra, Kort & de Zeeuw 2001), and 
international trade (Karp & Perloff 1989). 
Adjustment costs result from changes in the capital held by the firm. In this context 
capital is treated as a quasi-fixed input where it is possible to increase (or reduce) the 
capital factor, subject to a positive adjustment cost whenever the firm adjusts its capital 
structure, and undertakes new investment (or if it disinvests some of its capital). 
Theocharis (1960) found that a noncooperative Nash-Cournot oligopoly problem with 
linear inverse demand and adjustment cost functions has a stable solution for a duopoly, 
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but becomes unstable when the number of firms involved is more than two; McManus & 
Quandt (1961), and Fisher (1961) showed that with quadratic adjustment cost functions, 
this oligopoly problem has a stable Nash equilibrium solution for n firms. 
Adjustment costs arise as a result of internal reorganisation within the firm when 
new investments are undertaken by devoting resources and personnel from existing oper-
ations to plan new ventures and develop new products, to oversee the installation of new 
machinery and equipment, expansion of production lines, training of staff and operators 
(Kort 1988). An important role played by adjustment costs is in controlling the size of 
the firm, when these costs are convex the implication is that it is more costly for the firm 
to adjust its capital more quickly than slowly (Pindyck 1982, 1988). Adjustment costs 
eliminate instantaneous jumps in capital to equilibrium in the form of the bang-bang 
solution, allowing inter-temporal developments to be undertaken by the model. Because 
these costs rise with increasing investment, capacity expansion is not instantaneous in 
one jump, but recurs over time, and takes place slowly. This type of capacity adjustment 
is more consistent with firms capacity decisions. 
The literature is abound with studies of investment models with quadratic adjust-
ment costs, very few of these, however, include empirical investigation of industry and 
oligopolistic markets. Karp & Perloff (1989) study the international rice market in a 
game theoretic framework. Along the same line but adding a dynamic dimension to the 
problem Reynolds (1986) studies the development of the US aluminium market. Also 
Steele (1995) studies the US-Canadian newsprint industry, and Booth, Kanetkar, Vertin-
sky & Whistler (1991) the paper and pulp industry in north America; both paper industry 
studies make allowance for adjustment costs in their models and report that these costs 
are real and substantial, and give some empirical estimates for adjustment costs in the 
respective industries. Although adjustment costs can be substantial, they are usually a 
small proportion of the total investment costs involved when firms undertake new capac-
ity expansions. Several companies attribute falls in earnings, or lower operating rates, 
to down time and diversion of resources associated with capital projects from normal 
operations.' 
1Steele (1995, p.66) reports that at least two of the companies he studied attribute in their annual 
reports for 1987 and 1988 a drop in their earnings and operating rates to the expansions and new capital 
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Large scale industries where projects have long lead times (for development and con-
struction), are more likely to be prone to these costs when undertaken by firms. Paper 
and newsprint industries, petrochemicals, power generation, aluminium and many others 
are typical industries where the scale of investment and size of operations are important. 
Empirical as well as theoretical studies that cover these industries, some of which have 
already been mentioned, employ investment models that are characterized by the inclu-
sion of convex adjustment costs. The vast majority of these utilise quadratic adjustment 
costs in their formulation (Reynolds 1987, 1991, Karp & Perloff 1989, Steele 1995, and 
Hanig 1986); a few which involve non-quadratic adjustment costs resort to quadratic 
approximations along the optimal solution path when estimating the model (Reynolds 
1986, Kort 1988, 2001). In this study I opt for using quadratic adjustment costs in the 
model formulation. But before closing this topic it is worth noting the following points 
regarding the role of adjustment costs, and the influence they bear on the performance 
of investment models in oligopolistic industries. 
The relationship between the-responsiveness of the adjustment of prices and chang-
ing costs in concentrated industries is somewhat ambiguous. But there is a large body 
of literature and empirical studies (Eichner 1973, Phlips 1980, 1983, Dixon 1983, and 
Fershtman & Kamien 1987) that support the view that the more concentrated the indus-
try, the less rapidly will cost variations be transmitted into prices, and price movements 
tend to be sluggish. Ginsburgh & Michel (1988) develop a model for an oligopolistic 
industry using a linear industry demand curve, and a general form of adjustment costs. 
Starting with adjustment costs on output changes of the firms (which may be interpreted 
in terms of capacity adjustment), they develop from Cournot equilibrium quantities of 
firms, a formulation for explaining price variations in response to costs. They find that 
quadratic adjustment costs in concentrated industries lead to a decrease in the speed 
of adjustment of prices, since concentration has a positive effect on price inertia. On 
the other hand, as the numbers of firms, n, increases, prices adjust more quickly; and 
in a competitive setting when n 	oo the adjustment cost term vanishes and prices 
adjust instantaneously despite, the presence of adjustment costs. It is this property, of 
projects undertaken by the two companies. One reported a drop of 5% in earnings, due to down time 
associated with capital projects, while the other saw a fall in its operating rate to 96% for similar reasons. 
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quadratic adjustment costs, that imparts on oligopolistic models predictions that are 
coherent with economic theory, which makes them appealing to economic modelers in 
formulating dynamic models. 
Ginsburgh and Michel also analyse adjustment costs that are not quadratic but are 
more general in form, and show how the number of firms in the industry and the economies 
of scale of the adjustment cost function influence the degree of price responsiveness. They 
show that different outcomes that appear in the literature can be explained by their model 
of adjustment costs. What is significant is that adjustment costs play an important role 
in both dynamic and static models of industry and cannot be ignored. 
3.2 Model Formulation and Specification 
In this model, firms (or players) produce a homogeneous product, and attempt to max-
imise the value of their discounted net profits over the duration of the game, from initial 
time, to, until final time, t 1. The game in this case is dynamic, and involves the inter-
action between the players over the entire lifespan of the game, as their capacities, costs 
and outputs evolve over time. 
As an illustration, it will be considered that the market is served by two firms only, 
i, and 1. Each firm faces a dynamic optimisation problem of choosing its investment rate 
and output in each period to maximise the stream of profits it generates over the planning 
horizon given the state of demand, and at the same time taking into consideration the 
output of the other firm; for firm i this may be represented by the following notation: 
t f 
Ji = max f e— twi( t) dt + e— pt  ca(ki (t f )) 
u;, 	to=o 
(3.1) 
subject to: 	ki = f (ui (t), ki(t)) = ui(t) — ki(t) 	 (3.2) 
	
ki(to) = ki3O a given known value, and ki(t f ) is free 	 (3.3) 
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where: 
Wi 	= 7ri (t) - (t) 	 (3.4) 
(t) 	= P(xi (t), xi (t)) xi(t) — 	(xi (t), ki (t)) 	 (3.5) 
(t) 	= ciui (t) 	di (ui (t) — 	(t))2 	 (3.6) 
P(t) = a — b (xi(t) xi(t)) 	 (3.7) 
a, b 	Demand function parameters. 
Risk free rate of interest. 
ci(t) 	Unit cost of capital for firm i at time t. 
Ci(t) 	Operating costs of firm i at time t. 
di 	Adjustment cost parameter of firm i. 
Depreciation rate of capital. 
(t) 	Investment cost of firm i at time t. 
ki(t) 	State variable or capacity of firm i at time t. 
P(t) 	Output price, or inverse demand function. 
Sri (t) 	Operating profit of firm i at time t. 
yo(ki (t f )) 	Salvage value of capital at final time t f . 
to, tf 	Initial time and final time of the planning period. 
ui(t) 	Investment rate of firm i at time t. 
wi (t) 	Short-run profit of firm i at time t. 
xi(t) , xi(t) Outputs of firms i and l respectively at time t. 
The integral term on the right hand side of equation (3.1), is simply the discounted 
sum of short run profits for firm i over the entire planning horizon; the second term is 
the salvage value of the capital assets held by the firm in the final period t f . Capital 
stock or capacity ki (t) evolves and accumulates according to the linear state equation 
(3.2); where ui is the investment rate at time t, and S is the depreciation rate of capital. 
Both, the control, ui , and state variable, ki(t), are assumed to be piecewise continuous 
and differentiable functions of time; and the control influences the profit function directly 
and indirectly through the state. 
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Short Run Profit 
The short run, or single period net profit wi(t) for firm i, in period t is defined by 
(3.4), where iri(t) and Ii (t) are the respective single period operating profit and cost of 
investment for firm i at time t. wi(t), is a concave function, that is continuous and twice 
differentiable. 
Operating Profit 
Equation (3.5) states that the operating profit, 7ri (t), is the revenue (the price P(xt (t), xi(t)) 
multiplied by the output xi of firm i) less the operating costs, Ci (xi (t), ki(t)). Both 7ri(t) 
and Ci (t) are continuous and twice differentiable. 71i (t) is concave, while Ci(t) is convex. 
Investment Cost 
The investment cost, /,(t), in (3.6) is a quadratic function due to the presence of adjust-
ment costs. The first term is the cost of investment, where ui is the rate of investment, 
and c, is the unit cost of capital. The second term represents the cost of adjustment, 
where di is the speed of adjustment cost parameter. In this formulation it is assumed 
that rapid investment is penalised as discussed in Section 3.1 above. ci , and di may be 
estimated from available historical industry data; the values of di used will be chosen 
such that the adjustment costs represent a reasonably small proportion of the total in-
vestment costs. 6 and g the respective depreciation and interest rate, are assumed to be 
constant and have the same value for both firms; their value will be based on estimates 
acceptable in industry practice. Ii (t), is a' convex, continuous and twice differentiable 
function. It is increasing in the two variables in its argument, ui and 
Price as an Inverse Demand Function 
Demand is assumed to be linear, and downward sloping. This is a typical assumption 
to make and is widely used in this type of models (Reynolds (1986, 1987), Kulatilaka 
& Perotti (1992), Karp & Perloff (1989), Bensoussan & Lesourne (1980)). There are no 
inventories in this model so total output is equivalent to market demand. Price of output 
is endogenised as an inverse demand function, and this price clears the market. 
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Price is based on a linear inverse demand function, and is given by P(xi, xi) in equa-
tion (3.7), where a and b are two parameters with a > 0, and b > 0. xi and xi are the 
outputs of firms i and / respectively. 
In the empirical sections of this thesis, the inverse demand function will be estimated 
econometrically from historical market data for the product under consideration; but 
for the time being both parameters, a and b, will be estimated such that demand is 
downward sloping. Different values are used to test the linear quadratic model. 
A Simplified Model 
To make the notation easier to follow, and for the sake of the problem exposition, I make 
the following simplifying assumptions: 
1. Operating costs are assumed to be negligible and can be ignored for the time being. 
This assumption will be relaxed in later chapters. 
2. The firms operate their plants at full capacity, as such each firm's output is equiv-
alent to capacity in place; total demand is then equivalent to total capacity of the 
two firms. This is a legitimate assumption, especially when complete reversibility 
is assumed, with the firms adjusting their capacity according to demand variability. 
In the absence of operating costs, operating profits ri are equivalent to revenue, which 
is price times output. Here we are considering output to be equivalent to capacity, and 
therefore ki replaces xi in the above functions and similarly k1 replaces xi. 
The problem at hand is one where firms i and 1, each is trying independently to 
maximize its respective value Je and J1 , which are their respective discounted sum of net 
profits over the time horizon under consideration, from initial time to to final time t f , 
subject to the capital accumulation equations and boundary conditions as shown below: 
tf  
Ji(to) = max f e—'st ((a — b(ki + ki))ki — cirri — di(ui — oki)2) dt + co(ki(tf)) (3.8) ui to 
	CHAPTER 3. DYNAMIC CAPACITY EXPANSION AND COMPETITION 	96 
subject to: 	ki = (ui (t), ki(t)) = ui (t) — 6ki (t) 
	
(3.9) 
ki(to) = kio, a given known value, and ki(t f ) is free 
	
(3.10) 
and similarly for firm 1 
t f  
Ji (to) = maxe—i3t (a — b(k, ki))ki — Qui — 	— 8k1 ) 2 dt+ c,o(ki(t f )) 	(3.11) ui 	to 
subject to: 	k1 = (u/ (t), (t)) = u/ (t) — Ski (t) 	 (3.12) 
ki(to) = km a given known value, and ki(tf) is free 	(3.13) 
Each of the two firms is facing an optimal control problem of capacity growth; when 
serving a single market the interdependence of the two firms derives from the fact that 
the price of their product is determined by the combined output that they both put on 
the market. 
3.3 The Single Firm Optimal Capacity Growth Problem 
The problem posed by equations (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) for a single firm has been dealt 
with extensively in the literature as an optimal control problem, a calculus of variations 
problem or as a class of optimal control problems of the dynamic programming type. In 
this chapter we deal with the capacity expansion as a general form of a linear quadratic 
optimal control problem, and in Chapter 4 it is solved using dynamic programming 
techniques. 
There is a rich literature dealing with dynamic problems of growth dating back to the 
1950's when the theory of the maximum principle was developed by Pontryagin, Boltyan-
skii, Gamkrelidze & Mishchenko (1962), and dynamic programming by Bellman (1957). 
Chenery (1952), Jorgenson (1963), Leland (1972), Manne (1961), Nickell (1978), Arrow 
(1968), and Abel (1981, 1983) were among the first contributors to the implementation 
of these techniques in the economic literature of the firm. Formulation of the solution to 
this economic problem based on a derivation for an optimal control problem, by Bryson & 
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Ho (1969) is shown in appendix A. Also Kamien & Schwartz (1991), and Conrad & Clark 
(1987) provide a lucid exposition of different classes of these economic problems. Both 
Kamien & Schwartz (1991) and Dreyfus & Law (1977) show the relationship between 
the various dynamic formulations of optimal control problems: the maximum principle, 
dynamic programming and the calculus of variations. 
The solution of the capacity expansion problem of the firm, as an optimal control 
problem, essentially involves the formation of the Hamiltonian, and then maximising it. 
This is carried out by meeting the optimality and the boundary conditions, while at the 
same time the state equation for capacity growth is satisfied. The Hamiltonian is formed 
by appending the state equation (3.2), to the short run profit of the integrand of (3.1), 
as shown below: 
Hi 	= wi (ki (t) , (t), ui (t)) 	A(t) f (ki (t) , ui (t)) 	 (3.14) 
where A(t) is a costate variable introduced as a dynamic multiplier; it plays a role sim-
ilar to that of the Lagrangian multipliers of static optimisation. It is assumed to be a 
continuous and differentiable function of time. As shown in appendix A, A(t) represents 
the shadow price of a marginal unit of capital (\(t) = aajik(t) ). The resulting conditions 
of optimality, when the firm follows an optimal policy of investment and output, are 
summarised by the following three equations (see appendix A): 
aHi  0 	 (3.15) 
uui  
aff i  
(3.16) 
OA 
/3A(t) —.(t) — 
Oki
°Ha 	 (3.17) 
Which upon expansion yield the following three equations: 
Owi(t) 	).(t)  Df (t)  
Dui (t) 	Dui 
OHi = 	
= OA 
0A(t)— A(t) = 
= 0 	 (3.18) 
ui — (Ski 	 (3.19) 
Owi (t) 	of (t)  
Oki(t) 
(t) Oki 
	
(3.20) 
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3.3.1 Optimality Conditions: An Economic Interpretation 
Solving these three equations simultaneously, determines the optimal trajectories of the 
decision variable, ui(t) (which is the investment rate), the costate variable A(t), and in 
turn the optimal capacity growth (which is given by equation (3.19)), over the entire 
planning horizon. 
These solution equations of the firm's optimal problem, have a consistent economic 
interpretation; equation (3.18) is a statement of the economic principle that the marginal 
value of capital equals its marginal benefit when the firm follows, at every instant of 
time, an optimal policy of output and investment. The first term in the equation, is 
the marginal effect of a change in the decision variable, ui(t), on the short-run profit 
wi(t); the second term is the marginal effect of the current decision variable on the rate 
of growth of capital (ki(t) = f (ui, ki )) multiplied by the price of capital which is valued 
at its marginal worth .\(t). So when following an optimal policy, the firm selects its 
decision variable (investment rate) such that the marginal immediate gain, just counter 
balances the marginal long-run cost; it should be pointed out that A(t) is, by definition, 
the marginal value of capital when an optimal policy of capital accumulation is being 
followed (i.e. A(t) = t4). 
Equation (3.19) just defines the rate of accumulation of capital as the gross investment 
in each period less the depreciation of capital. 
Where as the economic interpretation of equation (3.20), can be viewed as a relation-
ship between the rate of depreciation of capital, and the influence of a marginal unit of 
capital on short-run profits, and the accumulation of the stock of capital. When A(t) is 
defined as the rate of appreciation of the marginal value of capital, then —A(t) is the rate 
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of depreciation of the marginal value of capital. And the equation simply requires that 
when the firm is following an optimal path of capital accumulation, the rate at which a 
unit of capital depreciates, is equal to the sum of its contribution to the short-run profits, 
(t ow )  
ak:(t)7 and its contribution to the increase in the value of the capital stock, ( since the 
second term on the right hand side is the marginal rate of change of capital accumulation 
multiplied by the marginal value of capital A(t)), less the interest on the marginal unit 
of capital, that is j3A(t) (Dorfman 1969). 
The problem of finding the optimal investment rate, and consequently the optimal 
capital growth path of the firm has been reduced to one of finding the solution to equa-
tions (3.18)-(3.20). With initial capacity known at the start of the planning horizon, 
the investment rate ui (to), is obtained from equation (3.18) as a function of A(to). The 
value of A(to) is obtained by solving equation (3.20) backward in time, starting from 
the boundary condition for the marginal value of capital in the final period. Having 
obtained A(to), which is the marginal value of capital in the initial period, it becomes 
easy to evaluate the optimal investment rate required in the first period. Since ki (to) and 
ui (to) are both known now, the optimal value of the capital ki(t) in the next period may 
be obtained from equation (3.19). This equation describes the evolution of the capital 
growth forward in time from the initial period until the end of the planning horizon. The 
cycle of finding the values of ui(t), A(t), and k (t) , is then repeated. This becomes more 
evident when the problem is solved in discrete time. 
In pursuing such an investment policy, the firm is in fact finding the optimal invest-
ment and capacity growth path at every instant of time over its entire planning period. 
Also from an economic perspective, the requirement for an equilibrium, of equating long-
run marginal cost of capital to its marginal benefit, is being met at every instant of time, 
through the solution of the equations (3.18)-(3.20) as discussed above. This solution is 
essentially the dynamic path of the economic optimisation performed by the firm at each 
point over the period from to to t f , as it adjusts its capital from its initial position to the 
long run equilibrium level. Due to the presence of adjustment costs, capital growth and 
the rate of adjustment take place slowly over time, thereby reflecting the inter-temporal 
nature of the investment process. 
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3.4 	Dynamic Duopolistic Competition: A Linear Quadratic 
Representation 
In the previous section we considered a situation where firm 1, was assumed to have 
fixed output choices or output path, over the entire duration of the planning horizon; 
while the other firm, i, was trying to maximise its profits through the choice of an 
optimal investment and production strategy over the same period. When firm i faces 
a residual demand, it operates as if it is the only player in the market. To achieve its 
goal, we found that firm i solves an optimal control problem; and that the solution to 
this problem is feasible if the optimality conditions, (3.18)-(3.20) are satisfied, and the 
equation of motion, (3.2), admits a solution. 
When firm's 1 output and investment rate are not fixed, and the two firms are trying 
simultaneously to maximise their discounted flow of profits, and at the same time find 
an optimal investment path to meet an inverse demand function defined by equation 
(3.7), the two firms are engaged in a differential game. The problem is no longer a 
straightforward optimisation problem that each is trying to solve. In a game theoretic 
framework, each optimising firm has to take into account the role and actions of its 
opponents; the type of interaction between different firms in oligopolistic industries has 
an important bearing on the market they serve. The price of their products is sensitive 
to the total output that they put on the market. When deciding how much to produce, 
the firm has to take into consideration how its output will affect the price, and also 
how its opponents will respond. An added dimension in a dynamic setting is the role of 
investment in affecting capacity, since each firm's output is bounded by the capacity it 
has in place. Current investments affect the capability for future output; for each firm 
therefore the actions of its opponents become an integral part of its problem formulation. 
Outputs affect the price level and the firm's profitability; this is accounted for in each 
firm's objective function. Where as investments in capacity affect the state variable and 
the evolution of the game through the state equation, the actions affecting the state 
equation of the game, therefore, constitute an indirect influence of the opponents on the 
profitability of the firm in future periods. 
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The interaction of the firms in the market place, and the interdependence of their 
objective functions or profitability define the game. Interdependence of the profitability 
outcome results from two aspects: (a) through the outputs, since the combined output 
of the firms determines the market price, and (b) through the rate of investment that 
each commits in every period with its bearing on changing the market structure. The 
optimising firm faces an optimal control problem that takes into account its own actions 
that affect the control variables that are under its own influence, and at the same time it 
allows for the actions of its opponents which it anticipates in response to its own actions. 
Other firms will be doing the same. 
Solution to the differential game entails each firm solving an optimal control problem 
within the framework of a particular information structure that governs the game. In 
order to characterise the solution of the game there is a need to define the information 
structure that is imposed on the game. That is to identify the decision rules that govern 
the pattern of play or actions of the firms when choosing their outputs or investments. 
In addition the nature of interaction between the firms needs to be identified. 
The models that we study in this chapter and in the thesis as a whole are of the 
noncooperative type. While we first deal with a duopoly, we consider noncooperative 
play between the firms in an oligopolistic industry; this choice was made since later 
on we consider a situation for a homogeneous commodity petrochemical product that 
is served by several companies; the assumption being that it would be unrealistic to 
discipline cooperation between these companies over long periods, extending over the life 
of the game. It has to be borne in mind also that we are dealing with games of pure 
strategy only, and hence the firms cannot switch from one type of strategy to another. 
It is also assumed that all players follow the same rules; so when the game is open-loop, 
then all players follow this strategy. No allowance is made for some to follow open-loop 
while others follow a different strategy. 
Two types of information structures are studied for the game utilising different strate-
gies for the players, namely the open loop Nash-Cournot, and the feedback Nash-Cournot, 
leading to different model formulations. For each model the information structure that 
is adopted is chosen such that it reflects the information that is available to the players 
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about the state of the game and the strategies that govern the rules of play. Rules like 
how the players interact as the game evolves, and how they influence and are influenced 
by the state of the game. 
Under the open-loop strategy the players' actions are a function of time only, and the 
firms choose their actions for the entire game from the outset. Where as with feedback 
strategy type model, the firms utilise strategies that are a function of the state and time. 
Under Stackelberg rules one of the firms acts as a leader, and the rest act as followers. 
The leader gets to move first, while the followers take the action of the leader as given 
when it is their turn to act and move to optimise their actions. 
3.4.1 Open-loop Nash Equilibrium 
In the single shot Nash-Cournot games that were considered in Chapter 2, the firm 
chooses its best strategy in response to that of its opponent, assuming that this opponent 
has selected its best strategy. So given its opponents capacity and the level of demand, 
the firm's strategy would be to choose a capacity and an output that will maximise its 
profits, given the output of the opponent which has been chosen, by the opponent, to 
maximise his profits. 
A dynamic game is a multistage game where the time duration of each stage is 
infinitely small (Bajar & Olsder 1999). The choice of output and investment in a dynamic 
game is made many times over. The general notion of an open-loop dynamic game, is 
that firms' strategies are dependent on time and the initial state at the start of the 
game. This argument presupposes that each firm knows from the outset the optimal 
profit maximising choices that are made by its opponents, and that it makes its own 
optimal choice for investment and output accordingly for the entire game. 
Each of the two firms faces an optimal control problem which is described by equa-
tions (3.8)-(3.13). For the two firms the problem may be formulated in a more general 
representation as a linear quadratic control problem as shown below. Using matrix and 
vector notation, the system dynamics defined by the differential equations (3.9)and (3.12) 
for the capital accumulation of the two firms is combined in equation (3.22); and similarly 
for the boundary conditions of equations (3.10) and (3.13). Also by assuming that all 
/ ail ul 
Ail 
, Ai = 
U2 
, u= Where k = 
un I 	\ Ain / 
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costs and the inverse demand function parameters a and b are constant over the entire 
duration of the game, the matrices and vectors of equation(3.21), namely Q,, Ri, ri , and 
Si become time invariant. These assumptions are made to see how the dynamics of the 
system for the two firms perform, even when all costs and variables are kept constant. 
Also it may be considered that the capital at the end of the game has no value, and 
therefore the salvage value of capital is zero. This assumption will not affect the quality 
of the results in any major way, especially when the costs are assumed to be constant 
over time, and the duration of the game is long. 
t f 
Ji = max J e—fit (i 	+ 2 u/17,u + r/iu + Sik + i k) dt 
uz to 
(3.21) 
for i = 1 n 
subject to the following equation which describes the rate of change of capacity: 
Ic = f (k, u) = Ak + Bu 	 (3.22) 
and the boundary conditions: k(to ) = ko and k(t f ) is free. Ai(t f ) = 0 since at this time 
we are assuming that the salvage value (p(t f ) is zero. 
The prime denotes a transpose, and A, B, Qi, Ri , and Si are symmetric square matrices, 
ri , and qi are vectors of appropriate dimensions. 
The game of prescribed fixed duration [to , t f ], under consideration admits an open-
loop Nash equilibrium provided some conditions are met that are considered below. Also 
existence of the solution and its uniqueness rest on the linear quadratic nature of the 
game, and the affine strategies that are used by the players. In what follows we make use 
of Theorems 6.11 and 6.12 of Ba§ar & Olsder (1999), and then proceed in the following 
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section to show that the necessary conditions for the equilibrium can be found if the 
solution to a set of coupled matrix Riccati equations exists. 
Proposition 1 For an n-person differential game of prescribed fixed duration [to, t 1], let 
(i) f (t,.,ui,...,un ) be continuously differentiable on R", Vt E [to, tf], 
(ii) wi(t, 	 and (pi n be continuously differentiable on R.', Vt E [to, tf], i E N. 
Then if ft il`(t,k0 ) = 	E N} provides an open loop Nash equilibrium solution, 
and {k*, to < t < t f l is the corresponding state trajectory, there exist n costate functions 
Ai(.) : [to, t 1] —> Rn, i E N, such that the following relations are satisfied: 
k* (t) = f (t, k* (t), u'l , . . . , 4)) , 	k* (to ) = ko, 	(3.23) 
v.7(t, ko) = 4(t) = max Hi (t, Ai, k*, u*i , . . . , ui*_ 1 , ui, ui*+1 , . . . , un* ) 	(3.24) u, 
Oki (t) — Ai (t) = OHi(t, Ai, k
ak
*, '14, . . . , 4) 
(3.25) 
Ai (t f ) =- 
ac,a(k*(tf)) 
(3.26) Ok 
where 
Hi(') = wi(•) 	)1 /4'10, t E [to, tf], i E N. 
Proof. The proof is found in that for Theorem 6.11, in Baqar & Olsder (1999, p.310-
311), and related theorems that make use of the maximum principle for continuous time 
control systems. • 
Proposition 2 For an n-person affine-quadratic differential game with Qi < 0, Ri < 
0, (i E N), let there exist a solution set {Ai; i E N} to the coupled matrix Riccati 
equations 
Ai + AiA — (0 - A') Ai + Qi — (AiB + S)R 1 + 	=0 
Ai(tf) = 
Oyo(tkf) 
, (i c N). 
a 
(3.27) 
Then the differential game admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution given by 
v*(t, ko) u*(t) = 	Sk + 	k + •=y)) 	(3.28) 
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where {-yi; i E N} solve uniquely the set of linear differential equations: 
-yi — (0 — A') -yi qi — (Ai B + S)11 1 (rr + 13'y1 =0 
-yi(t f ) = 0, (i E N). 
and k* (-) denotes the Nash equilibrium state trajectory, generated by: 
k* _ e(A+BZ2)tk(to)  + 
rtf e(A.-ksoz.2 )(t—T)Bzi dr 
to 
where .14 1 ,1., ands are defined in (3.36)-(3.40), A, A =y are defined in (3.42)-(3.45), 
and Z1 and Z2 are defined in (3.55) and (3.56) respectively. 
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as Theorem 6.12 in Baqar e.4 Olsder (1999). 
In Section 3.4.1.1 below the optimality conditions satisfying Proposition 1 are sketched 
out. The Riccati equation solution satisfying (3.27) and (3.29) is given in Section 3.4.1.2; 
and for the optimal state (vector of capacities) trajectory satisfying (3.30) is provided in 
Section 3.4.1.3 • 
3.4.1.1 Model Solution: Open-loop Nash Strategy 
First we define the Hamiltonian for each firm i: 
Hi = 2k'Q jk + 	+ r'iu u/ Si k + q'ik A(Ak Bu) 	(3.31) 
for i = 1, n 
Then each firms tries to maximise its Hamiltonian by choosing an investment and 
output strategy that maximises its profits for the duration of the game. The conditions 
of optimality require that equations (3.32)-(3.34) are satisfied: 
13Th 
0Ai 
	k= Ak Bu 	 (3.33) 
/A, 
	13 Hi 
Ok 
	 (3.34) 
(3.29) 
(3.30) 
= 0 	 (3.32) aui 
OHi 
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Now taking the derivative of the Hamiltonian in (3.31) wrt u we obtain: 
8H 
= Ou 11.11-1-r.+S•"k-FgAi (3.35) 
and by applying optimality condition (3.32), which indicates that player i, controls only 
his own investment rate ui , we get: 
OH 0 = 	= Riiu + rii + Siik + Bari au
i  
i 
from the above we conclude, provided R.„ R1 and Rk are invertible so that: 
	
1  (rii + Siik + giAi) for i = 1, 	n 	 (3.36) 
and similarly for the other players we get: 
ul 	= 	(r 	+ -Mat) for i 1, i = 1, 	n 	(3.37) 
un 	= + Snnk B'„„An ) for i n, i = 1, n 	(3.38) 
where u7, u;`, and un* are the optimal investment strategies for firms i, 1 and n respectively. 
Similarly, the optimal investment strategy for the remaining firms may be obtained. 
Therefore we can define an optimal strategy vector u*, for all the firms involved: 
 
rii + Siik + 
 
u* = (3.39) 
    
\ 	\ rim + S„„k gink, J 
which may be represented in a more compact form: 
u* 	1 (I' + ;;'k + B'A) 	 (3.40) 
from (3.40) it is clear that in order to find the optimal investment strategy, u*, all we 
have to do, is determine the vector value of A. Now let's assume that A, is linear in k 
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and has the following form: 
/ Ail 
Ai2 	
= Aik + -yi 	 (3.41) 
Ain / 
Where Ai and -yi are anxn matrix, and a n x 1 vector respectively, that we need to 
evaluate. The equation is shown in expanded form below: 
011 012 	svin 	01 \ 
021 022 	02n 	02 k+ 
= 
Ail \  
Ai = 
	Ai2 
\ Ain / \ (15n1 On2 	Onn 	\ cn / 
=-7 
similarly we have for firm 1, a costate variable equation which is linear in the state, 
namely: 
Ail 
Al2 	
= Aik 	 (3.42) = 
\ A/72 / 
/ 
Ak = 
Ak2  
= Akk + -Yk 
and for firm k: 
(3.43) 
Therefore A has the following form: 
/ 	\ Aii 
A1/ 
Ann 
Akn 
( Aii 
All 
\ Ann )  
a= k+ 
	'vii 	
(3.44) 
'vnn 
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where Aii refers to the ith row of matrix Ai; A11 refers to the lth row of matrix Al , and 
so Ann refers to the nth row of matrix An. Similarly -yii refers to the ith element of the 
vector -yi, and so on for the lth, and kth elements. As such we define a new vector A 
that may be represented in the following form: 
A = Ak 
and u* of equation (3.40) can now be written as: 
u* 	-17 	+ ,51e B'k ;)",)) 	 (3.45) 
where the tilde sign, '', refers to formulated matrices and vectors, whose rows or elements 
are defined from across the corresponding rows and elements of the matrices and vectors 
of the different players, and in the order ` ii',`//', `nn', as was shown above. 
3.4.1.2 Riccati Equations Formulation 
Having found the optimal investment strategy, we turn to the second condition of opti-
mality that needs to be satisfied, namely equation (3.34). The first term on the rhs of 
this equation, aj=i:, can be obtained by differentiating (3.31): 
OHi 
= 
8k 	
Q.k Sin+ qi + A'Ai (3.46) 
We now turn to evaluate equation (3.34) using the above result. 
/3A — Ai = Qik + Siu + qi + A'Ai 	 (3.47) 
It has already been stated that the costate variable Ai is assumed to be linear in the 
state, and has the form as shown in (3.41). Taking the time derivative of this equation, 
we obtain: 
= A.ik + Aik +;yi 
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Also from (3.22) we have k = Ak + Bu, so we can write: 
Ai = Aik + AiAk + AiBu + ryi 	 (3.48) 
where u is evaluated at its optimal value, or more accurately u = u*. Then substituting 
the value of Ai from the above equation, and the values of Ai and u* from (3.41) and 
(3.45) respectively in (3.47) and rearranging we obtain: 
— A')Aik + (,(3 — A')-yi — Aik — AiAk — Qik — qi — 	
(3.49) 
— (Ai B + S i )(—R-1 )(i." + Sk + 	k + 5,)) = 0 
The necessary condition for the above equation to have a solution is when the coefficients 
of the capacity vector k and the independent matrices, and vectors are zero. So next we 
collect the coefficients of the k terms, and the independent terms to get two equations 
as shown below: 
{(13 — A')Ai — AiA — Ai — Qi — (Ai B + Si)(-1Z-1 )(S + B'A)}k = 0 	(3.50) 
(0 — A')-yi — q i  — Yi — (AiB + 	1 )(1. + 	= 0 	(3.51) 
Now by rearranging the above two equations we obtain two coupled Riccati like equations 
in Ai and -yi that satisfy the optimality conditions of equations (3.32)-(3.34). 
Ai = — A') Ai — AiA — Qi + (AiB + S) 1 + B'A) 	(3.52) 
= (i3 — A') -yi — qi + (AiB + S) 	+ BC-y) 	 (3.53) 
Similarly for firm 1 we obtain two Riccati like equations of the same form as (3.52) and 
(3.53). These are the matrix Riccati equations (3.27) and (3.29) of Proposition 2 whose 
solutions determine the unique solution of our game. 
These are nonlinear differential equations that are solved numerically. In the case 
of a duopoly we obtain four equations that we solve simultaneously. It is found that 
they admit a stable solution. Having found the values of Ai and -yi , and Ai and 	we 
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can determine the corresponding values of A and '5,, using equation (3.44). The optimal 
investment strategy u*, which is a vector of the investment strategies for all firms can 
now be evaluated for the entire game using equation (3.45). 
3.4.1.3 Optimal Investment Strategy and Capacity Growth for the Open-
loop Case 
It is clear now that the optimal investment strategy is easily obtained for the entire 
period from to to tf, by applying (3.45), since all the elements of the matrix A, and 
vector .5",, are now known from the solution of the Riccati equations. With the optimal 
path of investment, u* at hand, what remains to be done is to find the optimal path of 
the capacity, k*. This can be done by solving the differential equation (3.22); which is 
discussed below. 
Bearing in mind that B' = I, then (3.45) may be written in the following form: 
u* = Z1  + Z2k 	 (3.54) 
where, 
Zl = -it 1(7; + 	 (3.55) 
Z2 = 	+ 	 (3.56) 
Now we can rewrite (3.22) using the optimal strategy for the game u*. This equation 
describes the optimal path of the state which is the capacities for all the firms involved, 
as a result of following an optimal investment strategy. 
k = Ak + Bu* 
= Ak+B.Zi+BZ2 k 
= (A + BZ2 )k + BZi 	 (3.57) 
This last equation is an in-homogeneous differential equation, since the second term on 
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the rhs, i.e. BZ 1 , is non-zero and is independent of k; this equation has a solution of the 
following form which is attributed to Athans & Falb (1966): 
t f  
k. 	e(A+BZ2 )tk(to) I e(A.+Acize2)(t—T)Bzi dT 
to 
(3.58) 
Equations of this form have no analytical solution, but they can be solved numerically; 
this was accomplished using numerical integration. 
As an illustration, a duopoly model is solved. The following parameter values for the 
base case of the model simulation were used: for the inverse demand function, a = 100, 
b = 2; while for the unit capital investment cost for the two firms, ci = 10, c2 = 1; 
and the speed of adjustment costs were assumed to be equal for the two firms, d1  = 50, 
d2 = 50; a depreciation rate of 8 = 0.10, and an interest rate on capital borrowing of 
/3 = 0.05. The parameters were chosen such that for normal situations, the operating 
profit for the firms is positive and the results that are obtained are meaningful. A wide 
range of values is tested in several runs to check the performance of the model. 
Starting with the symmetric costs case, where the two firms have the same investment 
costs, ci = 10, and c2 = 10, it is found that the two firms converge to the same equilib-
rium, where their capacities equalise, despite having different capacities at the start of 
the game, as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
For the asymmetric case, where the capital investment costs are, Cl = 10, c2 = 1, the 
results are shown in Figures 3.3-3.9. Each figure contains 4 panes. Panes (a), show the 
development of capacity and equilibrium values for the two firms; panes (b) the current 
value profits; panes (c) the investment rates, and panes (d) the investment cost functions. 
Before discussing the significance of these results, I turn to consider the case of feedback 
Nash-Cournot strategies and finding an equilibrium solution in the next section; and then 
I discuss the results for both models in Section 3.4.3. 
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Figure 3.1: Investment and output profile for symmetric costs open-loop equilibrium: 
parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, ci = 10, c2 = 10, d1 = 50, d2 = 50, 5 = 0.10, 
= 0.05 kt (to) = 10, lc/ (to) = 0. 
(a) 
	
(b) 
(c) 
	
(d) 
Figure 3.2: Capacity profile for symmetric costs open-loop equilibrium. Initial capacities 
for the two firms vary in each case: parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, c1  = 10, 
c2 = 10, d1  = 50, d2 = 50, 5 = 0.10, /3 = 0.05 
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co) current proms ror two arms 
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Figure 3.7: Investment and output profile for open-loop equilibrium: parameter values 
used: same as in Fig.3.3 except for ki(to) = 50, ki(to) = 30. 
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(a) Duopoly capacity for NC openloop game 
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3.4.2 Feedback Nash Equilibrium 
With feedback Nash strategy, also referred to as Markov perfect Nash strategy in the 
literature, the firms follow strategies that are dependent on the state of the game and 
time. In Markov, or memoryless feedback games, the history of previous play or the 
previous actions of the players is not considered on its own merit. The evolution of the 
history of the game is embodied in the current state of the game itself, since each firm's 
strategy is a function of the state. The current state of the game which is the vector of the 
capacities held by the firms is the result of the previous actions in terms of investments 
made in previous periods up to the present. 
A memoryless feedback, or Markov perfect Nash equilibrium is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium, in the sense that the firms follow strategies that are decision rules which 
constitute Nash strategies over any part of the subgame; that is when starting from any 
period over the interval of the original game, the investment strategy leads to the Nash 
equilibrium. 
Furthermore, what the firms care about is only the profits that each generates over 
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the horizon of the game. As before, each of the firms faces an optimal control problem 
similar to that of Section 3.4.1, when choosing its output and investment strategy that 
maximise its profits over the planning horizon of the game [to, t f ]. The profit function for 
each firm is described by an equation exactly as in (3.21), and the system dynamics which 
refers to the capacity change of all firms is given by an equation the same as (3.22) for 
the open-loop model. All other assumptions about boundary conditions, time invariancy 
of costs, demand level and zero salvage value for capital are the same. 
t f 
Ji = max f em3t 	Q ik + u' Ri u + r' iu + u' S + q' i k) dt 	(3.59) 
ui to 
for i = 1 n 
subject to the following equation which describes the rate of change of capacity: 
k = f (k, u) = Ak Bu 	 (3.60) 
and the boundary conditions: k(to) = /co and k(tf) is free. Ai (tf ) = 0 since at this time 
we are assuming that the salvage value co(tf) is zero. 
Where k =- 
k1 	 ui 	 1 
k2 	 u2 	 Ail 
, u= 	, Ai = 
kn 	 Un 
The prime denotes a transpose, and A, B, Qi, Ri , and Si are symmetric square matrices, 
ri, and qi are vectors of appropriate dimensions. 
The main difference with the open-loop model is in the pattern of interaction between 
the firms reflected in the decision rules of investment that govern the game now. In addi-
tion to taking its opponents investment decisions in response to its own investment into 
account when trying to find the optimal values of investment by each profit maximising 
firm, the investment rate at every instant of time is now a function of state of the game 
which is the capacities held by all the firms. 
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In feedback strategy, the decision variable of every player is explicitly dependent on 
its own capacity and that of its opponents. All firms realise that the capacities they hold 
will influence future decisions about how much each invests in the future. Investment 
decisions have a direct bearing on future profits of each firm and its competitors. This 
realisation influences the pattern of investment, and gives rise to a strategic aspect to 
the investment decision and about how much capacity to hold. If the investment decision 
of each firm is inversely proportional to the capacity held by its competitors, then by 
holding more capacity the firm would reduce the investment rate of its competitors in 
the next instant of time, or the next period, thereby reducing its capacity holding. 
The optimal control problem facing each firm, and the necessary conditions for a so-
lution to the game is described by another two propositions adapted from Theorems 6.15 
and 6.16 and related definitions and remarks due to Ba§ar & Olsder (1999). 
Proposition 3 For an n-person differential game of prescribed fixed duration [to, t f], let 
(i) f (t, • , 	un ) be continuously differentiable on Rn x U1 x • - • x Un , et E [to,tf], 
wi(t,.,ni,...,un ) and cpi(•) be continuously differentiable on Rn x1J 1 x • • • x Un, 
and R.' respectively, Vt G [to, tf], i E N. 
Then if fv'i'(t,k0 ) = 14(t);i E N} provides a feedback no-memory Nash equilibrium 
solution, such that v7(t,k0 ) is continuously differentiable on N et E [to, tf], i E N, and 
{k*, to < t < t 1} is the corresponding state trajectory, there exist n costate functions 
Ai(•) : [to , t f ] 	Rn , i E N, such that the following relations are satisfied: 
k* (t) = f , k* (t) • ui, • • • , 4)), 	k* (to) = ko, 	(3.61) 
k* , ko) = 4(0 = max Hi(t, Ai, k*, uT, 	, 	ni, 4+1, 	, un* ), 	(3.62) ui 
fiAi (t) — Ai (t) = ak 	 k* ,t 1 ' , k* , ko), • • ,Iii'_1(t,k* ko), u7, (3.63) 
74+1(t, k*, ko), - • • 74(t, k* ko)) 
	
At (t f ) — 
0 c 0 (k* (t f) 
, i E N 	(3.64) Ok 
where 
Hi (•) = wi(•) 	A'if(•), t E [to, tf], i E N. 
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Proof. The proof follows from that for Theorem 6.15, in BaNr 	Olsder (1999, 
pp.320-321), and related theorems that make use of the maximum principle for continuous 
time control systems, as in Theorem 6.11. • 
Corollary 4 For an n-person affine-quadratic differential game with Qi < 0, Ri < 
0, (i E N), let there exist a solution set {Ai; i E N} to the coupled matrix Riccati equa-
tions: 
AiA —(0— A') Ai + Qi - (AiB + 	+ 13' A.) - 
CA 	+ 	(R-1)Ail = 0 (3.65) 
Ai (t f ) = 	
Ok 
Oc,o(tf)
, (i E N). (3.66) 
Then under the Markov perfect solution, the differential game admits a feedback Nash 
equilibrium solution ajfine in the state, given by: 
v* (t, k) u* (t, k) = -R-1 	+ 	(Ak ;Y)) 	(3.67) 
where {-yi; i E N} solve uniquely the set of differential equations: 
— 	— A') 	qi — (A.,13 S) R-1 	+ B'•=y) — 	B 	') .141 1-yii =- 0 (3.68) 
-yi (t f ) = 0, (i E N). 	 (3.69) 
and k* (•) denotes the Nash equilibrium state trajectory, generated by: 
k* e(A+BZ2)tk(to) tf  las z dr .1
to 
(3.70) 
where k 	are defined in (3.36)43.40, 5. ,A-- , ;Y are defined in (3.42)-(3.45), Z1 and 
Z2 are defined in (3.55)-(3.56). 
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Proof. See Corollary 6.5 in Baqar 	Olsder (1999, p.323); and by the solvability of 
the matrix Riccati equations in Section 3.4.2.2, also by the restrictions on the negative 
definiteness of matrices Qi , Ri and the restriction to affine strategies imposed on the 
game (refer to Remark 6.16 p. 324 in Baqar 	Olsder (1999)), the game admits a 
unique solution in feedback strategies given by (3.77) p. 121 and state trajectory given by 
(3.93) as shown in Section 3.4.2.3 • 
3.4.2.1 Model Solution: Feedback Nash Strategy 
Finding a solution for the present game involves the familiar steps of defining the Hamil-
tonian for each player, and satisfying the optimality conditions set out in Proposition 3: 
Hi = 2 k'Qi k 	u'Riu + r/iu + u'Sik 	AaAk Bu) 	(3.71) 
for i = 1, n 
The conditions of optimality require that equations (3.72)-(3.74) are satisfied: 
0 	 (3.72) 
	
= Ak + Bu 	 (3.73) 
arii Ou ax, 
Ok 	ak au 
These are the same equations as (3.32)-(3.34) for the open-loop Nash game of Sec-
tion 3.4.1.1. The main difference is in the extra last term in the costate equation (3.74). 
Recall that each player's strategy under feedback or Markov perfect Nash rules, is a 
function of the state of the game. The Hamiltonian of player i in equation (3.63) in-
cludes strategies of other players that are functions of time and the current state k*; the 
partial derivative of the Hamiltonian wrt k in this equation receives contributions from 
the dependence of remaining players strategies on the current state of the game. The 
costate variable Ai accounts for these contributions, which in turn influences the optimal 
investment strategy of firm i as depicted in equation (3.63) of Proposition 3. 
The term ku • au in (3.74) is exactly this contribution expressed in matrix form. 
OHi 
atti 
OHi  
aA, 
— Ai (3.74) 
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The first term of this expression is the influence of the state on the investment strategy of 
the competitors, and the second is the influence of the competitors investment strategy 
on the firm i's profitability through its Hamiltonian. 
Deriving the optimal investment strategy ui using (3.72), is the same as for the open-
loop model. By going through exactly the same steps of differentiating the Hamiltonian 
in (3.71), wrt ui as before where each firm i has control only over its investment rate, ui, 
we get: 
—FIT,:  1 (rii 	Siik giAi) for i = 1, ..., n 	 (3.75) 
+ Szlk + .13 /11 A1 ) for i 	1, 1 = 1, ...,n 	(3.76) 
where 	and ut are the optimal investment strategies for firms i and 1 respectively. 
Similarly, the optimal investment strategy for the remaining firms may be obtained. 
Therefore we can define an optimal strategy vector u*, for all the firms involved: 
u* 	1 (I- + 	B' (AkY )) (3.77) 
which has the same form as equation (3.45) for the open-loop equilibrium. 
3.4.2.2 Riccati Equations Formulation 
Deriving the Riccati equations for the feedback Nash equilibrium involves the evaluation 
of the differential equation of the costate variable (3.74); and this will be done starting 
from the rhs of the equation, with the term 2 • a where the vector u is evaluated at 
its optimal value, and 2 can therefore be obtained by differentiating equation (3.77). 
au 
= —S R 	( 13' Ar( -11-1 ) / ak 
_:§/(k- )' 	/.13 (.1-Ec 1)' 
Therefore: 
au _ = (S,  + A B)(—R)' 	 (3.78) 
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Where, 
a U2 
au  
ak 	Ok 
aul au2 	 _ \ak, ak„ • - • ak, / 
aui au, 	au„ N 
akl  aki " • aki  
aui au2. 	aun 
ak2 ak, • • • -D372 
: 	: 	• . 
(3.79) 
It has also been established that: 
= Riu -1- r 	Si k .13/jAi 	 (3.80) 
au„ 
If the matrices on the rhs are expanded then it can be verified by inspection that when 
i utilises an optimal investment strategy u7: 
\ 
aui 
au2 
\ Ain j 
au 
aHi  
au, 
all • 
au2 
OHi  
au 
0 
Al2 	
(3.81) 
since by definition w = 0. 
We can now turn to evaluate the last term on the rhs of (3.74), namely: 
using (3.78) and (3.81) to obtain: 
au 
ak 
OHi _ 
/ au, au, au„\ 
J , 
/ OHI 
ak 	ak 	• • 
au, au?  
ak, ak, • • 
aun au2 a ak, ak, 
aki  
au„ 
aul 
OH, 
• ak, au, 
au 
ak, \ au, / 
au axi  
au 
0 0 	0 0 / 0 \ 
Ailk + -ya 021 	022 	• • • 02n 02 
Aikk 031 	032 	• • • 03n k + 03 
Aink + -yin ) On]. 	0n2 	• • • Onn J \ On I 
/ 0 \ 	/ 
fit 
'ik 
\ Ain / 
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= (§1 + A/B)(—R-1 )' 
\ Ain 
(k§i 	1 yAi1 	1 = 1, .., n, 1 	i (3.82) 
And since it was assumed that Ai is linear in k, we can assume the same for Aq , and 
so we may write: 
=Ai l k+ -y. —2/ 
or in expanded form: 
Ail 
Therefore we have: 
Ou 
Ok Ou 
O.Hi 1 
(S 	B)(—R )/ (Aiik + 'Yid) (3.83) 
Then we turn to st- the first term on the rhs of (3.74); this can be obtained by 
differentiating (3.71): 
Ok = Q •k + Siu + qi + A'Ai 
(3.84) 
Now from (3.83)and (3.84) it is possible to evaluate the rhs of equation (3.74). Next we 
turn to evaluate the lhs of (3.74). It has already been stated that the costate variable Ai 
is assumed to be linear in the state, and has the form as shown in (3.85) below. 
Ai = Aik -yi 	 (3.85) 
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Taking the time derivative of this equation, we obtain: 
ai = Aik + Aik + yi 
Also from (3.60) we have k = Ak + Bu, so we can write: 
Ai = Aik + AiAk + AiBu + 	 (3.86) 
where u is evaluated at its optimal value, or more accurately u = u*. From the above 
equations we are now able to evaluate the /its of (3.74), and therefore we write (3.74), 
using (3.83) and (3.84) for the rhs as follows: 
i3Ai — Ai = Qik + Siu + qi + 	+ 	+ B)(-11)'(Ai ik + -y 
substituting the value of Ai from (3.86) in the above equation, we get: 
Q~i —Aik—AIAk—AIBu--'yi = Qik + Siu + qi + 	+ (§+A'B)(—R 1)'(Aiik +-yid 
which we rearrange in the following two steps: 
0Ai — 	— Ai k — AiAk — AiBu — Siu — Qik — qi — yi 
— 	+ 	.13)(-11 1 )' (Aii k + -yid = 0 
(f3— A')Ai — Ai k — AiAk — (AiB + Si)u Qik — qi — 
— 	+ A'B)(—.-/4 1 )/(Aiik + -yid = 0 (3.87) 
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Substituting the values of At and u* from (3.85), and (3.77) respectively, we obtain: 
(0 — A')Aik +(I5—  A')-yi — Aik — AiAk — Qik — qi — 
— (AiB + Si)(—k 1 )(i; + 	+ (Ak + 
	 (3.88) 
— (§ + '13)(—.14 1 )' (Auk + -yid = 0 
For the above equation to admit a solution, the coefficients of the capacity vector 
k, and the independent matrices and vectors, must be zero. So next we collect the 
coefficients of the k terms, and the independent terms to get two equations as shown 
below: 
fp- A')Ai — AiA — Ai — Qi — (AiB + Si)(44-1)(,S+ 13' A.) 
— 	+ A.113)(—k 1 Ai jk = 0 (3.89) 
(0 — A')-y i  — qi — - (AiB + Si)(—it ')(f• + B''5') 
— (:S/ + 1.13)(—h l )' ra =_ 0 (3.90) 
Now by rearranging the above two equations we obtain two Riccati like equations in Ai 
and -yi that satisfy (3.72)-(3.74) (c.f. equations (3.52) and (3.53)): 
	
A.i = — A') Ai — AiA — Qi + (AiB + S) it 1 + 	+ 
CA.//3 + ' ) (it-1) All (3.91) 
= 	— 	-yi — qi + (AiB + S) 	+ Bc-y) + 	+ 	l Y -y i1 (3.92) 
In the n player game we obtain 2n similar Riccati equations. For the duopoly game 
there are four of these equations. So for firm 1 we obtain two Riccati equations of the 
same form as (3.91) and (3.92). The four equations can then be solved simultaneously. 
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It was found that they admit a stable unique solution. The conditions set by equations 
(3.65) and (3.68) of Corollary 4 are satisfied. 
From the solution of the Riccati equations, we obtain the values of Ai and -yi , and Al 
and -y i , and the corresponding values of A and 7y. With these values it is now possible to 
find the optimal investment strategy u*, using (3.77), which is a vector of the investment 
strategies for all firms for the entire game. 
3.4.2.3 Optimal Investment Strategy and Capacity Growth for Feedback 
Case 
While the optimal controls for the open-loop and feedback Nash games are the same 
as in equations (3.45) p. 108 and (3.77) p. 121 respectively, the capacity equilibria they 
admit are different. Different strategies lead to different Riccati equations and different 
solutions. 
The unique solutions of the Riccati equations give rise to unique optimal equilibrium 
paths for the rate of investment and capacities in the two games. The accumulation 
of capital develops forward in time from the initial known capacity level ko at to the 
starting time of the game. This path is dependent on the values of A and ;y- , which for 
the feedback game now have extra terms involving Ail and -yii , in the respective Riccati 
equations (3.91) and (3.92). 
The derivation for the optimal capacity growth for the feedback case is similar to 
that of the open-loop case of Section 3.4.1.3. The optimal trajectory of the vector of 
capacities is obtained by solving the system dynamics equation (3.60) which leads to the 
same equation as in the open-loop case: 
t F 
k* 	e(A-4-B 2)tk(t o ) 	 e(A+BZ 2)(t—T)BZ1 dr 
	 (3.93) f 
to 
where Z1 and Z2 are defined as before. Since the initial capacities at time to for all firms 
are known, the optimal trajectory of capacity growth is obtained by solving the above 
equation forward in time until t f by numerical integration. The results for several runs 
are shown, for a duopoly model, below in Figures 3.10-3.14. 
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Figure 3.14: Investment and output profile for feedback equilibrium: parameter values used: 
same as in Fig.3.10 except for k,(to) = 50, k1 (to ) = 30. 
3.4.3 Discussion of Results 
Both open-loop and feedback Nash strategies for the linear quadratic model of fixed 
duration admit unique equilibria. The state trajectories converge to stable stationary 
capacity levels for the two firms in both cases. To examine the convergence of the model, 
several runs were conducted, in which variations in the following model parameters were 
considered: 
• The starting values at time to, for the vector of capacities of the two firms. 
• The unit costs of capital investment. 
• The speed of adjustment costs. 
• The inverse demand function parameters. 
The runs are divided into two classes. In the first, it was assumed that the two firms 
face identical costs of investment; while in the second, the firms face asymmetric costs; 
the smaller firm is assumed to have more advantageous costs of investment than the 
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second larger firm. Another case is considered where the larger firm is more efficient in 
terms of investment costs. 
It was shown in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2 that there exists a unique pair of in-
vestment strategies that lead to stable Nash equilibria for the capacity expansion problem 
formulated as a linear quadratic Nash-Cournot game of fixed duration. The uniqueness 
of the solution is contingent on finding a solution to a set of matrix Riccati equations. 
Indeed, these equations admit unique solutions for both open-loop and memoryless feed-
back, or Markov perfect models, provided the players are confined to strategies that are 
affine in the state. The solution is an adaptation of a general formulation for this type of 
models by Ba§ar & Olsder (1999). Engwerda (1998b,1998a) on the other hand showed 
that for a linear quadratic game an open-loop Nash equilibrium may exist for situations 
where the Riccati equations do not admit a solution. 
Existence of unique solutions for linear quadratic differential games is due to Starr & 
Ho (1969a). Papavassilopoulos & Olsder (1984) also demonstrated the existence of linear 
feedback solution for finite horizon linear quadratic games; Kydland (1975) showed the 
existence and uniqueness of linear feedback strategies for linear quadratic discrete time 
dynamic games of finite horizon. Reynolds (1987) showed the existence of a solution for 
an infinite horizon linear quadratic game for a duopoly; using a quadratic value function 
he solves the Hellman equations and shows the stability and uniqueness of the solution. 
Capacity adjustment in the Reynolds model is subject to adjustment costs that are 
quadratic in the gross investment (h = cui + 2th,,F). The model developed in this 
chapter is defined for a fixed duration, and the adjustment costs are quadratic in the net 
investment undertaken by the firm, (h = cui + 	— 5ki)2). 
The uniqueness of the solution is clear from Figures 3.3(a)-3.7(a) for open-loop strat-
egy, where the capacities of the two firms i and 1 (or respectively 1 and 2) converge 
to the Nash equilibrium which is maintained until the end of the game. This equilib-
rium is unique, in the sense that no matter at what initial capacity levels the two firms 
start the game, by following the optimal investment strategies u7, ui they will eventu-
ally converge to the same equilibrium. And similarly for the feedback case as shown in 
Figures 3.10(a)-3.14(a). 
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When the two firms incur symmetric costs, both end up having identical capacities 
and market shares, as they converge to the Nash equilibrium. Reynolds (1987) findings 
are also consistent with this outcome. 
The intertemporal nature of investment and changing market shares of the two firms 
is also discernable from these figures. Due to the presence of adjustment costs, the firms 
adjust their capacities slowly over time towards the equilibrium level. 
Another feature which is apparent from these figures is that towards the end of the 
game, both firms realise that the useful life of additional investment is very short, and 
marginal earnings are too low to cover rising marginal adjustment costs (Kort 1988). 
They reduce the investment rate from the level required to compensate for depreciating 
capital, and their capacities decline, or dip slightly, from the equilibrium level. This 
pattern of investment is shown in panes (c) of the figures for all the cases considered. 
When firm i has a larger market share than firm 1 at time to, initially the smaller firm 
invests at a higher rate than the larger firm i, until the two firms become comparable 
in size, and the investment rates stabilize to maintain a capacity level that is capable 
of meeting market demand. As can be seen from Figures 3.3, and 3.4 for the open-loop 
model, and also Figures 3.10 and 3.11 for the feedback, the capacities of the two firms 
converge, to the Nash equilibrium level, which is maintained until the end of the game. 
The economic interpretation of this result is that in a duopoly the firms realise that by 
controlling the output they can influence the price. Since both firms are only concerned 
about maximising their profits, when the smaller more efficient firm, 1, expands its ca-
pacity by utilising a high investment rate, the larger firm, i, maintains a low investment 
level, and consequently a low output such that the price is not adversely affected. 
In Figure 3.5 firm i, which starts from a high level of capacity, allows its capital to 
depreciate, while firm 1 invests at a high rate until they both stabilise when the Nash 
equilibrium is reached. As firm i's capacity and market share decline, its profits decline 
initially and then stabilise; while firm 1 invests heavily raising its market share and profits. 
When both firms have capacities far in excess of market demand as in Figures 3.6 and 
3.7 both firms reduce their capacities to arrive at the Nash equilibrium. As the two firms 
allow their capital to depreciate, they reduce their costs and the profitability rises. In 
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Figure 3.7 both firms disinvest initially in order to reduce their overcapacities, and losses. 
Investment then stabilises as they approach the Nash equilibrium. Initial investment, 
which is negative, may be interpreted as the two firms selling their capital. In the 
present model there are no limits on the investment which may take positive as well as 
negative values. 
The firms act strategically by following feedback Nash strategies of investment and 
output. Unlike with the open-loop, there is no pre-commitment over any period under 
feedback strategy solution, instead the investment strategy is dependent on the current 
state of the game represented by the pair of current capacities held by the two firms. 
Since each firm's investment strategy is decreasing in the capacity held by its rival, each 
firm has an incentive to overinvest in an effort to preempt its rival in future periods, or 
more accurately for the remaining period of the game. 
By overinvesting the firm induces its rival to invest less, as the firm realises that its 
investment strategy and that of its rival, is a function of the current state of the game. 
The reaction of the other firm, by following the same strategy of overinvesting in an effort 
to influence its rival's investment decision, gives rise to a pair of capacity equilibria for 
the two firms that is higher than that attained under open-loop strategy. This is true for 
all the cases tested as shown in Figures 3.10-3.14, pp. 127-129, and their counterparts for 
the open-loop in Figures 3.3-3.7, pp. 113-115. 
It is noticeable also from these figures that feedback Nash strategies result in more 
competitive outcomes than open-loop strategies. When the firms follow feedback strate-
gies investment is higher, leading to higher capacity and output equilibrium levels for 
both firms than for the open-loop counterpart. Higher outputs result in lower prices, and 
both firms achieve lower profits as depicted in panes (b) of the figures. 
Also Table 3.1 shows the capacity Nash equilibria attained for several runs where the 
two firms have asymmetric capacity investment costs ranging from 0.01 to 100. Some of 
the results of the asymmetric costs cases are somewhat intriguing. Assuming that firm i 
is the smaller of the two firms, and that it incurs higher investment costs, it is found that 
by utilising the same optimal investment strategy as in (3.45), or (3.77), i will continue 
to invest rapidly initially, to catch up with firm 1, despite its higher costs. Eventually 
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i, ends up having a capacity, and consequently a market share, close to that of 1. The 
discrepancy in the market shares between the two firms is dependent on the magnitude of 
the difference in the cost structure of their investment costs. When i has an investment 
cost 10 to 100 times that of 1, its equilibrium capacity is nearly equal to that of 1, or in 
the worst case about half that of firm 1. 
But on the face of it this result runs counter to standard findings of examples given 
in economics textbooks; which is that market shares of firms should reflect directly their 
cost efficiency. However, it should be remembered that these examples refer to static 
situations. In a dynamic setting the outcome is different. Again the duopoly analysis is 
relevant here. As long as there are profits to be made and firm i can cover its costs, it 
will continue to invest at a high rate despite its higher costs. 
On the other hand if firm i were to start from a very high level of capacity; then 
as 1 invests, i will reduce its capacity to accommodate the increase in its rivals capital 
additions. This continues until the Nash equilibrium is reached. But why should i make 
these sacrifices? Again the analogy is derived from oligopoly theory. In a market served 
by a duopoly both firms realise their interdependance in affecting the market price; the 
leading firm realises that unless it accommodates its rival, the price will crash. Firm i 
has an incentive to reduce its capacity to support prices and maintain profitability. 
Table 3.1: Nash equilibria under different investment costs(b) 
Investment cost 
ci 	C2 
Feedback 
k1 	k2 k1 
Open-loop 
k2 
0.02 0.01 15.19 15.18 13.78 13.78 
2 1 15.08 15.18 13.70 13.77 
10 1 16.23 16.51 15.01 15.44 
30 3 14.62 16.87 13.47 15.11 
40 10 13.80 16.70 11.80 13.80 
50 0.5 13.36 17.73 12.49 15.71 
100 1 10.34 19.51 10.27 16.81 
100 10 10.15 18.65 9.89 15.30 
100 20 11.05 18.32 10.80 16.32 
(b) parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, d1 = 50, d2 = 50, 
r = 0.05, 6 = 0.10. 
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The results of the table show that on average the equilibrium capacity levels attained 
under feedback strategy are 5% - 22% higher than the open-loop capacity levels; reflecting 
the strategic behaviour of firms when they follow feedback (or Markov perfect) Nash 
strategies. 
A decrease in demand elasticity (b = 4) results in Nash equilibria at lower capacity 
levels (k1 = 7.57, k2 = 8.55) than those of the base case. Where as when b = 0.5, indi-
cating a demand curve with higher demand elasticity, the pair of equilibrium capacities 
are much higher, in the range of k1 = 53.9, and k2 = 61.2. As shown in Table 3.2, 
despite the variation in the demand curve slope, the Nash equilibria obtained for the two 
firms are consistent with previous runs where the two firms i and I attain capacities that 
are comparable in size, and where feedback capacities are higher than their open-loop 
counterparts. 
Table 3.2: Nash equilibria under different inverse demand parameters(t) 
b 
Feedback 
k1 	k2 k1 
Open-loop 
k2 
0.5 64.97 64.67 62.19 62.29 
2.0 15.60 16.89 14.84 16.04 
4.0 7.57 8.55 7.21 8.07 
parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, Cl = 10, c2 = 1, di. = 50, d2 = o, 
r = 0.05, 6 = 0.10. 
Variations in the adjustment cost parameter d appear to have a small impact on the 
equilibrium values for both the feedback and open-loop strategies, as shown by the small 
variation in the values of k1 and k2 in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Nash equilibria under different speed of adjustment costs(*) 
Adjustment Cost 
d1 	d2 
Feedback 
ki 	k2 
Open-loop 
k1 	k2 
0.05 0.05 13.68 15.99 12.14 13.96 
0.50 0.50 13.90 16.03 12.41 14.04 
50 50 16.23 16.51 15.01 15.44 
100 100 16.11 16.29 14.76 14.87 
* parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, ci. = 10, c2 = 1, r = 0.05, 
o = 0.10. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The dynamic capacity expansion problem faced by a duopoly is formulated in this chapter 
as a Nash-Cournot differential game with convex adjustment costs. Using optimal control 
techniques, the optimal investment strategy that maximises the profits for each firm 
is found by solving a system of coupled matrix Riccati equations. These investment 
strategies are referred to as the golden investment rule by Conrad & Clark (1987); they are 
given by equations (3.45), p. 108, and (3.77), p. 121. The optimal investment strategies 
induce unique equilibrium solutions for the state trajectories under both the open-loop 
and feedback, or Markov perfect, information structures. It was demonstrated that 
when firms follow feedback strategies, they hold larger capacities at the steady state 
equilibrium than when they follow open-loop strategies, indicating strategic intent, by 
attempting to influence the investment behaviour of their opponents. This result was 
shown to be robust under different conditions of investment costs, adjustment costs, and 
demand curve variations. 
Unlike the one shot games of. Chapter 2, the advantage of preemptive investment by 
the incumbent to deter mobility in the long run is ineffective due to the dynamic nature of 
the investment game, depreciation and the reversibility of capital. In the Spence (1979) 
model, the first mover firm has an advantage over its rival, and early investment has a 
preemptive effect on the outcome of the game. Fudenberg & Tirole (1983) by developing 
the same model show that in a Markov perfect equilibrium, the firm that has a head start 
can deter entry or mobility, by overinvesting causing its rival to reduce its investment. 
In this chapter, the capacity equilibria that are generated by following open-loop 
or feedback Nash-Cournot investment strategies, are independent of the pair of capac-
ities the two firms possess at the start of the game. From the foregoing, it may be 
concluded that in this model small firms increase their market share rapidly, provided 
that adjustment costs are reasonable, while larger firms make allowance for the growth 
of their smaller competitors. This indicates that profit maximising firms accommodate 
their rivals when following Nash-Cournot investment strategies. 
Despite large differentials in initial capacities at the start of the game between the 
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two firms, at equilibrium they equalise in size and end up having equal shares of the 
market when they face symmetric costs. In this chapter, it was found that even in cases 
when there are substantially large differences in investment costs between the two firms, 
their capacities converge in the long run to comparable sizes. The discrepancy in the 
market shares between the two firms, nevertheless, is dependent on the magnitude of the 
difference in their cost structures. 
Investment costs play a small role in affecting the equilibrium values, when these are 
only a small proportion of total costs, or are small in comparison to the revenue. In the 
petrochemical industry the production of most bulk products involves processes where 
the investment cost is a small fraction of the cost of production; which may explain the 
existence of inefficient producers in such oligopolistic markets and why they are able to 
survive for long periods; and suggests that firms follow Nash-Cournot strategies. 
Chapter 4 
Optimal Output and Investment 
with Binding Capacity 
4.1 Introduction 
The assumptions made in Chapter 3, that the firms face production at full capacity, 
and negligible production costs are relaxed in this chapter. Also capital is allowed to 
depreciate in this chapter; thereby imparting some capital reversibility on the problem 
when the investment rate falls behind the annual depreciation of capital. Relaxing the 
assumption of operating at full capacity, increases the dimension of the problem; instead 
of controlling just one control variable, each firm now has to decide on two control 
variables in every period: an optimal investment rate, and an optimal production rate. 
Each firm solves an optimal control problem with a two dimensional control variable. 
We resort to a discrete time formulation for the problem, using an algorithm attributed 
to Kydland (1975). A discrete time formulation of the problem facilitates applying the 
model to empirical testing using industry data, which will be the subject of the next two 
chapters. 
In addition to the the Nash-Cournot competition that takes place between the two 
firms discussed in Chapter 3, we look at a Stackelberg game in this chapter, where one 
of the firms takes on the role of the leader in the market. The role of the leader may 
be alternated between the incumbent and the entrant. The leadership position may 
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be assumed by one of the firms for a variety of reasons. It could be due to historical 
reasons like the role of a long established producer in the market, with its marketing 
network and sales outlets, or perhaps with the added benefit of accumulated technical 
and production know how. Another would be technological advantage like the ownership 
of an efficient proprietary production process, or access to cheap raw materials. Yet 
another reason could be due to a more efficient management structure rapidly responsive 
to market developments and industry dynamics; also more innovative, skillful and creative 
workforce enjoying good industrial relation with its management gives companies a lead 
over their competitors. The Stackelberg model is dealt with in Section 4.4 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Both types of strategies are considered 
for the Nash-Cournot model, the open-loop, and feedback strategies, with an analysis of 
the likely credible outcome. The feedback strategy for the model is considered first in 
Section 4.2, and the open-loop in Section 4.3. The performance of the dynamic model un-
der different market structures, and the role of variations in adjustment cost parameters, 
are studied in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Nash-Cournot Duopoly with Two Decision Variables 
and Feedback Strategies 
This section deals with the case where each of the two firms have to contend with two 
decision variables, namely, the output, x, and the investment rate, u, in each period, and 
use Nash-Cournot feedback strategies. Furthermore, the equilibrium solution that we are 
seeking for the investment problem will be a feedback equilibrium; since in each period, 
the optimisation is carried out on the basis of the current state of the world. Each firm 
solves an optimal control problem, assuming a feedback information pattern, where the 
permissible strategies are dependent on the current value of the state and time (Ba§ar & 
Olsder 1999). This will become clear from the exposition of the problem which follows 
in the next section. 
The strategies are decision rules about actions that are undertaken in each period. 
In the present context, these actions concern the production rates (or outputs), and the 
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investments in capacity that the firms pursue over the planning horizon under consider-
ation. Past actions of the players and the history of the evolution of game to the present 
state are not relevant, since in every period the players base their decisions on the current 
state; this gives rise to the subgame perfectness property of the feedback game. When the 
firms follow these type of strategies, the game starting from any designated time within 
the time horizon of the game, constitutes from that time until the remaining part of the 
game, a perfect game. A Nash-Cournot feedback equilibrium is reached when each firm 
solves its control problem, and neither firm has an incentive to deviate from its course 
of action. For instance the actions of the firms regarding their outputs are interdepen-
dent, since in a duopolistic market, their combined production determines the price. So 
when each of the two firms solves its optimal control problem, it makes an assumption 
about action of its competitor, that that firm is following an optimal policy of outputs. 
And when each arrives at its optimal solution, neither has an incentive to deviate from 
this outcome since neither can unilaterally benefit from any deviation. This amounts to 
solving two optimal control problems for the two firms simultaneously. The question of 
whether firms decide on the timing of their moves alternatingly or simultaneously, when 
timing choice is made endogenously (i.e. the choice of timing of production or investment 
in every period is made by the firms and not imposed on the structure of the game) in 
a Nash-Cournot setting game similar in nature to the one analysed here was discussed 
in Maskin & Tirole (1987). They demonstrate that when firms move alternatingly, they 
have a tendency to produce higher quantities leading to lower profits than if they were to 
move simultaneously. The firms have a joint incentive to be in a simultaneous mode. In 
the presence of relatively low interest rates, the gain to firms from moving simultaneously 
is more significant, and simultaneity of moves therefore prevails. 
The problem is formulated in a dynamic programming framework. By construction, 
this formulation ensures that decisions are optimised from the present time until the 
final period under consideration irrespective of any previous actions or decisions made 
(Bellman 1957)1. The planning horizon for the problem we consider is a finite one; but a 
sufficiently long horizon will be assumed, to warrant usefulness for the study of empirical 
'Dynamic programming is used for the case where a feedback solution is required. Alternatively it 
would have been possible to use differential game formulation for the problem as we did in Chapter 3. 
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work or long range planning. Bearing this in mind, and the fact we are considering 
interest rates that are small in value, the salvage value of capital at the end of the game 
would be insignificant, and may be safely assumed to be zero. Finite horizon problems of 
the type studied here, in general, have no closed form solution. They can be formulated 
using either Riccati equations, or dynamic programming formulation, and then numerical 
methods are used to solve for the optimal control solution. 
Most of the work in this area, however, assume infinite planning horizon. Cyert & 
de Groot (1984) paper is one of the earliest to the consider a finite horizon for this 
problem. Maskin & Tirole (1987) show that the finite horizon equilibrium strategies 
converge to their infinite horizon counterparts as the planning horizon is extended; giving 
an indication of the robustness of the nature of equilibrium solution. Kydland (1975) 
derived a game theoretic solution for a similar problem for n, players, where each controls 
a single decision variable. Reynolds (1986), extended this formulation, by considering 
developments in the US aluminium industry, to a problem where each firm i controls 
two decision variables: investment rate, ui, and output, xi. Here we follow the same 
methodology, which in reality is a dynamic programming problem with two decision 
variables. The algorithm is described in detail in Kydland (1975) for the Nash-Cournot 
game, and for the Stackelberg game in Kydland (1977). The theorems and their proofs 
are found therein, and the reader is referred to the two papers. Here, only reference is 
made to the theorems, and the basic structure of the algorithms is sketched out. It is 
worth noting also, that the formulation in Kydland is for problems where the players are 
concerned about minimising costs. So instead of maximising, the problems that players 
contend with in Kydland are those of minimisation over the horizon of the game. 
4.2.1 Model Description and Structure 
As in chapter 3, the market is served by a set N of firms or players, where N -=- {1, 	,n}, 
and in a duopoly we have n -= 2; each player i E N has a vector control variable ui t , such 
that ui,i 	xt ,i11, comprising its investment and output rates respectively. Where 
ui E Ui , and U i is a compact and convex set of admissible controls, U i E R2. The 
planning horizon of the game is finite, and it is defined to cover [1, 7]. 
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In each period t, the net profit for each firm, wi,t is defined to be a quadratic function; 
this is so because Tri,t , Ci,t , and Ii ,t are all quadratic, and time dependent; but initially 
for the duopoly simulation runs we assume that they are time invariant: 
wi(t) = iri (t) — Ii (t) Vi E N, Vt E [1, 11 
where the operating profit is the revenue less the production costs: 
7ri (t) = (a — b(xi,t T xj,t))xi,t — Ci,t (xi,t, ki,t) 
and the production cost function, Ci ,t is quadratic in output, xi,t , and capital, ki,t . 
ki,t ) = 	miki,t 	— ki,t )2 
fi and mi are the unit variable, and fixed costs respectively; these are the costs of 
materials, supplies and capital related costs per period. They cover all costs of activities 
such as those involved in the day to day running of the plant, production and sales 
operations of the product. The firm is penalised by the last quadratic term in the 
equation, when output deviates appreciably form the optimal design capacity of the 
plant; and gi is an output adjustment cost parameter. The significance of the adjustment 
cost element of the production cost function, and the relevance for its inclusion in the 
context of the petrochemical production costs is expounded upon in the next chapter. 
In most studies of dynamic models, the adjustment cost element of the production cost 
function, is assumed to be quadratic in gross change of output (Reynolds 1987, 1991, 
Karp & Perloff 1993a, 1993b); this effectively means that adjustment costs are increasing 
with output; and at higher rates of output the firms are penalised by paying higher costs 
of adjustment. In the present formulation of the model, when the production rate is 
at the optimal level, the adjustment cost is zero. Only when production deviates from 
optimal capacity do firms get penalised; and the cost of adjustment is proportional to 
the deviation irrespective of the level of production at which firms are operating. Also as 
before, the investment cost, /i(ui , ki ) is quadratic in the investment rate, ui , and capacity, 
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k„ and includes an adjustment cost element as defined in Chapter 3 
/i(ui,t , ki,t) = ci ,tui ,t + 	— okit)2 
Following Kydland (1975), Reynolds (1986), and Slade (1995), the state vector yt , in 
each period, is defined to include the output, the rate of investment and the capital stock 
of both firms. yt , therefore describes the state of the industry in each period t. The net 
profit wi,t(yt ), now takes the following compact form, as a result of redefining the state 
vector2 ; which is a linear quadratic function of the state: 
	
wi,t(Yt) = 	.Y /tCli,tYt for i, 	 (4.1) 
the vectors Pi t , and matrices Qit , have the appropriate sizes of 6 x 1 and 6 x 6 respec-
tively; for a duopoly the state vector, y t E R.3n , since for each player the state has three 
elements: its capacity and the two control variables of production and investment; pi,t , 
and Qi,tcontain the equation parameters of the model. Capital is subject to depreciation, 
and the evolution of capacity is described by: ki,t+i = ui,t + (1 --(5)ki,t . which is analogous 
to equation (3.12) of Chapter 3. It simply states that the capacity in the next period 
is equivalent to the current gross investment, ui,t , undertaken by the firm plus the net 
capacity (after depreciation) in place in the current period. Both firms are undergoing 
this process. The development of capacity over the planning horizon, as represented by 
the state, is shown in equation (4.2). It describes the evolution of the state, for both 
firms, as a function of the state in the previous period, and the current decision vector 
of investment and output rates. 
yt = AYt_i + But 	 (4.2) 
where the state vector y't_ i 	x1, k1, u2, x2, k2 )t_ i , and the control vector, u't = 
(u1, xi, u2,x2 )t . Also A and B, are two matrices with the respective dimensions of 6 x 6 
and 6 x 4. Chow (1981) provides a detailed exposition of the construction of these 
21 use interchangeably the notation i, j and respectively 1, 2 to refer to the two firms, which is an 
acceptable and common practice in the game theoretic literature. 
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equations in the context of the optimal control of dynamical economic systems. The 
objective of each firm is to maximise the flow of its profits over the planning period, by 
selecting optimal values for the investment and output, that it controls, while at the same 
time taking into consideration the actions and strategy of the rival firm. Ji is the net 
present value of current and future profits generated by the firm as a result of following 
an optimal policy over the planning period. /3 is the discount factor, where /3 = 	, and 
r is the risk free per period discount rate3, namely: 
Ji = max E /31-1-wi(yt) for i and j, i j 	 (4.3) 
t=i 
We can introduce a dynamic programming formulation for the problem; where the stream 
of profits generated by firm i at any time t as a result of holding a capital stock described 
by yt , is expressed by the value function, Vi,t (yt_i ); which comprises two elements: 
the profits generated in the current period wi,t (yt ), and the future flow of profits that 
its capital stock will continue to generate, when the firm follows an optimal policy of 
investment and output until the final period of the game, T. This future flow of profits is 
expressed as a value function for the next period, and is discounted to the present by the 
discount factor /3. But the capital stock is dynamic, and is changing in every period as 
a result of depreciation and capital investment; and the maximisation of (4.4) is subject 
to the state equation (4.2). 
Vi,t(Yt_i) = max (wi(yt) + i3Vi,t+i(Yt))Vi E N, Vt E [1,T] x j,,,ui,, (4.4) 
By construction, a dynamic programming implementation of the planning problem for 
capacity expansion is akin to a feedback strategy, since at every stage each firm reacts 
to the state variable at time t when deciding on its future policy and the selection of 
its optimal decision variables; perhaps to illustrate this point, it's worth noting here 
Bellman's principle of optimality which states that: 
3The interest rate is assumed to be constant over all periods, and all firms discount their profits at 
the same rate which appears to be the norm in the literature; although it may be argued that different 
companies may have different discounting rates, depending on the value of their capital, and the ability 
to raise funds internally. In the present formulation of the model this could be easily incorporated. 
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"An optimal policy has the property that, whatever the initial state and 
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with 
regard to the state resulting from the first decision." (Intriligator 1971) 
To solve the capacity expansion problem, we have to specify the value function. 
Equation (4.4) suggests that the value function is a function of the state in place in 
the previous period, which reflects mainly the existing capital in place and production 
capability. Since we are dealing with a quadratic problem where wi (yt), is quadratic, we 
assume that the value function is quadratic in the state, and has the following form: 
Vi,t(Yt-1) = vt,t + 	+ 
	
(4.5) 
where vi,t, ri,t and Si,t are unknown and have yet to be determined. If it can be shown 
that such a function exists, and that it satisfies the optimality conditions for both firms, 
then the problem is solved. Dynamic programming suggests a recursive procedure, so we 
can also write the value function for the next period, t + 1: 
Vt,t+i(Yt) = vt,t+i + rit,t+17it 	lyitSt,t+iYt 
	 (4.6) 
Now using equations (4.1) and (4.6) in (4.4), we obtain: 
Vt,t(Yt_i) = max Pvt,t+i + (Pit + Orti ,t+i)Yt 	Y /t(Qt + f3St,t+1)Yti 
	
(4.7) 
then substituting the value of yt from (4.2), we get the value function for period t in the 
desired form, as a function of yt_1, the state variable in the previous period: 
Vi,t(yt_i) = max [Ovi,t+i + 	Or2nt+1)(Ayt_i + But)+ 
+ But)r(Qt,t + OSt,t+i)(AYt_i + But)] (4.8) 
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and similarly for firm j we have: 
xj,t,ni,t vi,t (yt_ i) = max 	+ (pij,t + firli,t+i)(AYt_i + But)-1- 
ButY(Q3 ,t + OS,i,t+1.)(AYt_1 + But)] (4.9) 
The two equations (4.8) and (4.9) are now compatible with their counterparts for the 
value functions Vi,t(yt_ i ), and 173,t(yt_i). They are of the same form as in (4.5), and 
are expressed in terms of the state in the previous period; this procedure, as we shall 
see in Section 4.2.3 below, facilitates solving the recursive procedure for the unknown 
coefficients, vi ,t , ri,t and Si,t, that are essential for the solution. 
4.2.2 Optimal Production and Investment Rates 
Next we set about to find the optimal investment and production strategy for the two 
firms, for the entire period from t to T. For clarity, in the following few steps, the 
maximisation is carried out individually for each control variable for the two firms. To 
perform the maximisation wrt ut,t, the investment rate for firm i, equation (4.8) is 
expanded to yield: 
Vt,t (yt_ i ) = max Pvt,t+1. + (.132,t + Pr't,t+i)(AYt_i + 1)12.44 + B1u,1,t )+ 
xi,t,ui,t 
+ biut,t + 	+ TiSt4+1)(AYt-1 + biut ,t + Blui,t )] (4.10) 
where the following notation has been introduced: b1 stands for the first column of matrix 
B, and where B1 = [b2, b3, 14], and 144 = [xt,t , ui,t , x j,t ]; taking the differential wrt ut,t 
we obtain for player i: 
bi (pi,t /3ri,t+i) 	(Qi,t OSi,t+1)(AYt_1 	ui,t 	= 0 	(4.11) 
which is the same as: 
bi(Pt,t + Ort,t+t) + 	+ 	) (AYt_ 	Bui,t) = 0 	(4.12) 
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and for the maximisation wrt the second control variable, xi,t, the output for firm i we 
obtain: 
112 (pi,t + ,3rt,t+1) + b2(Qt ,t + 13St,t+i)(Ayt_1 + Bui,t) = 0 	(4.13) 
And similarly for the second firm, j, when the maximisation wrt the choice of investment 
rate, uj,t, and output rate, xj,t , is performed, we obtain the two respective equations: 
b'3 (pi,t + /37.34+1) + b'3 (Qi,t + 	3 ,t+i)(Ayt _i + Bu3 ,t ) = 0 	(4.14) 
W4(pj,t + 07-3,t+i) V4(Qi,t /3Si,t+i)(Ayt_1  + Bui,t ) = 0 	(4.15) 
combining the four equations, they may be represented in matrix form as: 
bl (pi,t + Ort,t+1.) 
1/2(Pi,t i3ri,t+1) 
113(13i,t + Or i,t+t) 
14(pi5t + Or j,t+i) 
 
bi (Q2;,t + OS t,t-F1) 
W2 (Qi ,t + OSt,t+i) 
li3 (Cj j ,t  
14 (Q.j ,t + 3Si,t+1) 
(Ayt_i + But) = 0 	(4.16) 
    
which may be written in more compact form by introducing the vector ht, and matrix 
Ht: 
	
ht + Ht(AYt_i + But) = 0 	 (4.17) 
and solving for ut, the optimal control vector of outputs and investment rates for the 
two firms in each period t, we get: 
ut = —(Ht B)-1[ht  + HtAYt—ii 	 (4.18) 
= —(Ht B)-1ht — (HtB)-111tAYt-1 	 (4.19) 
= dt  + EtYt—i 	 (4.20) 
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where the following notation has been used: 
d t = —(Ht B) —l ht 	 (4.21) 
Et = —(Ht B)-1.11t A 
	
(4.22) 
Ht = 
bi (Qi,t + PSi,t+i) 
W2(Qi ,t OSi,t+i) 
(93(Cht+13.5 j,t+1) 
114(Qj,t OSj,t+1) 
and similarly ht = 
bi(P,,t+ i@ra,t+i) 
112(13,,t Ors,t+i) 
b3(Pi ,t + 3r3 ,t+i) 
b4  (1)34 + Or j,t+1.) 
(4.23) 
     
It is clear from the above how Ht and ht can be constructed for the two firms at each 
time interval t for the entire planning horizon. By Theorem 1 of Kydland (1975, p. 325), 
the necessary conditions for the existence of a maximising optimal ut in equation (4.20), 
are: 
i. Ht B < 0 Vt E [1, 7] 
ii. IHt BI 	0 Vt E [1,7] 
Due to the linear quadratic nature of the the problem, and since Qit , and Qit  are both 
semi-definite negative, (i) is met. The revenues irt,t , and 71-i,t , are concave in the output 
arguments as a result of a downward sloping inverse demand function, and the convexity 
of the cost functions, making the functions wt ,t(yt ), and wi,t(yt ), quadratic and concave 
in both output and investment rates. All the elements along the leading diagonals of 
Qi,t , and Qi,t , are negative. This ensures that the optimal control vector of output and 
investment maximises the value function of the respective firms. For a formal proof along 
these lines, see Outrata, Koovara & Zowe (1998, Chapter 12). They provide proofs for 
both the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg models. 
And (ii) is necessary to ensure that matrix Ht B is invertible. Furthermore, this ut 
is the equilibrium solution to the problem, which is also unique for the class of strategies 
that are linear in the state. 
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As can be seen from equation (4.20), the optimal controls of output and investment 
for the two firms in ut , are dependent on the state variable, yt _ i , in the previous period. 
In a duopoly this gives rise to each firm trying to influence the actions of its rival firm; 
because the state, by definition, includes the capacities of the two firms and their controls, 
and in a feedback Nash-Cournot set-up, the firms make allowance for the decisions of their 
rivals in every period when deciding on their actions; if a firm increases its investment a 
little bit more above the equilibrium level in this period, it can force its rival to reduce 
its investment and output in the next period (Fudenberg & Tirole 1992); both firms 
engage in this investment rivalry. This preemptive behaviour on the part of the players 
is reinforced by the feedback structure of the game, and the interaction between the 
firms. Investment, output and the capacity, as expected, will be found to be higher 
under feedback rules than under the open-loop. 
While the planning problem appears to be solved, since the optimal control vector 
for the industry, ut in (4.20) has been found as a function of the state in the previous 
period, yt _i which is known; dt and Et are functions of St,t+i, ri,t+i, Si,t+i, and  ri,t+1 
(as can be seen from (4.23)), that are valued in the next period, and have yet to be 
determined. Typically in a dynamic programming formulation the problem is solved 
backward in time, and the values for the coefficients of the value functions Vi,t+i (yt ) and 
yi,t±i(yt ) are obtained starting from the boundary conditions in the final period. This 
is shown below. 
4.2.3 The Recursion Procedure and Optimal Capacity Expansion 
We can now proceed to show how the recursion equations for vi,t , ri,t , and St ,t are 
obtained so that the value function Vt for each firm is evaluated. In the following few 
steps, to avoid clutter, the subscript i will be dropped. Now if we substitute (4.20) into 
the right hand side of (4.8), and (4.5) for the left hand side, we obtain an equation of the 
value function when the firm implements an optimal policy of output and investment, 
depicted by ut of equation (4.20), and whose two sides are in terms of the state variable 
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in the previous period: 
r'tYt- + •1  Vt- StYt- = 
Ovt+1 + (71t Or/t-F1)(AYt_i B(dt  + EtYt-i)) 
+ 1(AYt_1 + B(dt  + EtYt-i))/(Qt+ OSt+1) 
(Ayt_ i B(dt  EtYt-i))  (4.24) 
and upon rearranging the right hand side of this equation we obtain: 
vt + ritYt--1 + Wt_iStYt-t = /3vt-+-1 + (pit + Ort+i)(Bdt + (A+ BEt)Yt-t) 
(Bdt + (A + BEt)Yt-i)/(Cit + OSt+i)(Bdt + (A + BEt )yt _i ) (4.25) 
Now the two sides of the above equation describe the value function; the equality implies 
that the coefficients of the independent, first order, and second order terms in yt_i on 
both sides of the above equation are equal, and we can write the following equalities, 
that are recursive difference equations, namely: for the independent terms 
vt 	= (31.1t+1 + (Pt + Orit+i)Bdt + 2 (Bdt)/(Qt + OSt+i)Bdt 
	(4.26) 
= 	Ovt+i + (Pt + 13rt+i + 2  (Qt + OSt+1)Bdt)' Bdt 
	 (4.27) 
and for the first order terms in yt_ i, we get 
rtYt-t = (Pt + Ort+i)' (A + BEt)Yt-i + 1(Bdt)' (Qt + i@St+i)(A + BEt)Yt-i 
((A + BEt)Yt-i)/(Qt+ OSt+i)Bdt 
= (Pt + Ort-Fi)'(A BEt)Yt-i + (Bdt)'(Cit + /3St+1)(A BEt)Yt-i 
which upon factorisation may be written as: 
= [(Pt + Ort-Fl)' + (Bdt)' (Qt+ 15St+i)1(A BEt)Yt-i 
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taking the transpose of both sides of the above equation, we get: 
Yt-irt 
	 + B EtY [(Pt + Ort+i)/ + (Bdt)/ (Qt + /3S  t+1)]' 
Yt-i(A + BEt )'Rpt + grt+i ) + (Qt +13St±i )/ Bd t ] 
therefore we can write the equation for rt: 
rt = (A + BEt)' [Pt + Ort+1 + (Qt 13St+1)Bdt] 
where (Qt /3St+i) = (Qt+13st+1)1 since Qt and St+1  are both symmetric. 
Also, for the second order terms in yt_ i , we have: 
1./ 2 t-1St- t-1 = ((A + BEt)Yt-i)' (Qt + i3St+i)(A + BEt)Yt-i 
+ BEtY (Qt + OSt+i)(A + BEt)Yt-i, 
and we may conclude that the S t recursion is as follows: 
St  = (A + B Et)' (Qt + S t+1) (A + B Et). 
Having obtained the recursion equations for S t , r t , and vt from (4.29), (4.28), and (4.27) 
respectively, the entire sequence can be solved backward in time from the final period 
T to any initial period t. As such the value function Vt(yt _ i ) can be evaluated from 
(4.5); and it has been established that it is quadratic in the state variable, yt _ i . Also the 
optimal strategy for investment, ui , and production, xi , for each firm i has been obtained 
in (4.20). It is clear that this strategy is linear in the state; d t and E t may be evaluated 
for each period from the variables given by the recursion equations thus obtained. 
The boundary conditions for the problem remain to be defined, and will now be shown 
below. Since V2,T+1 = 0, we can immediately deduce that: 
Si,T+1 = 0, 	ri,T+1 = 0, 	 = 0 
(4.28) 
(4.29) 
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Si,T = (A + BET )'Qix(A+ BET ) 
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(4.30) 
ri5T 	= 	(A+ BET )'Ipi,T  + (Qi,T )BdT ] (4.31) 
vi,T 	- 	(Pi 	Qi,TBdT)'BdT. (4.32) 
It is clear that dT and ET, are now evaluated for the final period, T. Also HT and hT 
are defined as in (4.23), from the corresponding matrices and vectors, Qi,T , pi,T , and 
Q jT , and pi T , which include the variables for prices and costs, for both firms in the final 
period. 
	
dT = -(HT B)-1hT , 	ET = -(HT B)-1HT A 
HT  = 131QT , 	hT = BIPT 
And for the previous period we can immediately write: 
dT--1 = -(HT-1B)-1hT-1 	ET_i= -(HT-1B)-1HT-1A 
-FIT-1 = -13/(C2T-1+ OST) 	hT-1 = -13/(PT-i+ OrT) 
and the recursion equations can be developed as: 
Si,T-1 = (A + BET_1 )1 (Qi ,T _i + f3Si,T)(A + BET_].) (4.33) 
ri,T-1 = (A + BET-1) [Pix-i+ Orix + (Cli,T--4 + OSi,T)BdT-1] (4.34) 
vix_i = [Pi,T-i. + Ori,T + 2  (C2i,T-1 + OSi,T)BdT-1]'BdT-1 (4.35)  
This process is developed for all periods t, until the initial time, utilising equations (4.33), 
(4.34), and (4.35). In this problem we are assuming that the firms have full foresight 
of how demand develops, and all the costs incurred are known for the entire planning 
period. Therefore all the pit vectors, and Qit matrices, are known. We obtain the values 
St ,t , ri,t , and ui,t for all periods. This is done for both firms; and the equations are solved 
simultaneously, as a two point boundary value problem. We are now ready to obtain the 
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solution. The evolution of the state of the game is obtained by applying the optimal 
control, ut , of (4.20) to the state difference equation (4.2); with the initial state, yo , of 
the game is known, the first period optimal control vector comprising the investment and 
output rates is determined from (4.20), which in turn is employed in (4.2) to determine 
the state of the second period. Since we have already determined the values of ht,Ht,dt, 
and Et , for all periods, this procedure alternates forward in time until the last period T. 
4.2.4 The Role of Strategic Investment in Feedback Nash-Cournot Games 
The preemptive effect of each firms investment strategy on its competitor, when the firms 
are engaged in a feedback Nash-Cournot rivalry, can be seen by considering the marginal 
effect of each firms capacity on the strategy of the other. When feedback strategies are 
employed, each firm's control is decreasing in its rival's capacity in the previous period. 
By differentiating equation (4.20) wrt to yt_ i we get oayut i = Et , and the marginal effect 
of a change in the state on the optimal control, is embodied in matrix Et . Upon closer 
examination of the partial differentiation given below, of the two vectors, where: 
Out  
	
( au, 	au, 	au,  
au, 	ax, 	ak, 
ax, 	as, 	ax,  au, 	ax, 	ak, 
au,  
ax,  
au2 
au, 	au,  
ax2 	ak2 
ax, 	as,  
ax2 	ak2 (4.36) 
au2 	au2 	au au2 au2 	8112 
au, 	ax, 	tllC, 
ax2 	ax2  
au, 	axi 	ak1 
au2 
au2 
ax2 	 2 
ax 2 	(2T2.  
ax2 	ak2 
and from the duopoly simulation we have: 
0 	0 	—0.0373 	0 0 —0.0176 
0 	0 	+0.3257 	0 0 —0.1144 
Et = 4 (4.37) 
0 	0 	—0.0176 	0 0 —0.0373 
0 	0 	—0.1144 	0 0 +0.3257 / 
it can be noted, that the third column of Et gives the marginal effect of a change in the 
first firm's capacity, k1, on the optimal control vector,; and the last column is the marginal 
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effect of the second firm's capacity, k2. Each firm's capacity has a larger influence on 
its own controls than on its rival's, and because the costs and capacities are identical 
for both firms, the influences are symmetrical. Investment rates are decreasing with own 
capacity for both firms (Oui/Dki = 8u2 /8k 2 = —0.0373) ; this is because the firms 
invest heavily initially, and then their investment rates decline as they approach their 
steady state feedback Nash-Cournot equilibrium4 . The influence of firm l's capacity 
on its rival's investment rate is smaller, 8u2 /0ki = —0.0176. As expected the output 
is increasing with each firm's capacity (Ox i /Ok i = 0.3257), but is decreasing with its 
rival's (Dx2 /Ok i = —0.1144). By increasing its capacity through overinvesting in this 
period, a firm can reduce its rival's investment and consequently its rival's output in 
the next period, giving it a bigger share of the market, and higher profits. The second 
firm behaves in exactly the same way, and both firms end up with higher capacity and 
output than if they were not behaving strategically. It is paradoxical that a strategy 
designed to preempt rivals and increase output and profits at their expense, results in a 
more competitive environment, with lower prices and profits. But this is also a rational 
behaviour. By overinvesting the firms ensure that they have some reserve capacity in 
case there is an unexpected surge in demand; a capacity that they can use to punish 
their rivals if they misbehave, by producing more and lowering prices if the need arises. 
Furthermore, the presence of overcapacity in the industry, gives the impression of a loose 
oligopoly which is more competitive; and the impression of a tough industry, which in 
turn may act as a potential barrier to entrants. 
4See Kort (1988) for the case of a similar analysis of a single firm, when there are no constraints on 
investment rate. 
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4.3 Open-loop Model Solution 
4.3.1 Model Formulation in Open-loop Information Structure 
In the open-loop formulation each firm chooses its investment and output rates that 
maximise its flow of profits for the entire game. The firms commit from the outset, to 
the optimal path of control variables that each will use for the entire game, considering 
that its opponents will be following the same strategy of committing to an optimal path. 
Each firm i, selects its vector of controls ui,t = (xi ,t , u,,t)', V t E [1, 7] 
T 
Ji = max 
	
riwi(Yt), 	Vi E N 
	
(4.38) 
=1 
and remembering that wt(yt ) is quadratic in the state variable yt and has the form as in 
(4.1), the above equation may be written out in expanded form for all periods: 
Jt = max 
ui,i,..•ui,T  
\ 	yi Pt,1 
t3Pi,2 	Y2 
02/3i,3 	Y3 
0T-1P
,-,i, T / \ YT 
Qi,1 
	 0 	0 
o 13Qi,2 0 . 
0 	0 02Q0 . 
/ Y1 
Y2 
1 
2 y3 
YT 
(4.39) 
Yi 
Y2 
y3 
YT 
0T-1 Q i7T  
Subject to a difference equation which describes the evolution of the state of the game; 
the state equation (or equation of motion) of the game, which written in terms of the 
initial state at the start of the game, is represented by: 
Yt -= Atm + 	At-iBut, t =1,...,T 
	
(4.40) 
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This equation of motion also may be expanded for all periods, as shown below, where 
U1  = (n1 Xl, U2, X2, • • • ,'an, Xn)t=1, is the vector of controls of all players in period 1: 
yl 
Y2 
y3 
T/ 
I A \ 
A2 
A3 
\ AT 
Yo + 
B 
AB 
A2B 
AT-1B 
0 
B 
AB 
AT-2B 
0 
0 
B 
... 
0 
0 
0 
A2B AB 
0 
0 
0 
B 
/ 
Ul 
U2 
U3 
\ UT 
(4.41) 
performing the maximisation by each firm wrt to its controls of investment and output 
rate over all periods, we obtain the following matrix equation: 
/ h1 H1 \ / A \ B 0 0 0 0 
h2 H2 A2 AB B 0 0 0 U2 
h3 H3 A3 Yo + A2B AB B 0 0 U3 
\ hT 1 \HT J  \ AT 
AT-1B AT-2B A2 B AB B \ UT 1_ 
(4.42) 
in the above equation each ht and Ht are a vector and a matrix containing elements 
from each player in period t as illustrated below: 
1~ 	pit 
1)12 i3t-l pt ,t 
1/30t 
by3t-1 
1: 3j3t-1 Q j,t 
ht = b/4 Qt -1 P ,t Ht by3t- (4.43) 
Wn-113t- 1 Pn ,t 
\ 	ot- pri,t 	 j 
Wn-10t-iqt,t 
wro@t—iQn,t 
writing equation (4.42) in a more compact form we get: 
+7-tAy0 +7-01.1.1 = 0 	 (4.44) 
=0 
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by rearranging this equation, we obtain the optimal control vector of investment and 
output rates, U, for all firms for the entire duration of the game, Vt E [1, T]. 
u 	— (1-i)-17-tAvo 	 (4.45) 
This indicates that the optimal strategy of the open-loop game is linear in the initial 
state, and (4.45) is analogous to (4.20) for the feed back strategy model. In fact we can 
write (4.45) in the same form as shown below although the values of d t and Et in the 
two equations are different due to the different information structure of the two games: 
= dt + Et yo 
	 (4.46) 
where: 
dt = (7-(4.)-10 
	
(4.47) 
Et = (7-t4)-17-/A 
	
(4.48) 
The evolution of optimal path of the state of the game can now be obtained by utilising 
the optimal investment and output rate of (4.46), which we could have written as U*, in 
(4.41): 
Y = Ayo + 4)u* 
	
(4.49) 
It is clear from (4.46), and the above equation that the evolution of the optimal control, 
and the optimal state are dependent on the initial state and the time. Each firm solves its 
optimal control problem, by selecting from the outset the vector of its optimal controls 
for all periods as specified in equation (4.38). 
4.3.2 Duopoly Under Competitive Market Conditions 
In a competitive market the firms operate as price takers. These markets are usually 
served by a large number of small firms, none of which is big enough to influence demand 
or market price. Under such market conditions, each firm produces as much product as 
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it can sell, and takes it that the price is dictated by the market. The firm does not care 
what other firms are doing; it plans its production and investment under the assumption 
that its decisions do not affect other firms. To illustrate how the firms interact under 
these conditions, we consider below the market for a duopoly first. The analysis is then 
extended to n firms in Section 4,5.3, p. 172, with the results shown in Table 4.4. 
Retaining the quadratic structure of the game, the objective function for each firm is 
described by the same equations as before. We make a slight modification to a perfectly 
competitive market, served by two firms only, as just described above. In that price is 
not constant for all periods, but rather it is linear, downward sloping, and is dependent 
on total output. Price is described by the same equation as before (equation (3.7) of 
Chapter 3): 
P(xi, xj, t) = a — b(xi(t) xj(t)), Vi = 1, 2 i 5L j, 	 (4.50) 
Using the same notation as in previous sections, the single period profit is described by: 
wi (P, xi , ui , ki , t) = iri (P, xi, ki , t) 	t) di E N = {1, 2}, Vt E [1, T] 
The operating profit 7i(t) is the revenue (which is simply price times firm i's output) less 
the production costs: 
7ri(P, xi, ki, t) = P(t)xi,t — Ci,t(xi,t, ki,t) 
and the production cost function, Ci t is quadratic in output, x,,t , and capital, ki,t . When 
each firm is trying to determine its optimal output, it maximises its profit function wrt to 
its output, assuming that the price in that period is constant; and since P(xi, xj, t) is 
constant, we have the following: 
awi (t) = p(t) 	 t = 
axi,t 	 OXi,t 	10Xi,t 
(4.51) 
in equilibrium al  ''t = 0, and we have the familiar result for each firm where price equals ax,,t 
marginal cost. And similarly for firm 2 we have: P(t) = ac,  t . 
Because the two firms are price takers, each firm operates under the assumption that 
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it does not have any bearing on the decisions of the other firm. The problem is therefore 
structured in exactly the same way as an open-loop game. The only difference is that the 
firms now take the price as constant and do not therefore interact as before. Each firm's 
decision is made independent of the other; and the optimality condition for output now 
follows equation (4.51). The equations and problem solution follows exactly the same 
steps as in Section 4.3.1. 
4.4 Stackelberg Game for n Firms with Two Decision Vari-
ables 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Another noncooperative Nash equilibrium concept, describing the interaction between 
rival players, or competing firms in an oligopolistic market, is the Stackelberg equilibrium 
that was first introduced by von Satckelberg, which later on gained wide acceptance in 
oligopoly theory. The main difference between a Stackelberg and a Nash game, is that in 
a Stackelberg game, the market is characterised by the presence of a leader, who has the 
advantage of making the first move by announcing his or her strategy first. And the leader 
has the advantage of taking into consideration the response of the rivals when making her 
decision. The leader gets to decide on her action first, and then the followers response 
follows. A Stackelberg equilibrium is arrived at when each player has no incentive to 
change his or her decision. 
In the context of this research, among the set of players, the leader knows that when 
each follower is evaluating what investment, and production, policy to follow that will 
maximise his objective function (which is the the value function of profits), he will take 
as given the leader's declared investment and production policy over the duration of the 
game. This derives from the fact that the leader gets to act first. Knowing this, the 
leader would therefore select the policy, (from her set of permissible strategies), to which 
she knows that her opponents would react optimally, that maximises her value function 
of profits. 
This problem is tackled in the following section. In every period, the leader announces 
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his production and investment strategy; the followers, having observed this, will each 
try to find his optimal response. So the followers' optimal control problem of profit 
maximisation is solved first. Then taking the followers' optimal response into account, 
the leader evaluates and selects her optimal policy that maximises her value function 
over the duration of the game. 
A question which arises in Stackelberg games is that of the credibility, and com-
mitment of the leader's declared decision. For this reason a feedback strategy is more 
sensible for all players. It is possible for instance for the leader to announce a strategy 
of investments and outputs; the followers then take this into account and evaluate their 
best response to the leaders declared optimal strategy. But once this has been done, 
and the game started, the leader may find it to her advantage to change her policy from 
what has been announced, and the followers actions are now, not a best response to 
the leader's present production and investment strategy and therefore not optimal. This 
makes a feedback strategy more credible, and feasible as an equilibrium concept. In this 
instance, both the leader and her rivals can follow strategies based on decision rules that 
are contingent on the current state and time; and can therefore modify their decisions 
as the game evolves, as opposed to an open-loop trajectory of outputs and investments. 
For this reason, only the feedback information structure is considered in the following 
section. 
4.4.2 Model Formulation for Stackelberg Game of n Firms 
The formulation of the problem follows the same structure as in Section 4.2.1 for the 
feedback Nash-Cournot duopoly, but now we have a market served by a set N of play-
ers, and the information structure, and sequence of play is different, reflecting the roles 
taken by the respective firms; once again, the ith player controls two decision vari-
ables ni , and xi, the investment rate and the output respectively, and has a capacity 
of ki , where i E N = {1, 	, n} since the market is now served by n firms. Let's 
restate some essential notation; for the industry we define a control vector ut , where 
Ut = (u1, x1 , u2, w2, • • • 	Xn)t, and where the prime denotes a transpose; the corre- 
sponding state vector is yt = (ui, xi , ki , u2, x2 , k2, 	, un , xn , W it . In this section it is 
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assumed that the 1st firm is the leading firm which acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the 
n — 1 remaining firms act as noncooperative Cournot followers. 
The problem in terms of the value function for each firm i is the same as equation (4.8) 
of the feedback model of Section 4.2.1: 
+ Vt,t(Yt-1) = max { t3vt,t+i + 	 But)  uz,txt,t 
1(Ayt_1  + But)'(Qt,t + OSt4+1)(AYt_i + But)} (4.52) 
Since in the present formulation of the problem each firm has two control variables, it 
is obvious that ut E R2n , and yt E R3n; and where A, and B are two matrices of 
dimensions 3n x 3n and 3n x 2n respectively. Also if we define bj as the jth column of 
matrix B, then it may be represented by B = [b1, b2, b3, b4, 	, b2,]. Following Kydland 
(1977), I also introduce the following additional notation to simplify the exposition of 
the equations developed in this section. Let /3,4 = pt,t + i3r,,t+i  and ei,t = Qit + 
/3S,,t±i. Also let B1 = [b1 , b2 ], and B1  = [b3 , b4 , . , b2,2 ]. And similarly let the leader's 
control variable be represented by u1 = (u1 , x1)1, and for the follower firms, by of = 
(u2, x2,113, x3, • • • , un, xn)1. Then (4.52) may be represented in the following form: 
ui,t,xi,t Vt,t (Yt_i = max {Ovi,t+i + 	+ But) + ( ,41Yt-1 But)/e1,t(AYt-1 + But)} 
(4.53) 
The information structure of a Stackelberg game dictates that in each period, the leader 
makes her decision first and then the followers having observed the decision of the leader, 
make their decisions, while taking the decision of the leader into consideration. The 
followers act non-cooperatively, as if they are in a Nash-Cournot game among themselves. 
They make their decisions independently of each other and act simultaneously5. 
5Other variations could be envisaged for the mode of play of the followers, one would be that there 
is a hierarchical mode of play between the followers in which case some of the players could be made 
to act before others, in a sequence of a Stackelberg hierarchy similar to a model studied by Matsumura 
(1999). Binmore (1992, p. 293), in the tradition of game theorists, considers that the distinction between 
Stackelberg and Nash-Cournot play is in the sequence and timing of play. 
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4.4.3 Follower and Leader Optimal Controls 
When the n-1 follower firms consider the maximisation problem of their value functions, 
they take the decision of firm 1, the leader, as given. The necessary condition for the 
selection of the optimal investment rate, ui,t for each follower firm j c N\{1}6 that 
maximises its value function, is obtained by differentiating equation (4.53) wrt u j,t to 
obtain: 
+ But ) = 0 	 (4.54) 
and for the selection of optimal output, xj,t we get: 
ti2j pa,t + 	03,t(Ayt_1  + But ) = 0 	 (4.55) 
where for both equations j E N\{1} = {2, , n}; the 2n — 2 equations for the n — 1 
follower firms may be written in matrix form as follows: 
ht + Ht(Ayt_i + But ) = 0 	 (4.56) 
where the following notation has been introduced: 
ht 
u3P2,t 11302,t 
W4P2,t 6402,t 
ht 	= and Ht = (4.57) 
b f2n —1 Pn,t 62n-1°72.4 
b2nPn,t bl2nOn,t 
recall that B = [B1 , Br], and ut = (ut, uf)', so the above matrix equation (4.56) for the 
follower firms, may be expanded to get: 
ht + Ht(Ayt_i + Bluit + Bfuif) = 0 	 (4.58) 
6This means the set N excluding firm 1, and is just a notation that refers to the set of rivals of firm 1, 
which is the set of followers. 
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which may be rearranged in the following steps to obtain the optimal control variables 
vector uf, for the follower firms. It can be noted that each is a function of the leader 
firm's control vector of output and investment rate, ult : 
Ht Bfuf = —HtAyt_i — HtBiu — ht 	 (4.59) 
uf = -(litBf)-iiit Ayt _i - (HtBf)-iHt B114 - (Ht Bf)-1ht (4.60) 
= Gtyt_i + 77114 + 
	
(4.61) 
where the following notation has been used: 
Gt = —(HtB f)-1HtA  
—(HtBf)-i fitB1 
—(HtBf)-1ht  
for the dominant 1st firm, the value function is defined by an equation in the same form, 
and structure as the other firms, as follows: 
Vt,t(Yt-t) = max (wi (Yt) + /31/1,t+1(Yt)) 111,t,x1,t (4.62) 
subject to the state equation (4.2), and equation (4.61), since the leading firm knows 
how the follower firms would react to its own actions, and would therefore take their 
response into account when choosing its optimal investment and output strategy. Once 
again we assume for the leading firm, a function which is quadratic in the state; its value 
function may be written as follows (c.f. equation (4.7)): 
Vi,t (yt_i ) = max {Ovi,t+1 + Pi,tYt  Ptt171,tYt} 
+ 1 l'N 	 (4.63) 
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where pi ,t = 101,t + /3ri ,t+i and el,t = Q1 t +0s,,t±i . Now substituting the value for 
yt using the state equation, (4.2) we get: 
Vi,t (yt-1)=- max{i3vi,t+i + /11,t (AYt_ + But ) + 2 (Ayt_ + But ) / 0i,t(AYt_ + But)} ut  
(4.64) 
and by expanding the vector of the control variables we obtain: 
Vi,t(yt _ i ) = max{OuLt+i + P/ i,t(AYt-i + B ut " + Bf f ) ut  
ut 
+ 2(Ayt_ i + Bl uit + Bf wtf)ien,t(AYt_i Blult + B f la (4.65) 
Since the leader knows that the n — 1 follower firms will choose their optimal investment 
rates and outputs subject to 4.61, we substitute the optimal value for uf to obtain the 
leaders value function when the followers are making their optimal decisions: 
	
1 	 \\ 
V1,t(Yt_1) = MaX{PV1,t+1 /11,t(AYt-1 B1 ut r3f  + 	0-YtYt-i.± „,1 _L l't))ut 
+ 2 (Ayt_i + Bl ult  + Bf (GtYt-i. ritult 7t))ie1,t(AYt-i (4.66) 
+ Bi ult ) + Bf (GtYt-i+ ntult 
which upon rearrangement yields: 
Vi,t(yt-1) = max{i3vi'  tH-1. + 	
+ BfGt )yt _i + (Bf Tit + Bl )ult + B f  
[(A + Bf Gt)Yt-i (B f nt + 	+ Bf-rd'eLt 	(4.67) 
[(A +Bf Gt)yt_i + (Bf m + B1 )14 + Bf-yd} 
Next we carry out the maximisation wrt the leader's control variables vector of investment 
rate and output, by taking the differential of the above equation wrt ult to get: 
(B fnt+.131 )1 p,,,t+(Bfnt+Bl Yen,d(A+BfGt)yt _i+(Bfnt+BI )u+Bf -rt ] = 0 (4.68) 
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by rearranging the above equation the optimal controls vector for the leader firm is 
obtained: 
= --RB f Tit + BlYeni,t(Bf nt + B1 )] -1  (B f + Bt ) (101,t + ei,tBf-rt) 	
(4.69) 
- [(Bfrit+ Bl )'ei,t(Bf nt + B I )] -1(Bf + Bl)'ei,t(A+BfGt)yt_i 
to simplify the notation, the following two terms are introduced: 
= 	--RBf 77t + 	ei,t(Bf + 131 )] -4(Bf ilt + 	ei,t(A + Bf Gt) (4.70) 
Ot,t = 	BlYei,t(Bf Tit +131)]-1(Bfrit +Bl)'(pi,t + e1,tBf-rt)(4.71) 
and equation (4.69) for the optimal control vector, ?lit, of the leading firm reduces to a 
simpler form: 
ut = 	+ 4'14 
	 (4.72) 
which shows that the optimal control vector of the leader firm is a linear function of the 
state variable of the previous period. Having found the optimal investment and output 
rates for the leader firm, 4/ , we can reevaluate the equation for the optimal control 
vector of the follower firms by inserting (4.72) in (4.61): 
	
ut 	= GtYt--.1 77t (di,tYt -1 + 014 + 'Yt 
	 (4.73) 
= 	(G, + 	+ (nt0i,t + 'rt) 
	
(4.74) 
Therefore the optimal control vector of investment and output rates for all the firms for 
the entire game, u't', may now be constructed by combining the two equations (4.74) and 
(4.72): 
ut 	di t 	 [ 	01,t  ut = 	= 	 Yt-i + (4.75) 
Gt + nt , dit ut 	 71tCbi,t + l't 
which may be written, as shown in (4.76) below, in a more compact form by introducing 
further notation, namely Dt , and c/ whose values are obvious: 
ut = DtYt-1 + 	 (4.76) 
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As expected, the optimal control is linear in the state variable, and dependent on the state 
of the previous period. The coefficients Dt and g5t are dependent on the values of Gt, 
di,t, Tit, 014, and -yt when the controls of the leader and followers are in equilibrium, as is 
evident in (4.75). Which in turn are obtained from H t , and ht. As can be inspected from 
the equations above, the values for d1,t, cht, ht , and Ht , are dependent on the respective 
values of pit , and ei,t for all players. But all of these coefficients are transient coefficients 
and they depend on the values of vi,t+i, ri,t+i and Si,t+1. These are valued in the next 
period, as is evident from the their subscripts. So the coefficients for the optimal controls 
in the present t period are obtained backward in time from the boundary conditions in 
the final period. The optimal control vector ut , cannot be evaluated as the state yt _i 
is not yet known. Instead, the coefficients Dt and Ot are evaluated at every stage and 
recorded backward in time until the first period where the initial state yo, is known. The 
whole procedure rests on evaluating the sequence of the values of vi, ri and Si for all 
periods. 
4.4.4 Recursion Procedure and Optimal Capacity Expansion 
The analysis which follows for the evaluation of the recursion equations vi,t , ri,t , and Si,t is 
similar to that for the Nash-Cournot game in Section 4.2.3. As before, the value function 
Vi,t (yt _ i) has been assumed to be quadratic in the state variable, and of having the same 
structure as in equation (4.5). Similarly, the maximisation problem is formulated as in 
equation (4.8) p. 144. The problem is then developed as in equation (4.24), where instead 
we will use the optimal control vector for the Stackelberg problem which we have just 
obtained in equation (4.76). Therefore we first get: 
Vi,t(Yt-1) = 
	 (4.77) 
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Also the optimal value for Vi,t may be obtained by inserting the optimal control vector 
from (4.76) into (4.53): 
Vt,t (Yt-i) =-P1'i,t+1 + P i,t(Ayt-i + B(DtYt-i. + 95t)) 
(4.78) 
(Ayt_i B(DtYt-i 0t))'ei,t(Ayt_1 + B(DtYt-i cPt)) 
By following the same procedure as in Section 4.2.1, of equating the independent, the 
first order, and the second order terms in yt_i on both sides of equations (4.77) and 
(4.78) we obtain three recursive equations for vi ,t , r,,t , and Si,t , as was done in equations 
(4.33)-(4.35): 
si,t_i = (A + 	 + BDt-i) 	 (4.79) 
ri t-1 = (A + BDt--1)'[Pi,t-1 + 	 (4.80) 
vi,t_i = 	+ [Pi,t-i + 	 (4.81) 
where i E {1, ... n} and t E [1, 7]; since the game ends at T, and the salvage value of 
capital at the end of the game is assumed zero, we have V i,T-F1(Yt) = 0. Therefore we 
can deduce that: 
Six+i = 0, ri,T+1 = 0, and vi,TH-1 =- 0 
	
(4.82) 
and the recursion equations for the final period are obtained by inserting these values in 
Pi,T and Cli,T, as shown below : 
Si T = (A + BDT) /Qi ,T (A + BDT) (4.83) 
ri,T = (A + BDT)1iPix + (4.84) 
,T — [Pi,T + 2 Qi,TBOTY-Bch (4.85) 
Once the sequence of values for vi,t , ri,t, and Si,t, has been obtained for the entire planning 
horizon t E [1, T], the problem would be solved. This is done sequentially backward in 
time, starting from the final period T, for each cycle of values in the following sequence 
until t = 1: 
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1. Note that since this is a deterministic problem, all the costs and the inverse demand 
function parameters are known for all players. We have all vectors and matrices 
p,,t , and Qit , Vi E N, et E [1, T] stored. Also store the time invariant matrices A 
and B. 
2. At T + 1 the coefficients vi,TH-1, ri,T+1, and Si,T+1 are valued at zero. 
3. Next evaluate pix and Oix for the leader and follower firms. hT, HT, and the 
values of GT, 71T, YT  are evaluated from (4.57) and (4.61). 
4. From the above step we can evaluate dix, and OLT from equations (4.70)-(4.71). 
5. Once this is done, the values of DT and cT  can be evaluated, from equation (4.75) 
and stored. 
6. The values of Six, ri,T, and vix can now be obtained using equations (4.83)-(4.85). 
This completes one cycle of values. 
7. Now we can evaluate the next set of coefficients Si,T_ i , 	and 	for the 
previous period T — 1, by going back to step (3), and repeating the same procedure 
for values of T — 1 instead, and using equations (4.79)-(4.81). Continue with steps 
4-6 for all periods, t until start of the game at period 1, storing the values of Dt, 
and cbt as we go along. 
Having obtained the sequence of values for Dt , and cbt for the entire game, the evolution 
of the state variable and the optimal control vectors may be evaluated. Since the state 
variable, yo, at the start of the game is known, the optimal control vector, u't"_1, of 
investment and output rates for the next period can obtained for both firms from (4.76). 
The evolution of capacity may be obtained from the state vector using the state equation 
of motion (4.2). With the state vector for the next period known, the optimal investment 
and output rates for the second period are again obtained using (4.76), and this process 
is repeated forward in time until the final period in the game. The optimal evolution of 
investments and outputs for the firms is obtained from (4.76), and that of the capacity 
from the state equation in (4.2). 
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4.5 Model Performance and Simulation Results 
Several runs were conducted to test the effect of changes in the investment adjustment 
cost parameter, d, and the production adjustment cost parameter, g, on the model perfor-
mance in terms of the production, capacity, capacity utilisation levels of the two players 
at steady state, and its impact on price. The results are shown in Tables 4.1, and 4.2. 
Except for asymmetries in the raw materials costs, the two firms are assumed to have 
identical costs in all the runs. The first player is more efficient with lower raw materials 
cost of fi = 8, and for the second, 12 = 10. The rest of the parameters used, are those of 
the model base case, and are shown in the footnotes to the tables. Several observations 
can be made about the behaviour of the model. The type of competition and its bearing 
on the market structure at equilibrium is examined below. 
4.5.1 Adjustment Cost of Investment - d Effect 
The following observations can be made about the model behaviour when d takes different 
values. 
• Firm 1 which has a lower cost of raw materials holds a higher capacity at equilib-
rium, and makes higher profits as expected in all the cases (see values of w1 and 
w2). At low values of d as in cases 1-3, both firms overproduce at a slightly higher 
rate than the capacity held. 
• As the d values rise, both firms now operate holding overcapacity, as in cases 4-7, 
where the overcapacity which ranges between 4% — 8%. The equilibrium capacities 
of both firms, and their respective production rates increase, and the price drops. 
In case 5 where d = 50 the firms register the highest capacity at k1 = 17.63 and 
k2 = 16.46. 
• When the adjustment cost rises beyond d = 50, increases in d value start to have 
a negative effect on the equilibrium values of capacity and production for the two 
firms. In case 8, where d = 5000, it becomes very costly for the players to invest, 
equilibrium is at a lower level, and now production exceeds capacity. 
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This behaviour is due to dynamics of the adjustment cost factor. Reynolds (1987) and 
Karp & Perloff (1993a) have discussed the role of adjustment costs for infinite games, 
with particular attention given to the influence of limit values on investment behaviour; 
when the d parameter tends to zero, and on the other hand as it rises to approach infinity. 
When d is very large, firm i's rival finds it too costly to respond to changes in firm's i 
output; and the preemptive incentive for firm i to use overcapacity is small. As d 	oo, 
the steady state of the feedback model tends to the open-loop steady state. The reason is 
that the preemptive incentive of holding excess capacity disappears with the rising cost 
of adjustment costs. The equilibrium capacities for the two firms therefore decline. On 
the other hand, for small d values, firm i's rival can easily respond to changes in output, 
and the steady states of open-loop and feedback models are different. When d = 0, there 
are no adjustment costs, and the static model is obtained. In this case the open-loop and 
feedback model results coincide. But when d is very small the two equilibria are not the 
same; even when d 0 the steady state equilibrium of the feedback model declines but 
remains higher than the open-loop equilibrium (Karp & Perloff 1993a). Reynolds (1991) 
also performs a similar analysis, and arrives at similar conclusions for a continuous time 
game. 
Table 4.1: the effect of investment adjustment cost (d) on feedback NC equilibria at 
steady-state(') 
d 	xi 	ki 	x 2 	k2 cui% cu2% price wi tv2 
1 0.001 15.45 14.81 14.45 13.81 104 105 40.2 479 419 
2 0.05 	15.49 14.93 14.48 13.92 104 104 40.1 478 418 
3 0.50 	15.66 15.62 14.62 14.54 100 101 39.4 473 413 
4 5.0 	16.02 16.98 14.91 15.77 	94 	95 38.1 461 400 
5 50 	16.18 17.63 15.10 16.46 	92 	92 37.6 454 396 
6 100 	16.03 17.38 15.11 16.43 	92 	92 37.8 454 398 
7 400 	15.78 16.44 15.12 16.09 	96 	94 38.3 458 408 
8 5000(2) 15.61 15.48 14.66 14.59 101 100 39.5 472 415 
(1)Parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, r = 0.05, 5 = 0.10, ci = 2, c2 = 2, d1 = d2, 
ml = 1, m2 = 1, fl = 8, f2 = 10, gi = 2, g2 = 2, T = 30. cui and cue refer to capacity 
utilisation rates of firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
(2)  The time horizon for this case has been extended to T = 300, to allow the firms to arrive 
at their steady state. 
CHAPTER 4. OPTIMAL OUTPUT AND INVESTMENT 	 170 
Table 4.2: the effect of production adjustment cost (g) on feedback NC equilibria at 
steady-state(t) 
d xi k1 x 2 k2 cui% cu2% price w1 w2 
1 0.5 15.71 15.72 14.66 14.66 100 100 39.3 472 411 
2 5.0 16.33 16.51 15.15 15.32 99 99 37.0 454 392 
3 50 16.74 17.04 15.52 15.80 98 98 35.7 438 380 
4 100 16.66 16.94 15.52 15.79 98 98 35.9 439 378 
(t )Parameter values used: same as in table(4.1) except for 91 = 20, and 92 = 20. 
Table 4.3: the effect of roles and adjustment cost on Stackelberg equilibria at steady-
state(1) 
fl f2 g x1 k1 x2 k2 cu(12)  cut  price 1A.3)  w2 
1 8 10 2 20.88 20.66 12.51 13.44 101 93.1 33.2 501 273 
2 10 10 2 19.92 19.69 13.03 14.02 101 93.0 34.1 456 296 
3 10 10 20 18.98 19.03 13.90 14.07 99.7 98.7 34.2 437 320 
4 8 10 20 19.94 20.00 13.55 13.69 99.7 98.8 33.4 482 296 
5 10 8 20 18.46 18.51 14.73 14.92 99.7 98.7 33.6 414 359 
6(4)  10 10 5 21.18 20.96 11.94 11.96 101 99.8 33.8 478 269 
(1)Firm 1 acts as Stackelberg leader, and firm 2 as follower. Parameter values used:a = 100, 
b = 2, r = 0.05, 5 = 0.10, c i = 2, c2 = 2, nil = 	1, m2 = 1, d1 = 5, 	d2 = 5, 91 = 92, 
T = 30. 
(2)cui and cue refer to percentage capacity utilisation of firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
(3)wi and w2 refer to single period profitability of firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
(4)di = d2 = 0.5. 
4.5.2 Adjustment Cost of Production - g Effect 
A substantial increase in the value of the production adjustment cost parameter, g, 
makes the holding of excess capacity by the firms more expensive; the adjustment cost 
for production becomes more significant, and accounts for a higher share of the cost of 
production. The firms adjust their output and investment to minimise this effect. As the 
value of g rises from 2 to 20, both firms increase their utilisation of capacity as shown in 
Table 4.2. At low values of d (d = 0.5 and d = 5.0), output and capacity rise for both 
firms (c.f. results of equivalent d value cases 3 and 4 of Table 4.1); and the price drops 
from 39.4 and 38.1 to 39.3 and 37.0. 
At higher values of d (d = 50, and d = 100), adjustment of capacity becomes costly. 
When g rises to 20, the two firms hold less capacity in steady state equilibrium than before 
(c.f. cases 5 and 6 of Table 4.1), to minimise the higher cost of overcapacity. Output 
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rises, but capacity drops slightly, resulting in the combined effect of a higher capacity 
utilisation rate. The drop in price is now more pronounced, falling to 35.7 and 35.9 for 
the two cases respectively. It should be noted that in all of these cases, while variations 
in the adjustment costs had a direct bearing on capacity utilisation, the market shares 
of the firms in terms of their production, or capacities, were more or less unchanged. 
Market shares remained around 52% and 48%, for firms 1, and 2 respectively. 
A profoundly different outcome is obtained when one of the firms acts as a leader, 
and the other takes the role of a follower. The results for the Stackelberg game, shown 
in Table 4.3, indicate that which firm takes the role of the leader, has a direct bearing 
on its market share and the outcome of the game. Consider for instance the results of 
case 1 in Table 4.3, and case 4 in Table 4.1; where the costs of the firms in the two cases 
are identical. When the two firms engage in a Nash-Cournot competition (case 4), firm 1 
which has a slightly more advantageous raw materials cost, has a capacity of k1  = 16.98 
while firm 2 has a capacity of k2 = 15.77. When firm 1 now acts as a leader (case 1), its 
capacity rises to k1  = 20.88, while firm 2 the follower, has a capacity of only k2 = 13.44. 
The leader, firm 1, has now increased its market share from 52% to 61% and can generate 
80% more profits than its competitor (wi = 501, W2 = 273) ; while the follower's share 
has dropped to a mere 39%. The market is more competitive as the two firms produce 
more under the Stackelberg mode of play, and the price drops from 38.1 to 33.2. 
When the two firms have the same raw materials costs (case 2 in Table 4.3, fi = 10, 
12 = 10) and with firm 1 still acting as a leader, the equilibrium capacities (k1  =- 19.69, 
k2 = 14.02) show that firm 1 still retains its dominant position and controls more than 
58 percent of the market. It also generates 54 percent higher profits than firm 2. Firm 2 
now has a slightly higher capacity than in case 1. But the two firms together produce 
slightly less than before, and the price rises to 34.1. 
Case 3 differs from case 2, in that both firms now have a higher production adjust-
ment cost (g rises from 2, to 20). The influence of higher g value here, is similar in its 
performance to that under the Nash-Cournot model, where the firms try to minimise the 
deviation from optimal capacity. Firm 2 now increases its production and operates at 
higher capacity utilisation (cue = 98.7); the profit gap between the two firms, is smaller 
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than before. 
Another example of the influence of a higher adjustment cost g, is case 4 where the 
leader, firm 1, has a raw materials cost advantage over its rival (c.f. case 1), the two 
firms modify their production and capacities to minimise the cost of overcapacity, and 
the results are comparable to those of case 1. 
Case 4 in Table 4.3 is comparable to case 2 in Table 4.2 for the Nash-Cournot game; 
both cases have identical costs, and have a high production adjustment cost (g = 20), 
but now firm 1 which has a lower raw materials cost is acting as leader. The leadership 
position of firm 1 gives it an advantage over firm 2, its Stackelberg production and 
capacity (xi = 19.94, k1 = 20) is much higher than what it can achieve as a Nash-
Cournot rival (x1 = 16.33, k1 = 16.51) . Firm 2 does worse as a follower, and its 
production and capacity drop (from x2 = 15.15, k2 = 15.32 to x2 = 13.55, k2 = 13.69); 
and does worse in terms of profits as well, which drop from w2 = 391, to w2 = 296. 
The advantage that the leadership position imparts on the firm that gets to make 
the first move is illustrated further in case 5 in Table 4.3. The leader, firm 1, is now 
disadvantaged in terms of its raw materials costs (fi = 10), which are higher than the 
follower (f2 = 8). Despite of this, the leader, still dominates the market (xi = 18.46, 
k1 = 18.51) and achieves much higher profits than its rival (w1 = 414, w2 = 359). 
Note also that the leader, firm 1, does only marginally worse, as a result of its higher 
raw materials costs, than when it had lower or the same raw materials costs as its rival 
follower (compare these results for firm 1, with those it had in cases 4 and 3). 
4.5.3 The Number of Firms and Roles of Play 
The impact of the type of rivalry that takes place between two firms serving a duopolistic 
market, on the industry equilibrium capacity and its competitiveness is shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. When the firms operate under the assumption that they ignore each others 
production and act as price takers, they generate the highest capacity level and operate 
as a competitive industry. For the remaining models, the industry equilibrium capacity, 
and competitiveness decline in the following descending order, for Stackelberg, feedback 
Nash-Cournot and open-loop Nash-Cournot markets. The Stackelberg leader does bet- 
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ter than the follower, in terms of market share and profitability, but the industry is 
more competitive, than the feedback Nash-Cournot industry as we saw in Tables 4.2 and 
4.3. Because the follower does worse under the Stackelberg model, and since industry 
profitability (the sum of profits of the two players) is also worse off, the Stackelberg dom-
inance in this model is only a weak dominance. Each player would prefer to be in the 
dominant position (Dockner, Feichtinger & Mehlmann 1989). In Chapter 2, Section 2.8, 
and Table 2.4, it was shown that the entrant firm obtains better results when it acts 
in a Stackelberg fashion in choosing its capacity. The entrant firm obtains higher prof-
its upon selecting a Stackelberg strategy. Cases Skgsd4 and Skgsd5 illustrated that the 
entrant is better off acting as leader, even under a Stackelberg disequilibrium scenario, 
than choosing the role of follower. 
Figure 4.1: The impact of game information structure on capital accumulation for a duopoly: 
parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, ci = 2, c2 = 2, d1 = 50,d2 = 50, fl = 8,12 = 10, gi = 2, 
92 = 2, m1  = 1, m2 = 1, 6 = 0.10, r = 0.05, k1(to) = k2(to) = 5. 
Another aspect of the model behaviour to be examined is the impact of an increase 
in the number of firms in the market on the equilibrium and total industry capacity and 
output. It can be seen in Figure 4.2 that as more firms enter the market the equilibrium 
capacity of the firms playing a feedback Nash-Cournot game, rises as well. Output also 
increases and prices drop. The industry becomes more competitive. When the market is 
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium capacity for an oligopolistic industry in a Nash-Cournot game: param-
eter values used: a = 100, b = 2, ci = 2, di = 50, fl =- 8, gi = 20, ml = 1, (5 = 0.10, r = 0.05, 
k1(to) = 5. All firms have the same costs. 
served by a larger number of firms, (the cases of 30, or 35 firms) the industry output of 
the open-loop Nash-Cournot, feedback Nash-Cournot, and price taking models, at steady 
state, start to converge; indicating that the market is approaching competitive market 
conditions. The results are shown in Table 4.4. 
4.6 Conclusions 
A dynamic model of capacity expansion, where firms make decisions about optimal invest-
ment and production in each period, was presented in this chapter. The model solution 
is based on two algorithms developed by Kydland (1975, 1977), that employ dynamic 
programming techniques. The four main modes of competition between firms, that are 
most prevalent in the industrial organisation literature are developed: Feedback Nash-
Cournot, open-loop Nash-Cournot, and Stackelberg type strategies for an oligopolistic 
market setting; and the more competitive model where firms behave as price takers. 
I obtain unique solutions for all the models, when the firms employ a class of strategies 
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Table 4.4: increasing number of firms and competitiveness of industry output at steady-
state(t )  
n Open-loop Feedback Price-taking 
2 29.26 32.35 43.42 
3 32.98 37.01 43.89 
5 36.66 40.88 43.98 
6 37.71 41.78 44.00 
10 40.38 43.35 44.00 
15 41.25 43.93 44.00 
20 41.90 44.28 44.000)  
25 42.31 44.43 44.00 
30 42.58 44.51 44.00 
35 42.78 44.58 44.00 
( l )Parameter values used: a = 100, b = 2, c = 2, d = 100, f = 8, gi = 20, 
mi = 2, 5 = 0.10, r = 0.05, T = 100. All firms have the same costs. 
(I) As the number of firms increases, the dimension of the problem becomes too 
large; for the price taking and open-loop models when n > 20 in this case the 
planning horizon is reduced to 'T = 60 to circumvent PC memory problems. It is 
expected that as n and d increase, the output of the three models would converge. 
that are linear in the state; I also show the optimal capital accumulation path for the 
competing firms. In all the models, the optimal control strategies for investment and 
output, have the same form but they embody different interactions that characterise the 
roles of play for the players in each game. The results are consistent with the findings 
of main stream literature on quantity games (Dockner, Feichtinger & Mehlmann 1989, 
Ba§ar & Olsder 1999, Karp & Perloff 1993a, Reynolds 1987, 1991). 
Under price taking conditions, investment and production rivalry between the firms 
is most competitive. The firms accumulate the highest levels of capacity, production 
levels are high, while prices drop to their lowest levels. The open-loop strategies generate 
the lowest capacity profiles, highest prices and highest profits for the firms. Because 
the firms have to commit to trajectories of optimal outputs and investments for the 
entire planning horizon, the open-loop Nash-Cournot, as a solution concept is difficult 
to implement. Despite their appeal to firms from a profitability point of view, open-loop 
strategies suffer from time inconsistency (Ba§ar & Olsder 1999). It would be difficult to 
enforce an open-loop strategy, as a planning policy, in case one of the firms deviates from 
the originally computed optimal plans at a later stage in the game. Such policies are 
more likely to be practicable when long term contracts are involved, such as those present 
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in natural gas agreements, or in bilateral or international agreements on pollution and 
environmental control for instance. 
The feedback strategies of the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg models, on the 
other hand, are time consistent. The firms are able to react to changes in the state in 
every period; for the strategies are now decision rules and not predetermined trajectories 
(Ba§ar & Olsder 1999). A Stackelberg game is more competitive than feedback Nash-
Cournot game; but a firm taking the role of Stackelberg leader is shown to have an 
advantage in terms of market share and profits. The leader's position therefore should 
reflect a significant production cost advantage, or some other strategic factor. Otherwise 
why should the followers concede to the leader market advantages at their expense? 
The type of strategy chosen, affects the market structure more profoundly than a 
reasonable production cost differential. The models analysed in this chapter may be 
adopted for empirical testing. Their construction is such that each model can be adapted 
to accommodate several states and control variables for each player. It is also flexible in 
allowing for variations in different costs, across time and firms. It is possible to allow for 
firms to enter, or exit at any stage during the game. The major weakness of the model, 
however, is the inability to place constraints or bounds on the control variables. 
By virtue of its dynamic nature, the model may be used to study the degree of 
competitiveness of oligopolistic industries, and the evolution of market structure. By 
estimating the prevailing price/demand relationship, and production costs for a specific 
product market, the different oligopolistic models examined in this chapter can be used 
to simulate the market data. Market shares, output and capacity evolution, prices and 
company profits can be generated. Using these results, the oligopolistic power of the 
market can be examined, and compared to the more competitive case of price taking 
behaviour. In the next chapter a single market for a chemical product is studied using 
the model concepts examined thus far. 
Chapter 5 
The US Styrene Market: 
Structure, Evolution, and 
Investment Behaviour 1974-1996 
Keep silent, because the world of silence is a 
vast fullness. 
Do not beat the drum of words. The word is 
only an empty drum. 
—Andrew Harvey (1994), The Way of Passion, 
p. 122 
5.1 Introduction 
The different formulations of the models developed in Chapter 4 are now tested using 
industry data from the US petrochemical industry, to see how well they perform in 
explaining the capacity expansion of the styrene industry and its development over the 
period 1974-1996 for which data is available. Initially I look at the main characteristics 
of styrene as a product, and its main uses in Section 5.2. In this section I also give 
a brief description of the chemistry of the product and a synopsis of the processes for 
its production; followed by an outline of the main global developments of the industry 
and the role of the major styrene producers in these developments. In Section 5.3 more 
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attention is paid to industry developments in the US market and the evolution of market 
structure. Then I present and estimate a formulation for the inverse demand function 
in Section 5.4, and for the production costs in Section 5.5.2. In addition, for the cost 
function, this section includes estimates based on industry data for cost savings resulting 
from learning and the experience curve, and also the those generated by the gains from 
economies of scale. 
In Section 5.6 the model simulations for the styrene industry are presented show-
ing the performance of the model that best describes the investment behaviour of the 
major US styrene producers, and deduce whether strategic intent is present. Then in 
Section 5.7 I discuss other aspects of strategic investment and entry or mobility barriers 
that are prevalent in oligopolistic industries and the industrial organisation literature, 
and evaluate in a heuristic fashion the extent of their use, or the presence of some of these 
strategic attributes and forms of investment behaviour in the styrene industry. Previous 
empirical work covering this area is discussed in Section 5.7.2 with particular reference 
made to studies that cover the petrochemical industry. In the last section I round-up by 
presenting some concluding remarks. 
5.2 Styrene: Product, Chemistry, and Market Character-
istics 
5.2.1 Market and Product Characteristics 
Styrene is an intermediate chemical product, produced on a large scale around the world, 
with a total output that exceeded 22 million tonnes in 2002. Styrene is produced in liquid 
form, and is transported in large tankers for industrial use. For producers involved in 
small scale operations such as the production of unsaturated polyester, it is delivered in 
regular size steel drums. Styrene is a highly flammable product; its production involves a 
series of chemical processes that operate at temperatures and pressures near the explosive 
limit of these products; this perhaps explains why accidents, though an unlikely event in 
the industry, take place at times disrupting the production process and forcing plants to 
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shut down'. 
The reader is unlikely to encounter or recognise styrene in its basic form; but like 
with many chemicals and plastics that are produced by modern chemical industry, we 
encounter styrene products and derivatives in products and items that we use in our 
everyday life. One of the main end uses for styrene is in packaging products. Perhaps 
the most discernible are the white foamed cups used in coffee shops at campuses and 
elsewhere, which are made from polystyrene, the plastic polymer derived from styrene. 
The disposable glasslike transparent plastic cups used for drinking water and refresh-
ments, used initially on flights but now widely available in eating outlets, are also made 
from polystyrene; as well as the white plastic pots for yoghurts and similar products. 
The packaging of burgers and the like in fast food restaurants is mostly made from 
foamed-sheet polystyrene. 
Most electrical and electronic items we buy such as TV sets, HiFi's, computers and 
laptops come packaged in a white styrofoam. Several of the body or internal plastic parts 
of these products are made from plastics material containing styrene such as acryloni-
tirle butadiene styrene, (ABS). Numerous household items contain ABS and polystyrene 
plastics; the interior plastic parts of refrigerators are made predominantly from this type 
of plastics. Rubber tyres and many of the rubber products we use also contain styrene 
butadiene rubber, (SBR). Styrene derivatives have a wide range of application, and enter 
into different industries. Figure 5.1 depicts the major downstream uses of styrene by type 
of product, which shows polystyrene in the leading position with a share of 62% of styrene 
consumption. With high-content styrene plastics such as ABS and styrene acrylonitirle 
(SAN), and styrene butadiene latex trailing at 8% each. SBR accounts now for a mere 
4%, and unsaturated polyester for 6%. Polystyrene is used in the construction industry 
where extruded styrofoam sheets and boards are used for insulation. And unsaturated 
polyester is an essential constituent of oil based paints that are used in industrial and 
marine applications. 
The pattern of consumption of styrene by end use and economic activity in the US is 
1The latest in the styrene industry was Nova's explosion at its plant at Bayport, Texas in 2003, 
Chemical Marketing Reporter 23 June, 2003. Arco had an accident in 1990 at one of its plants, and Dow 
also had one in the mid 1980's. 
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shown in Table 5.1. The packaging segment dominates the consumption of styrene and 
accounts for 30% of all styrene consumed in the US market; while construction, household 
and consumer goods, electronic and electrical products account for about 10% each. The 
transportation sector accounts for 6% and recreation for 5%. Other miscellaneous uses 
of styrene account for 28% indicating the wide variety of applications styrene products 
have in different sectors of the economy. 
Table 5.1: US consumption of styrene by end use — 1998(a) 
(Percent) 
Household 	Electrical 
Packaging Construction Consumer Electronic Transportation Recreation Other Total 
Products Appliances 
30 	10 	10 	11 
	
6 
	5 	28 	100 
(a)Source: Chemical Economics Handbook, SRI, Menlo Park, California, USA. 
Figure 5.1: Pattern of styrene consumption in the US -1998 
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5.2.2 Chemistry and Process Technology 
Styrene is produced from ethylene and benzene in two stages. Initially ethylene and ben-
zene are reacted in the first stage to produce ethylbenzene, and the second stage involves 
the production of styrene by dehydrogenation of ethylbenzene to crude styrene, followed 
by purification and stabilisation of the purified styrene final product. Ethylbenzene and 
styrene units are almost always installed together in matching capacities because nearly 
all of the ethylbenzene produced is converted to styrene. Ethylbenzene's other uses such 
as for solvent applications, or as an intermediate for other products are insignificant. As 
a result there are no commercial sales of ethylbenzene on the market to speak of. It 
is advantageous also to integrate the two stages of styrene production from an energy 
saving point of view, since the first stage is exothermic generating a surplus of energy; 
while the second is endothermic requiring a significant input of energy. 
The alkylation reaction between benzene and ethylene takes place over an acidic 
catalyst. In the older processes such as those developed by Monsanto, Dow, BASF 
and one by Union Carbide in cooperation with the engineering company Badger, the 
reaction takes place in the liquid phase over an aluminium chloride catalyst. The Union 
Carbide-Badger process was widely used in the 1960's and 1970's; 20 plants employing 
this process were built around the world. Other improvements were made by Monsanto 
in the 1970's on a similar process. UOP the engineering company also developed another 
process which became available for licensing. The improvements that were being made 
affected the process design and catalyst efficiency. Another process was developed in 
1980 by Mobil, and Badger a process engineering company. Their process which became 
known as the Mobil-Badger vapour-phase ethylbenzene process, uses a zeolite catalyst 
which has the advantage of being noncorrosive and environmentally more benign than 
the older aluminium chloride process. The first plant to be commercialised based on this 
process was built for Hoechst at Bayport, Texas. This was a single train plant with an 
annual capacity of 450 thousand tonnes/year. 
Most plants built in the 1990's were based on this process. About 35 plants based 
on this process were built around the world by 1995, with a combined capacity of 10 
million tonnes/year. ABB Lummus Engineering developed a similar liquid phase process 
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Figure 5.2: Ethylbenzene production flow chart 
that uses zeolite catalyst in 1990, and had commercialised three plants based on this 
process by mid-1995 in Japan. The overall yield to ethylbenzene from the zeolite based 
processes is estimated to be 98-98.5%, for the ABB Lummus process, and 99.5% for the 
Mobil-Badger process; with the residue accounting for most of the losses. 
The alkylation reaction that takes place in all of these processes is described below: 
C6H6 + CH2 = CH2 `=, 2 C6H5CH2CH3 
benzene ethylene 	ethylbenzene 
In most processes the benzene and ethylene used are of very high purity to minimise the 
formation of byproducts and the formation of impurities that may poison the catalyst. 
Consumption figures of raw materials consumption vary depending on the type of process 
in use and its efficiency, the catalyst used an operating conditions. On average about 
0.305 tonnes of ethylene, and 0.838 tonnes of benzene are consumed for each tonne of 
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styrene produced. Excess benzene to ethylene is used, which favours the forward reaction 
to form ethylbenzene and to ensure that all the ethylene is reacted, which minimises 
the formation of polyethylbenzenes (PEB) and other alkylated products. Unreacted 
benzene, and Polyethylbenzene are separated and recycled to complete the reaction. 
Excess benzene is recycled back to the reactor with fresh benzene and ethylene; while 
ethylbenzene product is purified and sent to storage as shown in Figure 5.2 which is 
based on the Mobil-Badger2 process. 
There are two routes for the production of styrene, both of which start from ethyl-
benzene. The first is the dominant process in the US and around the world, and accounts 
for about 86% of world wide styrene capacity. This a straight forward process based on 
ethylbenzene dehydrogenation, and produces a single product. Its main attributes are 
presented below. The second route involves a more complicated process, that involves 
the combined production of propylene oxide and styrene, and is known as the PO-SM 
process. 
The dehydrogenation of ethylbenzene to styrene takes place on a metal oxide catalyst 
at high temperature in the presence of steam, and relatively low pressure since low 
pressure favours the forward reaction to styrene, and produces hydrogen which is usually 
used as a fuel in the process. The reaction is shown below: 
C6H5CH2CH3 	C6H5CH = CH2 + 	112 
ethylbenzene 	 styrene 	hydrogen 
The rate of reaction is highly temperature dependent; high temperature favours de-
hydrogenation, but also increases byproducts in side reactions, and decreases styrene 
selectivity. The reaction selectivity to styrene is high at 97%. The main byproducts in 
the dehydrogenation reactor are toluene and benzene; they account for about 2% and 
1% respectively of the styrene yield loss. However both are recovered and purified, in the 
process; they contribute to recover some of the cost of lost ethylbenzene. The section 
of a typical process for the production of crude styrene is shown in Figure 5.3. There 
2The source of information for the chemical technology in this section is the Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia 
of Chemical Technology, and SRI. 
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are several processes for the production of styrene in operation, the design concepts are 
essentially the same but they differ in some of the details, and the catalyst in use. Dow 
and BASF use their own proprietary catalysts and their own processes, whereas the ma-
jority of licensed processes rely on supplies from specialised catalyst manufacturers such 
as Criterion, United Catalysts, and the Sud-Chemie Group. There are two main pro-
cesses available for licensing for styrene production. The Fina-Badger process licensed by 
Badger, and the Monsanto process licensed by ABB Lummus; and most of the licensed 
plants under construction around the world since the 1990's rely on one of these two 
processes. Several factors are taken into consideration by the licensee when selecting a 
process, namely, the capital cost involved, the yield on raw materials consumed, plant re-
liability, energy efficiency, product purity, consumption of catalysts and other chemicals, 
and process flexibility in addition to other factors. 
Ven gas 
Figure 5.3: Ethylbenzene dehydrogenation production flow chart. A, steam superheater; 
B, reactor section; C, feed-effluent exchanger; D, condenser; and E, settling drum. 
Modern plants have an average ethylbenzene to styrene yield of 89-92% which cor-
responds to 1.12-1.14 tonnes of ethylbenzene per tonne of styrene produced. Because 
polymer garde styrene of high purity is required, an elaborate distillation system is in- 
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Figure 5.4: Styrene production and purification flow chart. A, benzene-toluene column; 
B, ethylbenzene recycle column; C, styrene finishing column; and D, residue finishing. 
volved in the production process. Styrene polymerises readily, so an inhibitor is added to 
suppress its formation within the process. Styrene is distilled in several stages to remove 
all impurities and because it has a boiling point close to that of ethylbenzene making 
the distillation more difficult. Benzene and toluene are recovered in the overhead of the 
benzene-toluene column as shown in Figure 5.4 which is based on the Fina-Badger pro-
cess. Ethylbenzene is recovered, distilled and recycled back to the reactor. The styrene 
is sent to a further distillation step in the styrene finishing column where it is collected 
at the top as a purified product and is sent to storage. The bottoms from this column 
are further processed to recover any styrene and inhibitor chemicals. The heavy residue 
is used as a fuel in the process. The design of the process as can be seen, optimises the 
recovery of energy used in the distillation section. 
The second route to styrene production involves the peroxidation of propylene and 
ethylbenzene, with the coproduction of styrene and propylene oxide, in what also became 
to be known as the PO-SM (propylene oxide - styrene monomer) process. This process 
was developed by Halcon International and was commercialised in Spain in 1973 in a joint 
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venture between Enpetrol of Spain, and Arco. Starting from ethylbenzene and propylene, 
in an oxidative reaction that involves three reaction steps, where ethylbenzene is oxidised 
with air and then reacted with propylene to form propylene oxide and styrene. The 
reactions in this process are complex and involve several reactors and processing units. 
The recovery and purification of the products is also complex due to the presence of 
oxygenates. Extensive distillation is required to purify the final products in this process 
involving the use of some specialised equipment. And the whole operation is capital 
intensive. Capital costs for this process are appreciably higher than the conventional 
dehydrogenation route. But the sales revenues from propylene oxide product more than 
compensates for this. On average the overall costs for the two processes are comparable, 
although somewhat more favourable to the PO-SM process. Styrene is a byproduct in 
this process, but more styrene is produced than propylene oxide; on average 2.4 tonnes 
of styrene are produced for each tonne of propylene oxide. In the US this process was 
operated by Arco, which is now owned by Lyondell, at two plants at Channelview, Texas. 
This process now accounts for about 21% of the styrene capacity in the US. It has achieved 
continued growth at the expense of the dehydrogenation process since the mid 1980's, 
not only in the US but also in other parts of the world. Its expansion however is limited 
by the demand prospects for propylene oxide. In the US it is expected that its share 
could rise to 30% in the coming few years. 
Shell also developed a similar process in 1979 based on the same concept, and has 
plants in the Netherlands, and Singapore that utilise this process. In Spain, Repsol, which 
now owns the joint venture that started in 1973 with Arco and Halcon, embarked on a plan 
in 1997 to expand its production by building a new larger plant (the planned project had 
a capacity of 150 thousand tonnes/year of propylene oxide and 340 thousand tonnes/year 
of styrene) at a new site at Taragona in Spain, using the original process. Arco disputed 
Repsol's rights to use the technology, and the case was referred by the latter to the 
European Competition Commission3 which provisionally decided that Arco's attempts 
to stop Repsol building its plant breached European Union competition regulations. 
Before a final ruling was made, the two companies had settled their dispute through 
3 Repsol, Ara) Settle Propylene Oxide Dispute, Chemical Market Reporter, 22 December, 1997. See 
also other related articles in 1st December, 20 October, 28 July and 4 April issues of the same journal. 
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an arbitration panel set up by the International Chamber of Commerce. After some 
delay, Repsol's new plant came on stream in 2000. It should be noted that none of these 
companies licenses this technology to third parties; but some joint ventures have been 
formed by Shell in Singapore, Korea, and in Japan. And more recently by Lyondell with 
Bayer in the Netherlands. 
In 1980 a Russian company, known as Nizhnekamskneftekhim, developed a process 
similar to the Arco process; and has been operating a plant of about 140 thousand 
tonnes/year. Dow bought the licensing rights from the Russian company in 1998, but as 
yet does not operate any plant using this process. Announcements to build a new world 
scale plant on the gulf coast in the US, using this technology have been made on several 
occasions, but construction dates continued to be postponed4. Dow is in a position now 
to utilise either technology. It is also a leading world producer of propylene oxide, where 
it utilises a conventional technology using a chlorine based process. It has plants in the 
US, Europe and other parts of the world where it produces both styrene and propylene 
oxide using its own processes. 
There are other processes as well for the production of styrene. Dow developed a 
new technology that converts butadiene from C4 streams of refinery fluidised catalytic 
crackers, or naphtha based ethylene crackers into ethylbenzene and then to styrene. 
The process has been demonstrated at pilot scale, and is thought to be competitive 
with conventional processes if butadiene is available in sufficiently large quantities. No 
commercial plants based on this process have been built yet. 
5.2.3 Major Producing Companies and Global Developments 
5.2.3.1 The Role of Major Producing Companies 
Dow, BASF, Monsanto, Shell and Union Carbide were among the first companies that 
became involved in the production of styrene and its derivatives in the world. Union 
4Dow has been planning a world scale plant for styrene in the US since the mid 1990's. Upon the 
acquisition of the PO-SM technology from Russia, it announced in 2000 that it was planning a world 
scale plant to come on stream in mid 2004 with a capacity of 250 kt/y propylene oxide, and 575 kt/y 
styrene, at one of its sites on the US gulf coast. A year later however, Dow announced it was delaying 
the project. 
Dow to Build World Scale POSM Plant, Chemical Market Reporter, 17 July, 2000, p. 3. Dow Delays 
Construction of Gulf Coast POSM Site, Chemical Market Reporter, 2 April, 2001, p. 3. 
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Carbide and Monsanto were responsible for developing process designs that are still 
being licensed by process engineering companies like Badger and Lummus. However, 
both companies exited styrene production in the US. Union Carbide was the first to exit 
in 1979; Monsanto followed by the mid 1980's, and within a few years it sold all its 
styrene derivatives production facilities in the US and around the world, as the company 
was moving away from commodity chemicals and into specialities and biotechnology. 
Dow, Shell and BASF on the other hand, continue to expand their production capa-
bilities in North America, Western Europe and around the world. They are the three 
world leading firms in styrene production, in that order, as shown in Table 5.2. 
Dow is the most diversified of styrene producers in terms of its geographical coverage 
and range of styrene derivatives it produces; and is also well integrated upstream into 
the production of ethylene and benzene. It has a large production complex of 1 million 
tonnes/year of styrene at Terneuzen, the Netherlands, and a large production plant of 
about 650 thousand tonnes/year at Freeport, Texas in the US. It also produces styrene 
at several locations in different parts of the world, in joint ventures or through local 
subsidiaries in South America, the Far East and China. And has polystyrene plants 
in even more countries. As part of a rationalisation programme Dow closed down its 
small styrene plants in Australia in 1994, and in Canada in 1999. But over the same 
period it expanded its styrene plant at Terneuzen in the Netherlands, and took over a 
petrochemical site at Schkopau in former Eastern Germany6 where it built a 200 thousand 
tonnes/ year plant. 
In the Middle East also Dow was a forerunner to be picked for a planned 500 thou-
sand tonnes/year styrene plant which was later built in 2005, jointly with Petrochemical 
Industries Company of Kuwait7; Dow had already become an effective joint venture part-
ner in existing petrochemical projects in the country upon acquiring Union Carbide and 
its global assets in 2001. Union Carbide had a joint venture in Kuwait for the production 
of ethylene, polyethylene and ethylene glycol since 1997. At one stage Dow and BASF 
5 Dow Hikes Capacity Around the Globe, Chemical Week, 29 March, 1995. Also same journal issue of 
9 October, 1996, p. 20; and 17 September, 1997, p. 36. 
6Chemical Week, 12 February, 1997, p. 16. 
7Chemical Week, 26 June, 2002, p. 14. 
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were considering a joint venture for a 500 thousand tonnes/year styrene plant in Brazil8 , 
where it already has a small styrene plant at Camacari, with a capacity of 150 thousand 
tonnes/year, and has styrene derivative projects in other parts of the country and in 
neighbouring countries. In the US Dow continues to lay claim to a world scale plant of 
nearly 600 thousand tonnes/year that has been under consideration since 19959 . Dow 
has allowed its share of the US styrene market to decline over the years, but it compen-
sated by expanding its operations in other parts of the world. Although it is the largest 
world producer, Dow continues to be overall short on styrene, and resorts to buying on 
the merchant market to supplement its requirements of the product for its downstream 
operations. 
Table 5.2: Production capacity of major world styrene producers. 
(Thousand tonnes/year) 
Company 1995 Company 2003 % 
Dow (US) 1844 10.4 Dow (US) 2224 9.4 
Arco (US) 1145 6.4 Shell (UK) 2166 9.1 
Shell (UK) 1110 6.2 BASF (Germany) 1618 6.8 
BASF (Germany) 870 4.9 Lyondell (US) 1480 6.2 
Cos-Mar (US) 862 4.8 TotalFinaELf (France) 1173 4.9 
Chevron (US) 771 4.3 Nova (Canada) 1030 4.3 
Sterling (US) 726 4.1 BP Amoco 803 3.4 
Elf Atochem (France) 680 3.8 Sterling (US) 772 3.3 
Huntsman (US) 672 3.8 Samsung (S. Korea) 670 2.8 
EniChem (Italy) 550 3.1 Enichem 660 2.8 
Others 8551 48.1 Others 11125 46.9 
Total 17781 100 Total 23722 100 
Shell also is a global styrene producer and has a wide geographical distribution of 
its production facilities. For a long time Shell was involved in the production of a wide 
range of styrene based products. In the mid 1970's Shell exited the US styrene market, 
but has continued to operate ethylene and benzene production units, which are closely 
integrated with its refining operations, in the country. A decade later it restarted styrene 
production at Scotford in Canada. In 1997 the facility was expanded to a capacity of 450 
'Dow, BASF Plan World Scale Styrene Unit in Brazil, Chemical Week, 23 August, 2000, p. 7; also 
issue of 24 October, 2001, p. 12. 
9Dow Hikes Capacity Around the Globe, Chemical Week, 29 March, 1995, p. 13, also Dow to build 
World Scale PO-SM Plant, Chemical Market Reporter, 17 July, 2000. p. 3 
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thousand tonnes/year. In addition Shell has styrene production plants in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Saudi Arabia and Singapore. In Germany, Shell operated Rheinische Olefin 
Werke a 50/50 joint venture with BASF, at Wesseling in the Nordhein-Westfalen region, 
since the early 1970's. Its UK styrene operation at Carrington was phased out by 1978. 
A year later it started using its newly developed propylene oxide and styrene monomer 
(PO-SM) process at a 315 thousand tonnes/year plant at Moerdijk, in the Netherlands. 
In 1985 it established SADAF, a 50/50 joint venture with the Saudi Arabian Basic 
Industries Company (SABIC) for a 400 thousand tonnes/year plant at Jubail in Saudi 
Arabia. The project is set next to a large refinery which is also a joint venture between 
Shell and Petromin, a local oil refining company. The project was expanded in 2000 to 
more than 1 million tonnes/year. A third expansionl° for a plant with a capacity of 600 
thousand tonnes/year is planned at the same site; it is expected to come on stream in 
2006. 
Shell employs the conventional ethylbenzene dehydrogenation technology at its projects 
in Canada, Germany and Saudi Arabia. In Singapore Shell uses its peroxidation tech-
nology, where in 1997 it established Seraya Chemicals, at Pulau Seraya where it also has 
a large refining complex. The project which has a capacity of 140 thousand tonnes/year 
of propylene oxide and 315 thousand tonnes/year of styrene, started as a joint venture 
between Shell (70%) and Yuka Seraya (30%) a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Petrochemical 
Company. Two years later the project came under Shell's total ownership when its part-
ner pulled outil. In 2002 the project capacity was upgraded to 400 thousand tonnes/year. 
In China Shell also operates a similar but larger PO-SM project which serves the growing 
requirements of the huge Chinese market. 
Singapore serves as a refining and petrochemical regional centre for Shell in the Far 
East. It supplies styrene to its polystyrene and other styrenic plastics projects, as well 
as to its customers in the region. However, by 1999 Shell was preparing to sell off its 
polystyrene operations in Europe and around the world. It had already exited styrene 
and polystyrene production in the US, and by 2000 it completed the sale of its polystyrene 
1° SADAF to Award Technology License for Styrene Plant, Chemical Week, 21 January, 2004. 
11 Chemical Week, 25 October, 1999, p. 3. 
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business to Nova12 Chemicals of Canada. The deal included Shell's plants in the Nether-
lands, France, and the UK in Europe where it was the largest producer of expandable 
polystyrene, as well as its smaller plants in Chile, China and Japan. It kept smaller scale 
styrene copolymer operations for styrene based plastics and elastomers which command 
high margins. By the late 1990's Shell was concentrating on producing basic chemicals 
like ethylene, propylene and their derivatives, as well as benzene and styrene. Products 
that complement its refining operations, where it has an advantage in raw materials, or 
a technological lead in processes and specialised products. 
Since the mid 1990's Shell has undertaken a massive capacity expansion drive for its 
styrene and propylene oxide operations around the world. In addition to its large scale 
plants in the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, and building on its previous 
experience with BASF, Shell formed Basell a joint venture owned equally by the two 
companies. Basell brought on stream two world scale plants in succession; both plants 
use Shell's PO-SM technology, one at Moerdijk in the Netherlands with a styrene capacity 
of 565 thousand tonnes/year in 1999; and another in Singapore with a capacity of 550 
thousand tonnes/year that started production in 2002. In the same year the two firms 
closed down their old plant at Wesseling, in Germany13. 
BASF undertook another expansion in 2002 when it brought on stream a 550 thou-
sand tonnes/year styrene plant that uses the conventional dehydrogenation technology 
at its petrochemical complex at Ludwigshafen, Germany. The new plant was simply a 
replacement of an older one, of about the same size, at the same site that was closed 
down a year later. Like Dow, BASF is a well integrated styrene producer with a product 
portfolio that covers a wide range of styrene derivative products, and is also integrated 
upstream into styrene raw materials. It has a presence in styrene production in China, 
where it has a small plant of 120 thousand tonnes/year; and in 2001 it acquired a 320 
thousand tonnes/year styrene plant at Ulsan from a South Korean company". BASF has 
a large styrenics complex nearby, that produces 500 thousand tonnes/year of polystyrene 
12Chemical Week, 15 September, 1999, p. 22; also issue of 9 February, 2000, p 12. Shell was also 
selling off other chemical product lines as well; see Chemical Week issues of 2 June, 1999, and 23 and 30 
December, 1998, p. 7. 
13 BASF and Basell Trim Styrene Output, Chemical Market Reporter, 4 February, 2002. 
14 BASF Acquires Styrene Plant from SK Evertec, 4 July, 2001, p. 26. 
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and styrene plastic products. It remains short on styrene in South Korea, and the Asian 
region due to its large scale production of derivatives in several countries. The company 
also has large scale styrene derivatives operations in the US (its styrene requirements in 
1998 amounted to 500 thousand tonnes/year); and in South America it produces styrene 
in Brazil where it has a plant of 120 thousand tonnes/year, at cubatao; but BASF is 
also active in styrene products in more than one country in the region. 
Arco through its association with Halcon International, the engineering company 
that first developed the peroxidation process that produces propylene oxide and styrene, 
became within a few years the fourth largest producer of styrene in the world; and was 
able to acquire full ownership of the process in 1982. The first plant using this process 
was built in 1973 in Spain with a capacity of 80 thousand tonnes/year; and a second 
plant was built in Japan and operated by Nihori Oxirane in 1976 with a larger capacity 
of 225 thousand tonnes/year. In 1977 as the process technology for the process had 
become well established, a larger plant was constructed at Channelview, Texas, with a 
total capacity of 454 thousand tonnes/year, and operated by Oxirane, the joint venture 
between Arco and Halcon. When Oxirane became insolvent in 1982, the company was 
eventually taken over by Arco15 . Arco also operated smaller styrene plants that use the 
ethylbenzene dehydrogenation technology in the US. The project was expanded in 1991 
to 635 thousand tonnes/year; and in 1992 a second plant was built on the same site 
with a capacity of over 500 thousand tonnes/year in association with Nova and BASF 
who have a share in the styrene output. Arco's core business is in propylene oxide and 
butyl alcohols such as MTBE16 (a fuel additive), and remains mainly a merchant styrene 
15Ralph Landau, the founder of Haicon Scientific Design, the company that was responsible for devel-
oping nine major chemical processes including the peroxidation process for propylene oxide and styrene, 
tells an interesting story of how this came about and how economics had triumphed over technology 
(Arora, Landau & Rosenberg 1998). Oxirane had been a successful joint venture operation with Arco; it 
had plants in the Spain, Japan, the US, and the Netherlands generating good profits. Halcon's contribu-
tion to their 50% share of the joint venture had been mainly their technology. To finance its share of the 
last large PO-SM plant built in Texas, Halcon took a loan of US$ 230 million at 11% interest. By 1979 a 
new chief, Paul Volker, was appointed to the Federal Reserve Board who moved to limit the money supply 
and curb inflation, and interest rates rose suddenly to 21%. Oxirane's cash flow almost disappeared; and 
Haicon could not cope with the situation. They were forced to sell their share of the venture, and its 
technology back to their partner Arco (its main business being in oil) who had no difficulty in raising 
the cash. Dr. R. Landau who had been a pioneer process engineer learned his lesson, and later became 
a professor of Economics at Stanford University. 
161t should be noted that the peroxidation process is flexible and can produce with propylene oxide, 
either styrene when etyhlbenzene is used, or butyl alcohol when propylene with isobutene is used instead. 
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producer. Its polystyrene plants in Pennsylvania were sold to Nova in 1996. And in 1998 
the company was taken over by Lyondell and capacity at its Channelview plants were 
expanded to 1.27 million tonnes/year. Since 1992 Arco had enjoyed the position of the 
largest styrene producer in the US. 
However, Arco's attempts to become the world's largest styrene producer17 were 
thwarted by Shell's quick move to build a large plant at Moerdijk with BASF, as part 
of Basell which came on stream in 1999, a year before Arco's planned project.18; and a 
second plant for the Basell joint venture in Singapore in 2002. Dow also increased its ca-
pacity for propylene oxide at its plant at Stadt in Germany by 205 thousand tonnes/year, 
to 625 thousand tonnes/year in 1998. Following the settlement of its dispute with Repsol 
regarding the use of its technology, Repsol also brought its new styrene plant of 340 thou-
sand tonnes/year on stream in 2000. Arco and its successor Lyondell, kept on delaying'9 
the construction of its PO-SM plant in Europe, as a result of the newly established capac-
ity by its rivals, and its inability to secure raw materials and a partner to lift styrene from 
the project. The company also feared that the new capacity if badly timed may cause 
overcapacity in the European market. Eventually Lyondell formed a joint venture with 
Bayer and the project was commissioned in 2004, at Maasvlakte, the Netherlands, with 
a combined capacity of 285 thousand tonnes/year of propylene oxide and 635 thousand 
tonnes/year of styrene. 
Chevron ranks among the top world styrene producers. It acquired Gulf Oil in 1985, 
together with its styrene plant at St. James, Louisiana. The plant has been expanded 
incrementally since 1991. Its capacity in 2003 was increased to 953 thousand tonnes/year. 
Chevron uses about half of its styrene output for polystyrene production, and sells the 
balance on the merchant market. It has a small styrene plant of 100 thousand tonnes/year 
in China. The company merged with Phillips Oil in 2000, in the wave of merger activity 
that was taking place in the oil sector, and its chemical arm now is known as Chevron 
Phillips Chemicals. The company has a large petrochemical plant in Saudi Arabia, 
where historically it had oil production activity. It owns this petrochemical project 
17Chemical Week, 2 August, 1995, p. 14, also in issues of 27 March, 1996, p. 18, and 17 February, 1997, 
p. 4. 
18 Shell BASF Joint Venture Could Crimp Arco's Plans, Chemical Week, 28 February, 1996, p. 14. 
19 Lyondell May Move Proposed Arco PO-SM Plant to the US, Chemical Week, 17 August, 1998, p. 7. 
CHAPTER 5. THE US STYRENE INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 194 
that produces benzene among its products, jointly with local investors. Its output goes 
mainly for export. A second joint venture was formed with private investors in 2000 for 
producing benzene, ethylbenzene and a plant for 600 thousand tonnes/year of styrene20. 
The new project is expected to come on stream at Jubail in 2006, with the bulk of its 
output destined for the export markets. Chevron has another large scale project for 500 
thousand tonnes/year of styrene, planned for Venezuela in 2007. The project is part of 
a joint venture with Pequiven, a local subsidiary of the state oil company. The project 
will be located at Paraguana where Chevron operates a large oil refinery, and its output 
will be mostly exported. When both of these projects become operational Chevron will 
increase its world styrene capacity to more than 1.5 million tonnes/year, thereby ensuring 
its position among the top styrene producers. 
Nova Chemicals (a Canadian company involved in the production of styrene, and 
other basic chemicals and plastic products) emerged from being a small petrochemical 
producer in the 1970's to become one of the top producers of styrene and polystyrene 
in the world by the end of the 1990's. The company owns a styrene plant at Sarnia, 
in Canada, which the company expanded to 430 thousand tonnes/year in 1999. A year 
earlier, Nova merged with Huntsman giving it control over its styrene plant at Bayport, 
Texas, and its polystyrene operations around the world. It also took over polystyrene 
production facilities from Shell in 2000 making it one of the world's largest polystyrene 
producers as noted above. It also had an equity in Lyondell's second plant at Chan-
nelview, and a tolling arrangement, securing for itself long term supply of styrene prod-
uct. Although Nova has large polystyrene production operations in Europe and Asia, it 
still lacks a styrene production base in Europe; but it has arrangements for swapping the 
product with other companies, by supplying them with styrene in the North American 
market. 
BP took-over Amoco in 1994. It raised the capacity of its styrene plant at Texas City, 
Texas, by about 90 thousand tonnes to 453 thousand tonnes/year, but has not invested 
in any major styrene expansion in the US. Its position in that country has declined since 
the early 1980's. However, in 1999 BP Amoco acquired from Hiils a 350 thousand tonnes 
2° CPChern to Build Styrene Plant in Saudi Arabia, Chemical Market Reporter, 5 July, 2004, p. 2; and 
Chemical Week, 17 April, 2002, p. 9. 
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styrene plant at Marl in Germany. A year later it closed an old 140 thousand tonnes/year 
plant at Port Talbot in the UK, and signed a long term contract for the supply of styrene 
with Basell in the Netherlands, after some discussions about a similar arrangement with 
Arco's planned project at Rotterdam21. 
The picture that emerges from the global styrene industry and its major players is one 
of growing markets, joint ventures and mergers, and continued technological development. 
It is a dynamic industry that has been changing, restructuring, and growing. 
Also, there appears to be a reversal in the trend for diversification, that was followed 
by most companies in the 1970's and the 1980's, when chemical subsidiaries of major oil 
companies diversified downstream into petrochemical production; while major chemical 
producers such as Du Pont, Dow, Monsanto, and BASF among others, sought to acquire 
a foothold in oil exploration and refining operations when oil prices were rising in the mid 
and late 1970's, and together with the associated concerns about the reliability of their 
supply (Fayad & Motamen 1986). With the rising cost of developing new oil ventures 
in more recent times, several oil companies such as Shell and BP Amoco were shedding 
some of the less efficient chemical ventures to raise cash for oil operations22. By the late 
1990's there was a return to the more specialised companies as opposed to the diversified 
ventures of the previous two decades23. Nova also divested its energy related assets (such 
as its share in the Canadian natural gas liquids supplier Dynegy24) at about the same 
time when it was completing its deals with Huntsman, and was in the process of acquiring 
Shell's assets for polystyrene. This was a necessary move for Nova, so that it can raise 
the required capital to enable it to finance the acquisition of styrene related assets from 
the two companies. 
Chemical subsidiaries of major oil companies expanded their role as major suppliers 
of styrene product on the world market since the 1970's. Five of the eight largest styrene 
producers in the world are owned by oil companies. Shell made the largest strides in 
21 Shell-BP Styrene Deal Blurs Future of Baglan Bay, Chemical Week, 13 December, 1996, p. 22; and 
Chemical Market Reporter, 11 November, 1996. 
22 Changing Perspectives: Restructuring and Global Strategies are Creating Opportunities for Petro-
chemical Companies in 21st Century, Chemical Market Reporter, EPCA Supplement, September, 1999, 
p. 24. 
23For an insight into the changing corporate strategies within chemical majors see the account of 
Chandler, Hikino & Mowery (1998) and Bower (1986). 
24 Nova Completes Shell PS Deal, Says Goodbye to Dynegy, Chemical Week, 9 February, 2000. 
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expanding globally during the 1990's. By 2003, it grew to rival Dow's position as the 
world's largest producer. It achieved this by exiting polystyrene production, and investing 
instead in the production of styrene and its raw materials; and by forming joint ventures 
in different countries. Shell located its modern and large scale plants in countries with 
growing markets, or where it had integrated refining operations like in the Netherlands, 
Saudi Arabia and Singapore. Lyondell, the successor to Arco which is an oil related 
company, also made a large leap becoming the fourth largest styrene producer in as little 
as about two decades. I discuss further the development of the US styrene market, and 
the role of the main producers in shaping the structure of the industry in that market, 
in Section 5.3 below. 
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5.2.3.2 World Regional Developments 
The world styrene market grew from 8.2 million tonnes in 1975 to 17.4 million tonnes in 
1995, and is expected to reach more than 28.7 million tonnes in 2005. An increase of 20 
million tonnes within the pace of three decades. Figure 5.5 shows how different regions 
of the world fared over this period. The production and consumption of styrene and its 
products, has been concentrated since its development in the 1940's, in North America 
and Western Europe, where most of industrial activity and economic growth in the world 
had been taking place. The two regions accounted for 67% to 50% of world capacity until 
1995. Japan, on the other hand, had a share which was roughly half the size of that of 
North America. Throughout this period North America, especially the US, was a net 
exporter of styrene to both Western Europe and Japan, with annual exports averaging 
between 0.5 million to 1 million tonnes/year. By the 1990's, N. American plants had on 
average larger capacities than their European counterparts, and were becoming smaller 
in number. Japan on the other hand, had a larger number of producers with smaller 
plants on average, than both their European and American counterparts. 
In Western Europe, the Netherlands overtook Germany as the largest styrene pro-
ducer by 1995. A few years later, in the small region between Rotterdam, and Antwerp 
(Belgium) the world's four leading styrene producers Dow, Shell, BASF and Lyondell 
were operating just over 50% of West European capacity. Germany's share in percentage 
terms, has steadily declined from its dominant position in the early 1970's, although its 
capacity has increased slightly in volume terms. The styrene producers are attracted 
to the Netherlands due to the extensive refining capacity, and developed petrochemical 
infrastructure, with good storage and transportation facilities for petrochemical and oil 
products in the region. Over the last decade, Spain has emerged as a large producer 
of styrene. Repsol, its major petrochemical producer now has a capacity of 0.5 million 
tonnes/year. Enichem in Italy has a capacity of 0.6 million tonnes/year, and Total-
Fina-Elf has a capacity of 0.7 million tonnes/year in France. The French company also 
has a 50% share in a large styrene operation Cos-Mar, in the US, making it one of the 
large styrene producers in the world. Notwithstanding that BP and Shell are UK based 
companies, that rank among the top styrene producers in the world, the two companies 
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closed down their operations in the UK over the last few years. As indicated above, they 
moved their operations to other regions of the world with access to larger growing mar-
kets, and where production costs are more competitive. Styrene production has declined 
in the UK, from 420 thousand tonnes/year in 1975, to a mere 60 thousand tonnes/year 
at present. 
While styrene markets in North America and Western Europe continued to grow, 
their share of world styrene production and consumption, was declining steadily notably 
since 1995. This trend was caused by enormous growth in Asia, excluding Japan, which 
had by this time become much faster, and larger in absolute terms as well, than any 
other region in the world. By 1997 styrene capacity in the countries of the Far East had 
exceeded that of Japan; and by 2003 Asia (excluding Japan), had become the largest 
market for styrene in the world, overtaking North America, and Western Europe. By 
2005, this region had a total styrene capacity of about 8 million tonnes/year. Figure 5.5 
illustrates, the changing structure of market shares in the different regions. The largest 
contributors to this growth were South Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore and in later 
years Thailand. The South Korean styrene market approached in size that of Japan. 
Growth in these countries was driven by expanding industries, namely electronics and 
automotive production, as well as the rise in personal income and expenditure, which 
drive personal consumption of electrical and electronic goods, cars, packaging for food, 
and consumer goods in general. It has already been mentioned how the major styrene 
producers established production facilities in different countries in Asia, and contributed 
to the growth in supply of styrene. Local companies had also invested heavily in styrene 
production especially in South Korea, Taiwan, China and Thailand. Despite the massive 
scale of investment in styrene production in China, the country at present, continues to 
be a major importer of styrene, with imports of about 1-2 million tonnes/year. 
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5.3 The Styrene Industry Stages of Development & Re-
structuring 
As an intermediate chemical product, styrene's fortunes are tied to the performance 
of its derivatives, mainly polystyrene, styrene copolymers (products such as ABS and 
other styrenic plastics), rubbers and other resins. Styrene has no other uses except for 
insignificant volumes as an additive in specialised oils, and antioxidants for rubber. 
Polystyrene25 was invented in 1925 by I.G. Farben 26 and production started on small 
commercial scale in 1930. Synthetic rubbers based on styrene followed, and production 
expanded during the war driven by the demand for tyre production and cable covers and 
related materials. Production at this stage was small; and the real demand take-off for 
these products did not arrive until after the war. Styrene products have been around for 
more than seventy years now. Although these products and their properties have changed 
and improved over the years they are essentially the same materials using styrene as a 
raw material. Like other innovations and products, the development of styrene can be 
seen to follow the innovation/product life cycle originated by Kuznets (1972, p. 74) and 
developed by van Duijn (1984). According to this theory, the product life cycle maps 
four phases of the known S-shaped growth curve, namely: 
1. Innovation and Introduction, 
2. Growth, 
3. Maturity, 
4. Decline or Extended Maturity. 
25Polystyrene was one of the first plastic products to be commercialised. It was developed at least two 
years ahead of PVC which was introduced in 1932; and before the other major plastics materials such as 
polyethylenes (LDPE in 1939; LLDPE and HDPE in 1958). 
261. G. Farben the German chemical giant of the time, was responsible for the invention of many other 
chemical products. The period of the 1930's and 1940's was rich in innovation activity, which saw the 
invention of polyvinyl chloride and styrenic rubbers (I.G. Farben), polyethylene (ICI, Britain), nylon 
(Du Pont, USA), and silicones (Dow-Corning, USA). Innovation activity was not confined to chemicals 
only, but covered also other sectors as well, such as: synthetic fibres, oil refining, medicine, electronics 
and telecommunication, and aircraft engines (the interested reader could refer to Freeman (1982a, 1984) 
and Arora, Landau & Rosenberg (1998) for more on this topic). I. G. Farben was broken up into three 
companies following WW II, to form Bayer, BASF and Hoechst, which were later to become among the 
largest chemical companies in the world. 
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Life cycles of innovations and products vary widely due to the diverse nature of the 
products, and their markets. The length of the different phases can also be quite variable. 
van Duijn (1984) estimates the average product life cycle at about half a century or more 
even before it starts to decline; and Kuznets (1972) gives an average of about 20 years 
for the introductory phase of the product, and much more for its diffusion phase which 
includes its growth and maturity. Due to its versatile properties styrene markets continue 
to grow in the US, albeit at modest rates now, and at much more faster growth rates 
worldwide, especially in the developing economies of east Asia. It appears that styrene 
is going through an extended growth phase, with no market decline in sight, after nearly 
80 years of its invention, and well over more than half a century of its commercialisation 
on a large scale. 
There is an intricate relationship between the innovation and duration of product life 
cycle phases, technological activity and economic growth. Whole industries had been 
developed as a result of the early discoveries of synthetic resins and plastics, not only 
those that are involved in the production of these materials, but also the downstream 
producers of their derivatives for packaging, recreation products, construction materials, 
automotive and electronic parts and many more related industries that evolved around 
these products. R&D centres were also established to develop new processes, and prod-
ucts with better properties. Furthermore a substantial engineering industry developed 
around all of these industries from the large process engineering firms that build the chem-
ical plants, to the makers of plastics machinery of injection moulding, blow moulding, 
and film making equipment that produce the plastic end products needed by everyday 
life uses, and the economy. With economic growth and infrastructural development dur-
ing the 1950's and 1960's, there was a rise in the demand for capital products and rapid 
expansion of consumer goods; this generated a multiplier effect that lead to an expanding 
plastics industry and the chemicals needed to make them. The development of the chem-
ical industry was driven by strong innovation and R&D push on the supply side, and 
equally strong pull on the demand side27. The relevance of the product life cycle stages 
27This is a type of Schumpeterian model of innovation and product development. See Freeman (1982a) 
for a detailed account of the role of innovations and patents in the development of the chemical industry 
and its interaction with macroeconomic activity. 
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to the developments in the industry, is that the growth period attracts more producers to 
the industry and this impacts on the structure of the industry and its competitiveness, 
and on the innovation activity and regeneration of further demand for its products. 
In his study of entry and market dynamics Geroski (1990) finds that entry takes 
place mostly during the growth stage of a product cycle, when swarms of firms enter a 
new market especially when entry barriers are low. But also that it is not confined to 
this stage, as considerable entry also takes place during the mature stage of a product 
when technology becomes more accessible and available for licensing. In this stage, 
the production process becomes standardised and the market large enough to absorb 
new producers with sufficiently large plants that utilise economies of scale. Innovative 
activity when combined with patents and know-how barriers can lead to concentration of 
markets as was the case in organic chemicals, synthetic fibres and pharmaceuticals. But 
also vigourous innovative activity can cause concentration to fall when several successful 
companies break into the market, by developing new products or alternative processes, 
a process that appears to have taken place in the synthetic fibres and plastics industry 
in the 1970's (Geroski 1990). 
The development of the US styrene industry is reviewed below in three stages, that 
relate to the historical milestones that heralded important structural changes within 
the industry, than to any other major development. The progress of the styrene indus-
try should be viewed in the context of the overall changes that were taking place in the 
petrochemical industry, and the interactive forces at work. For instance, techno-economic 
developments would continuously reshape the industry, where the roles of the main con-
tenders change in lieu with market forces, and reflect the dynamics of the industry. Also 
the competitive positions of firms are influenced by their capital assets, know-how and 
technology in possession, and access to raw materials. Integration downstream insures 
marketing outlets, and generates value added for the firm's products. On the other hand 
increased competition may result from a rise in the number of market players, sluggish 
growth or a slack in demand; or may be from a strategy by one or more competitors 
to gain market share at the expense of their rivals. As a result, the new environment 
creates ripe conditions for a new wave of restructuring in the industry. One of the ways 
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in which the industry can restore profitability is when some firms under the pressure of 
market exit the industry, or when a wave of takeovers, and mergers reduces the number 
of players. The pressures of competition is eased upon the reorganisation of the market. 
Also at times the firms may find a variety of ways to collude either directly or indirectly, 
to overcome adverse market conditions. One way is when firms enter into illegal price 
fixing arrangements, or the formation of cartels that allocate market shares, and prop-up 
prices. The continuous interaction of these factors in a dynamic environment, help to 
shape the structure of the industry and affect the behaviour of its firms. 
5.3.1 The Growth Phase: Pre-1974 Period 
Following the Second World War there was rapid economic growth during the 1950's and 
1960's driven by massive infrastructure projects at home as well as for reconstruction in 
Europe and Japan. The production of capital and consumer goods was at an all time 
high, and demand for synthetic materials and plastics products, which was growing at 
2-3 times the rate of growth of GDP, was in double figures throughout this period. The 
production of cars, trucks, automotive equipment and tyres, witnessed a rapid increase. 
Also production of electrical and electronic products, household appliances, and numer-
ous office equipment, all of which contain parts made from plastic and synthetic resins 
was rising rapidly. Demand for plastics and synthetic products and their chemical raw 
materials, such as styrene, was growing fast. Styrene showed a corresponding increase in 
production over this period. In the US its output rose from about 800 thousand tonnes 
in 1960, to 1.3 million tonnes in 1965, and 1.8 million tonnes in 1970. An increase of 2.5 
fold over a span of one decade. 
The number of styrene producers and their capacities over this period mirrored the 
rapid rise in demand. Eight styrene producers were already in operation in the US market 
in the 1950's. Of those only two, Dow Chemicals and Union Carbide, had large plants 
with capacities of 170-180 thousand tonnes/year. The rest had much smaller capacities 
in the range of 10-70 thousand tonnes/year. Over the next few years five new producers 
entered the styrene market; four of those were companies involved in oil refining, and 
three entered with large capacities: Amoco brought a plant on stream in 1965 with an 
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annual capacity of 363 thousand tonnes/year, while Cos-Mar entered the styrene market 
in 1968 with an annual capacity of 227 thousand tonnes/year, and Gulf Oil in 1971, 
with an annual capacity of 238 thousand tonnes/year. Suntide Refining brought a small 
plant (36 thousand tonnes/year) on stream in 1962, and Borg-Warner (61 thousand 
tonnes/year) in 1964. By 1973 the number of styrene producers had risen from eight to 
thirteen. 
The involvement of some oil companies in styrene production stems in part from their 
chemical operations in benzene production which is closely tied to oil refining. Benzene 
is the main raw material for the production of ethylbenzene, the precursor for styrene. 
During this period, nearly half of the styrene capacity was controlled by companies 
involved in oil refining. These include: Amoco, Cosden, Fina (the joint venture partner 
in the Cos-Mar operation), Gulf, Shell, El-Paso, and Suntide Refining. This trend of oil 
companies involvement in the production of basic chemicals, and plastics materials will 
be reinforced in the 1970's following the oil price rises that changed the cost structure of 
production costs in favour of the oil companies. 
5.3.2 The Turbulent Years: 1974-1990 
At the same time as the oil price rises of the 1970's were taking effect, two other driving 
trends were at work that will have a profound impact on the petrochemical industry: (a) 
the slowdown in the rate of growth of demand for petrochemicals and plastics materials, 
and (b) the developments at the technological front which lead engineering companies to 
successfully build plants with much larger capacities than before. Following the rapid 
growth of synthetic materials in the 1960's, and their wide acceptance as substitutes 
of traditional materials, as well as for many new applications in different sectors of the 
economy, petrochemical markets were becoming mature. By the early 1970's economic 
growth was showing signs of slowing down. Production of petrochemicals and manu-
facturing output even declined in the recessionary year of 1975. But this was only a 
temporary blip, growth recovered quickly the following year. It was realised by now that 
petrochemical markets would grow at more modest rates than in previous decades, and 
prices and profit margin were on a downward trend. However, new producers were still 
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being attracted into the highly profitable US petrochemical market. 
Several factors contributed to reduce production costs, and would eventually play a 
part in dampening prices. Firms benefited from scale economies of larger capacity plants, 
in that the investment and fixed costs per tonne of product were drastically reduced. Also, 
learning effects together with advances in process design and catalysts meant that styrene 
producers could get higher yields from their plants, and lower their costs. Overcapacity 
was becoming more evident in the industry as new capacity additions were becoming 
larger in size and demand growth was slowing with the increased maturity of end-use 
markets. Additional entry intensified the effects of overcapacity especially during periods 
of economic downturn; as the demand for styrene and other basic petrochemicals had now 
become closely tied to the business cycle. In such an environment competition between 
the market players is heightened, and price levels and profit margins tend to suffer as a 
result. 
Two major petrochemical companies entered the styrene industry on a large scale. 
Hoechst started styrene production in 1980 with a plant of 408 thousand tonnes/year, 
at Bayport, Texas. And Arco brought on stream a large plant in 1981, with an annual 
capacity of 454 thousand tonnes at Channelview, Texas. A new technology was used 
at this plant, originally designed for the production of propylene oxide, which also co-
produces styrene28. More styrene is produced than propylene oxide, the ratio being about 
2.4 tonnes of styrene for each tonne of propylene oxide produced; although Arco's main 
interest is in propylene oxide, as part of its large urethane chemicals, one of its core 
business units. 
The two companies followed different paths of development. Arco a producer of basic 
petrochemical products, purchased Sinclair-Kopper's 100 thousand tonnes/year plant at 
Monaca, Pennsylvania, and would continue to expand its styrene operations in later years. 
On the other hand, Hoechst was already established as a diversified chemical company 
and one of the largest in the world; its operations cover a wide range of products, in per-
formance and speciality chemicals, pharmaceuticals as well as plastics, fibres, and basic 
28The technology was developed by Halcon a US chemical engineering company, and was first com-
mercialised in Spain in 1974, in a joint venture between Atlantic Richfield, Arco's mother company, 
and Empressa Nacional del Petroleo. This venture would operate under Repsol Quimica the Spanish 
petrochemical producer. 
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chemicals. In 1988 it merged with Foster Grant, acquiring its 400 thousand tonnes/year 
styrene plant at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. But a year later Hoechst exited the styrene 
business by selling its Bayport plant to Huntsman Chemical, and the Baton Rouge plant 
to Deltech Corporation. Both Huntsman and Deltech were essentially polystyrene pro-
ducers that found an opportunity to move upstream into styrene production. Deltech as 
mentioned earlier did not manage to get into styrene production, and the styrene plant 
it acquired was kept idle for a long time. 
Three more major chemical companies exited the styrene industry during this period. 
Shell shut down its plant in Torrance, California, in 1974. It exited all styrene and its 
major derivatives operations in the US; although it continued its involvement in the large 
scale production of the main raw materials ethylene and benzene, and high value added 
styrenic products such as latexes and specialised styrene based plastics. In 1984 Shell 
reestablished a large styrene production base at Scotford, Canada, with a 306 thousand 
tonnes/year plant making it the largest styrene producer in the country. Union Carbide 
also, closed down its 136 thousand tonnes/year plant in Texas, in 1979. Monsanto, on 
the other hand sold its large styrene operation (680 thousand tonnes/year) also in Texas, 
to Sterling Chemicals in 1986. 
Further rationalisation of styrene capacity took place involving the following compa-
nies. Gulf Chemicals' 272 thousand tonnes/year plant at St. James, Louisiana was sold 
to Chevron's chemical subsidiary'in 1984. And El Paso sold its 145 thousand tonnes/year 
plant at Odessa, Texas to Rexene Corporation in 1989. Several other smaller ventures 
also were closed down or exchanged hands. Sinclair-Koppers' other styrene plant at 
Houston, Texas was sold to United States Steel company in 1980; but the latter exited 
the styrene industry completely by 1983, closing down its small operation. Borg-Warner, 
Cosden and Suntide-Refining also exited styrene production by closing down their small 
operations, all of which were located in Texas, the centre of oil refining and petrochemical 
production in the US. 
But what lies behind this considerable activity in the styrene industry? The process 
of entry and exit into markets, and the survival rate of firms is a rather complex pro-
cess; there is a large body of literature on this topic which has been studied by Geroski 
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(1991a, 1991b, 1995), Gort & Klepper (1982, 1996, 2000), Scherer & Ross (1990), and 
Sutton (1998). However in the context of the developments of the petrochemical in-
dustry during the period under study, the causes of increased activity can be traced to 
three main factors. First, the rise into prominence of the role of financial markets in 
investment funding in the 1980's, gave rise to increasing pressure on corporations for 
more efficiency, and the requirement for higher returns on capital. Stock markets were 
experiencing phenomenal growth and returns; chemical companies had to satisfy their 
shareholders with adequate returns on their stocks. This lead to particular emphasis on 
the virtues of comparative advantage and specialisation of firms. A wave of takeovers, 
mergers and reorganisation of product lines and corporate structures swept the petro-
chemical industry, and affected all industrial sectors as wel129. Second, there was a high 
degree of uncertainty about security of raw materials supply and concern about higher 
energy costs at the time. The larger firms established integrated production operations 
by expanding upstream into raw materials; and moved into downstream markets as well, 
to secure higher added value for their products. Some of the main styrene producers 
for instance got involved in styrene derivatives like polystyrene and other products, as 
well as investing in processing and fabrication operations such as packaging products, or 
autoparts and the like. Only Hoechst among the major players was not integrated into 
the production of styrene precursors, and purchased all its ethylene and benzene require-
ments on the merchant market or through long-term contracts. Third, the pressures 
of increased competition combined with emergence of large scale operations squeezed 
smaller producers by forcing them out of the market, or by acquiring their operations all 
together by rivals. 
This period was marked by two major entries into the styrene industry. Arco, and 
Hoechst which sold its operations to Huntsman by the end of this period; and by the exit 
of four major petrochemical producers (Shell, Union Carbide, Monsanto and Hoechst). 
The number of producers rose at first, which heightened the competition in the market, 
but then declined to 8 producers. Total capacity closures amounted to more than 700 
thousand tonnes/year, and a further 260 thousand tonnes/year (Dow's Midland, MI, 
29 For an account of these developments in the petrochemical industry, and corporate priorities of 
management at the time see Bower (1986), Stobaugh (1988), and Arora, Landau & Rosenberg (1998). 
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plant and Arco's plant at Pennsylvania) were placed on standby bringing total retired 
capacity to about 1 million tonnes. But all major existing companies, notably Arco, 
increased their capacity over the period. Capacity rose by 1.9 million tonnes, from 2.4 
million tonnes/year in 1974 to 4.3 million tonnes/year in 1990. 
Strategic decisions that affect the direction of future development of the four major 
petrochemical producers lay behind their exit from the styrene industry. Shell and Union 
Carbide are both strong in basic petrochemical products in terms of production capability 
and technological base in these areas. The two firms are among the world leaders in these 
products and license their technology for many products, to third parties on a global 
scale. They exited styrene and concentrated on polyolefins such as ployethylenes and 
polypropylene plastics, ethylene oxide and ethylene glycols. Union Carbide continued 
also to operate vinyl acetate production which is an ethylene based product; while Shell 
exited styrene production in the US market, but reestablished a base across the border in 
Canada a few years later, and retained its position as a major global producer of styrene. 
On the other hand, Hoechst and Monsanto moved in the opposite direction; like many 
companies that abandoned basic petrochemicals and moved downstream into higher value 
added products. Both companies concentrated on life science products which were seen 
as having high growth potential, and promising new markets in the nineties and beyond. 
Hoechst with its strong base in pharmaceuticals and speciality chemicals concentrated its 
operations in these areas, and a few years later would spin Aventis (a joint venture formed 
in 1999 between Hoechst and Rhone Poulanc of France) a life science company. Monsanto 
sold its petrochemical operations around the world and concentrated on establishing a 
strong R&D base since the mid 1980's, to become a leader in genetically modified foods 
and agrochemicals. 
5.3.3 Consolidation Period: Post 1990 
Merger and takeover activity continued, albeit with a lower number of transactions, but 
on a larger scale and level than before. The companies and assets involved at this stage 
were much larger than during the 1980's and 1990's. Also new capacity additions were 
significant in terms of volume, especially during the opening years of the decade, and 
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following the exceptionally high performance of 1988, when a wide range of petrochemical 
products achieved record profits, Over a million tonnes of new capacity was built by 
three producers. Arco's new plant of 510 thousand tonnes/year was built in 1992 on the 
same site at Channelview, Texas. In the same year, Chevron also brought on stream 
a large plant with a capacity of more than 410 thousand tonnes/year at the site of its 
existing operations in Louisiana, thereby more than doubling its capacity, which rose to 
771 thousand tonnes/year. Westlake Styrene Corporation entered the market as a new 
player, with a small capacity of 160 thousand tonnes/year. Westlake was formed as a joint 
venture between Taita Chemical Company (Taiwan), BTR Nylex (Australia), Sumitomo 
(Japan) and the Westlake Group (USA). Most of the production at Westlake is exported 
to the the shareholders of the company, who are involved in the production of styrene 
derivatives in the Far East, with very small sales in the US styrene merchant market. 
Also smaller capacity expansions were made by Cos-Mar, Huntsman and Sterling in 1991 
which totalled about 350 thousand tonnes/year. 
Three major takeovers took place during 1998 and 1999, involving Lyondell Chemical 
Company30 which acquired Arco Chemicals entire assets including styrene. Arco had 
already shut its old facility at Monaca, Pennsylvania in 1992. The other takeover was by 
Nova Chemicals which is a Canadian based company. It entered the US styrene market in 
a big way when it purchased from Huntsman its styrene plant located at Bayport, Texas in 
December 199831. Nova was already established as a large polystyrene producer in the US 
market. A year earlier Huntsman had acquired Rexene's small styrene plant at Odessa, 
Texas that was not involved in this takeover; and it continued to operate independently 
until it was closed down in 2002. The third move involved BP's merger with Amoco 
which took place in 1999; and this involved oil operations as well as chemicals including 
styrene. Following the takeover, Nova was quoted as reviving plans to debottleneck 
the facility at Bayport, Texas, to increase its capacity to 681 thousand tonnes/year. 
The original plan to expand capacity dates back to 1996 when it was announced by 
Huntsman at the time that it was planning this capacity expansion, but was shelved a 
3°Lyondell is also owned by Atlantic Richfield Corporation, the main shareholder of Arco. 
31Chemical Week, 24 February, 1999, p. 8. 
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Table 5.3: Production capacity growth of major US styrene producers(a). 
(Thousand tonnes/year) 
Company 1960 % Company 1975 % Company 1985 % 
Dow 254 35.4 Monsanto 590 21.9 Monsanto 680 18.9 
Monsanto 172 24.0 Foster Grant 399 14.8 Dow 590 16.4 
Sinclair 79 11.0 Amoco 381 14.1 Cos-Mar 590 16.4 
Shell 73 10.2 Dow 295 10.9 Arco 554 15.4 
Union Carbide 54 7.5 Cos-Mar 270 10.0 Hoechst 408 11.3 
Foster Grant 54 7.5 Sinclair 254 9.4 Amoco 363 10.1 
El Paso 23 3.2 Gulf 238 8.8 Chevron 272 7.6 
Cosden 9 1.3 Union Carbide 136 5.0 El Paso 145 4.0 
- - - Others 132 4.9 - 
Total 718 100 Total 2695 100 Total 3602 100 
Cab)  - 80.5 C4 - 61.8 C4 - 67.0 
C6  - 95.5 C6  - 81.2 C6 - 88.4 
Company 1995 % Company 2000 % Company 2005 % 
Arco 1145 21.4 Lyondell 1270 22.1 Lyondell 1270 18.7 
Cos-Mar 906 17.0 Cos-Mar 906 15.8 Dow 1219 18.0 
Sterling 726 13.6 Sterlino.  . 772 13.4 Cos-Mar 1136 16.8 
Chevron 680 12.7 Chevron 726 13.4 Chevron 953 14.1 
Dow 644 12.1 Dow 644 11.2 Nova 794 11.7 
Huntsman 567 10.6 Nova 600 10.5 Sterling 772 11.4 
Amoco 366 6.9 BP-Amoco 453 7.9 BP-Amoco 453 6.7 
Westlake 160 3.0 Westlake 180 3.1 Westlake 180 2.7 
Rexene 145 2.7 Huntsman 145 2.5 - 
Total 5339 100 Total 5741 100 Total 6777 100 
C(4b)  - 64.7 C4 - 64.8 C4 - 67.6 
C6 - 87.4 C6 - 86.4 C6  - 90.7 
a Capacities for 2005 include expansions that are planned, or under construction. 
(b)C4 and C6 refer to the concentration ratios of the largest 4 and 6 firms of industry capacity. 
year later when world prices of styrene began to falter in 1997. Nova32 moved quickly a 
few years later following an explosion at its Bayport plant to announce further styrene 
capacity expansions. It started building a major addition to its plant on the same site 
that was expected to increase its existing capacity by about one third, making Nova one 
of the largest styrene producers in the US. When this plant came on stream in 2005, 
Nova33 had amassed a total styrene capacity of 0.80 million tonnes/year. Cos-Mar also 
32 Styrene Market Quiet Following Nova Explosion, Chemical Market Reporter, 23 June, 2003, p. 1. 
33Nova also has a styrene plant at Sarnia, Ontario, in Canada with a capacity of 430 thousand 
tonnes/year. This gives the company a total capacity of 1.2 million tonnes/year to service its opera-
tions in the North American market, placing it on a par with Dow and Lyondell. 
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announced a large expansion equivalent to 25% of its existing capacity, which was to 
come on stream in the third quarter of 2004. Upon completion, its capacity rose to 
more than 1.1 million tonnes/year, making it the third largest styrene producer in the 
US after Lyondell and Dow which retain the lead position. With these developments 
taking place, Dow Chemicals started building a new plant at the Gulf Coast, Texas, 
with a rated capacity of 575 thousand tonnes/year. The plant as expected became fully 
operational in 2005. Dow had been planning for this project since 1995, but kept on 
postponing its implementation citing unsuitable market conditions. Upon completion of 
all these expansions, the US styrene capacity rose to an estimated 6.7 million tonnes/year 
by 2005. 
Once again, since Huntsman exited in 2002, the US styrene industry is being served by 
eight producers. The number of producers in the market has since the 1970's, oscillated 
between eight to fourteen firms. By 2005 the largest producers, Lyondell, Dow, and Cos-
Mar had comparable market shares, as measured by their capacities, of about 17%-18% 
of the US market. Those top three are followed closely by Chevron, Nova and Sterling, 
and with BP-Amoco and Westlake as distant followers. The capacity shares of the major 
US styrene producers over different time frames are depicted in Table 5.3. What is 
noticeable over this period, is that nearly 1.5 million tonnes of styrene capacity had been 
added since 1990, and a further one million tonnes was scheduled for completion by 2005. 
The net effect of the restructuring process following takeovers and mergers, has been a 
decline in the number of firms serving the styrene market; and the wave of expansions 
that followed each stage of restructuring resulted in the top four, or top six producers 
enlarging their market share each time. In 2005 the largest 6 styrene producers accounted 
for about 91% of the market, whereas in 1986 their share was a little less than 87%, and 
only 81% back in 1975; indicating the emergence of a tight oligopoly in the US styrene 
industry following its consolidation over the last decade. 
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5.4 Estimation of Inverse Demand for Styrene 
Demand for styrene is derived demand. As an intermediate chemical product, styrene is 
used as a raw material for the production of a variety of other products that are needed 
by the economy. Polystyrene, styrenic plastics such as ABS, styrene based synthetic 
rubbers and latexes, and polyester resins are the main uses of styrene. The demand 
for these products is driven by the general wellbeing and performance of the economy. 
Polystyrene's are consumed mainly in packaging, the construction industry, and electrical 
and electronic equipment manufacture. The automotive sector, together with electrical 
equipment and cables industry, on the other hand, drive the demand for ABS plastics and 
synthetic rubbers. Unsaturated polyesters, which end up in paints and fibreglass, also 
are strongly influenced by the performance of automotive production, the construction 
industry, and the output of machinery and capital goods. 
Like many primary and intermediate products such as metals and paper, demand 
for petrochemical products especially those at the commodity end of the market, is 
strongly influenced by the business cycle. fluctuating raw materials costs, the level of 
industry capacity utilisation, new entry into the market, or eminent large scale expansion 
of production capacity by existing producers impact on price variability. Also shifts in 
the competitive behaviour of firms brought about by a changing market structure, or 
the introduction of new more efficient technology would inevitably disturb prices in the 
market, and bring about a new equilibrium. As a result many of these products suffer 
from cyclical instability where the degree of price fluctuations is usually much higher 
than that for demand variability.34 
Two additional factors contribute to the market cyclicality, namely the short-run 
inelasticity of styrene demand to changes in price. The cost of styrene and its derivatives 
make only a small part of the cost of the final product which incorporates styrene. 
This in particular applies to electrical and electronic products, automotive parts and to 
many packaging applications that use polystyrene. In other applications there is little 
competitive alternatives that producers can switch to quickly. Styrene butadiene rubber 
34See the special issue of Resources Policy, Volume 17, 1991, and references therein for a review of 
this topic. Also Davutyan & Roberts (1994) provide some evidence of the interrelationship between the 
duration of metal price cycles and economic performance. 
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(SBR) which enters into the production of tyres and other rubber products, competes 
with natural rubber; and for unsaturated polyester producers have little choice but to 
use styrene which enters the manufacturing process in small proportions anyway. A rise 
in the price of styrene would therefore have a proportionally lower impact on the cost of 
the final products containing styrene. Unless styrene price rises are large and perceived 
to be permanent, consumers of styrene and its direct derivatives have little incentive to 
switch to alternatives, which in general would involve modifications to equipment and 
process of production at a not insignificant cost to manufacturers. 
The other factor, is the inelasticity of supply of styrene product in the short-run. 
The supply of styrene by producers is constrained by their production capacity in place; 
as the level of production approaches capacity, it becomes more and more difficult, and 
costly for producers to expand their output. Modification of the plant in the form of 
debottlenecking35 , becomes necessary to expand output further; or it may even require 
a major capital investment in a new plant, which in the chemical industry on average, 
takes about 1-2 years to complete, and several years of planning prior to that. Expanding 
output in a big way is not always a feasible alternative in the short-run in petrochemical 
production. 
This behaviour of cycling prices associated with shifts in demand and the extent of 
capacity utilisation, is characteristic of many petrochemical products, and commodity 
industries. It is seen in many primary metals such as copper, aluminium, lead and even 
gold. Figure 5.6 which is taken from Vogely (1985) depicts this process; an analysis of the 
price cycles of major primary metals can be found in Eggert (1991). The figure shows 
how price rises rapidly as output reaches full capacity utilisation. A shift in demand 
upwards from DmD, to DpDp due to a small output increase from Xn, to Xp brings 
about a dramatic rise in price from Pm , to pp which lies on the intersection of demand 
curve DpDp , and the supply curve as it approaches the capacity limit. 
In general, the price of most petrochemical products rises significantly when pro-
duction approaches full capacity utilisation. Sedriks (1994a, 1994b) observed a similar 
35The term debottlenecking is used in the petrochemical industry to describe a capacity expansion 
which involves a modification in the production process to circumvent bottlenecks that allow production 
increases by installing some additional equipment and process modification. It usually involves major 
but not very significant investment to achieve. 
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phenomenon for the petrochemical industry, where prices for many petrochemical prod-
ucts were observed to follow a `hokey-stick' pattern. With price rising significantly when 
capacity utilisation rises above the 90% mark. In the paper industry, anchor price levied 
by producers, is achieved when strong demand prevails, which is when operating rates 
are sustained at more than 93% (Rich 1978). Christensen & Caves (1997) also confirm 
this threshold level for capacity utilisation in the paper and pulp industry, beyond which 
price rises significantly. 
Figure 5.6: Cyclical demand and price instability in the petrochemical industry. 
Different approaches have been pursued for estimating demand for oligopolistic indus-
tries. The most widely used is the econometric approach of evaluating demand as a func-
tion of GNP or GDP, industrial production, price of product and its competing alterna-
tives, and some other factors that influence its consumption. Another approach involves 
input-output analysis originally pioneered by Leontief (1951) for economic planning and 
resource allocation. In petrochemicals, demand for the west European polyvinyl chloride 
industry has been econometrically modelled in logarithmic form (Paraskevopoulos 1988). 
And demand for several plastic products has been modelled using input-output techniques 
for the UK (Fayad & Motamen 1984). 
Booth, Kanetkar, Vertinsky & Whistler (1991) estimate an inverse demand function 
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for newsprint in Canada using a logarithmic function relating consumption of newsprint 
to its wholesale price, the real price of substitute inputs and GDP. Steen & Salvanes 
(1999) on the other hand, estimate a demand function for an oligopoly fishery market in 
salmon for Norway. The model they use is a modified version of an earlier model that was 
first developed by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). While the aforementioned models 
may perform well for long run estimates of demand and prices, and may prove useful for 
forecasting purposes. They are all complex in structure, and are not suitable for our linear 
quadratic model. Most of these models involve non-linearities in the form of logarithms 
and lagged differences of the price, or other demand factors in their formulation, and 
cannot be incorporated in our dynamic model. 
It is quite likely that the demand for styrene is nonlinear in the independent or 
explanatory variables that drive its consumption. But in keeping with the requirements of 
linear quadratic modelling, and the rich literature in this area, a linear downward sloping 
inverse demand function, of the form we have seen in previous chapters, is used. Our 
purpose here is not to estimate a demand function for forecasting purposes, but rather 
to facilitate, within reasonable and accurate bounds, the modelling of firm behaviour 
within the framework of a dynamic model. A linear downward sloping demand function 
is consistent with economic theory; where price declines as production increases, and 
more product is placed on the market. 
The inverse demand model that is adopted in this thesis, has been studied in a game 
theoretic framework by many authors, including Boyer & Moreaux (1986), Reynolds 
(1986, 1987, 1991), Steele (1995), Slade (1994, 1995, 1996) and Vives (1988). It is given 
in equation (5.1), and below I explain its characteristics, and how it is estimated from 
industry data. 
P(t) = a(t) — b(t)X (t) 	 (5.1) 
where36: a(t) = ao eat , b(t) = b0 eI3t , and X(t) 	xi(t). By expressing a(t) and b(t) 
in exponential form, we allow for nonlinearity and time variation. The inverse demand 
function can now shift in time, while retaining its linearity in the total output, X (t), of 
36 Gaskins, Jr. (1971, p. 309) uses a formulation for a dominant firm where the demand function involves 
a similar exponential term. 
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the major oligopoly players that dominate the styrene industry and determine its price. 
xi(t) is output of an individual major producer, and n is the number of those producers. 
Another property of this formulation of a and b is worth noting. At the initial time, 
a = ao, and b = bo; and because a and /3 are both negative (as we shall find later), 
as t increases, both a and b decline in value, and the price shows a falling trend. This 
is a property consistent with learning effects, where products prices fall with increasing 
cumulative output. 
A variant of this formulation for the demand has been used by Lloyd (1979, p. 223), 
to demonstrate market penetration. He also shows how market saturation is obtained as 
t approaches infinity, and cumulative production stabilises at a constant value asymptoti-
cally. Rosenbaum & Ye (1992) utilise the same formulation to that used here for modelling 
titanium dioxide prices, in their effort to study Du Pont's investment behaviour in that 
industry37. Below we follow the same steps to evaluate the inverse demand function as 
specified in equation (5.1) from industry data on output and prices for styrene; and then, 
using a simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression, determine the values for a(t), and 
b(t) for all periods. X(t) is the total output of the six major US styrene producers, in 
any year t. The fringe firms are treated as price takers and therefore would not affect 
the market price38. They just supply whatever product they can accommodate on the 
market at the prevailing market price dictated by the oligopolistic producers. Both a(t) 
and b(t) are nonlinear and time varying, they are estimated below from industry data on 
prices and production. Prices are measured in constant 1990 US dollars, and output in 
thousands of metric tonnes. By allowing a(t) and b(t) to be time varying, the demand 
function takes care of fluctuating demand which is witnessed in many petrochemical 
products markets. Figure 5.6 shows the shifts in demand and the associated price and 
output variations. When output rises to approach capacity in place, as point X p, on the 
intersection of of the supply curve and demand curve, DpDp, price rises dramatically to 
P. Starting from an estimate for the price elasticity of demand for styrene, e, for the 
37Rosenbaum & Ye (1992) do not give any justification for using such a demand function, nor do they 
make any comment about its properties. 
38The underlying assumption here is that fringe producers and importers are price takers; and exports 
are assumed to be sold at the same price prevailing in the US market. The total output of the 6 major 
producers determines the price of styrene in the US market as an inverse demand function. 
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period under study, we can determine the values for a(t) and b(t), using equations (5.3), 
and (5.2). Since by definition, E 	ddXptt? 	 It)),  from (5.1) we estimate E = b(r)stc)(t)• 
This equation can be rearranged to give b(t) in terms of the price of styrene, its price 
elasticity and output as shown in (5.2) below. Substituting this in equation (5.1) again 
and rearranging we obtain a relationship for a(t) as in (5.3). 
b(t) — EI;Ct(t) 
	 (5.2) 
a(t) = P(t)(1 
	
(5.3) 
And since we assumed exponential relationships for both a(t) and b(t), we can run an 
OLS regression using the calculated yearly values we have just obtained, and the time 
index for the following two equations: 
ln(a(t)) = clo + alt 	 (5.4) 
ln(b(t)) = 130 - - 	 (5.5) 
from the regression results we obtain the values for ee0 = In(4), and al = a. And 
= ln(60), and 01  = ra. This defines the inverse demand function of (5.1) in terms of 
its parameters a(t) and b(t). 
There are no published values for the price elasticity of demand for styrene that are 
readily available. But we know that styrene is now a mature product that has been in 
use in the US market since it was introduced on a large scale in the 1950's. And as 
indicated above, like other intermediate products, demand for styrene and its derivatives 
is inelastic, suggesting a price elasticity of demand e < 1. It is likely that s for styrene falls 
in the range exhibited by other similar intermediate products such as titanium dioxide, 
PVC or newsprint paper. Table (5.4) shows the price elasticity of demand values range 
from a low of 0.25 to 1.37, and for PVC at 0.76. For the base case runs of the model, 
I use a value of E = 0.70. Other values are also tested, in which allowance is also made 
for e > 1, to check how well the model performs in explaining industry developments if 
styrene demand were price elastic. 
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Table 5.4: Price elasticity of demand for various commodity industries(a). 
Author Year Industry Elasticity, e 
Booth et. al. 1991 Newsprint —0.25 — —0.50 
Steele 1995 Newsprint —0.42 
Townsend & Uhler(b) 1986 Newsprint —0.66 	—1.37 
Rosenbaum and Ye 1992 TiO2 —0.50 
Hall 1990 TiO2 —0.25 	—0.44 
Paraskevopoulos 1988 PVC —0.76 
(a)The price elasticities are negative, indicating a downward sloping 
demand curve. In equation (5.1) p. 214, demand for styrene is defined 
as downward sloping, and the price elasticity for styrene used is an 
absolute value. 
(b)Quoted in Steele (1995). 
From the data series for the period 1974-1996 of annual styrene prices, the output of 
the six major styrene producers, X(t), and the price elasticity of demand, estimated at 
e = 0.70, for the base case of the model, we calculate annual values for b(t) and a(t), from 
equations (5.2) and (5.3). These are shown in Table B.1 in Appendix B. It should be 
borne in mind that styrene importers, and the fringe firms are treated as price takers and 
therefore would not affect the market price. They just supply whatever product they can 
accommodate on the market at the prevailing market price dictated by the oligopolistic 
producers. 
The OLS regression results for equations (5.3) and (5.2) using the yearly values we 
have just obtained for a(t) and b(t), are shown in Table 5.5. The statistics show that, 
the results are acceptable; although the R2 value for the ln(a(t)) equation are somewhat 
low in view of the short time series we have, and the large swings in prices. The Durbin-
Watson values for the two equations are acceptable. And the t-statistic values, show 
that a two tailed t-test at the 1% significant level, rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients for both equations; the validity of the equation coefficients can therefore be 
ascertained with a good degree of confidence. The standard errors for the independent 
variables are shown in parentheses. 
From these results the estimated values are obtained; for a(t), we have ?to = exp(cto) = 
e56'18 	a = , and l  —0.0245, and similarly for b(t), we get bo = exp(f3 	el36.48, 0) = 	and 
= th = —0.0692. The parameters of the inverse demand equation given by (5.1), are 
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now defined for all periods from 1974 to 1996, and are given in Table B.2 in Appendix B. 
It can be seen from Figure 5.7 showing the values of estimated and actual prices for 
styrene, that the derived demand equation just estimated performs well. This equation 
can now be readily used in the model for the price of styrene. 
Table 5.5: Regression results for styrene derived demand equations( t ). 
	
ln(a(t)) 	= 	56.1790 — 0.0245 x t 
(13.2318) (0.0066) 
t-statistic 	4.246 — 3.678 
R2 	= 	0.39, F = 13.53, DW = 1.47 
ln(b(t)) 	= 	136.4851 — 0.0692 x t 
(14.2217) 	(0.0072) 
t-statistic 	9.597 — 9.665 
R2 	= 	0.81, F = 93.42, DW = 1.57 
(0 Figures in parenthesis are for standard errors 
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Figure 5.7: Styrene prices: Actual and estimated price 1974-1996. 
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5.5 Production Cost Estimation and Sources of Data 
Production cost data and pricing are confidential. Several empirical studies use produc-
tion costs data, that would have otherwise been proprietary, but had become available 
as a result of court cases. In a study of the aluminium industry, Reynolds (1986) relied 
on data for US aluminium industry that became available as a result of the infamous 
Alcoa39 antitrust court case. He also made use of long-run average cost estimates per 
tonne of aluminium, from a world wide United Nations study covering a large number of 
aluminium smelters in various countries. Similarly, Rosenbaum & Ye (1992) study the 
investment behaviour of Du Pont in the titanium dioxide industry, utilising data which 
emanate from the court case against it. Paraskevopoulos (1988) used capacity and cost 
of production data from Chem Systems, also Henderson & Cool (2003) made use of data 
sets from Chem Systems and Tecnon for their empirical analysis of capacity expansions of 
the worldwide petrochemical industry; while Lieberman (1987a, 1987b, 1987c) relied on 
the database of SRI. On the other hand, Steele (1995) relied on capacity and investment 
cost data from a combination of annual reports of North American newsprint compa-
nies, government statistical reports, and from the chemical processing industry. These 
are some of the major industry consulting firms that publish multiclient and sometimes 
elaborate studies that provide a benchmark for industry planners to evaluate their per-
formance and plan investments. These studies include supply curves, production costs, 
price projections and profitability profiles for different product groups. Some firms spe-
cialise in the study of metals, and even in a single product like aluminium (Anthony 
Bird and Associates). Producing companies and clients from industry who participate 
by supplying data and then by subscribing to these studies at substantial cost, have an 
incentive to do so. Their incentive is in having a benchmark against which they can 
rank themselves; and in having an independent and reliable third party that provides 
an overview of the industry and its developments. Firms can evaluate their cost and 
business competitive position against their rivals in the industry. 
This thesis is not any different. I make use of the SRI databases. Styrene is one of 
the products that has been studied extensively and for which a good data set is avail- 
39The Aluminium Company of America. See also Scherer & Ross (1990) for a brief account. 
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able. Capacity on the firm level, and aggregate output data is available from the World 
Petrochemical Program; investment and production cost estimates based on engineer-
ing design, and process specific parameters, form the core of the Process Engineering 
Program which covers most of the major chemical products. Furthermore, perhaps justi-
fication for relying on consultants' data can be put in the words of Scherer (1995, p. 348) 
when commenting on a paper on industry productivity based on a study by McKinsey 
& Company: 
"..I am led to conclude that the study must be taken quite seriously and 
that the marriage of economists' methodological skills with a consulting firm's 
vast knowledge of industry detail can be a fruitful one." 
The basis of arriving at these cost estimates is discussed further below. 
5.5.1 Capacity & Output Estimation at the Firm Level 
While capacity for individual plants held by petrochemical producers is published and is 
usually widely publicised, production data is available only at the country level. Govern-
ment agencies, and specialised industry consultants collect this data, but it is published 
at the aggregate leve1.40 Capacity and production data for styrene is based on the 
SRI World Petrochemical Program estimates, that are collected on annual basis and are 
widely used by the industry planners. Capacity data is available at the firm and plant 
level; each firm's capacity refers to end year capacities for individual plants held by the 
firm that are updated and aggregated as the effective rated capacity for each product. 
These are then aggregated for each country and region of the world.41  
40In Europe also, associations such as the European Council for the Federations of the Chemical 
Industry (CEFIC) based in Brussels, collect capacity and output data from its chemical and petrochemical 
producer members. Production data on the country level only is published, and it is the stated policy of 
CEFIC to destroy production data on the company level, once the aggregates are produced. 
411t must be emphasized however, that in many instances some plants are placed on standby, and are 
not in effective use by the firm. Plants may also be mothballed when they are put out of service for 
prolonged periods of time; before they are replaced or shut down completely. This information filters 
through via trade journal articles, and industry forums, and is usually known within that particular 
industry. Capacities for such plants is usually not included in the aggregated capacity for the year. 
Dow Chemicals placed its small styrene plant at Midland, Michigan on standby from 1981 until it was 
finally shut down in 1986. Until 2003, Deltech Corporation was still being reported to have a plant of 
270 kt/year capacity at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, which had been dormant since mid 1980's. Only when 
there is an unusually high upturn in demand in a particular year, or if a problem arises with existing 
facilities such as an accident that puts an operating facility out of action, which is not uncommon in 
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The output of the six major styrene producers that will be needed to solve the dynamic 
model, is estimated based on the capacity held by each firm, multiplied by the industry 
average capacity utilisation rate for each year. The same data for output is also used in 
deriving the inverse demand function equations. 
5.5.2 The Cost Function Form and Evaluation 
In the study of the economics of the firm, and in the industrial organisation literature 
in general, the emphasis in studying production processes is on the use of production 
functions that describe the relationship between the output of the production process, 
or the firm, and its factor inputs, such as capital, labour and other inputs, that are 
determined by the type and nature of the production process involved. Data about 
the production process and the cost elements involved, are obtained from the technical 
information specific to the process. In economic theory, Cobb-Douglas and CES type 
production functions are predominantly used; other aspects pertaining to the production 
process such as whether increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale are involved, 
are also specified. For industry studies, the production function parameters are then 
determined by statistical analysis of time series data for the instrumental variables that 
are specified for the production function. 
Alternatively, cost functions may be estimated and used directly. In practice, measur-
ing cost curves is often more convenient than estimating production functions, since the 
accounting data are normally cast in money terms (Walters 1963). The use of engineering 
studies to estimate cost functions is not new. Chenery (1949) and Johnston (1952) were 
among the first to investigate the use of engineering data in industrial process functions. 
Chenery studied transmission of natural gas by pipeline by employing principles of gas 
engineering. He found a relationship for estimating the cost of transporting gas as a 
function of pipe diameter, its thickness, compression ratio and horsepower. Johnston 
(1952) estimated the cost of electricity generation for power plants, as a function of the 
output and size of plants, and generated different types of average and marginal cost 
the petrochemical industry, that mothballed or standby plants are serviced and brought on stream. For 
instance Arco restarted its 100 kt/y styrene plant in Louisiana, and increased its capacity to nearly 500 
kt/y at Channelview, Texas in 1988 to meet high demand (Polysar Mulls styrene Restart, European 
Chemical News, 25 April, 1988, p. 10). 
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curves. Moore (1959) applied similar techniques using chemical engineering principles, 
and found that there are increasing returns to scale for chemical plants. He also estimated 
that for each doubling in capacity, the plant investment costs rise by only 60%; which 
later became to be known as the 0.6 rule, that is widely used in the processing industries. 
Furthermore Smith (1961) provides a detailed study of the interrelationships between 
investment theory, cost and production functions and the engineering approaches. He 
shows how learning can lead to substantial reductions in labour requirement as cumula-
tive output doubles. 
Wei, Russell & Swatzlander (1979) show that in many chemical processes cost func-
tions can be approximated, or estimated in a quadratic form. And Walters (1963, p. 45) 
discusses the use of a cost function which involves a penalty when output deviates from 
the optimal design output at which the short run average cost is minimised. Which is 
analogous to the concept of adjustment cost, and the formulation of the cost function 
used in this thesis. 
More recently, Morrison (1988) applied a generalised Leontief restricted cost function 
in a study of US and Japanese manufacturing industries. She assumed quasi-fixed inputs 
cost function as a basis for estimation. Watkins & Berndt (1992) on the other hand, 
incorporate a quadratic cost function with adjustment costs in their investment model. 
Both are applied in a dynamic context. Morrison studies investment and infers capital-
labour ratio variations between the US and Japanese economies. While Watkins & Berndt 
(1992) are concerned about capital investment in manufacturing and the implication for 
energy demand in the US. Also Karp & Perloff (1989, 1993b) use quadratic cost functions 
to study international trade in the rice and coffee markets in the context of game theoretic 
models for an oligopoly of exporters. They use the model to study the oligopolistic power 
of major exporters. 
In developing the model for this chapter, I make use of cost functions, which are more 
adept for the study of an operational industry. This allows for the direct estimation of 
factor inputs involved in the production process. Hall (1990) follows a similar methodol-
ogy in estimating production costs for the titanium dioxide industry. These factor inputs 
may vary somewhat, from firm to firm even if the same process is used, depending for 
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instance on operating conditions at the plant, the experience and technical know how 
of the operators, and the purity and quality of raw materials. They may also vary for 
the same firm over time as a result of how the process is run, or due to improvements 
or learning effects as more experience is gained by operating labour. For raw materials 
consumption average figures are used in this study, that are derived from engineering es-
timates of reaction kinetics of the production process in use, and corrected in accordance 
with available industry data and practice. The figures are based on the estimates of the 
Process Economics Program, (PEP), of SRI. For the purpose of economic evaluation it is 
assumed that firms utilising the same process have the same consumption figures of raw 
materials and face similar costs for factor inputs such as wages, number of operators and 
overhead costs. 
For chemical plants it is reasonable to consider fixed proportions technology where 
consumption figures for materials, utilities, the number of operating labour required, 
and other production input requirements are known and may be based on engineering 
contractors data. The variations between companies do not warrant a significant impact 
on the economic cost estimate averages that are used in this evaluation. 
In general, capacity estimates for chemical plants are rated on size of the reactor, and 
main processing equipment. The plant is operated at an optimal profile that yields the 
highest output, with the most efficient use of inputs, raw materials and least waste. It is 
possible, however, to increase the output beyond this optimal capacity, but this would be 
at a cost in the efficiency of the conversion of the raw materials, or higher consumption 
of other inputs such as utilities for instance. Similarly when the plant is operated over 
long periods, at utilisation rates well below the rated design capacity, unit production 
cost of output would be higher than when the plant is operated optimally (Wei, Russell 
& Swatzlander 1979). An allowance in the cost function is made to account for these 
variations which is similar in form to adjustment costs. 
The cost function which has already been alluded to in Section 4.2.1, Chapter 4, is 
restated below: 
ci(xi, ki ) = fixi + miki + 	(xi — ki)2 	 (5.6) 
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The first term, fixi, in the production cost function comprises the variable cost element; 
this accounts for costs such as raw materials, utilities and other inputs whose consump-
tion, or requirements, vary in direct proportion to production. Where f i is the aggregate 
cost of those inputs measured in constant 1990 US dollars per tonne of styrene produced; 
and xi is firm i's annual output of styrene in thousands of tonnes. Similarly, mild , is the 
associated fixed cost element, which covers costs that are incurred by the firm irrespective 
of variations in the level of production, these are usually measured in proportion to the 
scale of operations of the firm. Where, ki is the capacity of firm i in year t, measured in 
thousands of tonnes, and mi is the average fixed cost per tonne of styrene product, also 
measured in constant 1990 dollars. The estimated unit fixed, and variable costs for each 
firm, reflect the scale of operations and technology employed by the firm. 
A breakdown of the investment costs, labour, raw materials requirements and other 
factor inputs, and the derived production costs per tonne of styrene are shown in Ta-
bles B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B. They refer to typical (hypothetical) plants that could 
have been built in the US in 1993. Table B.3 shows the production economics for a 
typical technologically advanced plant, employing latest developments in process tech-
nology, and benefiting from the largest economies of scale achievable in industry. While 
Table B.4 refers to the economics of older and smaller scale plants that are less efficient. 
This simple form specification for the cost function allows for the inclusion in the 
analysis, firms that employ different processes and technologies. Since fi x, is equivalent 
to the product of two vectors; that of the unit costs of each variable input, and the 
requirements for each input per tonne of styrene produced. And similarly the fixed cost, 
mi ki can be represented by its constituent elements. 
The last term in the above equation, is the adjustment cost, or penalty that the firm 
incurs. This term is zero when the firm is operating optimally, with its output equivalent 
to its design capacity; it increases dramatically when its output deviates substantially 
from its optimal capacity. 
The short-run cost functions in the form indicated above, are U-shaped, a property 
consistent with economic theory assumptions. Figure 5.8 depicts a typical quadratic 
cost function with specified parameters. It shows the behaviour of the cost function 
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with different combinations of its variables. As can be seen production costs follow a 
U-shaped trajectory in capacity, and output along every vertical plane that cuts through 
the 3D diagram. The arrow in the figure indicates the optimal combinations of output 
and capacity that yield minimum cost. 
Figure 5.8: Variable cost function, with the following parameter values: f = 8, m = 
2, g = 2. 
5.5.3 Learning and the Experience Curve 
The concept of experience curve, where unit production costs decline by a certain pro-
portion with every doubling of output, resulting from the accumulation of experience, 
was first formalised by Hirsch (1952), and then vigorously seized upon and marketed as a 
management tool by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), in the 1960's and 70's. BCG 
promoted this concept on the basis of industrial evidence to support the relationship be-
tween declining production costs and cumulative output. In addition, in many products 
it is found that prices decline with time and increasing cumulative output. By this time 
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the electronics and chemical industries, were subjected to intensive scrutiny for learning 
effects (Baden-Fuller 1983). 
This phenomenon was observed earlier on, around the 1930's, in the aircraft manufac-
turing industries, where it was found that cumulative learning had a profound impact on 
workers efficiency in the production of aircraft frames. Several aircraft producing compa-
nies were already using the learning curve as a production planning instrument, to plan 
production schedules for new contracts on different models, and to negotiate their cost 
with the military (Andress 1954). Applications to other industries such as automobiles 
and computers followed suit (Abernathy & Wayne 1974). 
In the machine tools industry Hirsch (1952) estimated that each doubling of cumula-
tive output, was associated with a saving in direct labour of 18.5%, as a result of learning 
and progress in technical knowledge. The chemical industry, where economies of scale 
are present, due to the involvement of large scale operations in production processes of 
most bulk products, and where innovation, R&D, and technical progress are important 
features, is a prime candidate for the implementation of learning curve concepts to cost 
saving improvements at different stages of product development and production; whether 
these involve operational aspects in the form of more efficient use of raw materials, en-
ergy consumption, process design, or efficient use of labour and other essential resources. 
The study by Hirschmann (1964) is one of the earliest applications of learning curves 
in oil processing and chemical production industries. The main concern of these studies 
was the projection of production costs of products, and their prices. For managers this 
became a means for evaluating new investments, and a tool in the arsenal of planners 
contemplating entry into new markets. 
In a study of 82 chemical products, Stobaugh & Townsend (1975) found evidence 
of learning effects on the long run trend of declining prices of chemical products. In 
addition to cumulative production, the scale of production operations, and the rise in 
the number of producers, were found to be the main contributing factors in affecting the 
decline in prices of chemical products. On average prices were found to decline by about 
8% annually over the period of study which covered five years. 
Ghemawat (1985) identifies three sources of cost reductions related to the experience 
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curve: exogenous factors, resulting from improvements in general and technical knowl-
edge, the exploitation of economies of scale (this could be exogenous or endogenous), 
and basic improvements learned from the firms cumulated output (where the firm makes 
improvements in the way the production process operates; improves product design, and 
increased labour and factory efficiencies). Experience gained in-house through improve-
ments resulting from the firms accumulated production, allows the firm to take advantage 
of the cost reductions in a strategic fashion. Du Pont's demonstrated this in its titanium 
dioxide chloride process it developed in the 1970's. This was a difficult process, and none 
of its competitors could come up with a similar efficient process. Du Pont took advan-
tage of this situation by keeping on expanding capacity ahead of demand. By doing so, 
it benefited from the cost advantages it acquired, while its competitors had to climb a 
steep learning curve, and Du Pont effectively kept on expanding its market share at their 
expense (Ghemawat 1985). 
Building investment strategy on the basis of anticipated cost reductions, however, 
could be disastrous. Several factors may contribute to this: mis-specifying the slope of 
the experience curve, overestimating demand growth prospects for the product, or un-
derestimating the competitive position and investment behaviour of rivals . Ghemawat 
points out several examples where this happened in industry, including Monsanto's trou-
bled acrylonitrile venture. The production process for this chemical product was charac-
terised as having an 87% experience curve; to take advantage of this, Monsanto pursued 
a policy of rapid expansions in capacity, but the expected large cost reductions did not 
materialise, leaving the company with large losses. 
But there were spectacular successes as well, especially in the electronics, and fibre 
optics industries. Experience curve based strategies, are most effective when a product 
is still in its rapid growth phase, and where product demand is price sensitive. In such 
a situation doubling of output takes place every few years, allowing the firm to reduce 
prices and propel further demand growth and output expansion. 
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5.5.3.1 Learning with Cumulative Output 
The effect of learning gained through increasing cumulative production on cost reductions 
is captured by an exponential relationship, depicted in the equation below: 
c = rx-6 	 (5.7) 
where C is the cost, and X is the cumulative output of the firm or the industry. These 
equations are usually evaluated from industry data. When plotted on a logarithmic 
graph equation (5.7) produces a downward sloping straight line with y-intercept r, and 
a slope of e. Most of the cost saving resulting from learning with cumulative production 
affects the direct fixed costs of production operations (which relate to cost item mi in 
the production cost function of equation (5.6)). These costs pertain to items such as 
operating labour, maintenance labour and materials requirements, overhead costs and 
sales operations, as shown in Table 5.6. On the basis of styrene process data, covering 
the period since 1967 and measured in constant US dollars, the estimated values for 
F = 1.12, and e = 0.35, are obtained as shown in Figure 5.9. This indicates that the 
US styrene industry has an experience curve of S=e— Vn(2) = 78%. Every doubling of 
cumulative output of styrene, results in a 22% reduction in fixed costs. In the decade 
from 1967 to 1977 when world styrene output increased by five fold, fixed costs were 
nearly halved in real terms from US$ 109 to about US$ 48 per tonne of styrene product 
respectively; by 1993 a considerable saving in costs was achieved, when it had dropped 
to just over US$ 37. But as the industry becomes more mature and growth slows down, 
it takes longer and longer for output to double, and the extent of cost saving achievable 
diminishes, as production and process improvement possibilities are exhausted. On the 
basis of the experience curve for styrene fixed costs, a time series data set is generated 
for two types of plants. Producers with small plants employing old, average technology; 
and the second is typical of styrene producers with large scale plants utilising latest 
frontier technology. These costs were checked against data obtained through industry 
wide surveys conducted for companies involved in styrene production42. Many styrene 
42This was a detailed large study, conducted by SRI for several chemical products including styrene. Its 
aim was to construct industry supply curves, and estimate costs of production, and profitabilty profiles 
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Table 5.6: Styrene production costs and learning effects.M 
(1990 US $/tonne styrene) 
1967 1973 1977 1993 
Plant Capacity (kt/y) 90 270 450 900 
Oper. Labour 31.05 10.93 6.99 2.72 
Material Supplies 10.86 4.72 4.02 3.05 
Overheads 38.71 13.04 10.32 6.36 
Sales & Marketing 28.97 26.54 26.46 25.14 
Total Fixed Costs 109.60 55.23 47.80 37.26 
Utilities 12.68 6.77 6.54 17.43 
Raw materials 486.16 495.25 501.33 473.16 
Investment Costs(b) 75.83 32.12 23.86 21.00 
Production Cost 684.26 589.37 579.52 548.85 
(a )The data refer to processes for the production of styrene 
starting from ethyl benzene, using similar technology of pro-
duction but allowing for process improvements. 
(b) Investment costs are apportioned according to the plant ca-
pacity, and are equivalent to depreciation charge. They reflect 
both increases in efficiency due to increasing economies of scale 
and learning in process technology. 
Log Production 
Figure 5.9: Fixed costs and learning effects for styrene production: 1967-1993. 
producers operate more than one plant and these have different vintages. The fixed 
costs are illustrated for the two types of processes in columns (6) and (9) of Table 5.7. 
The production cost data are representative of plants in the top and lower ends of the 
for petrochemical producers. 
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distribution of plants in operation in industry. The fixed costs used in the model are based 
on plants operating at full capacity, rather than the average industry capacity utilisation 
rate. Deviations from full capacity are accounted for by the adjustment cost element, 
the last term of equation (5.6) p. 223, as discussed in Section 5.5.5 below. Like with 
many chemicals, process improvements and technological advances were made during 
this period which affected the performance of styrene plants. Raw materials and utilities 
consumption were reduced as a result of improvements in process and engineering design; 
and the introduction of new, more efficient catalysts. This has a positive influence on 
the variable cost element represented by fj in equation (5.6). However due to fluctuating 
prices of raw materials and energy, the variable costs in columns (5) and (8) of Table 5.7 
show more variability than fixed costs. 
5.5.3.2 The Impact of Economies of Scale 
The significant increases in operating labour productivity, and declining fixed costs was 
not only a result of learning and experience gained through years of operating styrene 
plants; but also due to economies of scale and rising styrene plant capacities. Improve-
ments in design and technical advances together with continuous developments in process 
engineering and know how, allowed the exploitation of economies of scale, by pushing 
the frontier of styrene plant capacities further and further. Over the period from 1967 to 
1993 styrene plant capacities have increased by ten fold, from 90 thousand tonnes/year 
to 900 thousand tonnes/year respectively. Larger plants require only marginal increases 
in the number of operators, maintenance labour and overhead support, to perform the 
same tasks as when operating smaller plants. This translates into considerable savings 
when projected into average cost per tonne styrene produced in the larger plant as shown 
in Table 5.6 (see also Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B). 
Economies of scale for capital investment obey similar laws of declining costs as the 
experience curve, exemplified by an equation analogous to equation (5.7): 
Ci (kiy 
C, 
j 	where, 0 < c < 1. 	 (5.8) 
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Table 5.7: Styrene production costs based on experience curve estimates for straggler 
and pacesetter producers.(') 
Straggler 	 Pacesetter 
Year 
Conv. 
Factor 
to 1990$ 
US 
CU 
(%) 
Styrene Price 
Variable 
Cost 
1990$/t 
Fixed Cost 
100% CU 
1990$/t 
Fixed Cost 
Avg. ICU 
1990$/t 
Variable 
Cost 
1990$/t 
Fixed Cost 
100% CU 
1990$/t 
Fixed Cost 
Avg. ICU 
1990$/t US$/t 1990$/t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (6) ( 7) (8 ) (9) (10) 
1974 2.445 82 379 927 675 188 229 631 87 106 
1975 2.227 82 419 933 673 180 220 626 83 101 
1976 2.093 78 434 909 645 171 219 598 78 100 
1977 1.962 78 410 805 599 163 209 555 74 95 
1978 1.829 87 384 702 560 156 179 513 70 80 
1979 1.680 90 639 1074 732 149 166 689 67 74 
1980 1.541 78 661 1019 914 144 185 859 64 82 
1981 1.405 76 728 1022 896 139 183 844 62 82 
1982 1.321 72 622 821 747 134 186 702 59 82 
1983 1.271 83 602 765 707 130 157 666 57 69 
1984 1.226 93 606 743 616 126 135 581 55 59 
1985 1.191 94 534 635 541 123 131 514 54 57 
1986 1.160 100 408 473 389 119 119 368 52 52 
1987 1.125 98 860 967 489 116 118 465 50 51 
1988 1.089 104 944 1027 504 112 108 478 48 46 
1989 1.044 99 719 750 562 109 110 534 47 47 
1990 1.000 85 761 761 542 106 125 519 45 53 
1991 0.963 80 580 559 440 104 130 420 44 55 
1992 0.937 81 540 506 384 101 125 368 43 53 
1993 0.917 88 498 457 353 99 113 338 42 48 
1994 0.898 96 616 553 376 96 100 360 41 43 
1995 0.876 96 894 783 368 94 98 351 39 41 
1996 0.856 99 637 545 346 92 93 331 38 38 
1997 0.838 91 565 473 358 89 98 342 37 41 
1998 0.822 90 466 383 278 87 97 265 36 40 
(1) Production costs are based on processes starting from ethylene and benzene raw materi-
als. Straggler producer refers to less efficient small scale producer; and pacesetter refers to 
producers operating larger and more modern plants. 
(2) CU refers to capacity utilisation, and ICU refers to industry capacity utilisation. 
For styrene plants, the scale exponent, <", is in the range of 0.69 - 0.81. This indicates 
that building a plant with double the capacity, ki, results in an increase of only 61-75% 
in investment cost. In processing industries, equipment capable of handling volumetric 
flows are involved, such as vessels, tanks, pumps and piping. Producing this type of 
machinery with double the size, requires a much smaller increase in the use of materials 
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and equipment. Infrastructure requirements, and design and construction are essentially 
the same, which explains the significant savings in capital investment costs for the larger 
plants. Silberston (1972) provides an account of the range of economies of scale factors 
from different industries and the significance of minimum efficient scale plants. However, 
the benefits from economies of scale are not limitless. In the same way that experience 
curves flatten out with the attainment of very large production outputs, the realisation 
of economies of scale are also subject, beyond a certain size, to diminishing returns (see 
Christensen & Greene (1976) for an analysis along these lines applied to the US electric 
power generation industry.). Advances in process design and engineering of equipment, 
is subject to physical and technical constraints. Very large size reactors, vessels and 
equipment are limited by their structural stability. In the design of larger plants, an 
array of technical factors has to be taken into consideration, such as reaction kinetics, 
process control, and thermodynamic stability of the chemical processes which determine 
the maximum attainable size of reactors and main equipment in the plant. 
Economic factors come into play and may form a limiting upper barrier on the eco-
nomically efficient scale of plants. For instance beyond a certain point due to operating 
conditions, larger size equipment may require special design to reinforce structural sta-
bility, with increasing costs creeping in. Larger plants carry higher risks to the firm, in 
case of accidental, or natural hazards leading to disruption of production and loss of most 
of its production capability. Larger plants, and more concentrated industrial operations 
on a single site, are more complicated to manage and run. Labour productivity may also 
be lower in much larger institutions (Scherer & Ross 1990). The combination of these 
factors plays a leading role in determining the size of efficient scale of production. More 
often this is referred to as the minimum efficient scale (MES) plant. This is defined as 
the smallest scale plant at which minimum unit costs are attained. With technological 
advances in process engineering, chemical technology and process control, the size of MES 
plants continued to rise since the 1950's, but made larger leaps in the 1970's and beyond. 
In steel, cement, fertilisers and most process industries the size of plants increased several 
fold. In ethylene the main building block for the chemical industry, the size of plants 
rose from 200 thousand tonnes/year in the late 1960's, to 400-600 thousand tonnes/year 
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in the early 1980's, and 800 thousand tonnes/year by the 1990's. And presently it is pos-
sible for modern plants to be built with capacities approaching one million tonnes/year. 
Styrene also followed a similar trend. Plant capacities increased from about 100 thousand 
tonnes/year in the late 1960's, to about 300-450 thousand tonnes/year in the 1970's; and 
rising again in the 1990's to 900 thousand tonnes/year. Investment costs per tonne of 
styrene produced, declined from about US$ 76 in the 1960's to US$ 21 in the 1990's as 
depicted in Table 5.6. 
However, the dominant cost element was raw materials costs. These costs were on 
average about 85% of the total cost of styrene production over the same period. Whereas 
investment costs represent on average between less than 4% to about 5.5% of styrene 
overall cost. Despite the fluctuations in the real cost of raw materials and utilities prices, 
which are in part related to the energy and basic petrochemicals prices;43 the overall cost 
of styrene production continued to decline in real terms." 
Firms realise the benefits of economies of scale that lead to falling unit costs with rising 
production, and larger plant sizes. When deciding on the size of their new investments, 
they take into consideration a range of techno-economic factors, that dictate the choice of 
plant capacity, which vary with product and process, and are dependent on the economic 
environment and the market characteristics in which they operate. The range of plant 
capacities brought on stream by the main styrene producers, over the years is indicative 
of this process and shows how plant capacities edged higher. 
5.5.4 Investment Cost Estimation 
In their large majority, petrochemical plants are designed, engineered and constructed 
by specialised engineering contracting firms that operate independently in the chemical 
industry. Some producers get involved in the basic design of the process and production 
43This is only partially the case since the supply/demand situation also affects the cost of ethylene and 
benzene, the two main raw materials for the production of styrene. On several occasions the prices of 
ethylene and benzene on the one hand, and energy prices would move in opposite directions as was the 
case in 1986-1988, and again in 1995, when chemical markets were tight. 
44This cost saving was not always passed on in the form of lower prices for styrene product, due to the 
oligopolistic nature of the industry and the integrated market structure where many styrene producers 
are vertically integrated into the production of ethylene and benzene raw materials; and also downstream 
into the production of styrene derivatives such as polystyrene and other products. Several of the larger 
styrene players are also involved in the fabrication and conversion business, and the consumer end of the 
market. 
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of proprietary catalyst, especially when a significant element of in-house process devel-
opment has taken place. Several processes are available for licensing for the production 
of styrene; and equally a number of engineering contracting companies are active in the 
business of their construction on a global scale. Petrochemical plants are capital intensive 
and costly. Typically a greenfield plant costs several hundred millions of dollars, requires 
a few years in planning, and its construction takes 2-3 years to complete. Producers an-
nounce their new investments in advance, and publicise their planned capacities making 
clear their intentions to their rivals in a form of a signalling game. The capacities, and in 
most cases the costs, of plants under construction are published in trade journals such as 
Chemical Week, Hydrocarbon Processing, and European Chemical News. These charac-
teristics suggest that a reasonably competitive environment exists for this segment of the 
industry. All firms face equal capital investment costs, ceteris paribus, when deciding on 
plans for new petrochemical projects such as styrene. 
Petrochemical plant costs are tracked by a number of institutions that publish con-
struction cost indices for the industry. These cost indices are based on detailed and dis-
aggregated engineering estimates of the main equipment of petrochemical plants. They 
also account for escalating cost influences to which petrochemical plants are subject to, 
such as: inflationary pressure, market conditions for machinery suppliers and equipment 
vendors, and the extent of construction activity by main contractors. In this study, yearly 
unit investment costs for styrene plants are estimated on the basis of the PEP, (Process 
Economics Programme), Chemical Industry investment cost index published by SRI and 
is shown in column (2) of Table B.5, for the period under consideration. The index uses 
1958 as the base year with a value of 100; by 1996 it stood at a value of 591. Starting from 
basic design, and process engineering of the major processes for styrene production, in-
vestment cost estimates are made using patents, published licensors documentation, and 
engineering contractors data. This detailed calculation is carried out for pivotal points 
in time (as shown in Table 5.6 for instance), where typical plant capacities, reflecting 
MES plant capacity for the period under consideration, are assumed. Investment costs 
for larger, and smaller plant capacities can then be made, scaling up or down by apply-
ing the appropriate scale factor exponent, as in equation (5.8) discussed in the previous 
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section. For the intervening years, the PEP construction cost index is used to estimate 
and update the investment costs to the current year. Unit capital investment costs, c, 
for firm i which appear in the quadratic investment cost function that we discussed in 
Chapter 4, are generated by dividing total capital investment cost, Ci by plant annual 
capacity, k and are measured in US$ per tonne styrene per year. The economic life of 
the plant is considered to be 10 years for economic evaluation purposes. The investment 
cost equation is restated below: 
Ii = ci rr i + di (ui — (5ki )2 	 (5.9) 
Economies of scale are exogenously determined by the engineering companies serving 
the petrochemical industry. Two types of producers are considered in the model. They 
reflect the status of plant capacities that existed in the industry as it developed over the 
years. The largest four styrene producers operate modern frontier technology plants, that 
benefit from economies of scale with smaller unit investment costs. They are designated 
as pacesetters. While the remaining two producers operate smaller plants utilising older 
type technology referred to as straggler producers. The unit capital investment costs 
are converted into constant 1990 US dollars, by applying a GDP based deflator index. 
Table B.5 lists these values. 
5.5.5 Adjustment Costs Revisited 
The arguments justifying the inclusion of adjustment costs in cost functions, when quasi-
fixed capacity is subjected to change as a result of capital investment, are not just steeped 
in theoretical formulations, but have recently been the subject of empirical evaluation 
and measurement in different economies and industrial sectors (for a survey of the recent 
literature on empirically determined adjustment costs see Chakrabarti (1999, 2004). 
Further to the coverage of this topic in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, there is a growing 
body of evidence suggesting that capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs45 . 
Watkins (1993) estimates adjustment costs based on an empirical study of four sectors of 
45Rothschild (1971) stands out in arguing for concave adjustment costs, but provides no empirical 
evidence to this effect. 
CHAPTER 5. THE US STYRENE INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 236 
Canadian industry, covering: manufacturing, iron and steel, textiles, and transportation 
equipment. The study finds variations in adjustment costs among different sectors of 
industry; but on average, total manufacturing as a sector shows that adjustment costs 
constituted 23-33% of total costs. Also Carmichael & Ng (1992) find disparities in ad-
justment costs between regions for Canadian manufacturing industries. Firms incur a 
positive adjustment cost in the process of attaining long-run equilibrium. In a study of 
the Greek manufacturing industry over the period 1958-80, Zanias (1991) finds that as 
much as 8.5% of output is foregone by firms due to adjustment costs as new investments 
are undertaken. Adjustment costs levels, evidently, vary in different sectors of the econ-
omy. Also a study of 521 US firms (Chakrabarti 1999), shows significant differences in 
adjustment costs associated with the introduction of new plants and equipment, between 
capital-intensive and labour-intensive industries. The estimated cost of adjustment is 
significantly higher in the former than the latter. 
Summers (1981) studies trends in the business cycle and capital formation using em-
pirical data from the US stock market. He introduces adjustment costs into an investment 
cost function which he employs in the analysis of taxation policy, and the rate of cumu-
lative corporate investment. His model examines the impact of changes in tax regimes 
and inflation, on savings and the rate of accumulation of capital. But his approach of 
introducing estimated adjustment costs has its critics as well; especially the notion of 
the ad hoc nature of these costs, and the proportionally high level of adjustment costs 
relative to total costs46. 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1992) argue that different firms have different abilities in pro-
cessing and evaluating information, giving them a leadership role, as they are in a better 
position to exploit opportunities for investment, or in running their operations, than 
other firms. Considering this point from a different angle, it can be reasoned that firms 
in the same industry, do not necessarily face adjustment processes with the same adjust-
ment costs; rather it would be reasonable to argue that more efficient firms have lower 
adjustment costs, imparted on them by their advanced information handling and man- 
46 B arry Bosworth (Summers 1981, p. 131) criticises the ad hoc inclusion by Summers of an adjustment 
cost that rises with the rate of investment which is similar in principle to the models of Gould (1968), 
Lucas, Jr. (1967), and Treadway (1970). James Tobin (Summers 1981, p. 134) argues against the high 
proportion accounted for by the adjustment costs as these raise the total cost by a factor of 2-3 times. 
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agerial skills. For how else can one explain the changing fortunes of firms, their profit 
cycles, and of their lost opportunities, investment failures, and successful achievements, 
that are reported frequently in financial media? These are firms that operate in the same 
markets and have the same line of business, but differ in their performance. 
In view of this, it would not be unreasonable to use in the investment model a range 
of adjustment cost parameters for different firms, instead of just applying a uniform value 
for all. This modification will introduce an element of differentiation into the adjustment 
process, and costs of firms, which does not impart a strong advantage in favour of the 
beneficiary firm, that the Stackelberg leadership role would. 
The adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium takes place through successive short-
run moves, and the adjustment cost covers the cost of the deviation between short-run 
and long-run equilibrium (Bernstein 1992, and Chakrabarti 1999, 2004). Quantity games 
are identified by Friedman (1986) as games of competition in capacity. In this study of 
capital accumulation, I am considering two types of adjustment as taking place. In 
the short-run the firms compete on production, and in the long-run they compete on 
capacity. In our model, the adjustment costs that the firms incur, for production and 
investment, are limited so that the cost of adjustment in any one year does not exceed 
40% of the total cost for that year. So in the case of capital investment, as can be seen 
from equation (5.9), the value of adjustment cost term 	— Ski )2 does not exceed 
40% of the value of Ii . It should be noted that this is the maximum value in the fixed 
cost differential between operating at full capacity, and at the average industry capacity 
utilisation for styrene producers (compare columns 6 and 7, and 9 and 10 of Table 5.7). 
In fact, the results of the model reveal that for most years, the values for the adjustment 
cost share are much lower. This is achieved by taking the adjustment cost coefficients, gi, 
for the production cost function, of equation (5.6), and di the adjustment cost coefficient 
for investment of equation (5.9), as free parameters. The adjustment cost coefficients are 
used to calibrate the model. It was shown in Section 4.5.1 and Section 4.5.2 of Chapter 4, 
that the model results are robust for a wide range of values of gi and di, and that these 
do not affect the equilibrium outcome or market shares47. The market shares are more 
47The results for market shares have been verified, as can be figured out from the output and capacity 
values, but are not shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
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dependent on the decision rules governing the type of interaction between the firms. 
5.6 Investment Behaviour in the US Styrene Industry 
5.6.1 Setting the Case for Optimal Planning in the Styrene Industry 
So far in this chapter I have developed and estimated the derived demand function for 
styrene, and the investment and production costs for typical styrene producers operating 
in the US market. 
Demand is exogenously driven by economic growth, the demand for styrene deriva-
tives, and exports. And all firms have full knowledge of how demand is evolving over 
time. So the price elasticity of demand for styrene, which is assumed to be constant, is 
known together with the parameters of the inverse demand function (that is r = 0.70, and 
the estimated parameters a and b of the inverse demand equation (5.1) p. 214, presented 
in Table B.2). Each firm is trying to maximise its net present value of profits over the 
time horizon from 1974 to 1996 covering a total of 23 years. The US is a net exporter of 
styrene to the rest of the world; and the largest six producers have on average accounted 
for 86% of the total US output. These firms operate in an oligopolistic market and must 
realise their interdependence. In a Nash-Cournot setting their joint output determines 
the price of styrene product. The firms do not need to observe the output of their ri-
vals, each can observe the market price, and what is required is just knowledge of the 
mechanism dictating the price formation. That is knowledge of the demand function and 
its parameters. Because it was assumed that the price at which the firms sell is market 
clearing in every period, there are no inventories carried over from year to year. 
How much should each firm produce to maximise its profits? This problem gets 
resolved by each firm solving an optimal control problem of finding the output that 
maximises the net present value of its profits over the period under consideration. But 
since the price is dependent on the total output of all producers, how much the firm 
produces also depends on the type of interaction with other firms, and how they behave. 
This behaviour is dictated by the rules defining the interplay between the firms and 
the conjectures they hold about each other. Which brings us back to the notion of 
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the information structure of the game, and the strategies that the firms follow (Ba§ar 
& Olsder 1999, Fudenberg & Tirole 1983) that was discussed in Chapter 3. The firms 
act strategically in an attempt to influence the actions of their rivals when they utilise 
feedback strategies of output and investment; and non-strategically when they choose 
open-loop strategies. When one of the firms acts as a leader in the market, a Stackelberg 
model arises as in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4. The leader firm gets to act first, and decides 
on how much to produce, while the followers face the residual demand. If the market 
were price competitive, each firm would act as a price taker, and the problem facing 
the firm is as described in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4. These four scenarios describe 
the possible market environment in which the styrene producers interact in a quantity 
game. There may be other more complex relationships at work, such as that some 
firms switching between different strategies over time; like selecting between equilibria of 
competing on prices, and then on capacity additions (Kirman & Masson 1986, Davidson 
& Deneckere 1990, Benoit & Krishna 1987). Our attention however, is restricted to pure 
strategies in accordance with the rich theoretical and empirical literature of dynamic 
Nash-Cournot games (Ba§ar & Olsder 1999, Fudenberg & Tirole 1992, Dockner 1988). 
In the following section I solve for an optimal solution of the capacity expansion 
problem of these four models, utilising the production costs of the US styrene industry 
to see which model describes best the industry developments. By examining the results 
of these models, I could infer from the performance of that model which best describes 
the industry developments, the competitive environment and investment behaviour of 
the main participants in the styrene industry over the period of study. The performance 
of the models is examined in terms of how well they predict the following criteria: the 
development of capacity and firms' market shares, in meeting the production schedule, 
as well as the evolution of price and overcapacity over the 1974-1996 period. 
In a dynamic environment, the firm faces changing costs and variable demand. Its 
capacity is subject to change as a result of depreciation, and additional new investment. 
The costs faced by the firms are changing because of the intertemporal nature of the 
industry, which is captured by the model, and the experience gained by the firms through 
involvement in production. The firms undergo a learning process which affects two cost 
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aspects: 
1. Plant construction and engineering design, embodying latest technological improve-
ments, and economies of scale that affect mostly investment costs (Section 5.5.3.2). 
2. And experience gained in operating and running of the plants which affects both 
fixed costs, and materials consumption which in turn impacts on variable costs in 
a small way (Section 5.5.3.1). 
The styrene industry cost savings of 22% in fixed costs, are not far from those reported 
by Hirsch (1952) for machine tools, and Hirschmann (1964) for oil and chemical processing 
industries. Both types of cost savings are allowed for in the model of this thesis. Fixed 
costs savings based on the experience curve for styrene, and gains in investment costs 
associated with economies of scale. Dynamic capacity expansion models that allow for 
learning include Paraskevopoulos (1988) for the West European PVC industry. Also 
Steele (1995) allows for economies of scale for the North American newsprint industry. 
Pineau & Murto (2000) evaluate investment costs for different types of power generation 
plants. Reynolds (1986) on the other hand, relies on long-run average cost curve function 
to evaluate production costs faced by individual firms, where all firms face the same costs 
that are time dependent. 
Further to selecting their outputs, the firms have to decide on how much to invest to 
maintain an efficient, reliable capacity level, and to be able to meet the requirements of 
rising demand. Each firm, therefore, chooses two decision variables in each period, the 
output and the investment rate, which is represented by a control vector u'it =- (ui,t, xi,t). 
Because of the presence of depreciation, the rate of change of capital from one period 
to the next is a function of the gross investment less the depreciation of capital, which 
is assumed to be at a rate of 5= 10% per year. This is represented in matrix form as a 
state equation, shown below. The equation forms a constraint on the dynamic capital 
expansion problem for each firm: 
Yt = AYt_i + But 
The firms maximise the flow of their profits over the life time of the project, which is 
CHAPTER 5. THE US STYRENE INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 241 
described by an objective function, Ji , where: 
T 
Ji = max 	ot-iwi‘yt\ Vi E N 
	
(5.10) 
=1 
in this context, by taking the entire planning horizon into consideration, and allowing 
the state to be subject to the state equation, the firms strive to find an optimal solution 
for their investment, and output rates, that maximises their profits in the long-run. 
For the cases of open-loop and price taking strategies, the firms select the entire 
sequence of their optimal controls of output and investment strategies for the entire game. 
That is the maximisation in .h, for each firm i, is subject to uo...ui ,T, as was shown in 
Section 4.3.1 and Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4. When firms, on the other hand, employ 
feedback Nash-Cournot (as in Section 4.2.1) and Stackelberg strategies, the objective 
function for each firm i is expressed as a value function Vi,t(yt_ i ), and is given by an 
equation equivalent to equation (4.4), p. 143: 
Vi,t(Yt—i) = max (wi(Yt) + 	(Yt)) Vi E N, Vt E [1,T] 
	
(5.11) 
It was assumed that the value function is quadratic in the state variable, yt_ i (given 
by equation (4.5)). The value function in the above equation describes in each period, 
t, the sum of the short-run profits, and long-run profits from the next period until the 
final period of the planning horizon. It was shown in Chapter 4, how the optimal path 
of the control variables describing the evolution of outputs and investments, for each of 
the four models is formulated and obtained. In all the cases the control variable, ut, for 
the game was found to be linear in the state variable, yt_ i. While the optimal controls 
are similar in form, its determination in each case is dependent on the type of interaction 
that takes place between the firms in the market place, and the price formation. For the 
case when open-loop and price taking strategies are employed, the optimal strategy of 
output, and investment rates for all firms, over all periods of the game, U, is obtained 
as a function of the state variable at the start of the game, yo. It was given by equation 
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(4.46), p. 156, shown again below: 
14 = EtY0 dt 
	 (5.12) 
As discussed in Section 4.3.1, the firms decide on their optimal strategies for the en-
tire planning horizon from the outset. The optimal controls for the feedback Nash-
Cournot and Stackelberg cases, on the other hand, as shown in equations (4.20), p. 146, 
and (4.76), p. 164, have also a similar form. However, the optimal strategy, ut , is now 
a vector of the optimal controls for all the firms in period t; and is a linear function of 
the state variable in the previous period, yt_ i . For the feedback Nash-Cournot game we 
have: 
ut  ==-EtYt-1 -1-c4 	 (5.13) 
and for the Stackelberg game we have: 
ut = DtYt-1 	 (5.14) 
It is also obvious in the above equations, that the formation and dimensions of Et and 
dt for the open-loop and feedback Nash-Cournot strategies are not the same, a point 
that was emphasised in Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.3.1. And similarly Dt and ckt for 
the optimal controls of the Stackelberg strategy. Note also, that with feedback Nash-
Cournot and Stackelberg optimal strategies, the optimal control is not taken over the 
entire planning horizon; but is robust and can respond to changes in the state from 
period to period, as it is a function of the state in previous period, yt_ i , which is not the 
case in the open-loop Nash-Cournot strategies, where it is dependent on the initial state, 
and time. The firms can respond to the actions of their opponents in every period, as 
the game evolves. In a Stackelberg game, the optimal control has two components, Tilt= 
(ut i , ut f ), respectively, the leader's vector of optimal controls, and the followers'. The 
followers take the leaders actions as given, and are accounted for in the formation of their 
optimal strategy. This was depicted in equation (4.75), on page 164 (see Section 4.4.3, 
Chapter 4). 
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Once the optimal strategies are obtained for each game, all that remains to be done is 
to implement the optimal strategy in the state equation. The optimal state, and therefore, 
the optimal capacity required in each period, may be obtained from the initial state, yo, 
at the start of the game, until the final period, T, in the game. With the optimal output, 
investment and capacity known in every period, for all four games, the main criteria 
for assessment of model performance, namely the evolution of styrene price, industry 
capacity and output, overcapacity, and market shares of industry major producers and 
fringe firms, may be evaluated. The pattern of investment behaviour by the main firms 
in the industry, is laid bare for assessment. 
The importance of economies of scale, and increasing size of modern petrochemical 
plants has an important bearing on the presence of overcapacity in the industry. If the 
firms follow a competitive investment policy without any consideration for the actions of 
their rivals, the overall industry capacity would be expected to be quite high especially in 
later years when plant sizes were rising as exemplified by the MES plants. Overcapacity 
on the industry level in such a case should be particularly high, considering the given 
demand levels. Prices also would show discernable levels of decline as a result of firms 
competing on production in an effort to gain market share. Profit margins in the presence 
of such a strategy would be low for prolonged periods as a result. 
Alternatively, when the firms allow for their rivals' investments in their planning, 
and are more accommodating towards them, the emerging overcapacity is expected to 
be on the low side despite the large size of modern plants. The firms do not have 
to cooperate directly; such a pattern my occur non-cooperatively through a signalling 
game. Firms announce their planned investments in advance, and the coordination of 
capital investment gets resolved in the longer term (Christensen & Caves 1997). 
In the petrochemical industry coordination of investment, particularly when large 
scale greenfield plants are involved, has been noted to reduce the incidence of excessive 
overcapacity (Gilbert & Lieberman, 1987; Lieberman 1987b, 1987c). This coordination 
appears to work well in tight oligopolies; when a large number of producers is present 
in the market, and demand growth is sluggish, the system may breakdown and large 
overcapacity becomes a problem. The persistent overcapacity of the West European 
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PVC industry during the 1970's and early 1980's has been attributed to such a failure 
(Paraskevopoulos 1988; Paraskevopoulos & Pitelis 1995). 
5.6.2 Model Implementation 
The US styrene industry has been dominated since the 1970's by 6 firms. Despite entry 
by some firms and the exit of others over the years, these involved mostly a change of 
ownership of existing operations; and the market continued to operate as an oligopoly. 
Since we are trying to capture the investment behaviour of the leading companies, I 
formulate the model for six firms (by setting N = 6). Taking into consideration the 
distribution of the firms by size in the industry, I allow for four large firms to operate as 
pacesetter producers, and the other two as straggler producers, where the latter operate 
smaller plants. The roles of which firms are in the lead position may change over time, 
as we have seen in Table 5.3; and this formulation allows for size distribution of the 
major producers in the industry to be preserved; we assess, in this model, the impact on 
industry performance through the interaction of individual firms. 
The model was implemented, and solved for the four different models by applying 
the corresponding strategies. In all the cases it was assumed, and for all firms, that the 
salvage value of the capital investment, recoverable at the end of the planning horizon 
to be zero. In view of the long planning horizon of 23 years, a fraction of the cost of 
equipment that may be recoverable would not affect the net present value of cash flows, 
especially when a discount rate of 6 = 10%, was applied throughout the models. We have 
to bear in mind also that the cost of equipment accounts for only a small proportion of 
the total production costs. In this situation the revenues from production operations 
dominate. 
For each firm i, the costs and inverse demand parameters of the quadratic net profit 
function, wi,t (yt), were saved in vectors pi t , and matrices Qit, as the firms were as-
sumed to have full knowledge of all costs and the evolution of demand in advance, 
for all periods (refer to equation (4.1), in Section 4.2.1, of Chapter 4). The optimal 
feedback Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg strategies were evaluated by implementing the 
recursion procedure for Si,t, ri,t , and vi,t , that solve the two point boundary problem 
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for each firm48. The procedure for the feedback Nash-Cournot game was discussed in 
Section 4.2.3. And a similar procedure for the Stackelberg game, in Section 4.4.4, where 
also the steps for the algorithm were presented. The values for Si,t, rt,t , and vt ,t , were 
obtained from equations (4.29), (4.28), and (4.27) respectively, for the feedback Nash-
Cournot game (see page 150.). And similarly for the Stackelberg game from the corre-
sponding equations (4.79), (4.80), and (4.81) respectively (see page 166). Starting from 
the final period, T, and using the boundary values Six, rt,T, and vt,T, where zero salvage 
value was assumed, the recursion was solved backward in time, to the starting period, 
where t1 = 1974. Along the way the values of _Et and dt , would have been saved for 
the feedback Nash-Cournot model, and Dt and c/;gt for the Stackelberg model, as these 
would be needed to evaluate the optimal strategies of the two models respectively. This 
was done by implementing these values in the state equation using the vector of initial 
conditions, yo. These initial conditions that refer to the major firms' capacities and out-
puts in 1974, together with the model's other parameters for the base case, are shown in 
Table 5.8. 
The Stackelberg model involved one firm taking on the role of leader, irrespective of 
how firm ranking was changing since the purpose of the exercise is to study the changing 
structure of the market, the investment behaviour of the firms, and type of interaction 
between them. The leader's production and investment costs were the same as the other 
three pacesetters; but the leader had the advantage of deciding first on production and 
investment, before the remaining five followers take their actions. 
Implementing the open-loop and price taking models, is simpler. It involves gener-
ating large matrices using the stored values of pit and Qit, of the profit function, and 
A, and B of the state equation (see equation (4.42) on page 155). Deriving the optimal 
strategy U, for the entire 1974-1996 period was achieved by multiplying and inverting a 
number of large size matrices, which represent Et and dt, as shown in equation (4.45). 
Implementing the optimal strategy, is then straightforward, and may be achieved in one 
step. This also involves the multiplication of very large size matrices. To obtain the op- 
48The algorithm can be made to run more efficiently by imposing a matrix structure; instead of solving 
the equations for Si,t, rt,t, and v,,t, individually for each firm, they may be stacked in matrix form, 
MATLAB runs more efficiently this way. In this format the algorithm can also deal with different 
number of firms with minimum modification. 
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Table 5.8: Model parameters and initial values for base case simulations — 1974.(1) 
Capacity 	Production 
ki 	 Xi 	 Ncfb7 	Ncol7 	Skfb7 
Firm i 	(kt/y) 	(kt/y) 	di 	gi 	di 	gi 	di 	gi 
1 	254 	254 	0.5 20 0.03 20 0.5 2.0 
2 	400 	400 	0.5 20 0.03 20 5.0 0.5 
3 590 590 	0.5 20 0.03 20 5.0 0.5 
4 	270 	270 	0.5 20 0.03 20 	30 2.0 
5 380 380 	0.5 20 0.03 20 5.0 0.5 
6 	181 	181 	0.5 20 0.03 20 	30 2.0 
Interest rate, r 	10 % 
Depreciation rate, 	8 	10 % 
Price elasticity, e 	0.70 
Number of firms, 	n 	6 
Planning horizon, T 	23 years 
Industry capacity, 	(kt/y) 	2580 
Industry production, 	(kt/y) 	2701 
Capacity utilisation, 	CU 	105 % 
timal evolution of investment, production and capacity expansion I solve equation (4.49) 
using the initial values of Table 5.8. Steady state may not be reached as the industry 
equilibrium is being disturbed regularly but the firms are in Nash-Cournot equilibrium 
in every period. 
5.6.3 Model Performance and Simulation Results 
In this section I present the results of the dynamic capacity expansion model, as it 
is applied to the US styrene industry, over a planning horizon from 1974 to 1996. The 
period covers two oil price shocks, and a number of entries, exits and mergers. Few studies 
employing dynamic game theoretic models, have been developed in the literature that 
deal with actual industries empirically. These include Reynolds (1986), Salant (1982), 
Haurie & Zaccour (1986), and Pineau & Murto (2000). Most of the work in this area 
remains of theoretic nature. However, there is increasing interest in the application of 
dynamic models to industry studies. 
Calibration of the model was carried out by adjusting the values of di and gi the 
adjustment cost parameters for investment and output respectively for each firm i, such 
that the cost of adjustment was on average within acceptable limits of 40%; and keeping in 
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mind the need to obtain output, and prices consistent with developments in industry. The 
model is driven endogenously in terms of selecting the optimal outputs and investment 
rates for each period, given the exogenous demand as dictated by the inverse demand 
function. The model is deemed to meet the total industry output, if the cumulative 
output generated by the model over the planning period, is equivalent to the cumulative 
output of actual industry. 
The simulation results for the different models are shown in Table 5.9. Spurious 
results were obtained for the price taking model and the results for this model have been 
eliminated from inclusion in the table. The first set of results refers to the base case with 
a price elasticity of demand, s = 0.70, and includes the Nash-Cournot open-loop model 
(Ncol7), the Nash-Cournot feedback model (Ncfb7), and the Stackelberg model (Skfb7). 
The other two sets refer to the case of s = 0.50 where demand for styrene is less elastic, 
and when it is more elastic with E = 1.20. The cases where firms use feedback Nash-
Cournot strategies, namely Ncfb5, Ncfb7, and Ncfb12, appear to give better results in 
terms of overall output, styrene price, capacity utilisation and market shares. The table 
gives only average values, where run Ncfb7, for the feedback Nash-Cournot strategies, 
gives the best performance. An examination of the full results confirms this, in terms 
of all the measures mentioned above; and the results for the base case Ncfb7 are shown 
Figures 5.10- 5.15. 
The performance of the model in terms of the output, and capacity of the major six 
producers is shown in Figure 5.10. The model performs very well, by generating optimal 
output and investment values for major six producers for all periods except for a short 
period for the years 1979-1981. In periods of low demand the firms can reduce their 
capital investments, drastically by disinvestment, or by slowing down their investment 
rate; and because of depreciation, capacity declines slowly in subsequent periods. This 
can be seen in Figure 5.10, where the model generated capacity for the major six firms, 
tracks the actual capacity of these six firms in industry (model M6, and actual M6 in the 
figure), as it declines and rises during the period from 1974 to 1988; and then increases 
more steadily thereafter. 
Capacity is utilised in full when the six firms employ optimal strategies as shown by 
1980 1975 1985 1995 1990 2000 
- Model-M6 
-e-- Actual-M6 
- Model-output 
- • Actual-output 
5000 
4500 
4000 
3500 
0  
0 
3000 
0 
0 
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
1970 
CHAPTER 5. THE US STYRENE INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 248 
Table 5.9: Model simulation results for US six major styrene producers. 
Model/Actual 
Output 
Ratio 
Industry 
Average 
Price 
Model 
Average 
Price 
Model 
Average 
CU(a)  
Industry 
Excess 
Capacity(b) 
Strategic 
Excess 
Capacity(c)  Cr C4 
(%) (1990 $/t) (1990 $/t) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ncol7 95 771 839 101.6 10.9 14.4 16.5 66.0 
Ncfb7 100 771 768 100.5 10.9 9.1 16.6 66.7 
Skfb7 96 771 806 90.5 10.9 4.9 37.1 69.2 
Ncol5 93 771 900 101.6 10.9 16.1 15.4 61.8 
Ncfb5 99 771 783 99.8 10.9 9.7 15.8 64.7 
Ncoll2 99 771 774 101.6 10.9 10.4 19.0 76.9 
Ncfb .12 100 771 736 100.7 10.9 9.2 14.0 66.9 
(a)Model average capacity utilisation is defined as the percentage ratio of model output against 
model capacity, averaged for all years. 
(b)  Industry excess capacity is defined as the difference between actual industry capacity and in- 
dustry output divided by actual industry capacity, averaged over all years. 
(c) Strategic excess capacity is defined as the percentage ratio of actual industry capacity less model 
capacity divided by actual industry capacity, averaged over all years. 
(d)C1 and C4 are the respective market shares of industry capacity of the largest firm, and largest 
four firms, generated by the model. Also note the case numbering, Ncol7 refers to Nash-Cournot 
Open-loop model, where demand elasticity = 0.7. 
Year 
Figure 5.10: Model vs industry capacity and output for the major-6 styrene producers 
for feedback NC game (Ncfb7). 
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Figure 5.11: Model vs industry output for feedback NC game (Ncfb7). 
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Figure 5.12: Model price vs actual price for feedback NC game (Ncfb7). 
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Figure 5.13: Model vs industry overcapacity for feedback NC game (Ncfb7). 
the model output and capacity in the figure. In terms of total output, which is obtained 
by adding the production of the major six firms and the fringe producers, the model 
production over the entire period under study, meets the actual industry production as 
shown in Figure 5.11. 
On the other hand, Figure 5.12 shows that the model generated prices were in good 
agreement with actual prices. The average prices for the model and industry over the 
whole period are within a very close range (model average price of US$ 768/tonne as com-
pared with an actual average price of US$ 771/tonne). Model prices track actual prices 
that prevailed in the US market over the period under study, as the figure illustrates. One 
observation worthy of note is that the model predicted prices follow the cycle of industry 
prices, but show slightly less variability than actual prices during the periods where the 
styrene market was tight, like in the years of 1988 and 1995. During periods of high 
capacity utilisation, and rising demand, markets are usually tight and the expectation 
of possible product shortages drive the prices up, leading to divergence between actual 
and model prices. Expectations play an important role in affecting prices during such 
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periods, and are only calmed down when the prospects of additional capacity coming 
on stream, are substantiated by credible announcements, or irrevocable investments to-
wards this aim, like performing detailed engineering studies, or commencing groundwork 
construction preparations by industry participants, for new projects or plant expansions. 
The cyclical movement of overcapacity observed in industry, is also explained well by 
the model, when the firms follow feedback Nash-Cournot strategies as in case Ncfb7. This 
is shown in Figure 5.13. The significance of, and how overcapacity is generated by the 
model, should be made clear once again at this point. By following optimal investment 
and output strategies, the six firms minimize the incidence of overcapacity; their output 
and capacity are almost identical as depicted by Figure 5.10. Model overcapacity is the 
percentage difference between the actual capacity held by the styrene industry, and the 
optimal capacity generated by the model for the industry (the sum of the capacities of 
the major-6 firms and of the fringe producers). This is strategic overcapacity, since it 
exceeds the optimal capacity that the firms need to be able to meet industry demand 
when they follow optimal strategies that minimise their costs, and maximise their profits. 
It was discussed earlier, that incumbent firms hold strategic excess capacity to influence 
the investment behaviour of their rivals, so that their opponents invest less in the next 
period; or as an instrument to punish them if they deviate from the industry equilibrium 
by overproducing, or if they attempt to expand their market shares in a large way. 
Another possibility also, is that overcapacity is held to meet unexpected rises in demand, 
attributed to market uncertainty. 
On average strategic excess capacity held by the styrene industry that the model 
generates,49 was about 9.1% over the entire period under study, as compared to an 
average industry overcapacity of 10.9%. Our model explains most of the overcapacity 
that was seen in the styrene industry. It performs well in explaining strategic overcapacity 
as compared to that of Reynolds (1986), where the model could explain less than 2% of 
strategic overcapacity50, when the industry average was about 9%. In Paraskevopoulos 
491n fact the strategic overcapacity held by the major-6 producers is higher; when fringe firms are ex-
cluded and overcapacity is measured against the capacity of the M6 producers their strategic overcapacity 
amounts to about 11.8%. 
50This may be attributed to two factors: the first is that of the production and investment cost estimates 
for styrene used in this thesis are closer to industry costs than those used by Reynolds for aluminium. 
He relied on two old studies for estimating costs which are derived indirectly. A UN study which gave 
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(1988) substantial excess capacity was generated by the model, which was attributed to 
nonstrategic factors, such as the industry's inability to reduce capacity because of exit 
costs and exit barriers, and significant economies of scale. 
Before closing the discussion on overcapacity the following observations on Figure 5.13 
ought to be made. The negative overcapacities that appear around the years of 1974 
and 1988 indicate that the industry was overproducing, and exceeding its capacity. In 
some years this can be achieved when production exceeds the tolerance of optimal limits 
of equipment set by designers; or by postponing annual maintenance turnarounds, a 
practice which takes place in industry during periods of exceptionally high demand, and 
when capacity utilisation for the industry is at its limit. During the recessionary period 
of 1980-1982 when demand fell, the industry managed to maintain profitability, and 
support prices, by reducing the capacity utilisation rate, which fell to about 72%-78%. 
The negative overcapacities for the model around the years of 1975 and 1986, indicate 
that the model capacities for the six firms, exceeded their actual industry capacities. 
The model and actual industry market shares for the major-6, and fringe producers, 
are shown in Figures 5.14 and 5.15. The first is based on shares in terms of firms' 
capacities; and shows that the models predictions were much better for the period from 
1984 onwards, than the previous decade, which experienced a turbulent development 
path. What is significant also is the persistent decline in the share of the fringe producers 
from about 34% of industry capacity in 1974, to just over 12% by 1996. Figure 5.15 
illustrates the same trend based on model generated outputs. The major-6 producers, 
expand their market share at the expense of the fringe. The figure shows the evolution 
of market shares for each firm. One final point to note, is that on average larger firms 
have a market share of about 18%, while the two smaller producers have a market share 
of 7%. The concentration ratios C4 = 66.7%, and C6 = 86%, which measure the capacity 
market shares of the largest four producers, and six producers respectively, as predicted 
by the model, were in agreement with industry values (see also Table 5.3 p.209). Because 
it was assumed that the pacesetter producers have the same costs, these firms eventually 
long-run average costs for aluminium, from which he derived his production costs. And another study 
for estimating investment costs. The second relates to estimating the derived demand equation. The 
diversion between his model price predictions and industry prices illustrate that the demand equation 
may have been misspecified. 
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Figure 5.14: Model vs industry market shares of major-6 and fringe producers for feed-
back NC game (Ncfb7). 
Year 
Figure 5.15: Model market shares of major-6 and fringe producers for feedback NC game 
(Ncfb7). 
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converge, and end up having equal sizes. 
The styrene industry profitability is illustrated in Figure 5.16. It shows the model 
predicting actual industry price margins fairly accurately. Price margin is defined as 
product price less cash costs (variable plus fixed costs; or the equivalent of production 
costs without the cost of investment. See Table B.3.); and is a measure of operational 
profitability. While chemical products prices have, in general, been reported to decline 
over time due to economies of scale and learning (Stobaugh & Townsend, 1975; Lieber-
man, 1984), styrene product prices have been undergoing cyclical movement, with what 
appears to be a downward trend. While price margins have been showing large swings 
as well, they have consistently, been fairly high for a commodity chemical product. On 
average, the styrene price margin measured in real values, was US$ 168/tonne, but could 
be as high as US$ 500/tonne, and US$ 400/tonne, as witnessed in 1988, and 1995 re-
spectively. Integrated styrene producers can be expected to make even more profits, as 
they can even out the swings in raw material prices of benzene and ethylene. These 
firms do not have to buy these products at market prices. They can be supplied directly 
from within the same organisation. What the figure illustrates, is that over the 1974-
2002 period51, styrene prices and margins can be seen to move in cycles. Except for a 
short period52 around the mid 1980's, price margins moved within a band of about US$ 
100/tonne to US$ 300/tonne, with some swings overshooting the barriers at times. There 
does not appear to be any discernable trend for falling margins. 
The open-loop model results for the base case price elasticity of demand E = 0.70, 
(case Ncol7) are shown in Figures 5.17-5.21. The pattern of the model results is similar 
to that of the feedback model, but somewhat slightly less consistent with industry devel-
opments than case Ncfb7. The capacity and output evolution of the major six firms, as 
shown in Figure 5.17, is lower for most of the years up to 1990, in particular during the 
periods of 1978-1982, and 1987-1989. The firms make full use of their capacity, and pro-
duce slightly above their held capacities for most of the time. But in general the industry 
51More up-todate data became available on styrene prices and its precursors recently. The remaining 
variable and fixed costs were estimated on the basis of existing data used in the model. 
52This period included a recession around 1982, and Arco and Hoechst establishing their operations in 
the US styrene market. 
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Model Margin VS Industry Margin for Pacesetter Producer in a Feedback NC Game 
Figure 5.16: Model vs industry price margin for pacesetter producer in a feedback NC 
game (Ncfb7). 
meets only 95% of the required demand as shown in Figure 5.18. The model generated 
prices follow the same trend as the actual industry prices (Figure 5.19). They are on 
average higher than industry prices with an average price of US$ 839/tonne, compared 
to an industry price of US$ 771/tonne. This is expected as the model predicts lower 
outputs, and consequently the model generated prices, are higher than when the firms 
follow feedback strategies (compare with Figure 5.12). 
The overcapacity for the open-loop model in this case, is also more pronounced than 
before as illustrated by Figure 5.20, p. 258. The average model overcapacity for the 
styrene industry is higher as well. The average strategic overcapacity for the industry 
generated by the model is 14.4%, compared with an actual industry overcapacity of 10.9%. 
The market shares of the major-6 and fringe producers, are depicted in Figure 5.21. The 
fringe firms have a slightly higher share than before; but the market shares of the main 
firms are in general consistent with industry developments. 
The model results when the major-6 firms use Stackelberg strategies for our base case 
where elasticity of demand E := 0.70, are shown in case Skfb7 of Table 5.9. One of the 
1985 2000 1980 1990 1995 1975 
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Figure 5.17: Model vs industry capacity and output for the major-6 styrene producers 
for open-loop NC game (Ncol7). 
firms now assumes the role of a Stackelberg leader. All four pacesetter firms, including the 
leader, are assumed to have the same investment and production costs; and the starggler 
firms their usual higher costs. The firms accumulation of capacity in this case is lower 
than that of the industry. The firms in this model are able to generate production that 
satisfies 96% of demand. Prices as a result, are in general higher; and an average styrene 
price of US$ 806/tonne is achieved. The figures for this case are similar in pattern to 
those seen in previous cases and are not reproduced here. What is significant, however, 
is that the leader firm accumulates far higher capacity than was the case by any firm in 
industry. The leader's share of the product market ranges from about 28% to 52% as 
shown in Figure 5.22. In the US styrene industry, the highest market share in terms of 
capacity that was held by Arco and then Lyondell was about 22% during the 1995-2000 
period (see Table 5.3, page 248). Furthermore, the leader has almost full utilisation of 
capacity, whereas the followers, have considerable redundant capacity. The Stackelberg 
strategies in this instance do not give a realistic representation of market developments 
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Figure 5.18: Model vs industry output for open-loop NC game (Ncol7). 
Model Price VS Actual Price for Open—loop NC Game 
Figure 5.19: Model price vs actual price for open-loop NC game (Ncol7). 
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Figure 5.20: Model vs industry overcapacity for open-loop NC game (Ncol7). 
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Figure 5.21: Model market shares of major-6 and fringe producers for open-loop NC 
game (Ncol7). 
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in the US styrene industry. 
The other cases when a lower price elasticity E = 0.50, is assumed show that the 
feedback strategy model performed better than the open-loop strategy model. As shown 
in Table 5.9, case Ncfb5 meets 99% of demand requirements, compared to 93% for case 
Ncol5. Prices are also on average higher than that of the styrene industry average, 
but perform better than the open-loop case, Ncol5, where the average price was USS 
900/tonne styrene. For the situation when styrene is assumed to be price elastic with a 
price elasticity of E = 1.20, the open-loop strategy case Nco112, appears to perform well, 
with average styrene price of US$ 774/tonne styrene. Strategic excess capacity of 10.4%, 
and average market shares seem to be within acceptable ranges. The performance in 
terms of price and meeting output demand, give the impression that case Ncoll2 is as 
good as Ncfb7. But a closer examination of the data reveals that this is not the case. 
Figure 5.23, shows that the capacity of the six producers is far lower over the period 
from 1979-1984. And while the performance in terms of model generated prices is rather 
good as Figure 5.24 illustrates (model average price of US$ 774/ tonne, compared to 
an actual industry price of US$ 771/tonne); market shares and capacities generated for 
smaller producers reveal a serious flaw. Figure 5.25 shows that the smaller producers 
have smaller shares than was predicted by Ncfb7, and for the years from 1979-1984, and 
from 1989-1990, the smaller producers (namely firm 2 and firm 4 in the figure) have their 
capacities, and market shares completely wiped out. This apparently compensates by 
making the average values, for the major-6 in the model for this case, to appear better 
than what the actual model prediction are. 
A final point to note about the results, is that in all the cases examined, there was 
strategic excess capacity present. This is an indication that the firms in industry held 
capacity, in excess of what is required to meet demand, while the industry participants 
were pursuing optimal investment strategies. 
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Figure 5.22: Model market shares of leader, five followers and fringe producers for Stack-
elberg game (Skfb7). 
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Figure 5.23: Model vs industry capacity and output for the major-6 styrene producers 
for open-loop NC game (Ncoll2). Price elasticity of demand, e = 1.2. 
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Figure 5.24: Model price vs actual price for open-loop NC game (Nco/.72). Price elasticity 
of demand, s = 1.2. 
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Figure 5.25: Model market shares of major-6 and fringe producers for open-loop NC 
game (Nco//2). Price elasticity of demand, E = 1.2. 
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5.7 Entry and Determinants of Market Structure 
Oligopoly theory suggests that growing markets have the propensity to attract new en-
trants. Firms expand into new markets when they find an opportunity to generate profits, 
or a niche which existing firms may not be able to fulfil quickly when the market is grow-
ing fast. Entry reduces the incumbent firms' profit margins. According to this line of 
argument, incumbent firms invest in a manner to discourage entry; since an increase in 
the number of producers raises the level of competition. Eventually, with a sufficiently 
large number of producers, price cost margins may be driven down to the level of com-
petitive markets, and may even go down to zero (see simulation results in Section 4.5.3, 
Chapter 4; and Bresnahan & Reiss (1991) for a diagrammatic analysis, and evaluation 
of entry thresholds with constant marginal costs). 
The response of firms to entry, or the threat of entry, is by no means uniform. It 
is dependent on several factors that pertain to characteristics of the market and the 
technology in use, the height of entry barriers, and the historical experience of the pro-
ducing firms. Being a dynamic process, entry is not only affected by the market and 
the incumbent firms behaviour, but it also affects the market structure in which it oper-
ates, changing and modifying it, and in the process altering the dynamics of entry itself. 
Consider for instance the development of a new efficient process for a product, which 
becomes available for licensing by the engineering company that developed it, may at-
tract a large number of new entrants into a growing market. This leads to a heightened 
level of competition, and may force some of the leading established firms out of their 
positions, making the market more fragmented and competitive. On the other hand, 
a rise in prominence of economies of scale may favour leading firms. As the product 
market becomes mature, larger firms can expand at the expense of smaller producers 
who fail to modernise, by investing in more efficient larger plants. The industry becomes 
more concentrated when smaller producers are squeezed out of the market; while entry 
is discouraged by low growth, and the rise in the size of investment required for large 
scale plants. As a result the market becomes, perhaps, less competitive. 
Entry is important in the development of market structure and the evolution of firms 
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investment behaviour, with significant implications for competitiveness and profitability. 
It is not surprising therefore, that a significant proportion of the industrial organisation 
literature is devoted to the study of the process of entry and entry barriers, in the form 
of both theoretical and empirical studies. The recent literature on entry and market 
structure is reviewed in Geroski (1991a, 1995), Davies & Geroski (1997), Caves (1998), 
and Sutton (1998). The traditional view is that the incumbent firms counter the threat 
of entry into their market by employing a variety of measures, with excess capacity 
as the leading instrument, to discourage entry, or at least impel it to take place at a 
lower scale. Implicit in the use of excess capacity in this context, is the threat that 
the incumbents can resort to overproduction forcing prices down if entry were to occur. 
Excess capacity is the tool that makes this threat credible, as was modelled earlier on 
by Spence (1977, 1979). Sutton (1998) emphasizes the role of other measures such as 
advertising, or R&D to heighten the level of investment competition, that eventually 
lead to market restructuring. He shows how this was achieved in the aircraft industry 
by Airbus and Boeing. By investing heavily in R&D, and by introducing new aircraft 
models that covered all market classes and niches, competition was heightened and the 
market restructuring that followed, forced other competitors to be merged, or hastened 
their exit from the industry. 
Two types of entry barriers are referred to in the industrial organisation literature: 
exogenous barriers, which are those that are not necessarily under the direct control of the 
firm, but affect the market as whole, such as new innovations, technological developments, 
economies of scale, and market shocks. The other type are the endogenous barriers, which 
are subject to the direct control of the firm, such as the investment in excess capacity, 
level of expenditure on R&D activity or advertising, integration of the production process, 
and others (Smith 1981, Mathis & Koscianski 1996, Geroski 1991a). 
exogenous barriers are by implication non-strategic in nature, since all firms are af-
fected equally by them. A new technology for instance, unless proprietary like when it is 
developed by the firm itself, is available to all market participants. Lumpiness of plants 
in petrochemicals resulted mostly from technological advances in the processing indus-
tries. So when firms invest in a new large scale plant causing overcapacity in the market 
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place, it may be argued that this is not a strategic investment in overcapacity; but the 
timing, and scale of new investments could be employed for strategic intent. Unexpected 
demand shocks or demand uncertainty also affect the level of investment, or production 
rate by the firm; the excess capacity that may result, is not considered as capacity held 
for strategic considerations. 
Whereas endogenous barriers entail strategic intent by the firm to gain advantage 
and influence the behaviour of its opponents. Excess capacity to deter entry requires 
the firm to devote additional investment in larger plants. To gain market share the firm 
has to invest directly in advertising, or in a new differentiated product. Or it has to 
intensify its R&D expenditure and effort, to come up with new products or more efficient 
processes. All of these instruments require the firm to take direct action to bring about 
the desired results. The choice of which of these strategic instruments to utilise, depends 
on the characteristics of industry and role of its member firms. 
The next two subsections (Section 5.7.1 and Section 5.7.2) look into some of these 
barriers and their pertinent use by petrochemical producers and the styrene industry, 
drawing attention where appropriate to empirical work in other industries. 
5.7.1 Strategic Investment and Entry Barriers 
Ever since Bain's (1956) seminal work on firms' investment in barriers to deter entry, there 
has been considerable interest on the theoretical and empirical levels, in the strategic use 
of entry barriers in industrial economics. There is ample evidence to suggest that firms 
in general, attach a great deal of importance to strategic considerations regarding entry 
by other firms into their markets (Singh, Utton & Waterson 1998). In a survey of 293 
US manufacturing firms, Smiley (1988) finds that 58% of firms make frequent use of 
strategic instruments to deter entry into mature markets. And in a similar survey of 
about the same number of UK firms Singh, Utton & Waterson (1998) also report that 
just under two thirds of firms attempt to use entry deterring strategies towards entry of 
new products, and the percentage rises to three quarters for competition against existing 
firms. The common instruments between the two studies, which are also the most widely 
studied in the literature include: excess capacity, advertising, R&D and patenting, and 
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pricing policy. Both studies found that advertising and R&D were the most widely used 
by firms to dissuade entry and protect their market shares; while that of excess capacity 
was least used among their respondents (the percentage who rated excess capacity as an 
important instrument to preempt rivals was 22% in Smiley (1988); and in Singh, Utton 
& Waterson (1998) about 25% considered capacity creation a strategic instrument, and 
8% would use excess capacity deliberately to make entry for other firms difficult). 
Other cross-section industry studies in this area, also find similar results, Davies & 
Geroski (1997) in a study of 200 UK firms over a period of 7 years, also found that 
advertising and to a lesser extent R&D play a major role in affecting the dynamics of 
market shares and industry concentration levels. The relative importance of each of 
these instruments to the respondents has more to do with the nature of the products, the 
characteristics of the production process and markets of each industry, and the scale of 
operations involved than with the significance and suitability of capacity or advertising 
as an entry deterrence instrument in general. 
Such cross-section studies, are perhaps ambitious in trying to generalise the findings 
of theoretical models like those of Spence (1977, 1979), and Dixit (1979, 1980) on strategic 
use of excess capacity in entry deterrence, to industry in general. Their samples usually 
cover a diversified group of mainly small or medium scale industries, and do not explore 
the characteristics of the industries being investigated. This becomes apparent when the 
industries are grouped by categories, and the question centres on the factors affecting 
the use of specific strategies, as performed by Bunch & Smiley (1992). The analysis is 
performed on the same set of industries studied in Smiley (1988); and where new and ex-
isting product markets are examined separately. They find that firms utilise preemption 
strategies using capital expansion in concentrated and growing markets that are popu-
lated by large firms. Another feature, is that capacity expansion to preempt rivals is the 
strategy of choice for large firms with deep pockets when demand is still growing. The 
strategy is employed more frequently when larger firms enjoy a greater cost differential 
over smaller firms. Which suggests that markets where economies of scale are important, 
are likely to carry more excess capacity than other markets. On the other hand, R&D 
and patenting are used more in research intensive industries where firms are large, with 
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large budgets for this type of activity. Here the markets are characterised by small min-
imum efficient scale operations relative to the market size, and advertising budgets are 
relatively large. Advertising and reputation are also more widely used to deter entry in 
research intensive industries, and/or industries where MES operations are small. 
It is more likely that preemptive capacity expansion would be used as a strategic 
instrument for entry or mobility deterrence in markets of homogeneous commodity prod-
ucts such as petrochemicals, fertilisers, cement, sugar, salt, or aluminium. Other types 
of structural barriers that may be employed for this purpose, originally proposed by 
Bain (1956), were studied by Caves & Porter (1977). Besides excess capacity, these in-
clude limit pricing, patented technology and know-how, setup or sunk costs, product 
differentiation, and vertical integration. Investment coordination also, was identified to 
be closely related to excess capacity (Smith 1981). Five of these barriers are discussed 
below, indicating where appropriate their relevance to the styrene industry. 
Excess capacity in the form of unused production capacity makes a threat of 
price war against entrant firms credible, and represents an entry discouraging in-
vestment by the incumbent firms. It may be less costly for the incumbent firm to 
acquire an entrant, than to engage in a price war; but this may increase the likeli-
hood of future entry whereas the prospect of a price war reduces it. Investment in 
entry deterring capacity protects not just the investing firm, but also its oligopolis-
tic rivals as well; excess capacity fosters the interdependence of oligopolistic firms, 
in their effort to protect their market from entrants. Excess capacity is useful in 
cartel like situations, since market shares are quite often assigned according to ca-
pacity (Scherer & Ross 1990). Investment in excess capacity to retaliate may pay 
whether it is used or not, because of its deterring effect (Wenders 1971). Even when 
excess capacity does not lead to the creation of a credible threat, it may still act 
as a barrier to entry by distorting the perceptions of potential entrants about the 
expected returns and risks, to the extent of diverting their potential investments 
into other industries (Hilke 1984). 
The strategic use of excess capacity for entry deterrence in the empirical literature 
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has already been alluded to in the works of Reynolds (1986) on the US aluminium 
industry, by Ghemawat (1984) and Rosenbaum & Ye (1992) on titanium dioxide, 
and Steele (1995) on the North American newsprint industry. In a study of the 
US titanium industry, Mathis & Koscianski (1996) conduct an empirical test of 
the impact of excess capacity on the probability of entry. While the authors were 
unable to establish proof of intent to preempt entry (in the sense that incumbents 
deviate from profit maximising behaviour in order to create a barrier to entry) due 
to the lack of necessary detailed cost information necessary for this kind of analysis, 
their results, however, remain significant. There was little sign of entry into the 
industry; building of capacity by incumbents appears to have preempted entry 
and thus served as a barrier to entry. Whether by intent or not, the incumbents 
investment in excess capacity managed to achieve the desired result of a form of 
entry deterrence. 
Similarly in the empirical model of oligopoly capacity and pricing decisions and 
of entrant responses by Masson & Shaanan (1986), the results do not provide 
evidence that oligopolists deliberately install excess capacity to deter entry, but 
they support the hypothesis that both lower prices and excess capacity inhibit entry. 
Furthermore their results support limit pricing, and suggest that limit pricing firms 
may exploit the entry inhibiting effects of unintended excess capacity by raising 
their limit prices. 
Strategic investment can take different forms other than simply the use of excess 
capacity as modelled earlier on by Spence (1979); advertising and R&D are impor-
tant elements of strategic investment responses by firms in the signalling game in 
the face of entrants as shown by the studies of Singh, Utton & Waterson (1998) 
and Davies & Geroski (1997) of the UK industry, and that of Smiley (1988) in the 
US. 
It is more likely that excess capacity will be used as an instrument of mobility, or 
entry deterrence where it would be guaranteed to give the desired effect. This is 
particularly true of industries with highly concentrated markets, and where large 
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firms dominate. Gilbert & Lieberman (1987), Lieberman (1987a) and Bunch & 
Smiley (1992) find that use of excess capacity occurred in products where con-
centration was high. But this is exactly the point; capacity in capital intensive 
industries is generally expensive and costly to hold. Oligopolists act rationally by 
utilising investments in industries, and products where use of excess capacity would 
pay-off. There is nothing to be gained from overinvesting and holding excess ca-
pacity when the market structure does not support tight oligopolistic interaction 
between the firms. When other barriers are present (such as restricted access to 
technology, or large sunk costs) excess capacity would be less likely to be used on 
a large scale. 
Also, the strategy of build and scrap, observed in petrochemicals (Lieberman 1989, 
Paraskevopoulos 1988) allows larger producers to stay ahead in the game of capacity 
expansion, by retiring older plants and replacing them with larger plants, that 
also employ latest technology. Styrene producers were following a similar strategy, 
especially Dow, Shell and BASF. By following this strategy the incumbent firms 
attempt to preempt their rivals; but effectively succeed more in preempting new 
entrants. A study of the US manufacturing industry covering a 20 year period 
(1963-1982), by Dunne, Roberts & Samuelson (1989) find that this is generally the 
case in the chemical industry. Despite the strong growth of chemicals and large 
entry, smaller firms fail to make as strong an impact on chemical industry structure 
and its competitiveness, as similar firms did in other manufacturing sectors, where 
entrant firms after 15-19 years, are on average about 20% larger than the average 
size firm in the industry. In chemicals after 20 years, entrants account for 28% 
of industry output, as compared to 42% for entrants in the total manufacturing 
industries. 
• Investment coordination in capital intensive and large scale industries, allows 
the firms to avoid excessive buildup of capacity; capacity is added gradually instead 
of the otherwise ruinous race to install capacity to meet expected growth opportu-
nities. This is done by regulating the addition of new capacity in an informal way, 
CHAPTER 5. THE US STYRENE INDUSTRY & INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR 269 
through the signalling game in the form of announcements about prospective new 
investments, allowing other firms to reconsider the timing of their own investment 
plans. According to Smith (1981) this form of strategic behaviour can result in 
improved resource allocation, because it improves the firms ability to forecast the 
state of aggregate supply, and minimises the effect of supply coordination failure. 
Strategic investment can take different forms, besides capacity, it includes product 
differentiation, innovation, futures markets long term contracts, and government 
regulations which facilitate for firms the coordination of the supply side of the mar-
ket. It is recognised also that this type of strategic investment, and its coordination 
can create barriers to entry (Caves & Porter 1977). 
In petrochemicals Gilbert & Lieberman (1987) and Paraskevopoulos (1988) found 
that the signalling and announcement game had been used extensively in coordi-
nating the addition of new capacity especially in the concentrated segments of the 
market. In the paper and pulp industry Christensen & Caves (1997) also show 
how the announcements made by firms play an important role in determining who 
abandons, and who goes ahead with investments. Henderson & Cool (2003) find 
that firms in the petrochemical industry learn from their past mistakes to time 
their greenfield investments avoiding redundant capacity, and improving their prof-
itability. 
Also in the styrene industry firms make use of announcements at different indus-
try forums, and in the trade journals to signal to rivals their investment inten-
tions about new planned capacity. An examination of this literature reveals that 
firms make allowance in their plans for their rivals' investments. Sometimes a firm 
would revise its original plans in terms of capacity, or the timing of new invest-
ment to reduce adverse effects on expected market supply demand balance. Some 
recent examples were discussed briefly in Section 5.2.3, like Lyondell's project in 
the Netherlands, and Dow's claim to a project on the Gulf Coast in the US. 
Sometimes the firms would go further in their coordination plans and form joint 
ventures, especially when these involve very large scale plants like in the case of 
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Cos-Mar, the joint venture between GE Plastics and Fina Oil in the US, and the 
equity arrangement that Nova and BASF had in one of Lyondell's plants in Texas. 
More recently, Shell and BASF formed 'Base11' a company that runs their two joint 
ventures in Singapore and the Netherlands. Lyondell and Bayer formed a similar 
joint venture in the Netherlands as well. 
Besides coordination of capacity investments, firms can coordinate the supply of 
their raw materials. Other than normal market transactions, firms can secure 
raw materials supply, either by direct investment in vertically integrated upstream 
operations, or through long term contracts with raw materials suppliers. The firms 
in this case negotiate directly the conditions of future supply, regarding volume and 
the pricing mechanism. Long term contracting is a form of strategic investment, 
since the parties involved enter into an agreement that facilitates the coordination of 
supply (Smith 1981), by allowing the seller in this case to plan capacity expansions 
without the risk of running an idle operation. These contracts are usually publicised 
in advance, so that all market participants become aware of its implications and 
would evaluate any expansion plans accordingly. In the styrene industry several 
arrangements of this nature are known to have taken place. 
Lyondell and Sterling are basically merchant producers, but the two firms are also 
involved in long term contracts, or toll production, where a percentage of the output 
would be earmarked for supply to another company. Nova for instance had an equity 
share in one of Lyondell's Channelview plants for 180 thousand tonnes/year, and 
another equivalent volume on a long term contract basis. BASF also has an equity 
share in the same plant. 
In more recent times another arrangement that avoids open market transaction 
mechanisms, was devised by some of the major players in the global styrene indus-
try. BASF which is the third largest styrene producer in the world, has significant 
styrene derivative operations in the North American market (its requirements in 
the US market alone were about half a million tonnes in 1999), arrived at an ar-
rangement with Nova Chemicals where the two firms would swap styrene product 
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in two different markets. BASF53 would supply styrene to Nova in Europe. Nova 
had acquired several polystyrene plants in recent years including those that were 
part of the deal with Huntsman In late 1998, and from Shell in 2000; as a result 
Nova was short in styrene in Europe. In exchange Nova agreed to supply BASF 
with styrene from its expanding styrene capability in the US and Canada, to meet 
BASF's requirements in the North American market where it lacks a styrene pro-
duction base. 
• Sunkness of costs and investment irreversibility 
Setup costs are defined as the minimal required level of outlays, in the form of sunk 
cost, incurred by an entrant into industry. Because these costs are sunk and irre-
versible, they can constitute an impediment to new entrants. In the petrochemical 
industry for instance, these costs are determined exogenously, by the engineering 
and processing industries. In its simplest form this setup cost can be identified 
as the cost of a minimum efficient scale (MES) plant for that particular industry. 
Hilke (1984) argues that investment in excess capacity has the effect of converting 
fixed costs into sunk costs for new entrants, because additional investment in excess 
capacity reduces the market for second hand equipment. 
Advertising and R&D activity play the same role as capacity in Cournot games; 
since the expenditure on developing new differentiated products, and on adver-
tising is a form of a sunk cost that raises the level of competition between firms. 
Schmalensee (1978) and Sutton (1991) demonstrate the mechanism of how this type 
of activity operates as a barrier to entry in different industries. For Schmalensee 
(1978) the lack of noticeable entry by new firms into the market of ready to eat 
cereals over a long period given the growth and profitability of the industry, is an 
indication of the existence of some form of impediment or barrier to entry. Dur-
ing the period from 1940 to mid 1960's the industry was highly concentrated; the 
largest four firms controlled at least 85 percent of sales, and the top six firms 95 
percent of the market. 
53 Nova Chemicals and BASF to Swap Styrene, Chemical Week, 7 August, 2002. p. 7. 
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011inger & Fernandez-Cornejo (1998) find that regulation (environmental rules and 
regulations relating to clean water and air) and research costs for the pesticide 
industry in the US, constitute a form of setup or sunk costs for the firms. They 
derive relationships similar to those of Sutton (1991), between the number of firms 
in industry and the level of market competition based on sunk costs. They show 
that non-price competition resembles price competition in the limit, where a decline 
in industry demand or an increase in the toughness of competition in the form of a 
rise in R&D expenditure, regulatory or capital costs, negatively affects the number 
of firms operating in industry. 
Setup costs have a bearing on market structure. Using the terminology of Sutton 
(1991), an increase in the setup cost, cr, leads to higher concentration in the market. 
He measures this in terms of the dimensionless ratio, S/a, where, S, is the market 
size measured in money value for that particular product for instance, relative to 
the setup cost, a. In general, Sutton54 finds that for a wide range of commodity 
industries there is an inverse relationship between S/a, and industry concentration. 
An increase in the setup cost leads the market to support a smaller number of larger 
firms. In the US styrene market, I find, using investment cost data of Table 5.6, and 
the market size based on styrene prices measured in constant US dollars, that over 
the period between 1973 and 1993, which is comparable to the planning horizon 
of this study, the value of S/a55 declined from 14.2 in 1973 to 8.8 in 1993. This 
pattern for styrene industry is consistent with Sutton's theory, which predicts a 
rise in the concentration ratio as the ratio of market size/setup cost declines. 
• Product differentiation reduces the interdependence among firms, and be-
tween the products of the incumbents and those of the potential entrant. When 
sellers brand their products, and emphasize their specific characteristics, they force 
the entrant to make extra outlays in the form of advertising and promotional ac-
tivity to gain a foothold in a crowded market. As a consequence, the entrant faces 
54See Sutton (1991, chp. 4), where a wide range of industries including salt and sugar, are analysed 
across different countries. 
551n this exercise, a for each year, was measured as the investment cost for an MES plant for that 
year in constant 1990 US$; and S was obtained by multiplying the styrene price also in 1990 US$ by the 
production for that year. 
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higher costs, and has to fight existing brands to gain market share56. Also when in-
cumbents differentiate their products, they insulate their market from that of their 
competitors, and all their promotional efforts go towards the niche market they 
created for each particular product. This has two desirable effects. The first, is 
that differentiation reduces the firm's concern about capacity expansion by rivals, 
as the firm can expand capacity to meet the demand for its own product which 
operates as a segregated submarket. And the second, is that differentiated prod-
ucts facilitate pricing differentials, as the products are not directly comparable to 
their competing substitutes produced by other firms. Because of its differentiated 
attributes, the firm can raise the expected value of the product, and the consumers 
become willing to pay a higher premium for the new product. 
In the petrochemical industry the vast majority of products are sold as commodity 
products, with the exception of a few specialised resins and fibres. But even here 
petrochemical producers have attempted to introduce some differentiation. Each 
of the major chemical companies for instance sells its plastic resin products such 
as polystyrene, PVC, polypropylene, or polyethylene under its own brand name. 
Nevertheless, these are effectively commodity products sold according to their tech-
nical specification that are known to the plastics converters. There was an attempt 
in the late 1980's to introduce differentiated plastics resins in the polyethylene seg-
ment (LLDPE and HDPE) using copolymers such as alpha-olefins57 that sell at a 
slightly higher premium. This end of the market, however, remained insignificant 
and constituted only a small share of the total sales volume of these resins. Most 
companies introduced their range of these products; but the plastics resins market 
remained essentially a commodity market. Moreover, intermediate chemical prod-
ucts such as styrene, are homogenous products that cannot be differentiated and 
56For an elaborate account of the use of product differentiation and advertising as a barrier to entry 
see the paper by Schmalensee (1978) on breakfast cereals, and also Sutton (1991) for an account of a 
range of industries. And Sutton (1998) discusses the use of R&D activity. 
57These are polyethylene products that are produced using the same process of production and in the 
same equipment as for conventional polyethylenes, but but in this case a copolymer such as butene or 
hexene is added to ethylene and the reaction takes place over metallocene catalysts. These copolymers are 
members of a family of products known as alpha-olefins, which in turn are also produced from ethylene. 
Their use results in producing highly linear polymers with enhanced properties. 
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are sold as such. 
• Vertical integration acts as an entry barrier by raising investment levels. A 
potential entrant faces uncertainty about supplies of raw materials and highly vari-
able spot market prices if entry is considered only at the downstream stage of the 
operation; and the prospect of much higher investment requirement if he considers 
entering as an integrated producer (Caves & Porter 1977). When firms integrate 
their operations, they are effectively ensuring security of supply of raw materials 
for their industrial venture, and/or the market outlet for their products. Also an 
element of market forces distortion is introduced, as integration seals a firm's trans-
actions from open market operations, hiding real costs and margins of profits. It 
can also be used for transfer pricing in the chain of various sections of the pro-
duction process, or between divisions of the firm with plants in different countries. 
Vertical integration facilitates the use of price discrimination among its buyers in 
oligopolistic industries (Tirole 1988, p. 141); an integrated firm for instance can 
sell its intermediate product at a higher price to other firms on the market, but to 
its downstream subsidiaries competing with other firms at a lower price, allowing it 
to reap high profits for its product, and giving its downstream operations an edge 
over their competitors. 
A high degree of integration can be found in the US styrene industry, with the top 
styrene producers integrated upstream into raw materials production, and down-
stream into styrene derivatives as depicted in Table 5.10. Chevron, Dow, and Nova 
are fully integrated in their upstream and downstream operations. Both Dow and 
Nova are among the top world styrene producers, but in the US they were in deficit 
in 1999 due to their large styrene derivative production. They continued to supple-
ment their requirements through long term arrangements with merchant styrene 
suppliers such as Lyondell and Sterling. Cos-Mar also is fairly integrated, if one 
considers the operations of the joint venture partners, Fina 0i158 and GE Plastics, 
that make up the company. Fina produces benzene as part of its refining opera-
tions, and is also a large producer of polystyrene. GE Plastics on the other hand, 
58Fina Oil is now part of the TotalFinaElf Oil Group. 
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is involved in the production of polystyrene and other styrene derivatives such as 
ABS resin and SAN styrenic resins. Overall Cos-Mar's output is totally consumed 
by its joint venture partners. 
Lyondell is integrated upstream into ethylene and benzene production, but has 
no downstream operations mainly because its interest lies in the propylene oxide 
segment of the business. Prior to being overtaken by Lyondell, Arco divested its 
polystyrene assets that were taken over by Huntsman. Sterling, on the other hand, 
is the only major styrene producer that is not integrated either into raw materials 
or derivatives of styrene. All its output is sold on the merchant market mainly 
for export, and in long term contracts where about 35% is sold on contract basis, 
mainly to BP-Amoco and Bayer. 
Table 5.10: US styrene producers and degree of integration of operations - 1999 
(Thousand tonnes/year) 
Styrene 
Capacity 
Styrene Precursors(t ) Styrene Requirements( t ) 
Net 
Styrene Ethylene Benzene 
Ethyl- 
benzene 
Poly- 
styrene Other Total 
Lyondell 1225 X X X 1225 
Cos-Mar 907 X 907 
Chevron 771 X X X 349 349 422 
Sterling 771 X 771 
Dow 644 X X X 590 268 857 -213 
Nova 567 X X X 1034 1034 -467 
BP Amoco 454 X X X 454 
Westlake 160 X X 160 
Huntsman 145 X X 84 84 61 
(1)1.1pstream integration into styrene precursors is indicated by X. 
(I)Styrene requirements are based on derivative capacities. 
This situation perhaps explains Sterling Chemicals' difficult position as a midsize 
styrene producer, which is not integrated in terms of its feedstock or downstream 
derivatives. Sterling was more susceptible to adverse effects of styrene's cyclical 
markets. By decreasing its reliance on export markets, and looking for domestic 
long term contract customers Sterling was trying to minimise the effect of spot 
market fluctuations on its profit margins. The firm was also considering takeover 
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bids59 from its competitors during mid 1990's. It remains possible that at a future 
date, Sterling will be merged or taken over by one of its competitors, or another 
firm seeking further integration. 
5.7.2 Petrochemicals and the Case for Strategic Investment 
Firm strategies should be evaluated on the basis of the outcomes that the firm actions and 
strategies produce. Since in general, one should assume that the management, in their 
investment behaviour, are rational decision makers, and their investments are designed 
to achieve the goals that they set for their company (Scherer & Ross 1990, p. 128). 
Empirical studies on investment behaviour in the petrochemical industry include 
the important studies of Gilbert & Lieberman (1987), Lieberman (1987a, 1987c), and 
Paraskevopoulos (1988). In these works, the authors find that generally there is little 
evidence of incumbents success in investing preemptively in capacity to deter entry into 
their markets. Their findings are consistent with Nash-Cournot type pattern of invest-
ment where smaller firms are more likely to add capacity, while larger firms are more 
careful in adding new capacity to avoid deteriorating market conditions where they have 
substantially more at stake. They suggest that firms in the petrochemical industry did 
not invest strategically and attribute excess capacity to exogenous factors such as market 
variability, and lumpiness of investments. 
However, the following points are worthy of mention here. Gilbert & Lieberman 
(1987), and Lieberman (1987c) study a cross-section of petrochemical products over a 
period extending from the late 1950's to 1982. The products belong to different sub-
sectors of the petrochemical industry. The technology, market structure, and market 
characteristics for these products can vary widely. For many products the process tech-
nology and production knowhow is not easily obtainable (such as toluene diisocyanate 
(TDI), methyl-diphenyl-diisocayanate (MDI), acrylonitrile, terephthalic acid, vinyl ac-
etate, propylene oxide, and pentaerythritol). In addition a high degree of market in-
tegration, where the major firms are vertically integrated from the production of raw 
materials, to the downstream production of derivatives, would make entry rather diffi- 
59 Is Sterling Chemicals Open for Bids?, Chemical Week, 5 April, 1995, p. 9. Also Sterling Situation 
Remains Unclear, Chemical Week, 3 April, 1996, p. 9. 
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cult. The investment behaviour and response of incumbents to the threat of entry in 
market segments of these products would differ markedly from those that do not share 
these attributes, like ethylene and its thermoplastics derivatives for instance, or fertilisers. 
It would not be surprising even if the behaviour of the same firm, that is active in both 
types of these products, differs in each market in accordance with the product attributes 
and its market characteristics. Without distinguishing between these product groups and 
controlling for their attributes with respect to the firms' investment behaviour, and the 
likely long term influence on concentration, the results are likely to be liable to bias60. 
Furthermore, the data coverage until 1982, extends over the growth phase for most of 
these products. Also entry on a large scale was taking place during this period. But it just 
covers the period when the market growth was beginning to slow down and overcapacity 
becoming more apparent as a result of the increased importance of economies of scale, 
and arrival of the era of large scale plants. It misses the rest of the 1980's and the 
period when considerable merger activity and market restructuring was taking place. It 
should be noted also that products, where the firms operated in concentrated markets 
and overcapacity was noted to be chronically high61, were studied separately as well. But 
here also, citing production decline resulting from obsolete plants and the effects of higher 
oil prices as the main causes of overcapacity, the period of study was confined to cover 
only up to 1973, thereby omitting one third of the sample, where chronic overcapacity 
was noted but had occurred in the post 1973 period. 
Upon examining the West European PVC industry, Paraskevopoulos (1988) found 
that the investment behaviour of larger firms was accommodating towards the smaller 
ones. He shows how excessive investment and rivalry between the large number of pro-
ducers lead to widespread overcapacity and severe price competition. As the markets 
stagnated in the early 1980's combined with significant capacity additions, price cut- 
60See Scherer & Ross (1990, pp. 645-650) review and discussion of empirical models on the relationship 
between market structure, innovation and investment in R&D. In particular the influence of proper 
specification of low-opportunity and high-opportunity industries on the direction of relationships with 
respect to industry concentration. Also see Geroski (1990). 
61Chronic excess capacity is defined in Lieberman (1987c), by the strict requirement that capacity util-
isation for the products concerned falls below 80% for five successive years or more. Capacity utilisation 
fell below 80% for 35% of the observations prior to 1973 but only 15% were classified as chronic. Of 
the ten products that were found to have exhibited chronic excess capacity, for three products only, was 
excess capacity used strategically. And of those, for one product only was entry successfully deterred. 
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ting between the major producers was rife; but planners realised that there is a huge 
financial price to pay resulting from price competition. It was a question of who could 
bear this situation and absorb financial losses before the weaker competitors, exited the 
industry and taking with them the excess capacity62. This situation was exacerbated by 
the reluctance of companies to exit the industry first, and were instead waiting for other 
competitors to make the hard decisions (Paraskevopoulos 1988, p. 198). 
The situation was remedied and profitability somehow restored as a result of the re-
structuring process which ensued. During the period between 1980 and 1983 the number 
of West European producers declined from 23 to 14 in vinyl chloride (the raw material 
for PVC production), and from 27 to 16 in PVC63, and almost one million tonnes of ca-
pacity was closed down. The largest 4 firms capacity rose from 39% to 50%. Like Gilbert 
& Lieberman (1987), he discounts the possibility that investment was used strategically 
in the West European PVC industry, and concludes by attributing overcapacity to the 
lumpiness of modern plants, demand variability, and poor planning of new investments 
manifested in many firms jumping on the investment bandwagon at some stages during 
the development of the industry. 
Gilbert & Lieberman (1987) also find a bandwagon effect whereby smaller firms' in-
vestments undermine larger firms' investments that would have had a preemptive effect. 
Their results reject the round-robin pattern of investment where firms take it in turn 
to maintain market shares. They, however, find both elements of preemptive behaviour 
and a tendency to maintain market shares. Where the role of short term preemptive 
investment is to coordinate new investments which minimises redundant capacity and 
has the long term effect of maintaining market shares. This is achieved through the role 
played by the firms with large market share, which have a more pronounced potential for 
preemption and in moderating fluctuations in industry capacity than their smaller oppo-
nents. This accommodating behaviour is found by Lieberman (1987a) to be prevalent in 
62European Chemical News June 22, 1982. 
63The number of PVC producers in Western Europe declined further to only 10 producers by 2002. 
PVC prices in Europe soared by 40% in the last few months, but producers were still unhappy with 
margins. Some were seeking opportunities for mergers in order to benefit from greater economies of scale. 
A large proportion of Western Europe producers were considered to be relatively small in comparison 
with PVC players in the US, and suffer from poor access to raw materials supply. Chemical Market 
Reporter, 13 May, 2002, p. 2. 
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concentrated chemical industries, where incumbent firms coordinated their investments 
avoiding excess capacity especially when investments in greenfield projects were under-
taken. But incumbents reacted with hostility towards investments by entrants, by adding 
capacity following entry. He finds that excess capacity developed in concentrated indus-
tries following entry, indicating the strategic use of excess capacity to deter mobility 
rather entry. 
Another interesting feature uncovered by Lieberman (1984) for the same set of prod-
ucts is that prices in concentrated markets showed a lower propensity for decline. Whereas 
in less concentrated markets prices declined sharply and were influenced equally by new 
investments by incumbent and entrants alike. The incidence of coordinated investments 
by incumbents, combined with low rates of unutilised capacity and maintenance of high 
prices in concentrated industries raises concern about the possibility of tacit collusion tak-
ing place for some of these products64. Neither Gilbert & Lieberman (1987), Lieberman 
(1987c), nor Paraskevopoulos (1988) consider or test for collusion in their models. 
Collusion did occur on several occasions in the West European chemical industry 
during the 1970's and 1980's. There were reports in the trade journals about some 
companies discussing the need for crisis cartel to deal with the special difficulties fac-
ing the industry'. In the fibre industry a cartel operated by the eleven major Western 
European producers between 1978 and 1980, with the intention of reducing overall ca-
pacity in such a way as to preserve the existing market shares (Shaw & Shaw 1983). 
Also, in polyethylene, polypropylene and polyvinyl chloride (PVC), price fixing arrange-
ments were uncovered to have been taking place, over the period between 1982 and 1986. 
Several of the largest West European petrochemical producers were party to these ar-
rangements. The EU Commission brought court charges against these companies, and 
were subsequently fined66. 
"Christensen & Caves (1997) make these observations as well, and give a fuller and more critical 
account of their implications. 
65Solvay and Ato-Chem were attempting the formation of a plastics cartel at a time when overcapacity 
was affecting the major petrochemical producers in Europe and the threat of imports was looming during 
a recessionary period. Financial Times, Plastids Cartel, 23 July 1982, p. 2; also The Economist, 24 July, 
1982, p. 58. 
66Financial Times, 2 May, 1986. Also European Chemical News issues of 4 November, 1991; 9 March, 
and 16 March, 1992. 
Suggestions about the formation of a crisis cartel for the petrochemical industry continued to appear in 
the press; there were discussions at the Association of Petrochemical Producers in Europe in this regard 
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The majority of these large petrochemical companies operate in markets on both sides 
of the Atlantic, and globally. Both Paraskevopoulos (1988) and Lieberman (1987a) fail 
to take these developments into consideration and seem to suggest that the industries 
they study were competitively priced. Gilbert & Lieberman (1987, p. 118) show that in 
concentrated sections of the petrochemical industry capacity could be used to preempt 
rivals' expansions; but were unsure about whether such behaviour was intentional or 
profitable. Declining prices and low capacity utilisation rates need not always be signs 
of a competitive industry (Caves & Porter 1977). The concerned industries continued 
to invest even during periods of severe overcapacity. Companies with strong competitive 
advantage took this opportunity to retire old plants, and replace them with new more 
efficient and larger plants employing the latest technology. They also engaged in a series 
of mergers and product line swaps. As a result, small and the less efficient producers were 
forced out of the market in the process67. All these moves can, if anything, be classified 
as strategic moves in the long-run scheme of events. They aim to reduce the number of 
industry players, thereby easing the pressure of competition and improving profitability. 
Although Stigler (1964, p. 45) takes a more acute view, and considers outright merger 
of firms as the most comprehensive form of collusion. 
Industry consolidation through the acquisition of opponents capacity, or preemptive 
investment that eventually leads to the exit of competitors, is one way of avoiding engage-
ment in illegal practices such as price fixing arrangements when competition is strong. 
In any case, price coordination is rather difficult to achieve in fragmented industries and 
which prompted Karel Van Miert the European Commissioner for Competition, to address the issue in 
a long article, restating the Commission's industrial policy. It was made clear that the Commission was 
ready to assess the situation provided it was satisfied that the situation did not arise from a temporary 
dip in the business cycle, and that a major restructuring of capacity was necessary. He alluded to the 
recent anticompetitive arrangements and subsequent fines, and that the Commission will not hesitate 
to take similar measures to uphold the principles of competition law. Competition Policy in the EC, 
European Chemical News, European Review, December issue, 1993, pp. 7-9. 
67In addition to the account of Paraskevopoulos (1988) of the restructuring process in the VCM and 
PVC industries, other petrochemical products were subject to a similar phenomenon, and in most cases 
the same group of large petrochemical companies were involved. Also these arrangements included the 
geographical redistribution of markets. For instance in 1992, ICI swapped its worldwide nylon assets with 
Du Pont's acrylics as part of a deal to rationalise their assets (European Chemical News, 1 September, 
1992, p. 5). Five years later in a deal estimated at US$ 3 billion, Du Pont acquired ICI's polyester fibres 
and PET (polyethylene terephthalate the plastic widely used for carbonated drinks bottles) worldwide 
operations, as ICI continued to concentrate its operations in speciality chemicals and away from com-
modities. An account of those developments for the world petrochemical industry can be consulted in 
Arora, Landau & Rosenberg (1998, chp. 13), Chapman (1991), Stobaugh (1988), and Fayad & Motamen 
(1986, chp. 2,3). 
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is usually short lived. In the US where antitrust laws are pursued more stringently than 
in other parts of the world68 , this was the industry preferred strategy to avoid the inter-
vention of the Federal Trade Commission (Scherer & Ross 1990, chp. 10). Consolidation 
following severe competition and market restructuring, produces the desired effect of im-
proving price margins, and restoring profitability. The developments in the US styrene 
industry (as in Section 5.3 above) appear to follow a similar pattern. 
Another view, is that in some industries, firms find it preferable to engage in price 
wars than to buyout competitors, as this gives the impression of a tough industry with 
a competitive environment (Fudenberg & Tirole 1983; Wenders 1971). However, when 
capital investment outlays are very large, and raw materials costs high, which is particu-
larly the case with basic petrochemicals, this kind of activity causes the engaging firms to 
suffer substantial losses with damaging effects on their profitability, and their ability to 
finance future investments. Coordinating investments, and capacity expansions becomes 
an incentive when only a small number of players is involved, and the industry has good 
growth prospects. The main players are encouraged to cooperate, however implicitly, by 
the prospect of maintaining, or expanding their market shares, together with minimising 
price erosion in a growing market. 
It is interesting to note that of the world's top three styrene producers, Dow, BASF 
and Shell, only Dow operates directly in the US market, which until recently was the 
largest world market for styrene. Dow has been following an investment strategy which 
is accommodating towards its rivals in the US for the last three decades by allowing its 
market share to fall over long periods, as its rivals expand their capacities (see Table 5.3). 
At the same time Dow has been expanding its global investments in styrene making it 
the world's largest producer. Similarly BASF and Shell operate on a global scale when 
deciding on where investments are made. 
In the industrial organisation literature there is no shortage of evidence of price co-
ordination, and of stories of cartel formation in different industries over the years. The 
histories of the salt and sugar industries give a perfect example of homogenous product 
industries; the long histories of the development of the these industries extending over 
68The exception being the case of Microsoft Corporation, where it was acquitted in the US, but was 
heavily fined in Europe for its monopolistic practices. 
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more than a century, provided a good number of studies which analyse the economic 
evolution of the two industries69. In the US the Federal Trade Commission would in-
vestigate the industry activities, issuing new regulations and fines to discipline the salt 
industry throughout the 1920 and 1930's. It continued to intervene in the 1950's and 
1960's also, against cases of price fixing arrangements by some of the leading companies. 
In many instances, US salt regional markets were controlled to the tune of more than 
90%, by the top three producers. 
Also in the UK, following a wave of investments and mergers in the 1950's and 1960's, 
the salt industry became effectively a duopoly with two firms controlling 95% of the mar-
ket. The Mergers Commission intervened in 1986 to regulate prices after an investigation 
found that there was a lack of effective competition. More recently, a case brought to 
the high court by the NHS (National Health Service) against five generic drug produc-
ers, for allegations of fixing prices and allocating market shares, was making headlines. 
Involved in the case, although indirectly, was the pharmaceuticals global producer Glaxo-
SmithKline. The case70 is still in its early stages, but its details are worthy of note as a 
typical example of coordination in a concentrated market where the stakes are high. 
Several other examples abound from the US regarding the monopolistic practices of 
some companies. The Justice Department challenged the dominant position of two major 
companies, IBM and AT&T in their respective markets71. Court cases were brought in 
1975 against IBM's control of the computer market, and AT&T's of the communications 
69  See Sutton (1.991, chp. 6) for a discussion of these industries, and cited references for further account. 
70The health secretary lodged a lawsuit on behalf of the NHS, seeking damages for £120 million from 
5 generic drugs companies in the UK. The NHS accuses these companies of fixing the price of the generic 
equivalent of the anti-ulcer drug Zantac, marketed by Glaxo-SmithKline. The case arose when the 
patent on Zantac expired in 1997, and the 5 new producers entered the UK market but prices remained 
practically unchanged. Glaxo-SmithKline had supplied the largest of the five producers with a generic 
version of the drug, and was not directly involved in price fixing arrangements. But according to the filed 
case, documents seized by the Office of Fair Trading appear to show that the 5 companies mistakenly 
believed that Glaxo-SmithKline was in the cartel with them, and they set aside 34% of the UK generic 
market for Glaxo-SmithKline, and attempted to fix prices. Top selling drugs protected by patents are 
very important for pharmaceutical companies. Zantac's sales in 1996 of £2.2 billion accounted for almost 
a quarter of Glaxo-SmithKline's total sales ( Glaxo ensnared in 12Orn lawsuit over drugs 'cartel', Sunday 
Times, 22 August, 2004, p. 7). 	• 
In 1988 Zantac accounted for as much as 49% of Glaxo's pharmaceuticals sales, and Tagamat a rival 
ulcer treatment drug produced by SmithKline accounted for 51% of its sales. The two companies merged 
in 2000 during the wave of pharmaceutical companies mergers which began in the second half of the 
1990's. An interesting and detailed account analysing pharmaceutical companies marketing strategies, 
and oligopolistic practices, covering Zantac and similar drugs appears in Sutton (1998, chp. 8). 
71Refer to Scherer & Ross (1990, pp. 459-464) and cited references for a detailed account of these 
developments. 
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and related equipment market. By 1982 the case against IBM was dropped due to fast 
technological advances that were being made and that brought about the mini and per-
sonal computers and changed the market for computers; while AT&T was broken up 
into three constituent companies. Earlier on, Alcoa was also forced to divest some of 
its aluminium assets, following its aggressive investment strategy of preempting its much 
smaller rivals in the 1950's, that left it in a dominant position in the US aluminium mar-
ket (Reynolds 1983, 1986). Du Pont's conduct in titanium dioxide, a chemical used as a 
whitener in the paints industry, was similar to that of Alcoa; its successive investments 
were shown to preempt its rivals giving it a leading edge and a large controlling market 
share (Ghemawat 1984, Hall 1990, Scherer & Ross 1990, Rosenbaum & Ye 1992). Du 
Pont was found to be following a limit pricing policy that would starve its competitors 
of the necessary funds to compete with it effectively, and was subsequently forced by the 
Federal Trade Commission in the late 1970's, to divest two of its plants and to license 
its technology to its competitors. On a previous occasion also, Du Pont was ordered 
to license its nylon technology, in which it also had a dominant market share in the 
1950's, to Monsanto without receiving any licensing fees from the latter (Arora, Landau 
& Rosenberg 1998, p. 92). More recently an antitrust case was brought against Du Pont 
Dow Elastomers, a 50-50 joint venture between the two companies, in the US District 
Court of Columbia for price fixing of rubber chemicals72. The company reached a settle-
ment, subject to court approval, with buyers of polychloroprene a synthetic rubber used 
widely in tyres, to pay them US$ 36 million plus attorney's fees for alleged overcharges 
from 1999 to 2003. 
Collusive behaviour can be found in other industries and a wide range of countries 
as well; besides OPEC in oil, cartels were operating in one way or another and with 
different degrees of success, in many countries and in different industries73: In steel 
(Yamawaki 1984,1985, Baker 1989), aluminium, and cement (Steen & Sorgard 1999), to 
name only a few besides those noted above in petrochemicals. The point to note here 
is not necessarily that the US styrene industry operated in collusion, but that firms, 
"Price-Fixing Investigations Continue, Chemical Market Reporter, 28 June, 2004, p. 2. 
73See also cartels that were operating in the US and other countries surveyed in Scherer & Ross (1990, 
chp. 12) 
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which are after all industrial establishments whose main objective is to generate profits 
for their shareholders, have a tendency to take advantage of opportunities that arise 
to collude directly or indirectly; and an oligopolistic market is more conducive to this 
behaviour, where it is more likely to lead to success, especially in situations where a 
small number of players are involved. In view of the experience of recent history, and 
firms' behaviour in oligopolistic industries, the findings of studies of these industries 
that overlook strategic intentions, or possible forms of collusion of its participants that 
operate in highly concentrated markets, should be treated with caution. The onus is on 
the regulatory authorities to detect and deal with these incidents when they arise, as has 
been the case on numerous occasions. 
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
Studies of investment behaviour of firms, that are concerned with processes of exit and 
entry, tell only half the story when they neglect to account for the impact of investment 
on changes in market structure. By and large, these studies confine their attention to 
measuring the determinants of the process of entry, in relation to the presence of over-
capacity. Capital investment in new capacity secures for the firm its claim for long term 
share of the market. Output is bound by capacity. And like with all large scale process-
ing industries, in the petrochemicals industry expansion of capacity and its adjustment 
is slow, and requires planning and substantial investment of capital. 
In industries that are characterised by economies of scale and learning effects, such 
as petrochemicals, raising capacity allows the firm to move further down the long-run 
average cost curve. A firm with a larger capital stock (plant) has a competitive advantage 
over its smaller rivals. With a larger plant not only can it produce at a lower cost, but it 
can also accumulate larger production volumes to its credit, and gain learning experience 
more quickly; which in turn enables the firm to reduce its costs further, at a higher rate 
than its competitors. Also additional capacity gives the firm the capability to service its 
customers when demand rises unexpectedly. A firm may be willing to incur higher costs 
of carrying excess capacity, so that it can meet unexpected rises in demand. Furthermore, 
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excess capacity in an industry gives outsiders the impression that the industry is a loose 
oligopoly prone to price wars and cyclical bouts of low margins and possible losses, which 
discourages entry into the industry (Kirman & Masson 1986). 
With these characteristics in mind, I proceeded in this chapter to examine the in-
vestment behaviour of the six major styrene producers that dominated the US styrene 
industry since 1974, using the dynamic capacity expansion model, and four different sce-
narios of investment strategies, ranging from competitive price taking environment, to 
open-loop Nash-Cournot , feedback Nash-Cournot , and Stackelberg leadership, that were 
discussed in Chapter 4. The model captures the interaction between the different firms, 
and the competitive nature of the market directly. 
Technological advances in chemical engineering and process technology, that had a 
profound impact on increasing the size of petrochemical plants, were found to be present 
in the styrene industry. The sizes of plants increased by a factor of ten fold over a 
period of three decades, and resulted in a considerable reduction of the unit investment 
cost required per tonne of styrene produced. Furthermore, learning effects where firms 
through their experience in production operations, introduce cost saving measures were 
at work in the styrene industry. 
In formulating the model for the simulations of the styrene industry developments, 
both of these effects were taken into consideration explicitly. When evaluating the in-
vestment cost for each firm, the economies of scale that were implemented by the styrene 
industry, were accounted for in each firm's investment cost function. Cost savings on 
the basis of a styrene industry learning curve, were also accounted for in each firm's 
production costs as they changed over time. 
Using empirical data from the styrene industry, the simulation results show that the 
investment behaviour of the major styrene producers, is best described by the feedback 
Nash-Cournot model. This suggests that the firms were pursuing strategic investment 
policies. In all the cases considered, the firms in industry held more capacity than would 
be necessary to meet demand, had the firms been following optimal investment strategies 
that maximise their profits (these results are consistent with those found by Reynolds 
(1986) in the aluminium industry; but in the case of styrene, the model has better 
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predictive power in explaining most of the industry overcapacity). This outcome was 
found to be consistent when different values of price elasticity of demand were examined, 
ranging from strongly inelastic demand (e = 0.50), to market conditions of moderately 
elastic demand (E = 1.20). 
The feedback Nash-Cournot model provided a better representation of capacity ac-
cumulation and expansion than the open-loop and Stackelberg models. The feedback 
Nash-Cournot strategy for our base case (Ncfb7), explains most of the excess capac-
ity experienced by industry. The evolution of capacity and styrene price it generates, 
are consistent with industry developments. If we are to believe the game theory story 
on strategic behaviour in Nash-Cournot games and the [explanation for the] incidence of 
overcapacity, then by following investment feedback strategies, the firms exercise a strate-
gic intent to influence the investment behaviour of their competitors. Excess capacity 
in this respect may be used to preempt rivals expansions, as well as to deter entry, or 
mobility of nouvo producers. When all the firms implement such a strategy the outcome 
is industry wide overcapacity. 
Notwithstanding the strategic behaviour, excess capacity may also be plausibly used 
by firms to counter the effect of uncertainty of demand, an element which has been 
assumed away in this chapter. We have allowed, like all deterministic models, the firms 
to have full foresight of future demand. In the next chapter I examine the effect of 
demand uncertainty on the capacity expansion of profit maximising firms, and on the 
extent of industry overcapacity. 
We have also examined developments in the styrene industry since 1974. The indus-
try continued to grow at high rates over this period, with capacity rising from just under 
2.7 million tonnes in 1975, to more than 5.7 million tonnes in 2000; and will increase 
by another one million tonnes, if all the expansions now underway or planned, come on 
stream by 2005. However, despite the considerable activity apparently taking place in the 
industry, only two entries may be classified as nouvo entries into the US styrene market, 
namely, Arco and Westlake. The rest were mergers or takeovers involving new ownership 
of existing producers and their facilities. All firms took advantage of an expanding mar-
ket to build new capacity over this period; but the market growth opportunities, did not 
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lead to an increase in the number of industry players. Two trends appear to have taken 
place in parallel: (a) Small firms expanded their capacity in a Nash-Cournot fashion. 
Cos-Mar and Chevron moved from being small producers in the early 1970's, to join the 
league of top producers in a series of expansions (see Table 5.3). Nova joined the race a 
decade later; and more recently moved to become one of the global styrene players. Each 
of these companies now holds a market position comparable to that of the traditional 
leading companies in the styrene market, such as Lyondell and Dow. Their new positions 
were reinforced by the new capacities that came on stream in 2004 and 2005. And (b) 
the increased level of activity in the industry heightened the level of competition, which 
eventually lead to the exit of a number of smaller producers from the market. A restruc-
turing process was precipitated, with some of the large players such as Monsanto, Shell, 
Union Carbide and Hoechst exiting the US styrene market and repositioning themselves 
in other more profitable segments of the chemical industry (Monsanto and Hoechst), 
or by reorganising their global operations and moving into other geographical markets 
(Shell). Following the second wave of mergers in the 1990's, the industry became more 
concentrated; and profit margins remained high. 
In view of the large market opportunities that the growing styrene industry offers, 
and very low level of entry over long periods, can we deduce that the industry incumbents 
have succeeded in reducing the level of entry, and in deterring mobility, by employing 
excess capacity? Our model results suggest that the firms invested strategically, and 
excess capacity was persistently present in the industry. Entry deterrence was not total 
in the styrene industry as entry deterrence models would suggest; but entry was effectively 
minimal. On theoretical grounds also, as suggested by Dixit (1980), the incumbents would 
not carry out their threats once entry occurred. In a dynamic setting Dixit's argument 
becomes even more convincing. In a growing market, growth opportunities make it 
easier and less painful for incumbents to accommodate a new entrant. By following 
Nash-Cournot strategies, the firms can generate more profits, and there is less likelihood 
of resorting to a price war. 
Other factors, that hindered entry, were at work as well. Merger activity lead to 
industry consolidation, leaving a smaller number of firms active in the market. The in- 
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dustry is now served by eight producers. With a smaller number of players, coordination 
of investment activity, and production discipline is by far easier than in loose oligopolies, 
where agreements are more difficult to enforce, and are prone to breaking down. Co-
ordination in the styrene industry was taking place at more than one level. As well as 
engaging in the signalling and announcement game for new capacity investments; some of 
the firms would cooperate more directly on the supply side of the industry by arranging 
long term contracts, swapping agreements for styrene product, or through direct joint 
investment in large scale projects. 
Another two characteristic features of the petrochemical industry linked to entry 
barriers, that were strongly evident in the styrene industry, are the vertical integration 
of production operations, and economies of scale. Although with the advent of large scale 
plants, significant cost savings in production costs could be achieved, and unit investment 
cost per tonne of styrene product were much lower; the sheer size of new large plants 
meant that the absolute capital investment required for the new projects were rising all 
the time. This trend places smaller producers under additional financial pressure, should 
they want to stay competitive and keep pace with industry developments. Integration 
of production operations, upstream to secure supply of raw materials (mainly ethylene, 
but also benzene for larger producers) by direct investment in their own facilities, or 
through long term contracts, was compounded by the effect of economies of scale, and 
the requirement for large investments in the form of setup costs. Capital investment 
costs for new large styrene plants, run into hundreds of millions of dollars. Financial 
burdens of this magnitude can be afforded only by large industrial enterprises, and is 
beyond the reach of most small industry players. Also, when major styrene producers 
integrate downstream into styrene derivatives not only do they secure higher value added 
for their styrene product, but they also crowd out potential suppliers, such as prospective 
entrants, from the market. 
Chapter 6 
Capacity Expansion Under 
Demand Uncertainty 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas the firms in previous chapters have been treated as being able to foresee future 
demand developments, giving them the chance to plan for future capacity expansions 
accurately; in this chapter the demand is treated as stochastic. The firms hold rational 
expectations about the stochastic process that drives the demand for the homogenous 
product they produce. That is the level of demand in the current period is known to all 
firms but its future value is uncertain; however, the mean and variance of the stochastic 
process are known to all firms. I adopt a geometric Brownian motion process (GBM) 
with time invariant mean and variance. This type of process is particularly suited for 
the problem tackled in this thesis, and has been widely used to model securities prices in 
financial markets as well as in the investment literature to model commodities prices, or 
the value of an investment in a project producing a product that is subject to a demand 
that follows a GBM process (Pindyck 1982, 1988, 1991, McDonald & Siegel 1985, Brenan 
& Schwartz 1985, Kulatilaka & Perotti 1992, Dixit & Pindyck 1994, Slade 2001). In 
addition to its appeal from an analytical point of view, a GBM process describes very 
well the evolution of economic developments. Firms may have an idea about the general 
level of demand, especially in a growing industry where the trend may be known, but it 
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would fluctuate along its path; and this is what a GBM process models. 
Uncertainty about other variables could also be envisaged as well. Uncertainty about 
raw materials costs, or capital investment costs has important implications for the prof-
itability of firms. And would no doubt have a bearing on the investment, or production 
decision of the firm. But in the context of planning capacity expansions, it is the ex-
pected level of demand for its products that is of crucial importance for the firm. Most 
petrochemical firms are integrated in their operations, and could pass, with relative ease, 
rises in raw materials costs onto down stream products; or they can absorb these rises in 
the chain of products involved in the production process. Also capital investment costs 
per unit of product produced, form only a small proportion of the final product total 
cost. For the investing firm, the way demand evolves in the future, and any uncertainty 
about the level of demand remain the main causes of concern. 
The rate of growth of demand (and consequently price through the inverse demand 
function) is being modelled with a certain degree of confidence in this chapter. The firms 
are concerned about the rate of growth of demand, from its current level to the not too 
distant future as a means for planning their investments or production schedules. And 
this has the obvious bearing on the rate of capacity utilisation and the rate of capital 
accumulation, with direct implications for profitability. 
6.2 	Demand Uncertainty and Capacity Planning in the Lit- 
erature 
The literature on the optimal capacity held by a firm facing uncertainty about demand, 
output price, or costs has been dealt with using different approaches. The investment 
behaviour of the firm, is contingent on whether capital is reversible or irreversible; also 
the presence of adjustment costs and the form of the production function have an impact 
on the direction of the investment-uncertainty relationship. 
One strand of the literature involves adjustment costs, and capital reversibility such 
as in Abel (1983), Caballero (1991), and Abel & Eberly (1994). In these works, increased 
uncertainty facing industry leads firms to increase their investment. Pindyck (1982, 1988) 
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also finds that a firm facing convex adjustment costs, and depreciating capital when 
subjected to stochastic demand or a price process of the GBM type, has an incentive to 
hold more capital. Under these conditions it is optimal for the firm to increase its stock 
of capital with increasing uncertainty. 
Whereas in the option pricing literature uncertainty leads to the opposite effect. Firms 
in this case are faced with uncertainty about the price of their output which is determined 
exogenously, and is subject to a GBM process. Like in the financial literature increasing 
volatility of price increases the option value of the project, and as a result firms hold on 
investment awaiting more information. This leads to a decline in investment. Capital is 
assumed to be irreversible in this case. And the main concern for firms in this strand of 
the literature is the relationship between price volatility and the timing of investment at 
the optimal price that maximises the value of the firm. A good survey of this literature 
is found in Pindyck (1991); and Dixit & Pindyck (1994) provide an extensive coverage a 
with wide range of examples of different applications. 
Abel & Eberly (1997) extend their previous work to the case of capital irreversibil-
ity; they find that irreversibility does not change the investment behaviour of firms, but 
it reduces its value. Similarly, Kobila (1991) find a generalised solution to the opti-
mal investment problem of the firm under uncertainty and irreversibility. Uncertainty 
is introduced in general form into the profit function, and can take the form of demand 
uncertainty, stochastic product price, input price uncertainty, or a random disturbance 
into the production function or cost function. The problem is formulated into a gener-
alised Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. They1 find the decision rule for investment, 
when the inverse demand function is subject to a Brownian motion process; and show 
that there is a risk premium due to uncertainty and irreversibility which leads to smaller 
optimal capacity under those conditions, than under reversible capital. They go on fur-
ther to show that Pindyck's (1988) results of the firms investment under uncertainty and 
irreversibility are a special case of their general result (Theorem 3, p. 183). 
Baldursson (1998) studies the behaviour of an oligopoly facing uncertain demand and 
irreversible capital. He derives optimal investment rules in the forms of a trigger price 
1Kobila is an acronym for a group of researchers at the Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo, Norway, 
and the Institute of Mathematics, University of Oslo. 
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at which firms can enter the market, as the industry develops from a monopoly to a 
competitive industry. 
Despite considerable advances made in theoretical work, empirical work in the area 
of capacity expansion under uncertain demand remains fairly small. Letteri (2000) intro-
duces uncertain demand in the context of a water resource planning problem, and utilise 
an option pricing approach as in Dixit & Pindyck (1994). In her case, the dynamic capac-
ity expansion problem is carried out for a single firm. Pineau & Murto (2000) evaluate 
capacity expansion for different types of power generation plants in the Finnish market. 
They apply the open-loop stochastic S-adapted solution concept, introduced by Haurie, 
Zaccour & Smeers (1990), to solve the investment problem and find optimal capacity ex-
pansion scenarios. In both of these studies uncertainty cause firms to increase investment 
and accumulate more capacity. 
Paraskevopoulos, Karakitsos & Rustem (1991) evaluate capacity planning in the West 
European PVC industry under demand uncertainty. Bell & Campa (1997) study the US 
chemical industry in an uncertain environment. They find that firms' investment is more 
sensitive to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates; and increased uncertainty reduces 
investment and leads firms to expand into foreign markets. 
6.3 Model Formulation for a Duopoly Under Demand Un-
certainty 
Once again for clarity of exposition, I now consider the case where the market is served 
by a duopoly, and make the same assumptions about the two firms as in Chapter 3, 
and follow the same steps in formulating the problem. To remind ourselves, the firms 
produce at full capacity, such that production is equivalent to capacity in place; and they 
face negligible production costs. Both firms are risk neutral and have existing capacities 
installed as before; but they are now faced with uncertain demand. An inverse demand 
function is again considered to represent the price that clears the market. The derived 
demand equation (3.7) of Chapter 3 now has the scalar a replaced by a random variable 
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0, and is represented by the following equation: 
P = 0 — b(k1 + k2) 	 (6.1) 
All terms and assumptions are defined as before, and the two firms' capacities are k1 and 
k2. We assume that the random variable 6 follows a GBM process: 
de = pte dt + ce dz 	 (6.2) 
where kt is the expected growth rate of 0 per unit of time, and o is the standard deviation 
of the proportional change in 0 per unit of time; and where 0 is non-negative, that is 
E [0, oo). In the above equation o- dz represents the variability in the path of the 
expected growth rate of e; where z is a Weiner process with a zero drift rate, and a 
variance of 1.0. The rate of change of z over a short period of time dt is given by 
dz = elat, where e is a random draw from a standard normal distribution. 
Before proceeding, I make the following assumptions about the two firms: 
1. The market is served by two firms only, and derived demand is given exogenously 
and is driven by a GBM process as in equation (6.2) above. Price is market clearing, 
and there are no inventories held from one period to another. 
2. The firms are risk neutral, and discount their future profits at the risk free interest 
rate r. 
3. Both p, and o are time invariant, and are constant over the entire planning horizon 
from to to T. Changes in 0 are exogenously generated; and its initial value Oo, at 
time to, is known to both firms, however, its future values are unknown, but the 
firms know its distribution which follows equation (6.2) above. 
4. Costs are known with certainty for all firms for the entire planning horizon. 
Since the price of the output follows a random process, the profit of each firm also 
will now become random, and follows the same process. The value of the firm Ji (to), and 
how capacity evolves have the same formulation as equations (3.1) and (3.2) defined in 
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Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. With the value function now involving a random process, the 
equation should include the expectation operator, as we now take the expected value of 
the random process as it evolves over time. 
Ji = max El f e — rt wi dt + Fi(k, Til 	i = 1, 2 ui 	to 
subject to 
ki = ui — ski 
where: 
J, 	= value of firm i at time t. 
w, 	= single period net profit for firm i in period t. 
Fi(k,T) = salvage value of capital for firm i 
at the end of the planning horizon T. 
interest or discount rate. 
ki 	= capacity of firm i. 
ui 	= investment rate of firm i. 
discount or capital depreciation rate. 
The value of the project, Ji consists of two parts, a cash flow which is now uncertain 
represented by the integral term, and a reward or salvage value that the firm can recover 
at the end of the planning horizon T; this is represented by the second term Fi(k, T). 
This second term is not a function of any random variable, and is therefore deterministic, 
although its actual value is unknown. Its value can be obtained form the boundary 
conditions. In view of the long planning horizon contemplated, the salvage value term 
is assumed to be zero. Making this assumption does not affect the project value in any 
significant way. 
Equivalently the above equation can therefore be written as: 
T  J. , max{ f E[e— Tt wi] dt} 	 (6.5) 
to 
Let us concentrate on the cash flow term. Recall that net profit is defined as the operating 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
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profits less investment cost: 
wi(t) = (t) — (t) i = 1, 2 	 (6.6) 
The project is treated now as a series of European call options; in each period the firm 
pays /i (t) and receives a claim of 7ri(t) on future revenues, and generates a flow of wi (t) of 
profits. It can be assumed that the firm will produce as long as it covers a certain fixed 
cost Ci(t), which is known with certainty. To avoid making losses the firm's decision 
to produce is conditional on covering its fixed cost, and has the option to shut down. 
Otherwise the firm will not produce and it makes zero profits. As such the value of the 
per period profit of this uncertain cash flow is given by: 
E[wi] = E maxkri — /i, 	i = 1, 2 	 (6.7) 
Now since the price follows a GBM due to the influence of 0, the per period profit wi, 
which is linear in 0, also follows a GBM. The value of firm i profits wi, can be estimated 
conditional on the information available at the initial time to, if the probability density 
function, g(0), for the GBM process can be obtained. But it is known that the probability 
density function for a log-normally distributed random variable can be easily derived from 
that of a normal distribution2 , and is shown in equation (6.11) below (McDonald & Siegel 
1985). 
Starting from the GBM for the inverse demand, where we know the initial value of 
0o and its distribution i.e the two parameters .t and o- , we have: 
d0 
=pdt+a- dz 0 (6.8) 
First, we make a change of variable ft = In0, and then apply Ito's Lemma3 (see Dixit & 
2by the transformation fn(x) 	= f n(lnx) (Harris Si Stocker 1998, pp. 797-798). 
3Ito's Lemma when applied to a function of 0, /2 = f (0) = InO, where 0 follows equation (6.8) states 
that: 
df (0) = dsz = f (8) .4, 	1 a2 f (6)  (0)2 (-1 2 ao 
	
atae 	82 t7,e remembering that 	 = 	, and using equation (6.8), while eliminating higher order ae e 
terms we obtain (6.9). 
00 
2 
[(esY41.1  — b(ki 	kj)) ki 	
e 
Tr dy 
	 (6.13) 
.\/ 
wi ( t ) = 1_,_!....LnC • — 
CHAPTER 6. CAPACITY EXPANSION UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 296 
Pindyck 1994; for a more detailed treatment of the topic with examples see Dixit 1993, 
and Harrison 1985). We obtain the stochastic equation for 1720, namely: 
1nOt —17200 = 	— 2 a2 ) dt + Q dz 	 (6.9) 
This can be written as: 
d12-= v dt -1- a dz 	 (6.10) 
which is normally distributed. So 12 = 1nO t has a mean xi = 17200 + 	— 2a2 )t and a 
variance s2 = a2 t. Since 1720 t is normally distributed then the density function g(0), for 
0, which is log-normally distributed, is written formally as g(0 t ; v, s, 00 ) and is given by: 
1 	( 1 (1n0 — 	2 
1 
) 
g(0) = 	ex 
.270s p 2 s ) 
With the density function of the log-normally distributed process B t known, we can now 
proceed to estimate the expected value of profits: 
wi(t) = 	(7rt It) 	
1 
- 
Os exp (1 (1n0 — 	2) 
2 s ) d0 
(6.12) 
(6.11) 
= f:,(0 b(ki kj)) ki Id 1 	1 ( ln0 — v) 
T71-0.s exP (2 	s 
2) 
d0 i j, i = 1,2 
Now let in g—u = y, so 0 = esY±v and d0 = sesY+udy. Substituting in the above equation 
of the expected value of profits we get: 
co 	esy± 
if r 
2 	 2 
oo e 2 2 
Wi(t) 	 ki 	dy f 	[bki(ki + ki) + e 
T7i dy 
	(6.14) 
V 
Once again we let y = y s, which implies that y = 	s and dy = d7, and reevaluate 
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the above equation to get: 
00 	k
z 
• 	 - .)2  
W i(t) =- 	 v/..Tr es'14s )±ve 2 ay In Ci—v 	2  
s 
00 	 2 
[bki (ki + ki)+ 	
e 
2 
	 dy (6.15) 
7r 
2 
00 it,_i_c_L_t°0 	s ,,Ti.ki 	-y2 s2+2y  = 	 e 2 e 2 c17 — j 	[bki (ki + ki) + Ii] e r dy (6.16) 
InCi—v 
8 	 s 
.=2.— 	00 
	
a) 	e 2 e 2 
= ki eV+ 
f 
dy f
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v — 1nCi 
lc 
) 
= , [bki(ki + kj) + iiJN (6.18) 
= ki eu+4 N(di) — [bki(ki + ki )+ Ii ]N(d2 ) 	 (6.19) 
d -41 g 	 ___j_—v , where we defined, N(d1 ) = 5 co - \---/2-77 -r dy, and N(—di) = 1— N(di). Also d1  = s in c, 
and d2 = v—isci ; or equivalently d2 = d1  — s. Now since v = ln,00 + Cu — J2- o-2 )t, and 
s2 = a 2t,  by substituting for s and v in the above equations for d1  and d2 , we obtain the 
value of the firm profits in terms of the known parameters of the original GBM equation. 
1nCi — v 	a-2t —1nCi +1n00 + 	2(3-2 )t 
di =- s 
o-V-t 
SO 
1n22, -1-(u+-1-4 ,72 )t 
d1 — 	  and 
In 6211_4_( 
d2 = c11 	 ci of 
20-2 )t 
therefore using these values in the above equation for the expected value of the firm 
profits we obtain: 
wi(t) = eo ki et' N(d1 ) — [bki(ki + ki)+ Ii]N(d2) 
	
(6.20) 
where all the values 00 , Ci ,o- and /..c are known. Also d1  and d2 can now be estimated. 
It can be seen that this equation has the same form as the value of the project in 
McDonald & Siegel (1985); which is also analogous to the Black-Scholes equation (Black 
Scholes 1973). 
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It is possible therefore to evaluate the expected values of future profits for each firm 
conditional on the known initial conditions. This entails summing the discounted values 
of the expected future profits, wi (t), up to time T, each firm will then be able to determine 
the net present value of its investment ..1,(to), by implementing equation (6.3) subject to 
the state equation (6.4), that is: 
Ji = max{ f Crt 090 ki 	N(d1 ) — [bki(ki + kj) + 	(d2 )) 	i = 1, 2 (6.21) ui 
subject to 
-= ui — (ski 	 (6.22) 
The problem can then be formulated as a two point boundary value problem, as in 
Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3, and a solution is then obtained by solving a set of Riccati 
equations. The optimal investment strategy vector, u* = (u1, u2)' for both firms is given 
by an equation similar to (3.77) (see Section 3.4.2.1, p. 121), but now involves stochastic 
terms. 
u* = 	1 (I, 	B' (AID + 	 (6.23) 
Bearing in mind now that the value of wi (t) is changing continuously with time, as given 
by equation (6.20). From the solution of the Riccati equations we can determine the 
values of A and ', and therefore the optimal value u*. Finding the optimal path of the 
capacities for both firms is then obtained by a straightforward implementation of u* in 
equation (6.4). The results are shown in Figure 6.1 below. Firm 2 which starts from a 
lower capital stock (in this case it is assumed to enter the market at to, with k2 (to) = 0; 
while firm 1 starts from a capacity of k1(to) = 10) invests initially at a higher rate than 
firm 1 as pane (b) of the figure illustrates. It can be seen also that the investment rate 
curve follows a concave-convex shape. This is because when the two firms follow optimal 
investment strategies, they start from a high rate of investment initially, which then 
declines slowly and stabilises as the two firms accumulate more capacity. Towards the 
end of the life of the project, the investment rate starts to decline again. This results 
from the fact that the marginal value of any additional unit of capital declines due to its 
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short life before the project's economic life comes to a close. 
Eventually firm 2 will catch up with firm 1; the capacities of the two firms converge 
and they share the market, since both have the same costs. Because of uncertainty the 
two firms invest more, and they achieve equilibrium at a capacity level of about 25 kt/year 
each, which is significantly higher than under deterministic demand. A comparison of the 
impact of demand uncertainty on capacity accumulated by the duopoly, with the results 
when demand conditions are deterministic is shown in Figure 6.2. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Kulatilaka & Perotti (1998), where increasing uncertainty 
increases the value of the project. This is because of the convexity of the value of the 
project wrt B, the stochastic variable. Note that the optimal control vector u* involves 
the demand stochastic variable 8; and the value function is quadratic in u* (see equation 
(3.21), or (3.71)). As uncertainty about demand increases, the value of the project, which 
involves 02 , increases at a faster rate because of its convexity. For the capacity expansion 
problem of the duopoly in our case, uncertainty about demand therefore causes the firms 
to invest in more capacity than under deterministic demand. The cost of investment is 
deterministic and bounded, whereas the demand expectations are increasing with time, 
and the firm has the option to shut down to avoid costs exceeding revenues when demand 
fails to materialise. 
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(a) Duopoly capacity for NC feedback game with deterministic demand 
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(a) Duopoly capacity for stochastic demand 
(b) Investment rate 
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Figure 6.1: Optimal capacity expansion and investment for a duopoly facing stochastic 
demand: it = 0%, Q = 15%, 00 = 100, b = 2, ci = 10, c2 = 10, Ci(t) = 70, di = 50, 
d2 = 50, b = 0.10, r = 0.05, ki(to) = 10, k2(to) = 0. 
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(b) Duopoly capacity for NC feedback with stochastic demand 
Figure 6.2: Optimal capacity expansion for a duopoly facing (a) deterministic and (b) 
stochastic demand conditions: /I = 0%, o = 15%, 00 = 100, a = 100, b = 2, ci =- 10, 
c2 = 10, CZ (t) = 70, di = 50, d2 = 50, 5 = 0.10, r = 0.05, ki(to) = 10, k2 (t0) = 0. 
CHAPTER 6. CAPACITY EXPANSION UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 301 
6.4 	Styrene Industry Optimal Capacity with Uncertain De- 
mand 
Uncertainty about the demand for styrene affects the overall demand facing the six major 
styrene producers (referred to as major-6 or M6 in the figures of this chapter). As in 
the case for duopoly, all the firms hold the same expectations about how the demand is 
evolving. Because the firms do not hold any inventory, their total output is equivalent 
to the demand in each period. I will look at two approaches in which demand is affected 
by the uncertainty process. In the first I will follow the approach of the option pricing 
literature where the inverse demand intercept a follows a GBM process as in Section 6.3; 
while in the second I will consider that the quantity of styrene product demanded follows 
a GBM process. 
6.4.1 Uncertainty Affecting Inverse Demand Parameters 
Consider the approach followed in the option pricing literatures as in Pindyck (1991), 
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) and Kulatilaka & Perotti (1992). This is a situation where the 
intercept of the inverse demand function, a, follows a GBM process as in Section 6.3, 
equation (6.20). All firms are therefore aware of how the demand is evolving and have 
full knowledge of its parameters: 
da = ua dt as dz 	 (6.24) 
Using 1974 as the base year the major styrene producer firms know the starting values 
a1974 = 2399, and b1974 = 1.04. The styrene produced by these firms over the period 
1974-1996 grew at a compounded average annual rate of 4.3%. I will assume that the 
major-6 firms had full knowledge of this growth potential for styrene so, u = 4.3%, and 
that they had expected a modest variation of demand a = 15%. 
Following the analysis of Section 6.3, suppose that each firm will keep its plant running 
and stay in production as long as its revenues can recover a portion of its fixed costs, which 
is the cost of its operating labour, C., 1 = mi,/ (t)ki. Where mi,/ is the operating labour 
cost per tonne of styrene for a medium size plant; and mi,_/, represent the remaining 
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unit fixed costs. The revenues are now stochastic and follow (6.24). As before each firm 
has full knowledge of the remaining costs, which are now assumed to be known with 
certainty. To simplify the calculations I will assume that all firms, irrespective of their 
size, face the same fixed cost that each needs to recover to stay in operation. 
To estimate the expected value of each firm's per period profits we follow the same 
steps as in Section 6.3, to obtain: 
1 
wilt) = a1974 xi eid N(di ) — [bxiX + mi,iki]N(d2) — fixi — 	— —2 
gi(xi — ki )2  
— 	
1 
— —di(ui — Jki)2 (6.25) 
je1974 	0 2)t 	 in“1974 +(.1-±2 )t 
where d1 = 	cr0 	, and d2 = d1 	= 	  
The value of the per period profit for each firm therefore evolves with time in accor-
dance with the above equation. wi (t), can be easily estimated since the moments of the 
stochastic process, and all the firm costs are known. We can follow the same steps as in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.6 and derive an equation equivalent to equation (5.11). The optimal 
output and investment rates for the industry can then be evaluated under this state of 
demand uncertainty as before. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
It is clear that over the period 1986-1996 the firms would invest and produce at higher 
rates than what was seen in industry if they were allowing for uncertainty in their plans. 
The model also under performs over the period from 1974-1985. A comparison is shown 
in Figure 6.4, between the model results with that of actual industry, and the results of 
the deterministic case Ncfb7 of Chapter 5. The figure shows that capacity accumulated 
by the major-6 styrene producers would have been higher under uncertainty especially 
for the latter period under study. 
6.4.2 Uncertainty Affecting Demand 
In this section I will consider the case where the demand for styrene is driven by a GBM 
process described below, where X =-- 	and xi is firm i's output: 
dX 	dt a- dz X (6.26) 
—e— Actual—M6 
• — • Actual—output 
Model—M6 
— Model—output 
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Figure 6.3: Model vs industry capacity and output for major-6 styrene producers facing 
stochastic demand: a1974 = 2399, b1974 = 1.04, it = 4.3%, a = 15%. 
the values forµ and a- can be estimated from the production of the six firms over the 
period 1974-1996 (data is given in Table B.1 in Appendix B). The underlying assumption 
is that over this period demand was driven by the GBM process just described. Equa-
tion (6.26) is normally distributed, finding the mean, p, and standard deviation, a, is 
therefore straightforward. It was found that ,tc = 5.37%, and a = 14.76%. Over a short 
period of time, A t, equation (6.26), can be written in discrete form: 
	
AXt = XoftAt ± Xocret 	 (6.27) 
where X0 is the initial level of demand, and c is a random draw from a standardised 
normal distribution. With all firms holding the same expectations about how future 
demand evolves, the entire sequence of values for Xt may be derived from the above 
equation, since X0 = X1974, tt, and a are all known, and c can be sampled from a 
standardised normal distribution. Recall also that the inverse demand equation (5.1) 
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Figure 6.4: Capacity evolution for deterministic and uncertain demand for major-6 
styrene producers: a 197 4 -= 2399, b1974 = 1.04, E.c = 5.37%, c = 14.76%. 
which determines the price in every period still holds: 
P(t) = a(t) — b(t)X(t) 
considering that the price elasticity of demand E = 0.70, the same procedure is followed as 
in Section 5.4 to estimate the values of a(t) and b(t). An OLS regression was performed to 
obtain the values for ao, "60 , 6e, and f3. However, a 2-stage OLS regression, which accounts 
for serial correlation in the errors of regression variables, was found to improve the results 
slightly in terms of higher R2 value, and slightly better Durbin-Watson statistics. The 
latter test was adopted. The values for a(t), and b(t) were evaluated as before; and 
the results are shown in Table 6.1. With the realisation of demand resolved, finding the 
optimal investment and output rates can proceed following the same way as in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.6. The results and main findings of the model when the firms follow feedback 
Nash-Cournot strategies are discussed next. 
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Table 6.1: Estimated derived demand function parameters with uncertain demand(f) 
Xs(t) OX E a(t) b(t) a(t) 6(t) 
1974 1773 .0 -172.02 -1.02 2251.29 0.747 2399.71 1.038 
1975 1601 .0 -8.94 -0.40 2265.86 0.833 2339.96 0.950 
1976 1592 .0 126.30 0.17 2207.57 0.816 2281.70 0.869 
1977 1718 .3 62.82 -0.12 1955.00 0.669 2224.89 0.795 
1978 1781 .2 375.41 1.06 1704.86 0.563 2169.49 0.728 
1979 2156 .6 37.70 -0.25 2608.29 0.711 2115.47 0.666 
1980 2194 .3 -373.66 -1.52 2474.71 0.663 2062.80 0.609 
1981 1820 .6 100.38 0.01 2482.00 0.802 2011.44 0.558 
1982 1921 .0 123.39 0.07 1993.86 0.611 1961.36 0.510 
1983 2044 .4 205.30 0.32 1857.86 0.535 1912.52 0.467 
1984 2249 .7 286.78 0.50 1804.43 0.472 1864.90 0.427 
1985 2536 .5 614.70 1.28 1542.14 0.358 1818.47 0.391 
1986 3151 .2 -85.58 -0.55 1148.71 0.214 1773.19 0.358 
1987 3065 .6 282.63 0.26 2348.43 0.451 1729.04 0.328 
1988 3348 .2 173.29 -0.01 2494.14 0.438 1685.99 0.300 
1989 3521. 5 -112.50 -0.58 1821.43 0.304 1644.01 0.274 
1990 3409 .0 1257.99 2.14 1848.14 0.319 1603.08 0.251 
1991 4667. 0 73.16 -0.26 1357.57 0.171 1563.16 0.230 
1992 4740. 2 -731.62 -1.41 1228.86 0.152 1524.24 0.210 
1993 4008. 5 1262.55 1.77 1109.86 0.163 1486.29 0.192 
1994 5271. 1 536.33 0.33 1343.00 0.150 1449.28 0.176 
1995 5807. 4 -647.35 -1.12 1901.57 0.193 1413.20 0.161 
1996 5160. 1 0 0.62 1323.57 0.151 1378.01 0.147 
(I)Columns a( t) and 6(0 are obtained from their exponential equations, by applying 
the regression results of equations equivalent to (5.4) and (5.5) p. 216. 
6.5 Demand Uncertainty and Overcapacity 
Demand uncertainty was found in Section 6.3 to lead the two duopolistic firms to invest 
in more capacity. Optimal capacity for the major-6 styrene producers under stochas-
tic demand exceeds the optimal capacity obtainable under deterministic conditions. A 
comparison with the best case scenario Ncfb7, where the firms follow feedback Nash-
Cournot strategies, that was discussed in Chapter 5 illustrates this, as shown in Fig-
ure 6.5 (compare with Figure 5.10, p. 248). As in the deterministic case the model under 
performs over the period between 1975-1985. But over the remaining period, the model 
shows that optimal feedback Nash-Cournot strategies allow the styrene firms to invest 
and produce more than what was found in industry; and higher than the capacity and 
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Figure 6.5: Model vs industry capacity and output for major-6 styrene producers facing 
stochastic demand: p, = 5.37%, a = 14.76%. 
Capacity Evolution for Deterministic and Uncertain Demand 
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Figure 6.6: Capacity evolution for deterministic and uncertain demand for major-6 
styrene producers: it = 5.37%, a = 14.76%. 
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Figure 6.7: Capacity evolution for deterministic and uncertain demand for major-6 
styrene producers 1985-1996: ,Lt = 5.37%, o- = 14.76%. 
output levels that were obtained in Chapter 5 for the optimal solution obtained under 
feedback Nash-Cournot strategies, case Ncfb7, and deterministic demand. For clarity 
the capacity levels for the actual industry, and the optimal solutions for the feedback 
Nash-Cournot strategy under deterministic and stochastic demand are shown again in 
Figure 6.6. 
Figure 6.7 just shows the same data with stochastic demand on a slightly larger scale, 
for the period from 1985 onwards. The capacity held by the major styrene producers 
under stochastic demand (stochastic-M6 in the figure) is larger than that with determin-
istic demand (Ncfb7-M6). The discussion in Section 5.3 showed that the industry by 
this time was consolidating, and rationalising capacity through acquisitions, and merger 
activity; and overcapacity was becoming more manageable than in the previous decade. 
We therefore concentrate on this period to explore the relationship between uncertainty, 
overcapacity and strategic investment. 
The probability distribution of stochastic demand realisation is put in perspective in 
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Figure 6.8: Optimal capacity for major-6 styrene producers with deterministic and un-
certain demand 1985-1996. 
Figure 6.9: Model vs industry capacity for major-6 styrene producers with demand un-
certainty 1985-1996. 
6500 
6000 
5500 
5000 
al 4500 
C 
4000 
3500 
3000 
2500 
6500 
6000 
5500 
5000 
4500 
C 
4000 
3500 
3000 
2500 
• — High demand 
— Stochastic demand 
Stochaslic-M6 
— - Ncfb7 capacity 
• — Low demand 
• — High demand 
Stochastic-M6 
— Actual capacity 
• — Low demand 
CHAPTER 6. CAPACITY EXPANSION UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY 309 
Figure 6.8, which shows the same results for optimal capacity under stochastic demand, 
and for case Ncfb7 from Chapter 5. Stochastic demand is shown within the 95% probabil-
ity range, and depicted as high demand and low demand from the year 1985. This is the 
range within ± 20- from the expected mean of stochastic demand. A similar illustration 
comparing the model performance for feedback Nash-Cournot strategies when demand is 
stochastic, with actual industry capacity is shown in Figure 6.9. The optimal capacity 
accumulated by the styrene producers, if they were allowing for stochastic demand, on 
average exceeds the actual capacity held by these firms. Even under mild conditions of 
market variability, a- = 14.7%, the firms would hold more capacity than what they actu-
ally held in industry. If the firms were particularly concerned about demand uncertainty, 
and were to allow for market demand volatility of 30% - 40%, industry overcapacity 
under these conditions would be much higher. 
The findings here are similar to those of Kulatilaka & Perotti (1992, 1998). Unlike in 
the real option literature where an increase in uncertainty increases the option value of 
the project, leading firms to hold on to their options thereby delaying their investments. 
In this case the firms decide on whether to invest or not in each period; and because the 
value of the project is rising firms decide to invest. 
The main reason for increased investment with demand uncertainty, is that unit 
capacity costs are small relative to other costs; and the benefits in case demand turns out 
to be high, by far exceed the cost of redundant capacity. The losses side in this situation 
is bound by the investment cost, but the benefits from investment, are unbounded and 
more than compensate for its cost with expected realisations of stochastic demand. The 
firms invest more due to the convexity of the profit function with respect to the random 
variable which increases with increasing uncertainty. 
Paraskevopoulos (1988) found that uncertainty about demand variability did not 
explain the large levels of uncertainty in the West European PVC industry during the late 
1970s and early 1980's. The results of Paraskevopoulos, Karakitsos & Rustem (1991) are 
also interesting. They find that increased demand uncertainty with cautious behaviour 
explains the incidence of overcapacity. Whereas a more risky behaviour which involves a 
scrap and build policy by PVC producers results in higher rates of investment and higher 
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capacity utilisation. This also points out in the direction that when firms follow risky 
investment behaviour, their investment decisions involve strategic considerations. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have examined the impact of demand uncertainty on the investment 
decision of firms. Demand was assumed to follow a GBM process where firms have full 
knowledge of the current state of demand, but its future evolution is uncertain. Firms 
were assumed to be risk neutral. It was also assumed that all firms hold the same 
expectations about demand and the stochastic process whose properties are common 
knowledge. The mean and variance of the process were considered to be time invariant 
as well. Variations in demand realisations in this respect affect firms' production and 
investment rates proportionately. 
In the present formulation, while demand is driven exogenously by the stochastic 
process, price is still being determined endogenously as a linear inverse demand function. 
The price level is affected by how much product the firms aggregately put on the market. 
Following McDonald & Siegel (1985), the project was evaluated as a series of European 
call options, where the firm has the option to shut down if demand falls and its revenues 
fall short of meeting a minimum level or a certain fixed cost. The simulation results for 
the duopoly in Section 6.3 showed that uncertainty has a positive influence on investment. 
It increases the value of the firm which encourages investment. Firms accumulate higher 
levels of capacity under uncertainty. The main reason for this outcome is that firm value 
is convex in the stochastic variable. 
Two approaches were used to evaluate the performance of the styrene industry under 
conditions of demand uncertainty. In both cases it was found that even with modest 
values of demand variability, the capacity and output of the major-6 styrene producers 
exceed the levels of the industry by a large margin after 1985. The rises in capacity 
investment rates indicate that if firms were acting in their investment choices to account 
for uncertainty about demand, they would have accumulated higher levels of capacity. 
On average industry capacity utilisation would have been lower than what industry expe- 
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rienced especially during 1986-1996 which was a period restructuring and rationalisation 
for the industry. Investment coordination allowed the styrene industry to avoid excessive 
addition of capacity which explains why industry capacity utilisation rates were above 
90% for most of this period (see Table B.1, in Appendix B). 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Just so every one in matters of doctrine 
gives a different description of the hidden subject. 
A philosopher expounds it in one way, 
and a critic at once refutes his propositions. 
A third censures both of them; 
a fourth spends his life in traducing the others. 
This truth and that truth cannot be all true, 
yet all of them are not entirely astray in error. 
If there were no truth, how could falsehood exist? 
Falsehood derives its plausibility from truth. 
It's the desire of right that makes men buy wrong. 
He who accepts everything as true is a fool, 
but he who says all is false is a knave. 
—Jaialudin Rrimi, AD 1207-1273. The Mathnawi, 
p. 98 
7.1 Modelling Optimal Capacity Expansion, Firm Interac-
tion, & Overcapacity 
I stated from the outset that the main objective of this research is the study of capacity 
expansion, optimal policies, and the investment behaviour of firms in the petrochemical 
industry. More specifically the relation between the pattern of investment in petrochem-
icals, and the presence of overcapacity. In particular, the purpose has been to examine 
the role of investment as an instrument of mobility or entry deterrence; and to what 
extent is overcapacity the result of strategic investment. Or is it merely the result of 
312 
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sluggish growth in demand and lumpy capacity expansion; poor planning by firms, or 
uncertainty about future demand? 
Another objective has been to examine the drivers of growth of the industry and 
the factors that shaped its development; and whether a mathematical model can be 
formulated to capture interfirm competition and explain the evolution of the industry in 
terms of output growth, capacity shares, and market prices. 
Understanding the nature of interaction between the firms which make up the indus-
try is a significant first step that can shed some light on the underlying forces that are 
in operation, and how they shape the investment process and the market in which they 
operate. Firm interaction and the pattern of investment play an important role in how 
industry develops, and can explain important aspects of market structure. For this pur-
pose different patterns of interaction between firms were explored throughout the thesis. 
To capture more accurately the decision making process of firms and their interaction, 
it was thought that this can be done by employing a game theoretic approach where the 
firms are modelled as independent agents, and allowing them to interact directly in the 
market place. Game theoretic models are more suited for the study of oligopolistic indus-
tries. A model of capacity expansion was developed in this thesis in which firms maximise 
their profits subject to new investment and depreciation. The model is a dynamic model 
with adjustment costs. It is the presence of capacity adjustments, that derive from cap-
ital investment and depreciation of capital, which give the model its dynamic property. 
Allowing the firms to have different cost structures and investment rates, gives a better 
representation of firm investment behaviour, and is more consistent with the doctrines 
of microeconomic and oligopoly theory. This formulation also facilitates for the model 
to capture the intertemporal developments that take place in an oligopolistic industry; 
where firms act independently but their interaction, in terms of output, and investment 
behaviour are interdependent and impact on market structure. 
Unlike static or 'bang-bang' type dynamic models where capacities adjust instanta-
neously, firms in industry add capacity periodically and in increments. This time de-
pendence of capacity adjustment is captured by a dynamic model, and the presence of 
adjustment costs facilitates the regulation of capacity expansion and limits the growth 
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in the size of firms, giving the model a relatively more accurate representation of firm 
behaviour and industrial development. Further more, adjustment costs were shown to 
be present in sizable measure in various industries; and have been estimated empirically. 
The interdependence of firms' actions derives from the homogeneity of their product. 
Most petrochemicals are indistinguishable homogenous products. It was natural to as-
sume that firms play Cournot production games and compete on output, rather than on 
price. In an oligopolistic setting, especially when a small number of firms dominate the 
industry, with insignificant imports, the firms realise their interdependence via output 
which determines the market price for their product. Price therefore obtains as an inverse 
demand function, whose parameters can be estimated. 
Firms face two types of costs: production and investment related costs. These costs 
are measured directly as cost functions instead of using an econometrically determined 
production function formulation, and are time dependent for the dynamic case. Produc-
tion costs comprise variable costs and fixed costs. Variable costs relate to production 
operations. For petrochemicals they are dominated by the cost of raw materials and 
utilities, which vary widely from year to year, rendering empirical estimation of function 
parameters impractical. Fixed costs pertain to items such as labour, capital and plant 
related assets, and general non-production operations. On the basis of a unit of output, 
these costs are prone to decline due to benefits of economies of scale and learning that 
characterise large scale processing industries such as petrochemicals. The present formu-
lation makes it possible to account for these cost reductions in the model, depending on 
firm size and the relevant point in time. 
In common with many studies in the dynamic and game theoretic literature the model 
I use is of the linear quadratic type. Both the production and investment cost functions 
contain a quadratic adjustment cost term. Justification for, and an appraisal of these 
costs was discussed at length in the thesis, namely in Sections 2.2.3, 3.1, 4.5.1, 4.5.2 
and 5.5.5. The combination of the quadratic adjustment costs and the linear nature 
of transition equation which describes the evolution of capacity (as a function subject 
to investment and depreciation), impart the linear quadratic property on the capacity 
expansion model. 
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It is worth noting that the quadratic adjustment costs adopted in our model are 
formed such that the firm is penalised for deviations from an optimal path at two in-
stances: in the production cost function when production deviates away from optimal 
capacity, and in the cost function for deviations of investment rate from its optimal path. 
With the exception of Reynolds (1983, 1986) and Steele (1995), most models ignore the 
role of redundant overcapacity which is a real cost that needs to be accounted for in 
empirical work (see Chapter 5, Table 5.7, p. 231). Other studies (as in Dockner (1992), 
Reynolds (1987, 1991), and others) consider adjustment costs that penalise the quadratic 
of output rates. This formulation presumes full capacity utilisation; and does not account 
for redundant capacity. In a way it corresponds to scenarios of very high costs of adjust-
ment which appear in Chapter 2. However, it was illustrated in that chapter how the 
cost of redundant capacity could impact on firm investment behaviour. 
Adjustment costs account for a small proportion of total production, or investment 
costs. This was accounted for by controlling the adjustment cost parameters gi , and 
di in the different model formulations. In the empirical part they were treated as free 
parameters. Nevertheless, the dominance of the variable cost over the fixed cost element 
of the production cost function for petrochemical products; and the small contribution 
of investment cost to the total cost of production per unit of output, were respected in 
all parameterised model simulations conducted, by careful selection of appropriate values 
for model parameters. 
Because different strategies and situations of static and dynamic settings are con-
sidered, corresponding formulations of the model and solution concepts are constructed 
and then evaluated in the thesis.. But the basic structure of the model, where each firm 
strives to maximise an objective function of profits, remains the same as presented in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1. The performance and robustness of the theoretical model is 
examined in Chapters 2 - 4. Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg strategies for an entry game 
under a duopoly in a single or a two stage game are discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.7, 
Chapter 2. Unique optimal equilibrium solutions are obtained in all cases. In Chapter 3 
the duopoly problem is tackled under a dynamic continuous time setting. The model 
formulation is described in Section 3.2, while the equilibrium solutions for the open-loop 
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strategy problem is presented in Section 3.3, and that of the feedback strategy problem 
in Section 3.4.2. A discrete version of the dynamic model is examined in Chapter 4. The 
model formulation and solution, based on two algorithms due to Kydland (1975, 1977), 
is presented in Section 4.2.1 for the Nash-Cournot problem; and in Section 4.4.2 for the 
Stackelberg problem. Open-loop and feedback strategies are also examined; as well as a 
competitive market situation where all firms act as price takers. The model formulations 
examined in Chapter 4 form the basis for testing the empirical data for the US styrene 
market in Chapter 5. 
The study of strategic behaviour of firms in oligopolistic industries centers on the 
following question: Is investment in capacity being used strategically? The purpose for 
strategic investment in capacity is to deter new entrants from the market; or perhaps 
it can provide the concerned firm with the capability that allows it to influence the 
investment behaviour of opponents. 
Using the model developed in this thesis, the arguments of Dixit (1980) and Spence 
(1977) on entry deterrence for a duopoly whose production and investment cost structures 
replicate those of petrochemicals were examined in Chapter 2 for a static setting; and 
in Chapter 3 for a dynamic situation. It was demonstrated in the exercises of the two 
chapters that in spite of large cost differentials between an incumbent and entrant firm, 
entry deterrence under low or moderate adjustment costs is not feasible. Further more, 
even mobility deterrence strategies have to be exercised with caution. The profits of both 
firms deteriorate significantly as a result of such a strategy; and they would soon realise 
that they are better-off playing profit maximising Nash-Cournot strategies as Figures 2.3-
2.5, and Figures 2.6- 2.8 illustrate. For under certain situations like when the entrant is 
the more efficient producer, a mobility deterrence strategy followed aggressively by the 
incumbent could become a liability, that may lead to its exit from the market. Such an 
eventuality could take place even when the incumbent firm is the more efficient producer, 
and the latter opts for too large a capacity to influence its opponent. It would be 
precipitated by: (1) the entrant firm choosing to enter the market with a large capacity, 
thereby forcing the incumbent to reduce output in a big way (see for example Section 2.6, 
namely, Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8, pane (c)); (2) or if demand falls, thereby leaving the 
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incumbent exposed to operating under large overcapacity and low prices (see case Ncga6 
of Table 2.1, Section 2.4). 
However, although entry deterrence under those conditions is unlikely, the advantage 
gained by the first mover has been demonstrated in Chapter 2. By investing preemptively 
in capacity the incumbent firm obtains larger market share and better profits than the 
entrant, as the results summarised in Tables 2.1, p. 52, and 2.2, p. 58, show. Even if the 
incumbent runs a less efficient production operation, he can still obtain higher profits 
than a more efficient entrant when adjustment costs are high. The incumbent invests 
strategically to influence the entrant's choice of capacity and output. And by acting 
strategically he operates with overcapacity as shown in Tables 2.1- 2.3. The incumbent's 
investment/overcapacity pays-off especially when the entrant follows profit maximising 
Nash-Cournot strategies. 
Nontheless, it was demonstrated that the entrant could improve on her outcome 
of the game by adopting a Stackelberg-like investment strategy. Because the cost of 
overcapacity is inexpensive under low adjustment costs, when the entrant selects a larger 
capacity than her Nash-Cournot equilibrium capacity, the incumbent reduces his output, 
and operates under a larger overcapacity, allowing the entrant to obtain higher market 
share and profits than before. In the petrochemical industry, notably in products where 
economies of scale have been exploited extensively, the investment cost per tonne of 
output produced is very small; which suggests that petrochemical firms operating in 
an oligopolistic market, are more likely to invest in overcapacity for strategic purposes; 
and suggests also that large producers would be willing to accommodate expansions by 
entrants, or by their smaller rivals. 
However, since holding excess capacity for the purpose of deterring entry may be 
questionable in view of Dixit's (1980) model; and with the outcome of the Nash-Cournot 
results of Chapters 2 and 3, where the firm which holds excess capacity for the purpose 
of retaliating by increasing its production and depressing prices should entry take place, 
eventually accommodates the higher output of its, usually, smaller competitor. Why 
should firms hold strategic excess capacity? Yet it makes more sense that the firms hold 
some excess capacity lest the need for its use may arise; to discipline opponents if they 
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overproduce or deviate from existing market equilibrium. The presence of excess capacity 
indicates to competitors the ability of the industry for meeting future demand and alerts 
the competitors to modify their expansion plans by going for a lower scale expansion or 
entry. Overcapacity also gives the impression of a loose oligopoly which is prone to price 
wars and tough competition. 
Also if overcapacity is to have any credible form of deterrent effect, it should be 
readily available at hand for use; rather than wait for the entrants to come along, and 
then retaliate by building a large plant to flood the market with overproduction. The 
larger players would be hurt to a larger degree by depressed prices and should be more 
sensitive to market stability. If they decide to engage in a price war it should be short 
lived. In petrochemicals, raw materials and variable costs dominate production costs; 
and it is not in the interest of producers to depress prices for long. Larger producers 
stand to lose more in this case. Another possible reason for the incumbent to build and 
hold excess capacity, is that it acts as a reserve for use in case of any unforseen upsurge 
in demand; which also doubles as a deterrent, lest it influences the novice opponent not 
to enter, and if he does, that would be done at a lower scale. The excess capacity is, 
therefore, like the option that the incumbent holds for retaliation, but that may never 
be exercised. 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that the incumbent, or the larger firm, reduces its capacity 
to allow for its smaller rival to enter and expand its market share. Here also the incum-
bent's overcapacity pays-off since, because of time-dependent adjustment of capacity, the 
incumbent benefits from its advantageous position by having a larger market share, and 
higher profits, for a longer period before the two firms arrive at their Nash-Cournot steady 
state equilibrium (see Chapter 3, Figures 3.3- 3.5, and Figures 3.10- 3.12). Nevertheless, 
the difference between a static and a dynamic situation was also demonstrated. The lead 
enjoyed by the incumbent as a result of preemptive investment in the first stage of the 
game, is ineffective in the long term in the face of a determined entrant. In a dynamic 
setting the two firms' capital stock is subject to investment and depreciation; a more 
efficient entrant can invest heavily and overtake the incumbent firm in market share at 
steady state in a Nash-Cournot game, despite the latter's initial lead. Or the two firms 
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can share the market equally when they face symmetric costs. 
On the otherhand the type of strategy adopted by the players has an important 
bearing on the outcome of the game, in terms of their market shares and profits. A 
Stackelberg strategy gives the leader a profound advantage over its rival that could easily 
exceed the benefits of a sizable cost differential under a Nash-Cournot strategy. Which 
type of optimal strategy the firms adopt would depend on the market situation, like the 
relative size of production cost differentials between the firms, elasticity of demand for 
their product and other related issues. For instance an entrant firm facing an incumbent 
that had invested strategically in a large capacity, would perform better by adopting 
a Stackelberg-like investment strategy when choosing plant capacity. By doing so the 
entrant firm lays claim to a larger market share, and the incumbent accommodates the 
expansion by its rival by reducing its own output. Once their plant capacities are fixed, 
both firms would then learn that by reducing their outputs to Nash-Cournot levels they 
would earn higher profits (see Sections 2.6 and 2.8). 
Optimal investment and dynamic interaction between firms under different strategies 
that was examined in Chapters 3 and 4, illustrated how firms accumulate larger capacities 
and produce more under feedback than open-loop strategies. Feedback strategies involve 
Stackelberg-like investment and production behaviour on the part of firms in order to 
influence their opponents. Feedback strategies are therefore symbiotic of strategic intent. 
And this is what we test for in the empirical part of the thesis, to determine which type 
of investment strategy best describes the investment behaviour of firms in the styrene 
industry. 
7.2 Investment Behaviour in US Styrene Industry 
The issue of identifying the nature of the investment game in a typical oligopolistic in-
dustry has been dealt with in this thesis, using the US styrene market as a proxy for 
the US petrochemical industry. This was done at two levels: (1) A mathematical model 
of capacity expansion was formulated in a game theoretic framework, and solved by 
applying optimal control theory and dynamic programming techniques to obtain opti- 
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mal investment and production policies. Using industry data, four different investment 
strategies were employed for model simulations to explore how well each explains indus-
try developments and the presence of overcapacity. The type of strategy used indicates 
whether investment in capacity is being used strategically to influence the behaviour of 
opponents; and determines the pattern that best explains the interaction between firms 
in the investment and production game. 
(2) Due to limitations in how far one can go in implementing mathematical models 
to describe complex industry relationships and techno-economic phenomena, however, 
some attention has also been devoted to a qualitative study of market developments in 
the styrene industry to augment the results of the model simulations, with an analysis of 
the underlying forces that are taking place and shaping the evolution of the industry. For 
some aspects of industry characteristics are market specific and may pertain to regional 
peculiarities. The history of how the market and its major firms have developed, and 
uncertain events such as the introduction of a new technology or process, or the sudden 
rise of energy costs, can influence the environment in which firms operate, and the course 
of how industry and market evolve. This is what is described in the literature as accidents 
of history, or of uncertainty (Caves 1998), that shakeout markets as a result of entry or 
exit of firms. Or the statistical regularities of firm growth and determinants of firm 
size and survival rates, that impact on market structure and competitiveness of industry 
(Mansfield 1962, Sutton 1997). 
The global development of the petrochemical industry had been dealt with elsewhere 
in the literature (Freeman 1982a, Stobaugh 1988, Fayad & Motamen 1986, Chapman 
1991, Arora, Landau & Rosenberg 1998). That for the styrene was briefly discussed 
in Section 5.3. The different stages of development of the styrene industry conform 
to the product life cycle of a typical petrochemical product; where a small number of 
producers are involved in the development and innovation stage. In this stage the product 
commands high prices but modest volumes are produced. The growth phase attracts 
more firms into the industry lured by expanding markets and the prospects of high 
profits. Continuous improvements in process technology and larger volumes demanded 
by expanding markets drive the rapid rise in the size of plants to benefit from economies of 
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scale; together with cost savings that are achieved due to the process of learning enable 
firms to reduce costs and prices, thereby fuelling further growth in demand. As the 
markets mature, growth slows down and the addition of new capacity faces the industry 
with a challenging task due to the increased number of firms in the market, and the 
enormous size of modern plants. Overcapacity becomes more prevalent in this phase 
putting pressure on industry profitability, especially during periods of faltering demand. 
The US styrene production rose from 0.8 million tonnes in 1960 to about 5.40 million 
tonnes in 2000. Similarly capacity increased from 2.70 million tonnes/year in 1974 to 5.74 
million tonnes/year in 2000, and further to 6.78 million tonnes/year in 2005. On a world 
scale the increase was even more dramatic, rising from 8.2 million tonnes/year in 1975, 
to 28.7 million tonnes/year in 2005. Engineering firms played a pivotal role in developing 
the process technology for petrochemicals including styrene and its precursors such as 
ethylene and benzene, all of which achieved enormous economies of scale. Styrene plant 
capacities for instance increased by ten fold, from about 90 thousand tonnes/year in the 
late 1960's to 900 thousand tonnes/year by the early 1990's. The rise in production 
and capacity was also accompanied by a learning process from which producing firms 
benefited and were able to reduce fixed production costs by about 22%, for every doubling 
in output. The combination of maturing markets with lower rates of growth in demand 
for styrene products, and the enormous size of modern plants meant that overcapacity 
occurs more frequently. 
The US styrene industry witnessed several instances of entry and exit of firms, but 
over the years there was a core of six firms that dominated the market. In the 1970's 
smaller styrene producers were placed under pressure as a result of the new competitive 
environment brought about by the advent of larger scale plants and the need to modernise 
production operations. Some firms exited the market while others were taken over by 
their larger rivals. In the 1980's some of the major chemical producers such as Monsanto 
and Hoechst exited the styrene market. Both firms were following a concerted strategy 
of abandoning the commodity chemicals market, and moving into higher value added 
products in the life sciences and speciality chemicals markets. Shell also exited the 
US styrene market in a move aimed at reorganising its global chemicals operations. 
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The market was undergoing a restructuring process. On the otherhand, oil chemical 
companies during the 1980's and 1990's consolidated their position in the US styrene 
market; with Chevron, BP chemicals, and Arco expanding their shares of the market in 
a big way. They were aided in this by integrating their oil processing and petrochemical 
operations. By the mid 1990's some of the smaller players, such as Huntsman and Nova 
Chemicals, that were essentially polystyrene fabricators moved upstream into styrene 
production. However by the turn of the century the major oil companies, notably Shell 
and BP, were shedding their petrochemical operations on a global scale, and concentrating 
instead on oil exploration, and production operations such as refining and processing with 
its huge financial requirements. 
The considerable entry and exit activity which characterised the styrene industry 
gives the impression of a dynamic and competitive industry. But unless this is translated 
into an increase in the supply base, lower prices, and lower profit margins it cannot be said 
that a structural change to make the industry more competitive has taken effect. Despite 
the considerable activity that was taking place in the US styrene industry, several of these 
involved only a change of ownership of existing facilities where closing down older plants, 
modernising and building larger ones took place. In two instances there were nouveau 
entry into the market. The industry went through a process of restructuring and became 
more concentrated as a result. Essentially the core of six producers continued to account 
for most of the styrene produced. 
With this in mind, the US styrene industry was modelled as an oligopoly of six major 
firms, and a fringe of producers. Using industry data over a 23 year period starting 
from 1974, optimal solutions for the capacity expansion model that was developed in the 
thesis were obtained for the six firms for four different investment strategies: open-loop 
Nash-Cournot , feedback Nash-Cournot , Stackelberg, and competitive price taking. 
Styrene price that had been assumed to be determined endogenously as a linear func-
tion of the output of the six firms, was then estimated econometrically as an inverse 
demand function over the period of study. Allowing the coefficients of the linear inverse 
demand function to take exponential form gave an improved estimate of the cyclical 
styrene prices (see Appendix B, Table B.2). Investment and production costs were ap- 
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portioned in accordance with the size of the firm. As such larger firms were assigned lower 
unit costs considering that they operated larger and more modern efficient plants than 
their smaller counterparts. Economies of scale and learning effects were also taken into 
consideration. These costs declined in real value for all firms over the planning horizon. 
Assuming that styrene producers in the real world follow optimal investment strate-
gies, and that the capacity expansion model captures with a fair degree of accuracy 
the investment behaviour of the six major styrene producers, the simulation results of 
Section 5.6.3 show that investment behaviour of the major players in the US styrene 
industry can best be represented by a strategic investment strategy. The feedback Nash-
Cournot strategy gave superior results to other strategies and predicted most of the 
overcapacity that was observed in industry. It also provided a good representation of 
the evolution of industry output and capacity growth, and of market shares over the 
planning horizon. The styrene price predicted by the model when firms employ a feed-
back Nash-Cournot strategy follows closely the trend of actual market prices for styrene. 
Furthermore, feedback Nash-Cournot strategy is more consistent with industry develop-
ments, since it allows the participants to react to changes in their markets and to their 
opponents' actions as the market structure evolves over time. 
It is possible for overcapacity to emerge naturally in an industry characterised by 
economies of scale, and whose markets are dependent on the variations of the business 
cycle. It is possible also that concern about uncertainty of future demand leads firms to 
hold additional capacity. So not only by the simulation results of the model can the use of 
strategic investment and overcapacity by styrene firms be established. An examination 
of market developments reveals more about the firms' investment behaviour and the 
role of overcapacity. These developments illustrate that investment in the petrochemical 
industry, and the styrene industry in particular, has been used for strategic ends. It is 
more likely also that overcapacity has served a similar purpose. The results of Chapter 6 
show that the introduction of a modest measure of uncertainty into the demand function, 
induces firms to invest at higher rates, leaving them with higher levels of overcapacity 
than the optimal results of the capacity expansion model, and what had been seen in 
industry. If the firms were accounting for uncertainty of demand, capacity levels in the 
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styrene industry would have been much higher. Overcapacity in the US styrene industry 
over the study period was not very large, on average it was about 10%. For strategic 
overcapacity to be effective, it does not need to be large either. In order to punish their 
opponents firms require only a small margin of overcapacity; since in an oligopoly price 
wars to discipline the errant producers are expected to be short lived. And due to the 
low elasticity of demand it takes only a small increase in output to oversupply the market 
and bring about a large drop in prices. 
The petrochemical industry went through episodes where demand faltered; following 
the oil price rises of the 1970's, and during the early 1980's there were periods when 
economic slowdown caused the emergence of significant overcapacity levels. And also 
in the early 1990's when a recessionary period coincided with rising plant capacities, 
which compounded the effects of overcapacity. Nevertheless, the petrochemical industry's 
`disease' of chronic overcapacity cannot be blamed on poor planning and the high exit 
costs. Several studies (Bower 1986, Paraskevopoulos 1988, Stobaugh 1988, Fayad & 
Motamen 1986, Henderson & Cool 2003) document instances which show that during 
periods when overcapacity was prevalent, and industry participants were experiencing 
low profitability and falling prices, investment in new capacity continued. Companies 
were swapping product lines, building larger plants, and engaging in merger activity 
and joint ventures. Smaller firms were forced to exit, while some of the large players 
moved altogether into higher value added products, and the industry was becoming 
concentrated. 
The major players in this industry are sophisticated in their decisions. These firms 
have been at this game for a long time. They play the signalling and waiting game. 
The timing of when to add modern large scale plants becomes a tool to heighten the 
capacity competition and force weaker opponents out of the markets. Or to accommodate 
'Considerable anecdotal evidence exists about large firms in the energy and chemical sectors having 
a full understanding of the significance of oligopolistic markets and how they operate effectively. To 
quote just two examples, back in 1992 an executive of one of Europe's largest gas producing firms, 
in a presentation he made to an energy conference held at the Petroleum Institute in London, was 
advocating an efficient EU utility market dominated by four or five producers. Another executive from 
one of Europe's largest chemical companies in a presentation made to the GCC's Fifth Petrochemical 
Products Conference held in Kuwait in 1997, drew attention to oligopolistic pricing, and demonstrated 
how petrochemical prices were improving as the number of producers declined following the wave of 
merger activity that was taking place in Europe. 
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opponents' expansion plans, and to allow capacity utilisation to tighten and prices to rise. 
And there is a process of learning in this respect which has become an important aspect 
of the strategic management literature (Henderson & Cool 2003). 
There was coordination in the styrene industry as was the case in other petrochem-
icals. In the absence of investment coordination, overcapacity would have been more 
profound than what had been experienced by the industry. Firms in oligopolistic mar-
kets avoid excessive overcapacity since it leads to a breakdown in market discipline and 
depresses prices. Investment coordination was taking place in a variety of ways. Indi-
rectly by the announcement of planned projects in advance in the form of a signalling 
game, which allowed firms to delay the implementation, and sometimes downsizing the 
scale of projects from original plans, to accommodate the investments of their rivals 
and avoid excessive incidence of redundant overcapacity. And sometimes cooperation 
between firms took place directly in the form of production sharing arrangements, long 
term contracts, or by forging alliances in joint ventures for new large scale projects at 
home and abroad. 
Also a number of merger activities that took place in styrene involved taking over 
rivals' production plants, to be modernised, or closed down so that it can be replaced 
by larger and more modern facilities shortly afterwards. Restructuring and merger ac-
tivity contributed to reducing the number of styrene producers; which translated into a 
more disciplined behaviour in the US styrene market. Styrene prices declined somewhat 
over the study period, but also showed a cyclical trend with sharp price surges. More 
importantly, however, is that profit margins remained high for the most part. 
Larger producers benefited from the massive rise in the size of new plants which 
exploited economies of scale, and allowed them to reduce unit costs. This contributed 
to lowering of petrochemical product prices. But it also meant that setup costs were 
rising due to the very large cost in dollar terms for new projects. Larger producers 
integrated their production operations, upstream into the raw materials for styrene as 
well as downstream into styrene derivatives. This market trend escalated the financial 
requirements for firms if they wanted to stay ahead in the investment game, and favoured 
larger producers with deep pockets. It created a natural entry barrier and restricted the 
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number of possible entrants into the US market. Most new entrants are to be found in 
global markets with expanding markets for styrene like the Far East, China and Brazil. 
Many of these involved joint venture partnerships between some of the leading US styrene 
producers with local partners; others were in countries where a comparative advantage in 
production exists, due to extensive oil processing operations, such as in the Netherlands, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Malaysia. 
7.3 Directions for Future Work 
In this study I have dealt with only one petrochemical product. There is a need to 
conduct more research into a wider range of basic petrochemical products similar to 
styrene, to uncover the nature of investment behaviour that was taking place in the 
industry. Several products have been through a similar process of restructuring and 
consolidation which lead their markets to become more concentrated. These include 
among others: ethylene glycol and other basic raw materials for polyester fibres such 
as terephthalic acid. Acetic acid and vinyl acetate, toluene diisocyanate (TDI), vinyl 
chloride and PVC, pentaerythritol, propylene oxide, and polypropylene. Some of the 
major producers that are involved in styrene, are also among the leading producers of 
these petrochemical products. 
One aspect alluded to in Chapter 5 was the possibility of a form of collusion taking 
place in the industry; but this was not tested for. In the game theoretic model formula-
tion followed in this thesis, a type of models known as trigger punishment models may be 
utilised. In these models when one of the players cheats, the rest revert from collusive be-
haviour to Nash-Cournot behaviour for the rest of the game to punish the cheater. While 
solutions may be obtained for this situations they are more difficult to implement for em-
pirical work due to the fact that collusion in real world situations does not operate along 
these behavioural lines. If punishment were to occur in the form of a price war, or rever-
sion to Nash-Cournot production levels, this would be for a limited period until another 
equilibrium is restored into the market. Testing for collusion with these models also re-
quires detailed data on production and prices on a monthly rather than on annual basis. 
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The model developed in this thesis may be a useful tool for planning purposes. It 
provides the basic steps required for evaluating optimal investment rates, and possible 
scenarios of market shares and price projections that could arise when firms follow op-
timal investment strategies. It could form the basis for a model that allows a firm to 
assess its investment plans; or regulatory authorities monitoring market developments, 
and the investment and production behaviour of firms. There are a number of impor-
tant limitations that still need to be tackled first, however. The model in this thesis does 
not allow for financial constraints which may be an important determinant in limiting a 
firm's ability to grow and expand its investment commitments. Introducing endogenous 
financing and allowing for financial constraints on the firm, would improve the model 
performance and make it more consistent with a real world situation. The works of Ben-
soussan & Lesourne (1980) and Kort (1994, 1988) are relevant in this respect. Following 
these model formulations, it would be possible to allow firms to accumulate losses, and 
induce endogenous exit from the market in a dynamic setting; thereby facilitating for 
market structure to develop with time as a result of firm behaviour. 
Inventories play an important role in smoothing out periodic variations and unex-
pected surges in demand. And in allowing firms to plan for plant turnarounds for main-
tenance and similar operations that require a halt in production. They can be useful also 
in restraining or easing pressure on prices when the supply/demand balance becomes 
restrained. Adding inventories into the model formulation, would make it more realistic, 
and is consistent with industry practice. Endogenising economies of scale and cost sav-
ings for first mover as in Kulatilaka & Perotti (1998) would be a more interesting way of 
modelling strategic investment in capacity. 
Finally a better way to evaluate the attitude of firms to uncertainty would be to use 
past industry forecasts for expected growth in demand, as a benchmark around which a 
margin of uncertainty can be added. If evolution of industry capacity falls within this 
expected range firms would be reacting to uncertainty of demand. Otherwise if actual 
industry capacity exceeds these expected projections by a sizable margin, then it may be 
concluded that firms are building a strategic element into their capacity plans as well as 
allowing for demand uncertainty. 
Appendix A 
Optimality Conditions for 
Capacity Expansion of a Single 
Firm 
The problem facing a profit maximising firm with quasi-fixed capacity subject to the 
following two equations is one of optimal control. The derivation of optimality conditions 
shown briefly below, is based on Bryson & Ho (1969). 
tf  
Jz 	= max 	e-13t wi(ki (t), ui (0) dt e-13t coi(ki(t f )) 	(A.1) 
to=o 
ki (t) = f (ki (t), ?it (t)) , 	ki (to) is given 	 (A.2) 
The objective of firm i is to maximise Ji(to), the discounted sum of its flow of profits 
over the planning horizon [to, t f ], and a salvage value term recovered at the end of the 
final period, t f . Ji is the sum of values that are discounted back to the initial period, to, 
at a constant discount rate /3. The per period profit wi (ki(t), ui(t))1  is a linear quadratic 
function of market output, (ki (t)), its capacity (ki (t)), and investment rate, 74(0. The 
salvage value term cpi(ki(tf )), is a function of the capacity attained in the final period. 
The capacity of firm i, evolves according to differential equation (A.2), which is linear 
in its capacity ki(t), and investment rate ui(t). The problem is to find the function ui(t) 
that maximises Ji over the planning horizon. This is done by the following steps. Adjoin 
equation (A.2) to Ji with a multiplier function ,u(t): 
t f  
Ji = f 	[e—'3twi(ki(t), ui(t)) 	p(t){ f (ki (t), ui(t)) — ki(t)}] dt 	e-13tcoi (ki(t f )) (A.3) 
to=o 
note that the second term of the integrand which multiplies p  is zero; and dropping the 
arguments where the notation is clear, we get: 
'It is assumed here that firm 1, has chosen its capacity and output optimally, and therefore we can 
write kt, so for this purpose Ict , can be treated by firm i as constant; also the firms produce at full 
capacity so output is equivalent to capacity 
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t f 
Ji 	= 	[e-43t wi(ki ,ui) + it f (ki , ui ) - ,Ltki] dt + e-'9t(pi (ki(t f )) 	(A.4) 
10 
tf 
= 	[7-ti (ki, ui, p) - ilki] dt + e-°t goi(ki(t f )) 	 (A.5) 
to  
where we introduced the Hamiltonian, 7-1i , in (A.5), which is defined as: 
7-(i (ki , ui , ,u) = 	(ki , ui ) 	12(0 f (k ni) 	 (A.6) 
Integrating the second term (pki ) of the integrand in equation (A.5) by parts, and rear- 
ranging we obtain: 
tf  
Ji = 	
itot f  
7-tt dt - [itki ]tof ± 	dt + e-13tcoi (ki (t f )) 
to 
ft:f  
[7-ti 	itki] dt + it(to)kt (to) - 1.1(t f )ki (t f ) 	e-'3tcoi (ki (t f )) 
Now consider the variation in Ji due to a small variation in the control variable ui for 
the fixed times, to and t f , and rearranging the terms to get: 
SJi 	
t f 	 02-(i = I 	[(— 	Ski 	bud dt [,ttS kilt° + [(e-at Oki - /.2) Ski]tf 	(A.9) 
to 	a k 074  
for a maximum bJi should vanish, so we choose the multiplier function pt(t) to cause the 
coefficients of dki to vanish in the above equation, namely: 
a7-ti 
Ft(t) = aki (A.10) 
and its boundary condition of: 
acioi 
Ft(tf) = 	oki 	 (A.11) 
t f 
bJi = µ(to) ki(t 0 ) + 	Su, dt 
to uut 
Since the initial capacity k,(to) is a given fixed value at time to, then Ski(to) is zero, and 
there is an optimal value kt(to). For a maximum, (5Ji should be zero for an arbitrary 
Jai (t) , and therefore the integral should vanish, so we have: 
axe  0 	 (A.13) 
aui 
We have, so far, established the necessary conditions for a stationary point of (V,. 
A sufficient condition for the stationary point to be a maximum, would be to consider 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
and bJi becomes: 
(A.12) 
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the second order expansion of 82Ji, and to show that this value is semi-definite negative 
for any value Sui. The derivation is somewhat long (the reader is referred to Bryson 
and Ho Chapters 3 and 6). The sufficiency condition for the chosen control ui to yield 
a maximum, is that in addition to 17--L. = 0, we must also have a27:‘ < 0. In our au, 	 au2 
formulation 1-ti is linear quadratic which is concave with respect to the control and the 
state variables, and this requirement is fulfilled. Furthermore, the problem in this case 
has a global maximum. 
In conclusion, the necessary conditions for solving the maximisation problem posed 
by equations (A.1) and (A.2), are summarised in the following differential equations: 
ki(t) = f (ki (t),ui (t)) 	 (A.14) 
1;40 =
_ot Ow, 	f 
= —e 	— (A.15) Oki 	Oki 	Oki  
where the maximising ui (t) is obtained by solving the following equation: 
O'Hi _ot awi 	f _ =e 	 0 
aui 	OUi 	aUi 
(A.16) 
and subject to the boundary conditions for equations (A.14) and (A.15) that are given 
respectively by: 
ki(to) 
11(t1) 
given 	 (A.17) 
e—at aWi (A.18) 
Oki 
So far the values we have been working with are discounted back to the initial time 
to, the Hamiltonian 7-(i(t), and the multiplier, ic(t), which is the shadow price or marginal 
value of capital, are discounted values. Very often it would be more convenient to work 
with current values instead. The benefit of using current values becomes apparent when 
dealing with problems where previous decisions were not optimal, and we are trying 
to find optimal values from current period onwards. Below we set about to make this 
transformation. 
Recall that the Hamiltonian given by (A.6), may be rewritten in the following form: 
xi (kip ui kt) = e-°t [wi(ki, ui) + eat 11(t) f (ki, ui)] 	(A.19) 
also introduce a current value multiplier, )(t), which is defined as: 
A(t) = el3t,u(t) 
and therefore equation (A.19) becomes: 
71,(ki, 	= 	Th3t [wi (ki , ui ) 	A(t) f (ki , ui )] 
Hi (ki, ui,  A) = el3t 	ui, p,) = w, 	A(t) f (ki , ui ) 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
(A.22) 
where we have introduced a current value Hamiltonian, Hi. If we differentiate (A.20) 
wrt time and substitute the values of A(t), ii(t) from equations (A.20) and (A.15) where 
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necessary we get: 
)t(t) = 06'910) + eN(t) 	 (A.23) 
= OA(t) - —Owi  of  
Oki 	A Oki 	
(A.24) 
substituting from (A.22) into (A.24) we obtain: 
A(t) - /X(t) = - H
O i  
Oki  
(A.25) 
Also if we rearrange the current value Hamiltonian, Hi, given by (A.22) and differ- 
entiate wrt the control ui(t), and using the result from (A.16), we get: 
07-(i a(e-pt Ho 0  (A.26) 
aui 	atti 
-ot = 
e aui 
and since e-13t > 0 , _0aHi  aui and by using (A.22), we have: 
axi Owi Of n - 	± A — dui ON ON (A.28) 
Also taking derivative of (A.22) wrt the current value shadow price of capital: 
OHi 
ki = 	= f (ki,ui) (A.29) 
Therefore, we have established the necessary conditions of optimality resulting from the 
choice of optimal investment rate, ut (t), in terms of the current value Hamiltonian Hi, 
and current value costate variable A. These equations are (A.25), (A.28), and (A.29) 
The boundary condition referring to the initial capacity (state) given by (A.17), 
remains unchanged. While the second boundary condition of the state at the final time 
described by (A.18) is modified using (A.20). The resulting two boundary conditions are 
shown in (A.33) in the table below: 
Conditions of Optimality 
where ki(to), 
a Hi awi 	a f 
Dui =aui 	797i
axi 
= ° 
ki = 	= f(ki, ui) 
(t) — )3A(t) 	- aHi  aki  
is a given known value, and .1(t f ) = Obi Oki 
(A.30) 
(A.31) 
(A.32) 
(A.33) 
(A.27) 
Appendix B 
Market Data for US Styrene 
Producers 
Table B.1: Capacity and market data for the US styrene industry and major styrene 
producers(t) 
Styrene 
Price 
(1990 $/t) 
Industry 
Capacity 
(kt/y) 
Industry 
Production 
(kt/y) 
Capacity 
Major 6 
(kt/y) 
Industry 
CU 
(%) 
Production 
Major 6 
(kt/y) 
a(t) b(t) 
1974 927 2580 2701 1694 105 1773 2251 0.75 
1975 933 2580 2120 1694 82 1392 2266 0.96 
1976 909 3648 2858 2762 78 2164 2208 0.60 
1977 805 3995 3115 2662 78 2076 1955 0.55 
1978 702 3739 3260 2617 87 2282 1705 0.44 
1979 1074 3789 3395 2563 90 2296 2608 0.67 
1980 1019 3977 3110 2787 78 2179 2475 0.67 
1981 1022 3977 3030 3241 76 2469 2482 0.59 
1982 821 3719 2695 2969 72 2152 1994 0.55 
1983 765 3719 3085 2969 83 2463 1858 0.44 
1984 743 3749 3497 2969 93 2769 1804 0.38 
1985 635 3692 3457 3184 94 2981 1542 0.30 
1986 473 3592 3578 3084 100 3072 1148 0.22 
1987 967 3714 3635 3206 98 3138 2348 0.44 
1988 1027 3910 4075 3402 104 3546 2494 0.41 
1989 750 3810 3782 3302 99 3278 1821 0.33 
1990 761 4272 3608 3764 85 3179 1848 0.34 
1991 559 4621 4091 4113 80 3641 1358 0.22 
1992 506 5291 4076 4623 81 3561 1229 0.20 
1993 457 5291 4595 4623 88 4015 1110 0.16 
1994 553 5291 5123 4623 96 4476 1343 0.18 
1995 783 5302 5230 4623 96 4560 1902 0.25 
1996 545 5411 5310 4732 99 4644 1324 0.17 
(t )Values for columns a(t) and b(t) are obtained from equations (5.3) and (5.2) p. 216, where 
the price elasticity of demand, e = - = 0.7. 
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Table B.2: Estimated demand function parameters for the six major styrene producers(t) 
et(t) b(t) 
Production 
for Major 6 
(kt/y) 
Estimated 
Price 
(1990 $/t) 
Actual 
Price 
(1990 $/t) 
1974 2375 0.81 1773 941 927 
1975 2317 0.75 1392 1267 933 
1976 2261 0.70 2164 738 909 
1977 2206 0.66 2076 843 805 
1978 2153 0.61. 2282 754 702 
1979 2101 0.57 2296 787 1074 
1980 2050 0.53 2179 887 1019 
1981 2000 0.50 2469 770 1022 
1982 1952 0.46 2152 952 821 
1983 1904 0.43 2463 837 765 
1984 1858 0.40 2769 738 743 
1985 1813 0.38 2981 688 635 
1986 1769 0.35 3072 687 473 
1987 1726 0.33 3138 695 967 
1988 1685 0.31 3546 597 1027 
1989 1644 0.29 3278 706 750 
1990 1604 0.27 3179 755 761 
1991 1565 0.25 3641 658 559 
1992 1527 0.23 3561 699 506 
1993 1490 0.22 4015 619 457 
1994 1454 0.20 4476 548 553 
1995 1419 0.19 4560 558 783 
1996 1385 0.18 4644 566 545 
(I)Columns (1(0 and b(t) are obtained from their exponential 
equations, by applying the regression results of equations (5.4) 
and (5.5) p. 216; and the estimated styrene price is obtained 
from equation (5.1). 
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Table B.3: Production economics for styrene by a pacesetter producer(1) - USA 1993 
PEP Cost Index 	 535 
Process Type: 	Third generation vapour phase alkylation 
Capacity (tonne/year) 644,000 
Capital cost (million US $) 
Battery limits investment (BLI) 121.10 
Off-sites investment 76.20 
Total fixed capital (TFC) 197.20 
Production Costs Use/Tonne styrene Unit cost $/t Thousand $/year 
Raw materials 
Ethylene 0.2843 tonne $ 406/t 115.4 74,300 
Benzene 0.7882 tonne $ 291/t 229.4 147,700 
Catalyst & chemicals $ 5.00/t 5.00 3,200 
Total raw materials 349.8 225,300 
By-product credits 
Toluene (0.0194) tonne $ 231/t (4.5) (2,900) 
Total credits (12) (2,900) 
Utilities 
Cooling water 85.1 m3 2.12 t/m3 1.8 1,200 
Process water 0.67 m3 20.4 t/m3 0.1 100 
Electricity 97.0 kWh 4.03 a/kWh 3.9 2,500 
Inert gas 2.95 m3 2.24 t/m3 0.1 50 
Fuel 6.98 GJ $ 2.36/GJ 16.5 10„600 
Steam 0.06 tonne $ 10.10/t 0.6 400 
Total Utilities 23.0 14,800 
Variable Cost 372.8 240,100 
Operating labour 6 operators/shift $ 27.18/h 2.2 1,400 
Control laboratory 20% of oper. labour 0.4 300 
Maintenance labour 1.6%/year of BLI 2.4 1,600 
Maintenance materials 2.4%/year of BLI 3.6 2,300 
Operating supplies 15% of oper. labour 0.3 200 
Subtotal 9.0 5,800 
Plant overhead 80% of total labour 4.1 2,600 
Taxes and insurance 2%/year of TFC 6.1 3,900 
G&A(1) costs 5% of styrene value 26.3 16,900 
Subtotal 36.5 23,500 
Fixed Cost 45.5  29,300 
Cash Cost 418.3 269,400 
Depreciation 10%/year of TFC 30.6 19,700 
Cash Cost + Depr. 448.9 289,100 
ROI(2) before taxes 25%/year of TFC 76.6 49,300 
Product Value 525.5 338,400 
(1)Pacesetter refers to producer employing modern and efficient plant. All costs are measured 
in current US $. 
(2)Refers to general, sales and administrative costs. 
(3)Refers to return on investment. 
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Table B.4: Production economics for styrene by a straggler producer(') - USA 1993 
PEP Cost Index 	 535 
Process Type: 	Liquid phase alkylation (A/C/3 ) 
Capacity (tonne/year) 145,000 
Capital Cost (million US $) 
Battery limits investment (BLI) 65.10 
Off-sites investment 41.00 
Total fixed capital (TFC) 106.10 
Production costs Use/tonne styrene Unit cost $/t Thousand $/year 
Raw materials 
Ethylene 0.3100 tonne $ 406/t 125.8 18,300 
Benzene 0.8210 tonne $ 291/t 238.9 34,700 
Catalysts and chemicals $10.50/t 10.5 1,500 
Total raw materials 375.2 54,500 
By-product credits 
Toluene (0.0520) tonne $ 231/t (12) (1,700) 
Total credits (12) (1,700) 
Utilities 
Cooling water 73.9 m3 2.12 0/m3 1.6 200 
Process water 20.4 0/m3 0.00 0.00 
Electricity 91.7 kWh 4.03 0/kWh 3.7 500 
Inert gas 4.1 m3 2.24 0/m3 0.1 0 
Fuel 4.3 GJ $ 2.36/GJ 10.1 1,500 
Steam 0.6 tonne $ 10.10/t 6.4 900 
Total Utilities 21.9 3100 
Variable Cost 385.1 55,900 
Operating labour 8 operators/shift $ 27.18/h 13.1 1,900 
Control laboratory 20% of oper. labour 2.6 400 
Maintenance labour 2.5%/year of BLI 9.0 1,300 
Maintenance materials 2.5%/year of BLI 9.0 1,300 
Operating supplies 15%of oper. labour 2.0 300 
Subtotal 35.7 5,200 
Plant overhead 80% of total labour 19.8 2,900 
Taxes and insurance 2%/year of TFC 14.6 2,100 
G&A(2) costs 5% of styrene value 37.4 5,400 
Subtotal 71.8 10,400 
Fixed Cost 107.5 15,600 
Cash Cost 492.6 71,500 
Depreciation 10%/year of TFC 73.1 10,600 
Cash Cost + Deer. 565.7 82,100 
ROI(3) before taxes 25%/year of TFC 182.8 26,500 
Product Value 748.5 108,600 
(1)Straggler refers to producer using small scale plant with old technology. All costs are measured 
in current US $. 
(2)Refers to general, sales and administrative costs. 
(3)Refers to return on investment. 
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Table B.5: Unit capital investment costs for styrene plants(a) 
Year 
Cony. 
Factor 
to 1990$ 
PEP 
CI 
Index 
Capital Investment Cost 
Straggler 
(US$/t) 	(1990$/t) 
Pacesetter 
(US$/t) 	(1990$/t) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1974 2.445 208 12.70 31.04 28.42 69.49 
1975 2.227 242 14.77 32.90 33.07 73.64 
1976 2.093 251 15.32 32.07 34.30 71.78 
1977 1.962 267 16.30 31.98 36.48 71.58 
1978 1.829 282 17.24 31.53 38.59 70.57 
1979 1.680 315 19.22 32.28 43.01 72.26 
1980 1.541 357 21.81 33.61 48.82 75.23 
1981 1.405 404 24.65 34.63 55.17 77.52 
1982 1.321 420 25.62 33.84 57.35 75.75 
1983 1.271 427 26.08 33.14 58.37 74.19 
1984 1.226 437 26.65 32.67 59.66 73.14 
1985 1.191 440 26.88 32.01 60.16 71.65 
1986 1.160 444 27.09 31.42 60.64 70.34 
1987 1.125 458 27.96 31.46 62.59 70.42 
1988 1.089 484 29.57 32.20 66.19 72.08 
1989 1.044 511 31.16 32.53 69.75 72.82 
1990 1.000 523 31.92 31.92 71.46 71.46 
1991 0.963 538 32.82 31.60 73.46 70.74 
1992 0.937 545 33.26 31.16 74.44 69.75 
1993 0.917 553 33.74 30.94 75.52 69.25 
1994 0.898 564 34.41 30.90 77.02 69.17 
1995 0.876 585 35.72 31.29 79.96 70.04 
1996 0.856 591 36.04 30.85 80.68 69.06 
1997 0.838 605 36.94 30.96 82.69 69.30 
1998 0.822 613 37.40 30.74 83.72 68.82 
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